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Introduction

"Gettin' no rest till de judgement day"

In October, 1922, the New Orleans Item invited Martin
Behrman, the former mayor and the leader of the Regular
Democratic Organization (RDO), to commit his personal and
public history to writing. For years the Item had been a
relentless and often merciless critic of Behrman and his socalled political machine. In 1920, with the help of an
assortment of anti-Regular reformers, including Governor
John Milliken Parker, and disaffected professional politi
cians, led by John Patrick Sullivan, the Item drove Martin
Behrman and his Regular Democrats from power, ending twenty
years of "ring rule" and electing a reform municipal admin
istration under Mayor Andrew McShane. Now weary of the end
less and pointless bickering and inept administration of the
municipal government under McShane and the commission coun
cil, the Item discovered a grudging appreciation for Mayor
Behrman and his "reform" Regular Democrats.x
Over the course of his discursive, though informative,
writings, Martin Behrman wondered why so many of the readers
and friends of the New Orleans Item opposed him and his

xNew Orleans "Behrman Tells," Item, October 23, 1922.
Paul Capdevielle was the first Regular Democrat elected as
mayor. Behrman succeeded him in 1904, serving four consecu
tive terms as mayor.
1

administration. Behrman believed, with considerable justi
fication, that his administration benefitted the interests
of civic and commercial leadership of the city, providing it
with effective public services and honest, progressive muni
cipal government. He could only surmise that the social and
civic leaders of New Orleans disliked him and his kind of
professional politician and could not abide the idea of
their social inferiors governing New Orleans.2
The dislike of the social and civic elite for profes
sional politicians and the people they represented was
both personal and political, Behrman suggested. The social
civic elites of New Orleans, Behrman asserted, considered
professional politicians uncouth, corrupt, and unfit to
govern. In their view, he wrote, "professional politicians
should not have political power and...public places that
have power should go to gentlemen of literary learning,
students of history, and prominent citizens of large estab
lishments, such as banks, railroads and so forth." It was
their belief that "plain men from less fortunate families
living on the side streets in small houses, men who spent
their whole lives actively in politics, should never be
promoted to positions of power in government." Rather,
Behrman argued, the "silk-stocking" and commercial elites
wanted public office and political power to remain exclu

2John R. Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New Orleans
Memoirs of a City Boss. (Baton Rouge, 1977), 107-08.

sively in their possession, rotating power and position only
among men of their own class, education, and moral and
political persuasion.3
Martin Behrman's description of municipal politics in
New Orleans during the Progressive Era is not without sub
stance or merit. The leading anti-Regular reformers of New
Orleans, men like John M. Parker, Charles Allen Favrot,
Esmond Phelps, James M. Thomson, and Donelson Caffery formed
a self-conscious social and civic elite, bitterly resentful
of its declining political power and the ascendancy of pro
fessional politicians like Martin Behrman. And, despite its
reformist rhetoric and pretensions, it objected to many of
the municipal reforms and policies of the Behrman adminis
tration, in particular the intrusion of the municipal
government in the private and public affairs of business and
industry. This self-styled elite rarely won a municipal
election, but it exerted a profound, though, at times,
detrimental, influence on city politics and the municipal
reform movement. For dispite its complaints, the social and
civic elite retained position and power in the municipal and
parochial governments of New Orleans and it used its posi
tion and power to satisfy its own personal wants and politi
cal interests .*

3Ibid.
■•Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy:
Electoral Reforms in Louisiana, 1894-1921," Louisiana
History, XX (Summer 1979), 247-60.

Admittedly, the principal leadership of the antiRegular municipal reform movement came from the "upper
crust" of Mew Orleans society and its beliefs had a signi
ficant influence on the disposition of anti-Regular reform.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume— and a close read
ing of the historical record does not suggest— that social
prejudice, class distinctions, moral considerations, and
anti-democratic sentiment formed the basis of progressive
municipal reform in New Orleans. Though the Regular Demo
cratic Organization had supporters among the lower working
classes of New Orleans, a recent study has concluded that
there was no clear social, ethnic, or occupational distinc
tions between the leadership of the RDO and the members of
the anti-Regular reform movement, suggesting, perhaps, that
ethno-cultural issues did not determine the content of muni
cipal politics in the Progressive Era.® The Regular Demo
cratic Organization contained men (and women) of all social
classes, economic classifications, educational achievement.

®Edward P. Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern Citv
New Orleans in the Progressive Erar (Ruston, 1988), passim.
Professor Matthew J. Schott suggested in two published
studies and in his doctoral thesis that "social prejudice
and moral considerations" formed the basis of antimachine
progressive reform. But Professor Schott's definition of
progressive reform is too narrow and conventional in light
of the immense historical literature on the Progressive Era.
See Schott, "John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varieties
of American Progressivism," (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1969), passim; "The New Orleans Machine and Pro
gressivism," Louisiana History. XIV (Spring 1983), 141-53;
"Huey Long: Progressive Backlash?," Louisiana History. XXVII
(Spring 1986), 134-35, see footnote 3.

and political persuasion. The Regular Democrats were, in
many ways, more representative of the progressive municipal
reform movement than the civic and commerical elite of New
Orleans. The RDO did not, as has been suggested, "co-optn
progressive reform out of political necessity. Rather, the
Regulars adopted municipal reform out of personal and poli
tical conviction, a devotion to the progressive reform prin
ciples of the Democratic party, and recognition that munici
pal reform was good politics." But it would be a mistake, as
well, to believe that city politics in New Orleans during
the Progressive Era focused principally on the social dif
ferences between working-class politicians, consumed with
local, pedestrian interests and dedicated to democratic
principles, and a civic-commercial elite, dispairing of
democracy and dedicated to efficiency, centralized author
ity, and cosmopolitian issues. The issues and politics of
municipal reform transcended social distinctions, centering
instead on fundamental questions of represenation, the
source and character of political and municipal authority,
and power and ethics.7

"Schott, "The New Orleans Machine," 141-44; Haas,
Political Leadership in a Southern City, 99.
7Richard L. McCormick, "Ethno-Cultural Interpretations
of Nineteenth-Century Voting Behavior," Political Science
Quarterly. 89 (June 1974), 351-77; McCormick, "The Discovery
That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Ori
gins of Progressivism," The American Historical Review. 86
(April 1981), 247-74.

The Regular Democrats and the civic-commercial reform
ers were concerned with the issues of expanding and central
ized municipal authority, regulation of private and public
corporations, completion and expansion of public services,
"living wages" and decent working conditions for organized
labor, equitable taxation and assessment rates for property
holders, and city planning. Though there were (and are)
innumerable social implications in all those issues, social
distinctions in the form of ethnic and religious differences
did not determine why the Regulars and the reformers divided
on those issues."
The answer lies, I believe, in the philosophical, ideo
logical differences between the Regular Democratic Organiza
tion and the reformers. The Regulars and the civic reformers
of New Orleans divided on one of the principal concerns of
the Progressive Era, the demand for a more effective, effi
cient, centralized public authority and the preservation and
expansion of democratic self-government. The division was
never a clear one. As a rule, the RDO did not fear or oppose
centralized municipal authority and, broadly speaking, its
"The conventional view of municipal politics is stated
in several sources. For example, see, Allen P. Sindler,
Huev Long's Louisiana State Politics. 1920-1952. (Baton
Rouge, 1956), passim; George Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans, 1897-1926, (New York, 1936), passim; T. Harry
Williams, Huey Long, (New York, 1969), passim; Alan
Brinkley, Voices of Protest Huev Long. Father Coughlin, and
the Great Depression. (New York, 1982), 15-16. Professor
Brinkley argued that Louisiana politics subsisted on "airy
platitudes, patriotic homilies, barbecues, and country
music".
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efforts to centralize municipal government championed home
rule and preserved democratic institutions. At times,
though, the commitment of the RDO to democratic institu
tions stymied efforts to establish a centralized municipal
government, particularly in its attempts to regulate and
rehabilitate the public utilities industry in New Orleans.
The civic reformers, on the other hand, believed that the
centralization of public power in their hands would promote
efficient municipal government, diminish the influence of
"unwarranted" political considerations, and bring about a
fundamental and just realignment of public and political au
thority. The civic and commercial elites of New Orleans
were never nonpartisans. They, too, sought public power and
political advantage. They advocated centralized municipal
government only when they could control it, characterizing
centralized government under the Regulars as "politicized"
and inefficient.
Personalities, organizations, and specific issues, of
course, also shaped municipal politics in New Orleans in the
Progressive Era. Most students of politics in New Orleans
considered the Regular Democratic Organization the southern
version of the corrupt, urban political machines of the
northeast and midwest. These students portrayed the RDO as a
political organization comprised exclusively of workingclass, parochial politicians, relentless in its pursuit of
patronage and political advantage. These same students de-

pict the Regular Democrats as corrupt and conservative,
allied with the interests of the "vicious class" and the
interests of alien corporations like New Orleans Railway
and Light Company.9
There were, to be sure, members of the RDO who came
from or represented the working class of New Orleans and who
were concerned with "pedestrian" issues. A few owned bar
rooms, drank and smoked heavily, missed Mass on occasion,
and at least two of them had financial (and romantic) in
terests in the infamous red-light district, Storyville. Some
Regulars were, for the most part, unschooled, like Martin
Behrman, others were unprincipled, like John Sullivan, and
more than a few were consumed with political patronage, like
Sullivan, Robert Ewing, and Ulic Burke..But these men and
conditions were the exceptions rather than the rules. Within
the ranks of the RDO, there were many college-educated,
middle- and upper-class business and professional men. Men
like attorneys Joseph Generally, Chandler C. Luzenberg, and
I. D. Moore, businessmen Arthur J. O'Keefe, Edward Lafaye,
William Bess Thompson, and Martin Manion. These men were not
pliable, "shirt front" businessmen lending respectability,
and nothing else, to a corrupt and irresponsible political
machine. Rather, they were leaders of the RDO and executive

"Williams, Huev Long, passim; Brinkely, Voices of Pro
test, 15; Edward F. Haas, DeLesseps S. Morrison and the
Image of Reform New Orleans Politics. 1946-1961. (Baton
Rouge 1974), 8.

members of the municipal government under Martin Behrman,
contributing directly to the political success of the Regu
lars and determining public policy for New Orleans.
Nor were these men and others like them opposed to
municipal reform. Martin Manion, for example, endorsed and
worked for the municipal regulation of the public utilities
industry in New Orleans and advocated woman suffrage. As
Commissioner of Public Property, Edward Lafaye developed a
comprehensive paving plan for New Orleans and forced the New
Orleans Railway and Light Company to reduce its electric
rates and to install "modern" street lighting for the city.
On the whole, the Regular Democrats supported municipal re
form, including the primary election system, the commission
form of government, the regulation of the public utilities
industry (the Behrman administration did not endorse munici
pal ownership, principally because the city could not afford
to purchase NORLC and because municipalization did not guar
antee lower rates and better service), and the centraliza
tion of municipal authority under the commission council.
The RDO was also dedicated to municipal public ser
vices. During Behrman's tenure as mayor, his administration
completed and expanded the sewerage, drainage, and water
system, began and completed a public belt railroad serving
the port of New Orleans, compelled the Board of Liquidation
City Debt, an indepedent commission controlled by the major
bankers of New Orleans, to place city revenues in interest-

10
bearing accounts (something not prescribed by law), initi
ated a comprehensive paving plan, and attempted, though did
not accomplish, the regulation and rehabilitation o£ the New
Orleans Railway and Light Company. The failure to regulate
and rehabilitate the public service industry did not result,
however, from an "unholy alliance" between the Regular Demo
cratic Organization and New Orleans Railway and Light Com
pany. Rather, that failure stemmed from the partisan objec
tions of the civic-commercial elite to municipal regulation
under the RDO and from the reluctance of the Behrman admin
istration to dictate a settlement.
The rehabilitation issue was not the only "failure" of
the Behrman administration. The city administration en
dorsed, though did not profit from, legal vice, fighting
efforts by local citizens and the federal government to
close Storyville, giving substance to accusations that the
RDO was a thoroughly venial and corrupt political machine.
The Regulars were also unable to resolve the city's anti
quated financial and assessment systems, leaving the city
administration without adequate revenues and opening it to
allegations of "politicized" assessment practices and
charges of maladministration of the public money.
In essence, then, despite its many accomplishments, the
Behrman administration could not convince the civic and
commercial leadership of New Orleans that it could govern
effectively and honestly. As a rule, civic reformers be-

11
lieved that the Regular Democrats lacked "popular" support
and governed, as one accomplished scholar noted, "through
a combination of philanthropy and corruption". The civicconunercial reformers accused the RDO of manipulating the
political process, adding thousands of unqualified, even
nonexistent, voters to the rolls, intimidating voters
through its abuse of tax and assessment practices, and "buy
ing" votes with political patronage and favoritism. Above
all else, the civic reformers of New Orleans complained that
the Regular Democrats "politicalized" private and public af
fairs, subjecting private economic interests to public con
trol and regulation and excluding the "better class" of
citizens from public affairs.10
Unwilling to accept their declining political influ
ence, the civic reformers demanded the restructuring of the
municipal government and the realigning of political power
in New Orleans. They demonstrated for the commission council
form of municipal government, preference primary elections,
the appointment of most executive public offices, and re
sisted attempts to eliminate their own positions and powers
on the independent municipal boards and commissions. They
achieved only modest success, but they managed to influence
the structure and content of municipal affairs. Though un^
able to sustain themselves in elected public office, the

xoBrinkley, Voices of Protest. 15; Schott, "John H. Par
ker," passim, "Progressives Against Democracy," passim.
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civic elite retained their near complete hold on the in
dependent municipal and parochial boards. And, contrary to
the conventional understanding, the civic reformers did not
desert politics after every electoral defeat. Rather, they
organized and politicked through the civic and commercial
organizations they controlled, compelling the Behrman admin
istration to temporize its attempts to centralize authority
and to further "politicize" municipal affairs.xx
Despite those accusations and complaints, the Regular
Democrats were genuinely popular, attracting support from
most every segment of the community and generally providing
effective municipal government. Though the Regulars never
willfully or systemactically manipulated the voting rolls
(as the civic reformers attempted), they did contribute to
the "politicalization" of municipal affairs in New Orleans.
They, too, urged the restructuring the municipal government
and the realignment of political power in New Orleans. The
Regular Democratic Organization and the Behrman administra
tion sought greater public authority over the independent
municipal boards, the regulation of private economic af
fairs, and the recognition of diverse political interests in
governing New Orleans. Little wonder, then, that the RDO and
the Behrman administration had few friends among the civic
and commercial elite of New Orleans.

xxSchott, "John M. Parker," passim.

Chapter One

"Where the Elite Meet to Eat"

For Walter Denegre and his friends and associates in
the Good Government League (GGL), the past twelve years in
the political life of New Orleans were bitterly disappoint
ing and terribly confusing.3* In the years since 1900, when
the Regular Democratic Organization (RDO), the so-called
machine, reestablished authority over municipal affairs,
Denegre and other men of similar social and business back
grounds complained openly about their loss of political in
fluence in New Orleans. Though several of them still held
positions of importance in the municipal and parochial
governments, in particular on several independent boards and
commissions, they were, they believed, unable to determine
the content of public policy to their satisfaction.2

Men

like Denegre, John M. Parker, the leader of the GGL, Esmond
Phelps, the Attorney for the New Orleans Daily Picayune,
James Mcllhaney Thomson, the publisher of the New Orleans

1Denegre to John M. Parker, January 28, 1912, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, here
after cited as Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. January
5, 23, March 3, 1912.
2New Orleans Item. June 21, 22, 1911; Matthew James
Schott, "John M. Parker of Louisiana and the Varities of
American Progressivism," (Ph. D. dissertation, Vanderbilt
University, 1969), 111-16; Schott, "Progressives Against
Democracy: Electoral Reform in Louisiana," Louisiana
History. XX (Summer 1979), 247-60.
13
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Item, and Charles Janvier objected to what they called the
"politicalization" of public policy and private affairs. In
public matters, the reformers complained that the "people"
had lost the ability to affect the selection of public offi
cials and to

control the government and determine its poli

cies. In theprivate realm,they wanted to protect
concerns and

private

initiatives from"inimical" political consider

ations.3 In essence they

ob-jected to a system of politics

and a structure of municipal government that, as Samuel P.
Hays wrote, "enabled local and particularistic interests to
dominate" municipal affairs.1* These local and pedestrian
interests, the reformers believed, dominated municipal af
fairs because of the decentralized character of municipal
politics and government The ward system, they argued,
favored parochial interests by giving those interests an
artifical and disproportional advantage on the city council.
The aldermen, too, were men of local and limited vision,
unable and unwilling to speak and work for interests beyond
3Walter Denegre to Parker, March 28, 1903; Charles
Janvier to Parker, October 20, 1903. Paker Papers, UNC.
'•Samuel P. Hays, "The Politics of Reform in Municipal
Government in the Progressive Era," Pacific Northwest Quar
terly, LV (October 1964), 157-69. Professor Hays correctly
identified the source of the discontent of upper-class re
formers like Parker and Denegre, and I have based my assess
ment of their actions on Hays's seminal essay on the sub
ject. However, Hays's claim that the upper-class complaints
formed the basis of municipal reform is incorrect. As J.
Joseph Huthmacher, John D. Buenker, Richard L. McCormick,
David P. Thelen, and others have shown, municipal reform in
the progressive era incorporated more than an upper-class
response to industrialism.
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those of their own neighborhood or district.9 There was no
advantage, either, in politicking to replace one set of
councilmen with another. By definition, ward representation
meant serving local and pedestrian interests. To remedy
their disadvantage, the upper-class reformers sought to re
move the basis of local representation.

"Toward this end,"

wrote Samuel Hays, the upper-class reformers "sought innova
tions in the formal machinery of government which would con
centrate political power by sharply centralizing the pro
cesses of decision-making rather than distribute it through
more popular participation in public affairs."®
In New Orleans, the charter of 1896, conceived and car
ried out in the name of municipal reform, succeeded in re
ducing the number of councilmen, but did not diminish the
importance of local interest in municipal affairs.7 The new
charter continued the standard practice of ward representa
tion, allotting one councilman for each of the seventeen
wards (a later revision increased the number to twenty-one).

9Hays, "The Politics of Reform," 161-62.
®Ibid.. 162-63.
7Joy J. Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age: Politics
and Urban Reform (Baton Rouge,1969), 312-27; Raymond 0.
Nussbaum, Jr., "Progressive Politics in New Orleans,
1896-1900," (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1974),
87-89; Edward P. Haas, "John Fitzpatrick and Political
Continuity in New Orleans, 1896-1899," Louisiana History.
XXII (Winter 1981), 7-29; Administrative Survey of the
Government of the City of New Orleans (New Orleans, 1922),
46-48.
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The charter removed much o£ the council's command over pat
ronage, placing common city officials under civil service,
and creating a civil service commission to administer the
new system. The charter also placed the police and fire de
partments under a separate civil service system and distinct
and independent boards. The reformers managed to enhance the
power and prerogatives of the mayor (an office traditionally
held by men of supposed greater ability and higher social
standing than councilmen8 ), granting him more authority over
the administration of municipal affairs. The charter author
ized the mayor to appoint the commissioners of several exe
cutive departments, creating to some degree a coordinated
and potentially powerful executive branch of city govern
ment .*
The new, more "representative" council, however, re
tained its traditional powers over franchises, budgeting,
finances, and approval over appointments to specific boards,
permitting local political interests to determine the con
tent of some of the more important aspects of municipal
policy. The mayor, too, no matter how independent or power
ful, depended on the council and those it served for the

“Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph Citv Government
in America,
. 1870-1900 (Baltimore and London, 1984), 42-54.
*Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age. 312-27; Nussbaum, "Progressive Politics," 87-89; Henry C. Dethloff,
"Populism and Reform in Louisiana" (Ph.D. dissertation, Uni
versity of Missouri, 1964), 300-01.
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practical and political authority to execute his office.
Even in a system that centralized power into fewer hands,
there was always the danger that truly essential services
and obligations could be "politicalized" beyond the reach
of the upper-class reformers.
Beginning in the 1880s, then, the city's reform estab
lishment convinced the state legislature to create boards
and commissions, independent of the municipal government and
removed from public, political considerations, to govern the
development, distribution, and funding of such essential
services as debt liquidation, water, drainage, health, levee
protection, and the management of the Port of New Orleans.
These boards had funding independent of the city council and
administration. And, as Jon C. Teaford has shown, "the com
missioners who expended these funds could act almost en
tirely without regard for public opinion, since they served
for life [or a term beyond that of any elected official] and
owed their appointment to their colleagues on the commission
and not to any elected offical."xo And, as Teaford has also
shown for New Orleans and other American cities, the civiccommerical elite dominated these boards, allowing only the
mayor or some other executive officer to serve as ex officio
members. "Free from the pressures of the public or
politics," Teaford wrote, these independent boards and
x °Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, 66-82, quota
tion on 70-71.
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commissions attempted to conduct the public business "in
accord with their own perceptions of the public interest."X1
Despite these apparent advantages, the upper-class re
formers were unable to determine public policy free of "po
litical" considerations. There were several reasons why.
First, the charter reforms and the special legislation
creating the independent boards and commissions did not cen
tralize municipal administration. To the contrary, the muni
cipal reforms of the 1880s and 1890s recognized what Jon C.
Teaford called a "complex framework of redistributed author
ity and balanced power." This new arrangement permitted for
"greater centralization and continuing neighborhood power,
for coordination as well as fragmentation."12 Under this
framework, the council remained the principal forum for lo
cal concerns, distributing services and favors to those at
the so-called local level. No longer in a ceremonial posi
tion, the mayor became a true executive, possessing author
ity and power to determine policy and compel compliance with
that policy. The urban elite retained immense influence over
vital services and concerns, often free of political consid
erations. Yet, the municipal framework satisfied no one be
cause it accomodated everyone. And it began to fall apart

“ Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, 68-77, quotation on
76.
“ Ibid. . 81.
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when services were no longer local and power no longer
centralized within separate spheres of interests.13
Second, though the reformers were able to reshape the
structure of government, they were never truly able to read
just the complex structures of urban politics. Throughout
the 1890s and into the twentieth century, electoral reforms
designed to reduce and hamper the voters managed to further
"democratize1* urban politics and government, much to the
dismay of the upper-class urban progressives who advocated
them.1*

In particular, the direct (and in the South, white

and partisan) primary helped restore faith in the political
party system. The direct primary, coming in the first decade
of the twentieth century, complemented earlier electoral re
form measures, dispelling the image of the party as the ad
vocate of vested interests. Indeed, supporters of the direct
primary saw it as a "remedy" for the corrupt political in
fluence of special interests, a way of "re-enfranchising"
the people.13 The political parties, particularly at the
local level, became everything to everybody, defining par
tisanship on the basis of shared interests.1®

13Ibid.. 9, 80-82.
1*Matthew J. Schott, "Progressives Against Democracy,"
247-GO.
lsRichard L. McCormick, "The Discovery that Business
Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism," 267, 269.
lsMcCormick, "The Discovery that Business Corrupts Poli
tics," 250-51, 269-70.
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Third, by definition, reformers like Denegre and Parker
shared few interests with the common voter or politician,
especially their notions of politics and, in particular,
government. In the years after 1900, Americans redefined
their concept of government and the role it played in their
lives. According to Robert H. Wiebe, after 1900, Americans
wanted a government "broadly and continuously involved in
society's operations."XT The new politics assumed a govern
ment vested with broad, flexible powers, capable of respond
ing to the demands of modern urban life. Good government,
Wiebe wrote, meant efficient government "not a handful of
honest men on low salaries; a rational electorate presup
posed the eventual inclusion of all citizens, instead of its
restriction to one class; civil service promised increasing
government service...rather than its further withdrawal; di
rect democracy no longer replaced government...but strength
ened it; and the harmonious society, now usually composed of
interacting groups instead of isolated individuals, depended
upon government's presence not its absence."XB
Finally, municipal reform was not limited to the con
cerns of Parker and the other "political" reformers in the
Good Government League. Several reformers within the GGL
urged the League to endorse reforms concerning corporate re-

17Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New
York, 1967), 160; McCormick, "The Discovery that Business
Corrupts Politics," 251.
“ Wiebe, The Search for Order. 161.
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gulation, woman suffrage, income tax, and workmen's compen
sation.3-9 But even moire important, municipal reform was not
restricted to New Orleans's upper-class establishment. Many
Regular Democrats, including those in the city government,
advocated the restructuring of municipal affairs, expanding
of popular participation in government, curbing the excesses
of corporate influence in city politics. In a different
sense, these men, too, were distressed and confused about
political circumstances in New Orleans. The structural revi
sions of the 1890s and 1900s divided and diluted the power
of the municipal government. By 1910, eighteen distinct
boards and commissions formed part of the municipal govern
ment of New Orleans. According to one survey of the munici
pal government, the board system encouraged "inefficiency"
and delay in public service and allowed those who controlled
it to escape "accountability" and "criticism and

blame".20

Martin Behrman, the incumbent mayor and the leader of the
RDO, believed that several boards, in particular the

Board

of Liquidation City Debt, the Board of Commissioners of the
Port of New Orleans, and the Public Belt Railroad Commis
sion, represented more the private concerns of their members
than the public interest. Behrman did not want to dismantle
the board system. Rather, the mayor sought to bring it under
greater municipal control. To that end, Behrman proposed
X9Schott, "John M. Parker," 112-15.
2°Administrative Survey of the Government of the Citv of
New Orleans. 59.
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consolidating the boards under the mayor's office and en
acting a home rule charter for New Orleans, permitting the
city to determine its own development and reform itself.21
Faced with opposition from various interests (public and
private), Behrman failed to achieve either reform.
The same political reforms that furthered the democra
tizing of the political processes in New Orleans also fur
thered the decline of the existing party system, as citizens
and special interests found ways other than voting to influ
ence the government. "Interests organizations took over much
of parties' old job of articulating popular demands and
pressing them on the government," writes Richard L. McCor
mick. "More exclusive and single-minded than parties, the
new organizations became regular elements of the polity."
"The result," McCormick concludes, "was a fairly drastic
transformation of the rules of political participation: who
could compete, the kinds of resources required, and the re
wards of participation all changed." The formulation of pub
lic policy also changed, requiring the government to "take
explicit account of clashing interests and to assume the re
sponsibility for mitigating their conflicts through regula
tion, administration, and planning.” The government of the
City of New Orleans was, as things stood in 1911, unable to

21Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman. 169-73; Teaford, The Un
heralded Triumph. 105-22; Bradley Robert Rice, Progressive
Cities The Commission Government Movement in America. 19011920 (Austin and London, 1977) xii.
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accomodate these changes and new requirements. But both the
reformers of the GGL and the reformers of the RDO seemed
poised for reform— even if they had to use the words and
tactics of the old politics.22

Late in May, 1911, as the cooler and dryer days of
spring gave way to the repressive heat and humidity of sum
mer, the leading contenders (and pretenders) for governor
gathered in New Orleans seeking support or encouragement
from the GGL and RDO. Neither faction could settle on a
suitable candidate. The most appealing candidate was Con
gressman Joseph Eugene Ransdell, but Ransdell parried every
attempt or device to make him a candidate for governor. He
wanted nothing to do with Louisiana's intramural and vola
tile politics.23
If Ransdell did not want to be governor, there were
many other Democrats who did. Among them was the long-time
Regular Democrat and the incumbent Secretary of State, John
T. Michel. Michel was the leader of the Thirteenth Ward in

22McCormick, "The Discovery that Business Corrupts Poli
tics," 250-51, 269-70; "The Party Period and Public Policy:
An Exploratory Hypothesis," Journal of American History, 66,
(September 1979), 279-98.
23George Q. Flynn, "A Louisiana Senator and the Underwood
Tariff," Louisiana History. X (Winter 1969), 5-6; Schott,
"John M. Parker," 122-64. Ransdell declined the nomination
so he could run for the United States Senate. Ransdell de
feated the aging incumbent senator, Murphy James Foster.
Ransdell held his Senate seat until 1930 when Huey Pierce
Long defeated him. See T. Harry Williams, Huev Long (New
York, 1969), 460-80.
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New Orleans, a minor political subdivison situated in the
lowest part of the city. Michel's tenure as Secretary of
State was hardly noteworthy. He was, as one scholar noted,
the epitome of the second-class politician, possessing all
of the vices of political popularity and none of the virtues
of concerned public service. He was unaccustomed to serious
campaigning and virtually inarticulate on public issues. He
too was, from all indications, uncomfortable with the senti
ments and intentions of "progressive reform" in Louisiana,
oblivious to the social and political changes within the
state since the 1890s. Apparently, Michel believed that he
could become governor by securing as many "public" endorse
ments as possible, convincing voters of his fitness and com
pelling other candidates to withdraw from the race. Michel
simply misunderstood the temper of politics in Louisiana. As
we have already noted, the political and electoral reforms
of the 1890s and 1900s had furthered the democratizing of
state and local politics. No longer did the convention
bosses— urban or rural— dictate the calibre of candidates or
determine the choice of issues. Those days in Louisiana and
New Orleans had given way to a more pluralistic and democra
tic form and style of politics.2-*

2-*Dethloff, "Populism and Reform," 121-54, 320-63;
Schott, "John M. Parker," 39-121, 242-76, 317-46, 466-95;
Joseph G. Tregle, "Another Look at Shugg's Louisiana,"
Louisiana History. XVII (Summer 1976), 245-81.
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Despite these misgivings and misconceptions, Michel
persited in his attempts to win support from the organized
political powers in the state. In June, 1911, anxious for a
visible sign of support, Michel demanded a meeting with the
leaders of the RDO and Governor Jared Young Sanders. They
met at the Grunewald Hotel in downtown New Orleans. Michel
insisted on a formal endorsement, but several Regulars, in
cluding Mayor Behrman and Robert Ewing, the owner of the New
Orleans Daily States and the Shreveport Times, considered
Michel's chances of victory remote. Ewing suggested that
Michel, like other potential candidates, test his popularity
in rural north Louisiana, where the balance of power resided
in state politics, before asking the RDO to commit itself
to his candidacy. Michel insisted, however, that he be given
some assurances of organized support, particularly in New
Orleans, before undertaking a statewide campaign. After sev
eral more hours of discussion and disagreement. Mayor Behr
man agreed to campaign for Michel, but only within the city.
Ewing refused to endorse Michel, seeing no discernible ad
vantage in supporting a nondescript "ward boss" from New Or
leans for governor.23
Though Robert Ewing saw no political advantage in sup
porting Michel, Martin Behrman clearly did. As a resident of
29New Orleans Item. June 18, 23, September 2, October
11, November 9, 10, 11, 1911, January 29, 1912. Ewing
endorsed Superintendent of Education James B. Aswell, who
finished last in the governor's campaign of 1911-1912. Jared
Young Sanders remained silent during the campaign.

New Orleans, Michel was familiar to the voters and politi
cians of the city. Despite his obvious liabilities as a can
didate outside New Orleans (a Roman Catholic from New Or
leans had not been governor since 1880), Michel could at
tract a sizeable vote within New Orleans, aiding the other
Regular candidates for state offices and displaying the vot
ing strength of the city and the popularity of the RDO. With
Michel as their candidate, the Regulars could fashion his
platform and conduct his campaign to suit the concerns and
interests of the city administration, emphasizing its com
mitment to progress and municipal— not partisan— reform.
Mayor Behrman saw the state elections as a referendum on his
administration and its brand of municipal reform. Behrman
and the Regulars did not want to surrender those initiatives
to John M. Parker and the Good Government League. Michel's
candidacy gave Behrman and the Regulars the opportunity to
display their appeal to the citizens of New Orleans and to
establish their claim to the mantle of municipal reform.26
John Parker and other members of the GGL also saw the
state elections as a prelude to the municipal campaign. The
old-line reformers believed that the "machine" dominated the
political life of New Orleans by controlling state and muni

26I have based this assessment of Behrman's actions and
reasoning on a study of Michel's platform and the Regulars'
campaign in New Orleans from September 1911 to January 1912.
See also Robert Webb Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and
Political Boss of New Orleans, 1904-1926" (M.A. thesis,
Tulane University, 1952), 34-35.
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cipal patronage, violating state registration and voting
laws, and falsely identifying itself with the principles of
direct democracy and the Democratic party.27 Since state law
and state officials underwrote these advantages, it was es
sential to the League's understanding of municipal reform to
control state government.2® A friendly reform governor could
withdraw patronge from the machine and order the purging of
the "animated voting rolls". With the help of the governor
and a willing state legislature, the GGL could realign city
politics by restructuring the municipal government along
prescribed lines and by eliminating the partisan primary.
With all these reforms in place, the GGL's candidates for
municipal office could easily defeat any "ring" ticket, as
suring efficient and honest government for the city and
eliminating all undue political considerations from the con
duct of municipal and private affairs.
Finding acceptable candidates for governor and the
state legislature and eliminating the political advantages
of the ring were not simple tasks. No one in the leadership
27Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker
Papers, UNC; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16; "Progressives
Against Democracy," 247-60; "The New Orleans Machine and
Progressivism," Louisiana History. XXIV (Spring 1983), 14153.
2aSince the Unification Movement of the 1870s, New Or
leans reformers considered winning state elections an indis
pensable to reform in New Orleans. T. Harry Williams, "The
Louisiana Unification Movement of 1873," Journal of Southern
History. XI (August 1945), 349-69. For a more recent and
considered interpretation, see Michael Perman, The Road to
Redemption Southern Politics. 1869-1879 (Chapel Hill, 1984),
154-55, 158.
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of the GGL, including John Parker, had any true practical
experience in the electoral politics of the state, and no
one in the ranks seemed inclined to seek public office.29
The League leadership, by necessity, had to look outside its
membership to find suitable reform candidates for governor
and, in several cases, for the state legislature, an expe
diency not lost on the RDO and the voters of New Orleans. In
May, 1911, John Parker and others of the GGL leadership met
with Luther E. Hall, an associate justice of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, a promising candidate for governor from north
Louisiana. After several days of discussion and delibera
tion, the executive committee of the GGL (Parker and certain
select members) tendered its endorsement to Hall. Hall, who
had also met with Governor Sanders and "representatives" of
the RDO, accepted the support of the GGL without hesitation,
but, at the same time, he asserted his own independence and
self-sufficiency. He would, he said, accept the portions of
the League platform as his own, but he would not exclude or
purge other Democrats from his administration or assault

29Jean Gordon to Parker, January 28, 1911, Parker Papers,
UNC. Gordon and her sister Kate were the leaders of several
"progressive” reform movements, including woman suffrage,
child labor, and prohibition. According to Matthew Schott,
the Gordons and other upper-class reformers within the so
cial justice movement turned to Parker and the GGL because
the RDO would not respond to their pleas for moral reforms
and because these reformers harbored social and religious
biases against the Regulars and those they served. Schott,
"John M. Parker," 118-19.
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"home rule" in New Orleans.30 Intelligent and well-spoken.
Hall was a seasoned and adroit campaigner and, above all
else, a skilled politician. In accepting the nomination of
the GGL and endorsing its platform, Hall stood for progres
sive reform in state and local governments. In welcoming the
support of every variety of Democrat, including the New Or
leans Regulars, Hall broadened the notion of municipal
reform beyond the stilted, partisan constraints placed on it
by reformers like John M. Parker.3X
Though the two major candidates differed vastly in
background, temperament, and ability, their platforms were,
to some degree, remarkably similar. The GGL and the RDO both
advocated a professional, "businesslike" approach to the
administration of state and local governments; a general
reduction in the size of expenditures; elimination of "use
less, unnecessary jobs" and dual office holding; the separa
tion of politics from education; extending the right of suf
frage to women on matters of taxation, education, and social
welfare issues; constructing a modern system of roads and
highways; and permitting local option on the use of alcoho
lic beverages. The League and the Regulars recognized the

3°New Orleans Item. June 1, July 27 and 29, 1911; Schott,
"John H. Parker," 112. In his political memoirs, Martin
Behrman claimed that Hall and Parker were too different in
their politics and temperaments for their political alliance
to last. See Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman. 259-65.
3XNew Orleans Item. June 21, 22, July 4, 1911; Walter
E. Burke and others, Luther E. Hall," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly. VI (January 1923), 46-55.
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need for a wholesale revision of state laws regulating the
incorporation and behavior of public utility and private in
dustry corporations. To that end, both factions recommended
stricter lobbying laws, hoping to remove or at least temper
theinfluence of

corporations on politics and government.

Finally, the two sides agreed on the need to reform state
laws and practices regarding taxation and assessment.32
Despite the apparent agreement on the ends of reform,
the

Regualrs and the GGL disagreed on the means and sub

stance of reform. For Parker and the League, businesslike
government meant more than installing "sound" accounting
procedures or remodeling the city government to resemble the
modern, bureaucratic corporation. As we have seen, it meant
a fundamental restructuring of political power in Mew Or
leans and redefining the ends of government to meet their
concept of the public welfare. In its platform, the GGL
called for a constitutional amendment subjecting all elec
ted public officials to the direct recall of the voters. As
the Item explained to its readers, the recall was fundamen
tal to establishing "genuine democracy" in Louisiana and in
New Orleans. The recall, its proponents claimed, allowed the
people (in this case thirty percent of the registered
voters) to rid themselves of corrupt and incompetent public
officials, irrespective of the artifical restraints of
32New Orleans Item, 18, 28, June 1, 13, 21, 22, July 8,
September 2, 3, 15, October 12 and 18, November 12, Decem
ber 22, 1911; January 3, 4, 10, 13, 17, 1912.
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partisanship. The recall, like the initiative and the refer
endum, would, the reformers contended, "re-enfranchise" the
people, giving the public direct control over the conduct of
public officials and the government.33
The League also wanted to end the sordid relationship
between politics and business, believing that politics cor
rupted business. The GGL platform called, then, for enacting
a corrupt practices act, prohibiting candidates from promis
ing jobs for votes and compelling candidates to disclose the
size and source of all campaign contributions. The League
assured the public that a corrupt practices act would break
the "unholy alliance" between the the RDO and "alien" cor
porations like New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the
Cumberland Telephone and Telegraph Company.
As a final consideration, the GGL urged the adoption of
a commission council charter for New Orleans. The commission
system, the Leaguers argued, would guarantee greater effi
ciency in government and more direct accountability from pu
blic officials. Charter revision alone, however, would not
restore integrity to public affairs. Political reform must
3 Progressive reformers did not agree on the worth of
direct legislation. Some reformers claimed that direct demo
cracy legislation permitted too few people to harass or re
move officials for partisan or trivial reasons. Others
believed direct democracy laws meaningless, too cumbersome
to be effective. See Rice, Progressive Cities. 73-76; Lloyd
Sponholtz, "The Intiative and Referendum: Direct Democracy
in Perspective, 1898-1920," American Studies. 14 (Fall
1973), 43-64.
3“,New Orleans Item, June 2, December 1, 1911, January 10,
12-14, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16.
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accompany the restructuring of the municipal government. The
commission system, then, must accomodate and promote politi
cal reform by concentrating political power in the proper
hands and removing many unwarranted public considerations
from the conduct of municipal administration. The reformers
found that accomodation in the nonpartisan primary, a device
designed to excise the advantages of party identification.39
The Regulars, too, wanted a more efficient, central
ized municipal government, one that also anticipated a re
formulation of political authority and public power. Their
platform called for the consolidation of the special boards
and commissions under the city government and for a home
rule charter for the city. For Behrman and the Regulars
(Michel had little to say about the platform or campaign in
New Orleans), these issues were the essence of municipal
reform. Unless the city could free— or at least loosen— the
grip of private concerns on public matters, it could never
plan and manage its own development. In this regard, the
issue of dual office holding takes on greater clarity and
significance. Several Regulars held elective state position
and also served in some capacity in the municipal govern
ment. For example, attorney George Terriberry was a member
of the Louisiana State House of Representatives from New
Orleans and served as the general counsel for the Board
39New Orleans Item, September 17, 1911; Schott, "Progres
sives Against Democracy," 254-57; Rice, Progressive Cities.
76-77.
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of Assessors (a board composed of the seven elected asses
sors of Orleans Parish). Representative James O'Connor was
the chief clerk for the Commissioner of Police and Public
Buildings. The Item and the GGL contended that the Regulars
wanted to end the practice of "double dipping" in order to
attract more men into their ranks.
Martin Behrman did not deny that the RDO would benefit
from prohibiting dual office holding, but he also asserted
that dual office holding created an inherent conflict of in
terest, especially for members of the independent boards and
commissions, pointing out that "dual office holding" cut
across partisan, occupational, and class lines. Bernard MeCloskey, the chief counsel for New Orleans Railway and
Light, was the general counsel for the Board of Commission
ers of the Port of New Orleans (the Dock Board) where his
brother, Hugh McCloskey, the president of the utility, was
the chairman of the board. Robert M. Walmsley, a bitter op
ponent of the city administration and president of the Loui
siana National Bank, was the chairman of the Board of Liqui
dation City Debt. Through these and other public positions,
Behrman argued, private men dominated important aspects of
public policy, often without any effective measure of public

36It was not unusual for state legislators to hold two
public jobs. The legislature met only once every two years
and state government, like municipal administration, was
only then becoming a professional occupation. See Jon C.
Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 98-102.

34
control.3-7
The city administration also favored greater regulation
of business, especially banking and utilities, but the Regu
lars wanted the authority to emanate from the city charter
and not state law. Too often in the past, the Regulars com
plained, special, private interests manipulated the state
legislature into circumventing municipal authority. The en
actment of a home rule charter, the Regulars said, would en
able the city government to regulate its own interests free
of undue state and private interference.30 The enactment of
nonpartisan primary, however, would allow special, private
interests to continue their domination over the city polity.
No other single issue more clearly separated and dis
tinguished the two rival factions than the issue of nonpar
tisan elections. Electoral politics in Louisiana, as else
where in the South, operated under the direct party primary
system. John Parker and the GGL saw the partisan primary as
the epitome of machine politics. In their view, it favored
the local professional politicians, catering to the parochi
al interests they served and permitting the intemperate and
unlettered voters to govern the course of public considera
tions. nIf the people of New Orleans don't want nonpartisan
election(s)," Parker remarked in 1912, then, "we've lost
37New Orleans Item. June 2, 1911.
3BNew Orleans Item. June 21, 22, 1911, January 13,
1912. For an account of the often misunderstood relationship
between the state legislature and the city government in
this period, see Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 83-131.
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everything we've been fighting for."3®
By contrast, the Regulars favored the direct partisan
primary for obvious political reasons. The primary system
placed a premium on organization, particularly at the neigh
borhood level where the Regulars were especially strong and
and local interests best defined. The direct primary system,
its proponents contended, favored popular politics, making
the candidates, the parties, and the government more respon
sive to the "will of the people". There was as well, advo
cates said, a residual benefit to the direct primary system.
They saw the primary as a means of curbing private influence
and power over public affairs. And, in the Deep South, the
party of Jefferson and Jackson, Bryan and Wilson stood as
the party against private privilege and interests. Any
attempt to dismantle the primary system, then, suggested the

39Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. June 22, 1911, January 10,
11, and 12, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16 (quota
tion from 111); "Progressives Against Democracy," 254-57;
"The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 141-53.
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return of municipal government by distant, private inter
ests .
Both platforms expressed the essential demands (and limi
tations) of political reform in the progressive era. Both
factions sought to concentrate power in administrative hands
and to expand the power and scope of the municipal govern
ment beyond the considerations of conventional politics.
Both sought to end the decentralized character of municipal
government and to end the factionalism that characterized
city politics. The GGL believed it could achieve both de
mands by eliminating local and partisan considerations from
public affairs. The Regulars thought they could attain
their version of municipal reform by removing the influence
of "private" interests from public considerations. But the
demands of the modern urban environment— sanitation, health,
police and fire protection, gas, electricity, mass transit,
and a host of other services— blurred the distinctions
between local and municipal issues, partisan and nonpartisan
considerations, and public and private good. The considera*°For an insightful interpretation of the "political"
significance of the direct primary in the context of the
progressive era, see McCormick, "The Discovery that Business
Corrupts Politics," 265-67. For an account of the Democratic
party under Bryan and Wilson, see John Milton Cooper, Jr.,
The Warrior and the Priest Woodrow Wilson and Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1983),12029. According to Professor Cooper, the Democratic party
under Wilson ascribed to a two-part political philosophy.
The first tenet called for the Democratic party to enlist in
the cause of "modern service" to the public. The second
principle acknowledged the party's traditional faith in the
people's ability to govern.
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tion of these issues, however, waited on the conventional
consideration of politics as usual.

In New Orleans, the League's first appeal to conven
tional politics was to the district attorney of Orleans
Parish, J. St. Clair Adams. In February, 1911, nearly a year
before the state elections, John Parker wrote to Adams
urging him to empanel a special grand jury to investigate
registration and election fraud in New Orleans. "Election
fraud," wrote Parker, "strikes at the very foundation of de
cent government, and your hearty support in the vigorous
prosecution of clear cases of violating the sanctity of the
ballot will be productive of the great good to the City [New
Orleans] and the State." Adams replied that indictments and
prosecutions required specific evidence of violations of ex
isting laws. Parker assured Adams that such evidence existed
and that the GGL would furnish him with the particulars.43The existing registration law, passed in 1908 under the ad
ministration of Governor Jared Young Sanders, permitted
political parties or recognized "political organizations" to
canvass the registration rolls and, if warranted, to compel
the Registrar of Voters to erase the name of citizens who

“ Parker to Adams March 15, 28, 1911, John Milliken
Parker Papers, Department of Archives, Dupre Library, Uni
versity of Southwestern Louisiana, hereafter cited as
Parker Papers, USL. Parker to Adams, February 14 and April
21, 1911, Adams to Parker, February 15, 1911, Parker Papers,
UNC.
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had forfeited the right to vote or who had been "fraudulent
ly and illegally registered". Armed with this law, which ap
plied exclusively to Orleans Parish, the GGL set out to
prove the Regulars guilty of fraud.
In April, 1911, Parker and H. Dickson Bruns, the Lea
gue's resident expert on matters of registration and voting
laws, hired Joseph F. Markey, an "irregular" politician from
the Third Ward, to scour the voting rolls for fraudulent and
improper registrations. After nearly two months of daily in
vestigations at the Registrar's office, Markey furnished
Parker with his "preliminary findings". Markey reported that
he and his staff had inspected nearly 50,000 registration
cards and applications and had "unearthed" over 3,000 in
stances of improper and illegal registrations. Markey admit
ted, however, that he could find no pattern to the obvious
"fraud" he had detected. Many of the violations centered on
voters who had moved within the precinct, ward, or parish
and had failed to inform the Registrar's office of their
change of address. What Markey found, however, was a bewil
dering degree of duplication in the parish's records, a pat
tern of performance not uncommon in most bureaucracies. Des
pite of the clutter and duplications, the public record
showed that the Regulars were routinely honest regarding re-

■*2Act 98 of 1908, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of
the State of Louisianaf 1908.
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gistration. In other words, there was no "cemetary" or "redlight district" vote as Parker had believed— or hoped.*3
More to the point, there was a relaxed attitude at the
Registrar's office toward the literacy and property require
ments that were the substance of Louisiana's registration
laws. Whether this attitude constituted willful, premedita
ted fraud is problematic, but Parker and the GGL assumed
that it did. Parker wrote to Registrar of Voters William P.
Ball, accusing him and his staff of violating the 1908 reg
istration act. "Your records show," Parker wrote, "very many
of [the] application blanks filled out by the clerks in your
office or by others and signed in [an] entirely different
[hand]writing, and evidently by some other person." Clearly,
Parker asserted, these transgressions were grounds for eras
ing the names of those registrants from the rolls. If the
Registrar's office did not correct this disgraceful situa
tion, he said, the League would "exact and take our full
rights according to the law." The usually temperamental and
fiesty Ball, a former police reporter, remained indifferent
to the League's taunts until Parker and Markey released
their findings to the press. Ball then accused the GGL of
fabricating "fraudulent" records in an attempt to smear the
Regulars and their candidates. Ball told reporters that
Markey and his staff of "vigilantes" interfered with the
registration of many citizens and demoralized the public
*3Markey to Parker, June 26, 1911 Parker Papers, UNC.
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with "loose talk" in the press about rampant fraud and
imminent erasures. If the League had any evidence of
systematic fraud. Ball asked, why did it not present its
evidence before the District Attorney for Orleans Parish.44
The same doubts about the propriety and legality of the
League's canvass circulated among some of other leaders of
the GGL. Esmond Phelps, Charles Payne Fenner, Edwin T. Mer
rick, and Joseph W. Carroll asked the Attorney General of
Louisiana, Walter Guion, to explain, in laymen's terms, what
constituted fraud under the registration law; what was the
proper and legal method of removing names from the voting
rolls; and what safeguards existed to prevent the manipula
tion of the Registrar's records for partisan reasons.43
Guion replied with a trite recital of the various provisions
of the 1908 act, neither answering the Leaguers' questions
nor providing them with proper counsel. From William Ball's
perspective, though, there was no question of the inequities
built into the act. According to Ball, the act permitted
political mercenaries like Markey and Bruns to "attest" to
suppossed irregularities and improprieties on the part of
44Parker to Ball, May 21, 1911, Parker Papers, USL; New
Orleans Item. August 11, 12, 14, 1911; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. December 8, 1911. The League's leadership did not
limit its actions to removal of voters. According to the
newspaper accounts, the GGL urged Lily-White Republicans to
switch parties for the state and municipal elections. Parker
also called on Registrar Ball to give "galvanized" Democrats
preference over new Democratic registrants. New Orleans
Item, July 11, 12, 1911, January 2, 7, 1912; Parker to
Jared Young Sanders, April 6, 1911, Parker Papers, USL.
4SNew Orleans Item, August 14, 1911.
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registrants and the Registrar's office without furnishing
any evidence of fraud or nonfeasance. With the help of a
compliant, partisan Registrar, any political group could re
move voters from the rolls without the guarantee of judicial
review. The law placed the burden of proof on the voter, and
not on the canvasser. It required any voter whose name was
marked for removal to provide the Registrar with affidavits
from two bona fide voters testifying to the canvasser's er
ror. If the canvasser challenged the affidavits, the voter
could seek a ruling from the Civil District Court, where the
voter paid the costs regardless of the court's decision. The
expense and inconvenience involved in these proceedings.
Ball said, needlessly taxed the resources of the parish and
tested the patience of the voters.*6
The good government partisans, of course, saw matters
differently. In their view, the Regulars used lax registra
tion procedures, escape clauses, and assistance provisions
to swell their majorities at the polls. The assistance pro
vision of the primary election law, the GGL argued, was a
graphic example of the RDO's abuse of the electoral system
for its own partisan advantages. The Regulars contended that
any voter, even one registered under the education clause,
could seek and receive assistance in marking his ballot. The
46New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 8, 1911, January
6, 7, 1912; New Orleans Item. November 28, December 11,
12, 20, 1911. Markey and Bruns claimed that the GGL would
remove between 10,000 and 15,000 names from the rolls. The
GGL succeeded in removing only 200 names.

League, naturally, disputed this claim and asked the Attor
ney General for an opinion on the matter. Guion responded
with an opinion that sustained the Regulars. Any voter re
gistered under the education clause, he said, could seek and
receive assistance in filling out his ballot. The question,
the Attorney General wrote, was not whether a voter could
read or write, but whether he was making a truthful state
ment when he claimed he needed assistance. District Attorney
Adams disagreed with Guion*s opinion, arguing that only a
physically impaired voter could ask for assistance at the
polls, and that he intended to prosecute anyone who violated
the assistance clause or any other provision of the primary
election law.4-7
Though John Parker and the GGL welcomed Adams's assis
tance, Parker and the anti-machine reformers preferred a
more direct and an immediate remedy to the "illicit" advan
tages enjoyed by the Regulars. According to Parker, the RDO
enjoyed an unfair advantage at the polls. Michel and the
other "ring" candidates for state office had over four hun
dred clerks and commissioners serving them at the polls, the
protection of the city administration, and the clout of the
Regular Democratic Organization at their disposal. With
these and other favorable considerations, Parker said, the
Regulars could distort the returns, depriving the League of
*7New Orleans Item. December 12, 1911, January 24, 25,
February 2, 3, 9, 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January
18, 20, 22, 1912.

victory in the state and municipal elections. Since party
practices and policy assured the Regulars' advantages, the
GGL would have to seek protection on the streets and at the
polling places themselves.40
Two days before the state elections, the GGL published
an advertisement in the newspapers, with Parker's name at
tached to it, calling for armed volunteers to stand ready to
guarantee a fair count and a League victory. Though he had
neither written nor signed the message, Parker later agreed
to its wording and sentiment. Speaking to the press, Parker
told Mayor Behrman that no civil or constitutional authority
could deny any American the "right" to carry his rifle or
shotgun in full public view. The GGL, he said, stood ready—
in the extreme— to ensure and assure an honest vote, a fair
count, and the proper expression of the people's will.4*
Mayor Martin Behrman found the entire episode (indeed,
the GGL's entire campaign) misguided and pernicious. Con
cerns about voting fraud were unjustified and an indication,
he said, of the emptiness of the GGL's campaign in New
Orleans. Rather than discussing its platform or debating its
differences with the RDO, the GGL resorted to vilification.
There was no reason, Behrman remarked, to anticipate any
irregularities or violence at the polls, and he expected

■•"Polling booths were literally on the sidewalks— ban
quettes in New Orleans parlance.
49New Orleans Item. January 9, 10, 18, 23, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. January 10, 24, 1912.

nothing less than an honest election and a fair count. How
ever, as mayor, he would not permit armed vigilantes to roam
the streets of New Orleans under the pretense of guarding
the sanctity of the ballot. The GGL, the mayor said, de
signed its campaign "to stir up bitterness and strife" in
the city, masking the shallowness of its version of munici
pal reform and concealing its inner desperation. The mayor
assured the voters of New Orleans that the city administra
tion was capable of protecting its citizens and conducting
a peaceful and honest election without resorting to armed
irregulars roving the streets. Unlike the GGL, Behrman
asserted, the RDO did not revel in personal attacks, appeal
to class prejudice, or ignore the contents of its own plat
form. Instead, he said, the RDO spoke to the issues of muni
cipal reform and administrative experience and competence.90
The Regulars did conduct a credible, though limited,
campaign, hardly bothering to mention their candidate or
pertinent state issues. By design the Regulars focused on
local, state, and party elections, campaigning almost exclu
sively among the numerous precinct and ward organizations,
neighborhood improvement associations, union halls, and
business and professional societies that characterized city
life and politics in the second decade of the twentieth cen
tury. The Regulars perforce concentrated on municipal

"Ibid.
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issues. They campaigned on twelve years of tangible accom
plishments, stressing their role in the development of the
sewerage, water, and drainage system, public ownership and
regulation of essential city services, the return of "fis
cal integrity" in the city government, better fire and
police protection, improvements in health and santitation, a
greater degree of home rule for the city, and the restora
tion of the port. By contrast, they depicted the GGL as in
experienced in municipal affairs and as "partisan" re
formers, concerned foremost with preserving and extending
their own advantages and only coincidentially concerned with
municipal reform.91
The League dubbed the RDO's campaign as provincial and,
of course, partisan. As the results in New Orleans bore out,
however, the Regulars' campaign reached more people and ad
dressed more concerns than the League's quixotic campaign
against registration fraud and assistance clause violations.
In Orleans Parish, Michel (the lost man in the campaign)
benefitted from the RDO's intelligent campaigning and exten
sive organization. Outside the city, though, where voter in
terest was equally high and superbly motivated, Michel suf
fered from the RDO's reputation as a big-city machine. In
the city, eighty percent of the registered voters went to
the polls without incident or provocation. Michel received
slNew Orleans Item, June 22, July 1, September 24, 1911;
New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 6, 11, 12, 15, 1912;
Schott, "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism," 144.

23,694 votes in New Orleans, an impressive sixty percent of
the vote. Michel had a majority in 111 of the 144 precincts
in New Orleans, winning every ward except the Tenth Ward.
Not surprisingly, Michel's principal support came from the
downtown and "back-a-town" wards, the First through the
Ninth and the Fifteenth Ward, the home of Martin Behrman.
In the Uptown wards, the Eleventh through the Fourteenth,
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth (the so-called center of antiRegular, upper-class reform) Michel outpolled Luther Hall by
more than 1,800 votes. Hall, too, benefitted from the high
voter turnout. Hall collected 13,896 votes, for a respect
able thirty-five percent of the vote. Hall won only nineteen
precincts, six in the Uptown wards and thirteen in the wards
below First Street.32
In rural Louisiana, Michel barely matched his vote in
New Orleans, raising his total to a disappointing 46,201.
Hall, on the other hand, amassed another 40,000 votes in
rural northern and southern Louisiana. Though Hall led
Michel by only 7,200 votes, Michel's prospects for over
coming that deficit in a second primary were nonexistent.
Michel was a one-parish candidate. His vote in New Orleans
amounted to fifty-one percent of his total, but the city's

32Report of the Secretary of State to his Excellency The
Governor of Louisiana. 1910-1912 (Baton Rouge, 1912), np;
New Orleans Item. January 26-28, 1912; New Orleans Daily
States. January 26-29, 1912. Aswell was not a factor in New
Orleans, garnering fewer than 2,000 votes, over half coming
from the Irish Channel area of the Tenth Ward.
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vote in the gubernatorial election was only thirty-two per
cent of the state vote. The Regulars could do no more for
Michel. It was evident to all, including Michel, that the
rural parishes wanted Luther E. Hall. Four days after the
primary, Michel conceded.33
The results of the election in New Orleans confused
many League supporters and troubled some others.9* The GGL
was instrumental in electing a reform-minded governor, but
Hall owed his election more to the League's country follow
ing than to the city reformers. Hall's vote in the city was
barely more than a quarter of his total vote. He had few
friends in the city and even fewer friends in the city's
legislative delegation. In the city, the League elected only
four members to the General Assembly, hardly enough to bene
fit Hall or carry through the GGL's reform agenda. The RDO
won a tremendous popular victory, giving Michel an impres
sive, honest majority, electing nearly its entire legisla
tive ticket, exposing the narrow popular base of the GGL
in New Orleans, and giving the Behrman administration a re
sounding vote of confidence. For some League members, es
pecially James Mcllhaney Thomson, the publisher of the Item.
the issue was clear. For municipal reform to succeed in New
Orleans, the old tactics, the old issues, and the old mem93New Orleans Item, January 25-28, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. January 25, 29, 1912; New Orleans Daily
States, January 25-28, 1912.
9*Denegre to Parker, January 28, 1912, Parker Papers,
UNC; New Orleans Item. January 23, March 3, 1912.
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bership, perhaps the old leadership, too, had to be aban
doned.
Soon after the governor's election, the New Orleans
Item called on the leaders of the GGL to "reconstitute" the
League's city branch along more "democratic lines". Given
the results of recent state elections in New Orleans and the
past performance of similar reform groups, the Item urged
the leadership of the GGL to open its ranks to the "common
citizen" and to concern itself with issues that addressed
the daily, practical needs and experiences of the people of
New Orleans. "Democracy," the Item wrote, "requires that
they share in the future councils of the independent and un
bossed Democracy which they themselves constitute." To do
less would open the League to charges of being another an
other machine, or worse, of being indifferent to the cares
of the ordinary citizen. The present arm of the GGL in the
city, the City Campaign Committee (CCC) was, the Item wrote,
poorly organized, cumbersome, and undemocratic, and could
not conduct a successful municipal campaign in the fall of
1912. Rechartering the League or defining the role of the
CCC, as some reformers suggested, would not broaden the re
form movement's appeal, but only further narrow its focus
and only jeopardize any hope of defeating Behrman in the mu
nicipal primary. What was needed, the Item suggested, was a
"grass roots" political organization modeled broadly along
ssNew Orleans Item, January 5, March 3, 1912.
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the same contours as the RDO, but incorporating the ideals
and programs of municipal reform.96
At the "grass roots" level, the Item proposed abandon
ing the CCC's practice of imposing leaders on the ward and
precinct organizations. In its place, the Item suggested
that the partisans of each precinct and ward choose their
own leaders. The proposal, the Item commented, had several
advantages. It would open the League to a greater number and
variety of people and interests, broadening the GGL's appeal
beyond the stale interests and concerns that led to its de
feat in the state primary in New Orleans. It would assure
voters of the democratic— if not Democratic— character of
municipal reform movement. It would introduce men of experi
ence (professional politicians) into the leadership of the
GGL, eliminating one of its more serious disabilities. It
would galvanize GGL partisans and workers, creating an at
mosphere of trust and confidence in the campaign organiza
tion. In the state campaign, the Item wrote, the CCC kept
its city workers "in the dark" concerning campaign strategy,
tactics, and issues. In the state election, the Item specu
lated, it may not have been necessary for each precinct and
block captain to know or comprehend campaign issues and tac
tics, but in the municipal campaign, ignorance and compla96New Orleans Item. March 3, 6, 1912. The executive
committee of the CCC was Parker, Charles Dechamp, Fred S.
Weis, C. R. Westfeldt, Jr., S.S. Labouisse, Edward F. Henrigues, D.W. Pipes, Esmond Phelps, Thomas D. Flynn, and
Henry Dickson Bruns.
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cency could prove "fatal" to municipal reform in New
Orleans.37
The Item conceded that its proposal could give the
municipal reform movement a parochial tilt, perhaps compro
mising the League's dedication to reform and, no doubt, mak
ing it susceptible to the selfish influences of special
interests and professional politicians. As a counterweight
to the imbalances in its plan, the Item recommended that the
current leadership of the GGL appoint a twenty-five man com
mittee, chosen from among the city's professional and commerical "men of standing," to oversee the selection of can
didates and drafting of policy for the GGL. These men would
give the new arrangement a dispassionate and wider vision of
politics and would keep the League in harmony with the
tenets of municipal reform in New Orleans and the nation.
The twenty-five man committee and the seventeen man "grass
roots" caucus would form a new city campaign committee. In
turn, the new CCC would select another committee from its
own ranks to direct the municipal campaign. This entire ar
rangement, the Item asserted, would give the GGL the broad,
democratic appeal and the organizational cement needed to
win popular support and maintain the reform discipline and
consistancy for the long and exacting campaigns that lay
ahead.

S7New Orleans Item. March 5, 1912.
*BNew Orleans Item, March 3, 4, 5, 6, 1912.

The few "profesional" politicians within the GGL saw
merit (and, no doubt, advantage) in the Item's plan. John
Caruso, Ulic J. Burke, and Raoul Sere endorsed the proposal,
which, they hoped, would give them a measure of influence in
the League (Burke and Caruso, as "ward leaders" for the GGL
won but four precincts between them in the governor's elec
tion, and Sere defeated the Regulars' candidate for the
state House of Representatives by only twenty-one votes**).
Other leaders of the GGL believed the Item's plan served no
constructive purpose. George Flynn cautioned against chang
ing the character of the organization "in the middle of
the stream,” and John J. O'Neill described the plan as
"unwieldy" and impractical, and he condemned the Item for
conducting the League's business in public. William J.
Hennessy believed the plan had some merit but only if the
"professional and business interests" dominated the organi
zation at each political and executive level. Samuel J.
Kohlman though the plan "worthless” and he urged the League
to grant John Parker "plenary power" over the campaign com
mittee and the municipal campaign.®0
John Parker, too, acknowledged the need to reconsti
tute the City Campaign Committee and to widen and strengthen
the League's political support. Parker refused, however, to
admit professional politicians into the ranks of the GGL

*"Ibid.
®°New Orleans Item. March 5, 6, 1912.
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leadership or to permit the people of the precincts and
wards to choose their own leaders. Parker understood, as
perhaps the Item did not, that to include these people and
interests in the GGL would demean and dilute the social and
political content of the municipal reform movement. The GGL
wanted to eliminate local concerns from the considerations
of municipal politics, not incorporate them into the reform
coalition. When Parker spoke of "broadening and strenghtening" the appeal of the GGL, he meant inviting more men from
the city's social and corporate elite to join the GGL.
Parker responded to the demand for a more appealing and
diverse reform organization by proposing that the existing
ward organizations and their leaders— the CCC— select seven
teen men from their organization to represent the wards on
the "new" CCC. In addition, Parker suggested that he alone
select a twenty-five man committee that, with the advice of
the new CCC, would set campaign strategy and policy for the
League. The selection process would, Parker confessed, take
time and study. In the interim, Parker would select sixteen
men to assist him in formulating the strategy and tactics
for the municipal campaign that would "redeem" New Orleans
from ring rule.BX
BXParker to Luther E. Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. March 26, 27, April 5, May 5
and 12, 1912. The members of committee of sixteen were from
among the civic and commerical establishment of New Orleans.
Among them were J. Zach Spearing, Frank B. Hayne, Joseph W.
Carroll, C. DeB. Claiborne, Philip Werlein, and Dr. Walter
S . Oser.

While John Parker pondered his selections for the per
manent committee of twenty-five, the ad hoc committee met to
chart the course of the League's municipal campaign. The
League's performance in the state elections impressed the ad
hoc CCC with the importance of taking the campaign directly
to the people of the city. The campaign the CCC planned to
take to the people, though, varied little from the one the
League conducted in the gubernatorial contest. The CCC's
campaign centered on the issue of ring rule, calling for the
removal of Martin Behrman and the Regulars from every aspect
of municipal government and politics. The CCC's strategy for
removing the Regulars and establishing good government was
twofold and required the cooperation of the state legisla
ture and of Governor Hall. First, the CCC called for immedi
ate adoption of a commission council charter that consoli
dated municipal and parochial governments into one and in
corporated the nonpartisan primary and the short ballot into
the political structure of the city. Second, to offset its
"disadvantages" at the polls, the CCC demanded the removal
of William P. Ball, the Registrar of Voters, and the contin
uous "purification" of the voting rolls in Orleans Parish
and the vigorous prosecution of those who violated the
voting laws of Louisiana.62

®2Parker to Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker to Hall,
March 1, 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item.
September 17, 1911, March 1, 2, 26, 1912.

These were not issues, frankly, that would necessarily
rally the citizens of New Orleans to the cause of the GGL
or, for that matter, assure the reformers of defeating the
Regulars in the fall elections. The enactment of a new char
ter required the consent of the state legislature and, in an
appeal to direct democracy, the approval of the citizens of
New Orleans. It seemed unlikely that the Regular Democrats
who controlled the New Orleans delegation to the legislature
would accept a charter that promised to legislate the re
formers into office and to "depoliticalize" public affairs.
Among the citizens of the city there was no discernible pop
ular demand for charter reform, with most people seeing it
primarily as a partisan issue. In the past in New Orleans,
partisans used charter revisions to either legislate them
selves into office or to prevent another sect of partisans
from becoming the dominant faction in city politics.83 And,
it seemed unlikely that the majority of the voters, who
favored the Regulars, would side with the GGL on a partisan
issue like charter reform. Though many New Orleanians wanted
a more coordinated administration, the state elections
showed that they did not want to exchange democratic prac
tices and principles for promises of greater administrative
efficiency and nonpartisan politics.

83Jackson, New Orleans in the Gilded Age, 45-47, 66, 316.
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In the first decade of the twentieth century, most
major American cities operated under the mayor-council form
of government. Critics of that system charged that the councilmanic system served too many masters. It catered to local
interests and biases at the expense of the larger needs of
the city. It gave local ward politicians and sectarian in
terest groups power and influence far exceeding their con
tributions to the community, and it forced those without po
litical standing to rely on informal, often "corrupt," means
of influencing the government. In addition, critics alleged
that the council system snarled the formal lines of authori
ty, shielded public officials from proper scrutiny and ac
countability, compromised business and political leaders,
and lent itself too readily to political pressure and com
promise. The result of these innumerable political and
social pressures was a public policy frozen in accomodation
and compromise. Managing the affairs of a city was, these
critics said, "a plain matter of business, securing the
best, cheapest, and most efficient service in the public
business." Politics should have little bearing on the admin
istration of the city.**
In the place of the ward-council system of government,
the advocates of the commission-council plan proposed a
®*Rice, Progressive Cities. 3-51; James Weinstein, "Or
ganized Business and the City Commission and Management
Movement," Journal of Southern History. XXVIII (May 1962),
168-70, 178; New Orleans Item. February 6, April 5 (quota
tion), 1912.
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system of government based on virtual, at-large representa
tion and nonpartisan politics. The proponents of this plan
saw at-large, nonpartisan representation as a means of end
ing the political division and social disharmony that, in
their view, plagued modern city life. The commission system
concentrated executive and legislative power and responsi
bility in the hands of a single board chosen without ref
erence to the arbitrary and artifical lines of political and
class distinctions. Acting as a legislative body, the councilinen determined municipal policy, the granting of fran
chises, and the of constructing budgets. Working as indepen
dent executives, the commissioners managed specific depart
ments within the city government, carrying out the policies
they, as the council, had set. Proponents claimed the system
prevented waste and encouraged efficiency by allowing the
commissioners to ignore unwarranted political considerations
and by providing greater coordination and concentration of
authority and responsibility in the administration of public
affairs.83
Commission partisans argued that the removal of the ar
bitrary, partisan lines of representation on the city coun
cil would convince men of notable standing in the community
to seek office in city government. Because of their social
and commercial importance, these men would not be dependent
ssRice, Progressive Cities, xi, 3-51, 64, 77-78;
Weinstein, "Organized Business and the City Commission and
and Manager Movement," 169-70, 178-79.
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on local, factional interests or behind-the-scenes power
brokers for support or direction. Free from the constraints
of partisan politics and the temptations of the spoils sys
tem, the commission councilmen would of necessity seek the
common good. Commission advocates claimed that given the
proper guarantees and safeguards, the commission form would
restore order, economy, and integrity to public affairs,
would initiate expert, professional management in city
government, and would eliminate parochial politics as a
consideration in governing the city.**®
Despite the claims of its supporters, there were sev
eral important structural and political weaknesses in the
commission system. The unification of executive and legis
lative powers did not necessarily provide for a more centra
lized, coordinated administration. In theory, each council
man represented all citizens and made municipal policy in
conjunction with the other members of the council, assuming
responsibility for the management of the entire city govern
ment and for each department. In practice, however, each
commissioner concentrated on his own department, placing him
in direct competition with the other commissioners for the

soRice, Progressive Cities. 30, 65-66, 72-83; New Orleans
Item. June 20, 24, 29, 30, 1911, April 12, 1912. Despite its
pretensions as a democratic reform, the commission system
lacked any significant measure of popular control. Mindful
of this deficiency, proponents grafted so-called direct
democracy devices on to the commission plan. The best known
of these devices was the so-called "trinity of democracy,"
initiative, referendum, and recall.
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city's meager resources and, as a consequence, preventing
the council from coordinating the city's policy needs.87
The removal of the "artifical" lines of representation
did not necessarily end local considerations in determining
public policy and did not result in attracting men of "char
acter" to public service. Indeed, opposition to the commis
sion system was not limited to those who criticized it as
undemocratic; many anti-machine reformers were skeptical of
the commission system, fearing that it might concentrate
power in the hands of the bosses and other local interests
they opposed. In 1909, when the New Orleans Item called for
adopting the commission form as a means of defeating the
RDO, John Parker opposed the plan. As Parker explained, atlarge elections were merely extensions of the partisan pri
mary system and, as such, would not end political considera
tions in the selection of public officials. Through their
mastery of primary the system and their extensive organiza
tion, Parker said, the Regulars also controlled the paro
chial government, providing them with countless elective
offices and appointive jobs. The commission plan, as inaugu
rated in Galveston and embellished in DesMoines, was
strictly a municipal reform, affecting relatively few public
officials. For the GGL, any charter revisions, then, had to
include the nonpartisan primary and a reduction in the num-

87Rice, Progressive Cities. 90-94.
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ber of elective officials in New Orleans and Orleans
Parish.BO
What attracted Parker and the leaders of the GGL to the
commission plan was how readily they could adapt it to the
principles of the nonpartisan primary and the short ballot.
By definition, the nonpartisan primary served to eliminate
political considerations and partisan voters from the elec
toral process. Without the party emblem and the other totems
of partisan politics to guide them, nonpartisan theorists
asserted illiterate and complaisant voters would soon aban
don politics, leaving the party organizations without pop
ular support. By reducing the number of elected positions in
the municipal and parochial governments, the short ballot
reform hoped to eliminate the influence of professional
politicians on government. The short ballot reform, in con
junction with the nonpartisan primary, would obviate the
need for ticket making and ticket makers, allowing the socalled better class of citizens to seek public office and,
so, restore government to the more "substantial and moral"
class of people. The commission plan, as Parker and the GGL
envisioned it, would serve primarily as a means of defeating

68Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. June 20, 24, 29, 30, July 1,
2, 20, 1911, February 3, 1912.
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the Regulars and removing them and the interests they repre
sented from the political process.
In September, 1911, fully eight months before the leg
islative session of 1912, the City Campaign Committee called
on the state General Assembly to enact a commission council
charter for New Orleans. The CCC did not disclose any speci
fic features of its proposal, but in instructing the legis
lature in the procedure needed for implementing the commis
sion system, the CCC revealed some of the complexities and
shortcomings of its municipal reform plan. The CCC counseled
the legislators to enact a "detailed and comprehensive" com
mission charter that affected every phase of the municipal
government of New Orleans. The CCC's plan also urged placing
the entire parochial government under the direct authority
of the commission government. The CCC's charter was not a
simple municipal charter revision at all, but a wholesale
restructuring of both the municipal and parish governments
and a reorientation of city politics.70
Flush with the spirit of reform, the Item endorsed the
CCC's plan sight unseen. The Item called the proposal "uncontestably true" and "fundamentally just". Such a plan, the
newspaper wrote, held within it the promise of a truly

6SE. J. Hamley to Parker, March 30, 1912, W.J. Redding
to Parker, June 4, 1912, Parker Papers USL; New Orleans
Item. June 29, 30, 1911, April 12, 1912; Rice, Progres
sive Cities. 82-88; John D. Buenker, Urban Liberalism and
Progressive Reform (New York, 1978), 118-20.
7°New Orleans Item. September 17, 1911.
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"radical" and democratic departure from the unimaginative
and corrupt administrations of Martin Behrman and the Regu
lar Democrats. For the Item, as well as for the Parkerites,
there was no question of the true intent and purpose of the
commission plan. Its aim was to overthrow the RDO "directly,
swiftly, and unmistakenly". There were, though, some League
members, like real estate executive Sidney St.John Eshleman,
who expressed reservations about blindly endorsing the CCC's
charter reform measure. Eshleman and others wanted public
discussions concerning the commission system and urged the
CCC to include provisions calling for home rule, utility
regulation, initiative, referendum, and recall. Above all
else, they cautioned against portraying charter reform as a
partisan weapon designed to restrict the suffrage or under
mine the Democratic party.7X
Parker and the CCC had no intention of conducting pub
lic discussions concerning its commission council proposal.
Immediately following Hall's election as governor in Janu
ary, 1912, the city affairs committee of the Progressive
Union, a businessmen's association more or less evenly di
vided between supporters of the League and the Regulars, be
gan a series of discussions on the commission council
system. The League's leaders "boycotted" the open forum,
"^Parker to James B. Aswell, January 27, 1912, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item September 17, 1911, January
10, June 22, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 111-16. For
criticism of the CCC's plan from other League members, see
Gordon S. Orne to Parker, May 20, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC.
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accusing the committee's chairman, Philip Werlein, a member
of the GGL's inner circle, of using the hearing to further
his own political aspirations. Werlein's committee made no
recommendations concerning the commission system and dis
continued the hearings soon after initiating them.'72
Late in March, 1912, the CCC, feeling pressure from
the reform press to hold discussions and needing public ap
proval for its plan, announced the formation of a special
Committee of Forty to study the commission council proposal.
The Item hailed the movement toward public hearings as a
"progressive step," and called on all citizens to attend the
hearings the committee planned. According to the Item, the
Committee of Forty planned to meet in public with experts in
the fields of law, finance, engineering, public administra
tion, and government to determine the best plan for the
city. In reality, the committee did not intend to conduct
open hearings or to meet with experts in municipal govern
ment. It planned instead to "educate" the public on the com
mission system through a series of newspaper articles and
editorials and to induce public support through a care
fully staged, old-time political rally.7:3
On the night of April 4, the League sponsored a "mass
rally" in support of the commission movement. The rally's
principal speaker was Chicagoan John Z. White, a profes
72New Orleans Item. January 30, 31, 1912; New Orleans
Daily States. January 31, 1912.
73New Orleans Item. March 27, 28, April 2, 1912.
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sional lecturer and a friend of many of the League's top of
ficials. The Item discribed the crowd, which it placed at
3,000, as wildly "enthusiastic, discriminating," and yet
representative of every class, occupation, institution, and
faction in New Orleans. White's speech was more a campaign
oration than a dispassionate, informative lecture. He merely
recited a litany of the commission plan's familiar virtues.
It was left to John Parker to completely and accurately des
cribe the League's commission plan. For Parker, the commis
sion plan was the only form of government that was truly
"nonpartisan and nonsectarian" and the only form capable of
assuring the defeat of the RDO in the fall elections.
At the end of the rally, John Parker, Donelson Caffery,
and Samuel A. Montgomery, whom the Item described as "impar
tial" proponents of good government, offered a resolution to
the audience calling on the Committee of Forty to draft a
commission council charter for New Orleans and to press for
its passage in the next session of the General Assembly. The
audience passed the resolution without dissent or hesita
tion. But the Item wondered aloud who would actually write
the charter bill. The newspaper called on Parker and the
Committee of Forty to select a drafting committee composed
of citizens whose experience combined "a practical knowledge
of local politics and local conditions generally with a
7*New Orleans Item, April 2, 3, 5, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. April 5, 1912; Parker to Luther E. Hall,
March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC.
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sound, scientific knowledge of the fundamental principles
of civil government." In other words, the drafting committee
should include members of the RDO and the GGL.79
To some extent Parker agreed with the Item. In a letter
to Governor-elect Hall, Parker acknowledged that the charter
revision issue was of such importance to progressive reform
in the city and state that "every branch of business in the
city should be invited to participate." Parker even went so
far as to propose that the "strongest and best supporters
of the opposition" be asked to take "an active interest in
the preparation of the charter". After almost a month of
study and discussion, however, no one besides Parker and the
Committee of Forty had seen the commission charter bill. As
the legislative term approached, James Mcllhaney Thomson,
the publisher of the Item and his dour editor, Z. Marshall
Ballard, lost patience with Parker and the committee. The
Item recognized the difficulty facing the committee in
drafting a simple, comprehensive charter bill. But the news
paper reminded the committee that the public expected and
demanded an adequate allotment of time to digested and re
vising the League's charter bill. It was one thing for "par
lor reformers," academics, and political dilettantes to
agree on an ideal reform measure, the Item remarked, but it
was quite another thing when precinct captains, ward
leaders, neighborhood associations, and the RDO caucus
79New Orleans Item, April 5, 1912.
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showed an interest in a particular reform measure. No re
form, the Item editoralized, no matter how wise or com
pelling could become law without the skilled efforts of pro
fessional politicians and the enthusiastic support of the
voters.76
As a rule, the RDO, like other political organizations
elsewhere in the United States, opposed structural or admin
istration reforms like the commission council that tended to
restrict popular participation in municipal politics and
government. There was nothing inherent in the commission
system, apart from the nonpartisan primary, that threatened
the Regulars' organization or jeopardized its standing or
control over city politics and government. In fact, in Mayor
Martin Behrman's view, given the proper guarantees for popu
lar control, the commission form could give the city a more
efficient and coordinated government that could move the
city closer to home rule. For the time being, though, Mayor
Behrman and the Regulars would reserve their judgment until
they knew the specific contents of the League's charter
reform bill.77
Despite the advanced warnings, the committee's charter
bill shocked most people. The charter bill covered 196 type-

76Parker to Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New
Orleans Item. May 1, 1912.
77New Orleans Item. April 7, 1912, January 3, 12, and 16,
1916; Buenker, Urban Liberalism. 122-23, 134-35, 161-62,
209, 215; Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Re
form," 231-41; Rice, Progressive Cities. 90.
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written pages, encompassed 104 distinct provisions, and
required thirteen constitutional amendments. John Parker,
who unveiled the plan in mid-May, announced that the GGL
charter bill was a composite of the modern commission
charters of Des Moines and Junction City, Kansas. The plan
provided for a five-man commission that, of course, posses
sed both executive and legislative powers. The Commissioner
of Public Affairs would serve as mayor and have a vote on
the council and general oversight of all municipal depart
ments, boards, and commissions. The four other commis
sioners, Finance, Property, Safety, and Utility, would ad
minister their separate departments within the municipal
government, and, acting with the mayor-commissioner, serve
as the common council for the city government. The commis
sion council would perform the duties then assigned to the
city council, mayor, fire and police commissioners, comp
troller, treasurer, commissioners of public works and build
ings, and the city engineer. In addition to these duties and
functions, the League's charter bill granted the commission
council "plenary" power over all parochial departments,
boards, and commissions. The Parker plan authorized the com
missioners to appoint the District Attorney, Coroner, all
city court judges, the clerks of the Civil and Criminal Dis
trict Courts (the judges to those courts would be elected),
the Civil and Criminal Sheriffs, Recorder of Mortgages, Re
corder of Conveyances, and two city assessors. The bill sub-
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jected all other municipal and parochial employees (exclud
ing common laborers, the majority of whom were black) to a
civil service and merit system. The plan also reduced the
mayor's salary from $10,000 to $7,500 and scaled down the
commissioners’ salaries from $9,000 to $6,000.78
There was no assurance, however, as the League knew,
that these provisions would themselves end ring rule in New
Orleans. If anything, the bill tended to focus greater power
in fewer hands— perhaps from the League's view, the wrong
hands. In essence, the reformers had to assure their own
election to the commission council. The Parker plan guaran
teed, at least to Parker's satisfaction, such an assurance.
The Parker charter provided that the voters of New Orleans
elect the mayor and the other commissioners in separate, atlarge, nonpartisan preferential primaries. In effect, elec
tions in New Orleans (what few would remain under the new
charter) would no longer be subject to the state primary
law, which, as we have seen, Parker and his followers in the
GGL saw as the quintessence of machine politics and corrupt
government.79

78New Orleans Item. May 18 1912; Rice, Progressive
Cities. 30. The charter bill reduced the number of assessors
from seven to two and made their tenure dependent on the
council and not the electorate. That state legislature
raised the mayor's salary to $10,000 in 1910. The issue
rankled the anti-Regular press and became part of the GGL's
reform program. Kemp, ed., Martin Behrmanr 255-59.
79New Orleans Item. June 4, 1912; Schott, "Progressives
Against Democracy," 255.

68
The bill attracted little critical attention. Some mem
bers of the legislature, meting before the summer session,
wondered if the League charter guaranteed the peopled of New
Orleans a democratic, republican form of government or
if the charter proposal permitted the voters an opportunity
to vote on its adoption.00
The charter bill was, broadly speaking, republican and,
in its strictest sense, progressive, but it was patently un
democratic. At the center of the commission movement in New
Orleans, as elsewhere in the United States, was the issue of
representation and the power to set and carry out public
policy. Despite its pretense of greater representation, the
Parker charter sought to narrow, not broaden, representation
in the city and parish governments. The intent and design of
the-commission system and the short ballot was to remove the
"artifical” considerations of local representation in the
formulation and conduct of municipal affairs and to concen
trate power and authority in the fewest offices possible.
The charter also diminished the role and significance of the
voter and citizen in the conduct of municipal policy, remov
ing government and its policies beyond his influence and
needs. Under the Parker charter, the voters of New Orleans
had but two duties, the election of the commission council
(and a few judges) and the ratification of the charter.

°°New Orleans Item, May 24, June 4, 1912; New Orleans
Daily States. June 4, 1912.

Parker was anxious
vote on the charter, as

to have the citizens of New Orleans
long as they did so before the mini-

cipal elections in the fall of 1912. Apparently, Parker be
lieved that the passage

of the charter bill was but a matter

of fact. He convinced himself that his plan had the support
of Governor Hall and the state legislature. Parker was mis
taken. During the course of the recent state campaign, Hall
had remained steadfastly independent and uncommitted to any
particular charter reform measure. He made a point of stay
ing clear of most of the city's intramural political
issues— and with good reason. As governor, Hall needed all
the support he could muster in the legislature and in the
local governments. He concluded that his success as governor
depended on friendly relations with the legislature, espe
cially with its largest and most cohesive bloc, the Orleans
Parish delegation .01
Contrary to what Parker believed, the GGL did not con
trol the state legislature and it had even fewer friends
among the Orleans delegation. In the Senate, eight of the
nine senators from New Orleans were Regulars. The sole
member of the League, William H. Byrnes, Jr., believed the
bill was hopelessly flawed and probably beyond repair. The

01New Orleans Item, December 16, 1911, March 3, 26, 27,
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune, March 28, June 15, 1912;
Parker to Hall, March 21, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; W. C.
Hardee to Parker, June 4, 1912, Parker Papers, USL; Schott,
"John M. Parker," 119-20, 183-84; Williams, "Martin
Behrman," 35.
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League had a few more supporters in the House of Representa
tives, but, as in the Senate, the Regulars dominated the im
portant Committee on City Affairs (CCA) that managed all
legislation concerning the City of New Orleans. Sixteen of
the seventeen members of the committee were Regulars, in
cluding its chairman, the hot-tempered Creole, Joseph E.
Generally. In short, the Parker charter bill had no execu
tive or legislative support and, most telling of all, its
true intent and purpose— the removal of the Regulars and
eliminating "political considerations" in municipal
affairs— ran contrary to the beliefs and wishes of a major
ity of the citizens of New Orleans, Regulars and reformers
alike.82
On June 8, 1912, Representative Raoul Sere, a Good Gov
ernment Leaguer from the fashionable Garden District of New
Orleans, introducted the Parker charter bill into the House
of Representatives. As expected, the Committee on City Af
fairs took charge of the bill and began hearings on June 12.
Parker, accompanied by Esmond Phelps, Charles Payne Penner,
and Frederick Weis, testifed on behalf of the Sere bill.
Mayor Behrman, John Fitzpatrick, the former mayor of New

azThe most notable of the League's supporters to oppose
the Parker charter were, in addition to Senator Byrnes,
Edgar H. Farrar, "father" of the Sewerage and Water Board
and head of one of the city's most prestigous law firms, and
Norman Walker, editor of the Daily Picayune. The Daily
Picayune was an early critic of the commission system, call
ing it an artifact of Reconstruction and a threat to munici
pal democracy. See Daily Picayune. June 14, 15, 1912.
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Orleans, Victor Mauberret, an assessor and reputed "king" of
the tenderloin district, and City Attorney Isaiah D. Hoore
appeared against the League's charter bill. The Leaguers
were confident and candid, but poorly prepared, and soon
grew reckless and defensive under the intense questioning
and rebuttals of chairman Generally and Mayor Behrman
(Behrman, who sat behind Generally during the hearing, acted
more like a member of the committee than as one of its
witnesses).
In his opening statement, John Parker told the commit
tee that the city, in effect, suffered from too much demo
cracy. There were, in his opinion, too many elected posi
tions in city government filled by too many professional
politicians. These officials, he said, made a burlesque of
the democratic process in New Orleans. They corrupted the
municipal elections, intimidated private citizens and busi
nessmen, made a "farce" of municipal administration, pre
vented needed progressive reforms, were profligate with the
public money, and, as a consequence, divided and demoralized
the people of New Orleans. The only way to end the influence
of these corrupt officials and to restore integrity and con
fidence in city government, Parker said, was to reduce the
number of elected officials and to eliminate the influence
of politics on municipal affairs. The GGL, Parker confessed
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to the CCA, designed the Sere bill to accomplish those
ends .°3
Generally pressed Parker for evidence that would sub
stantiate his allegations. Parker admitted that the League's
canvassers and poll commissioners had been unable to uncover
evidence of fraud in the recent elections, and he could not
cite a particular instance of corruption or malfeasance in
the Behrman administration. Confused and overwrought by
Generally's questioning, Parker tried to change the subject.
Regardless of the Regulars' perfidy, he said, the citizens
of New Orleans demanded the enactment of a commission coun
cil charter that promised to rid the city of the curse of
ring rule. Generally, however, protested that he and the
other members of the CCA saw no indication that the people
of New Orleans wanted a charter that encompassed the reforms
demanded by the League. Generally reminded Parker that the
New Orleans reformers made the commission council plan an
issue in the recent state elections in New Orleans and that
the voters rejected the League by nearly 10,000 votes. The
chairman of the CCA dismissed Parker's testimony as parti
san, and he confessed he saw no benefit or merit in a system
of government that denied its citizens the power of the bal
lot and a fair degree of direct representation.a-€

a3New Orleans Item, June 8, 12, 13, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. June 13, 1912.
•’■•New Orleans Item, June 12, 13, 1912; New Orleans TimesDemocrat. June 13, 1912.
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Frederick Weis challenged Generally's interpretation of
the charter bill and of the League's intentions. The short
ballot and the nonpartisan primary, Weis told the CCA, were
essential to the success of the commission plan. These two
provisions afforded the voter greater freedom of choice in
selecting public officials and would, if incorporated in the
commission council the party primary, break down the artifical character and considerations of the ward system of
politics and government. By simplifying the lines of author
ity and focusing responsibility in the hands of a few
elected officials, Weis reiterated to the committee, the
commission system invited greater participation in govern
ment by the ordinary citizen. "Our intention," Weis said to
"is to make the government of New Orleans a single, concen
trated government of five men. We want good government."83
Mayor Behrman did not question that the commission form
of government would create a more coordinated municipal gov
ernment, allowing the city administration to formulate and
carry out a more comprehensive municipal policy. The Parker
charter, however, created an oligarchy of three men, no
doubt, he said, chosen from the "better class" of citizens,
who would debate, write, execute, and adjudicate the ordi
nances of New Orleans. They would decide, free from socalled "political considerations," which people, interests,
and issues required their attention. Regardless of its
83New Orleans Item. June 13, 1912.
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merits, Behrman said, the plan was unquestionably undemo
cratic and constitutionally impractical.08
The next day. Generally entertained a motion from
Representative Thomas Anderson, a Fourth Ward Regular (also
reputed to be the "King of the Tenderloin") calling for an
unfavorable report for the Sere bill. Sere pleaded with
Generally to delay consideration until June 17 when he would
offer several amendments removing the provisions concerning
the appointment of the parochial officials and the nonparti
san primary. Martin H. Manion, an intensely independent Reg
ular from the Twelfth Ward, supported Sere's attempts at
postponing a vote on Anderson's motion. He told Generally
that he believed the issue of charter reform too important
to dismiss without a "fair assessment". At this point. Gen
erally had had enough. He scolded Sere and Manion for their
discourtesies to the committee, then turned his anger on the
League,. At no time in the past several months since the GGL
began preparing this bill, Generally taunted, did the League
bother to consult with the people's elected representatives
in the state and municipal governments or hold public dis
cussions on its charter reform proposal. Instead, he con
tinued, the League concocted an ill-conceived, poorly draft
ed bill, fully expecting the Comiittee on City Affairs, the
General Assembly, and the voters of New Orleans to pass this
bill without comment or criticism. During the entire proB6Ibid.
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cess, Generally said, the GGL showed no consideration for
the people of New Orleans, its elected officers, or, for
that matter, the democratic process and deserved no special
consideration from the committee. Generally called for a
vote. Only Sere and Manion voted against Anderson's
motion.8-7
Proponents of the Sere bill chastized the Generally
committee for its "purblindness," and predicted that the de
feat of the League's charter reform bill would eventually
work against the Regulars. "The idea that a great national
movement for progressive local government can be delib
erately checked with one arrogant resolution by a represen
tative from the Red Light section of New Orleans," the Item
wrote, "is contrary to all human experience." The Daily
Picayune saw the issue differently. The CCA's vote to give
the Sere bill an unfavorable report was well-considered and
appropriate. The bill tried to do too much. It was too in
volved and poorly written, of doubtful practicality, and
of questionable constitutionality. The committee's vote did
not expose the Regulars as reactionaries, but showed them to
be deliberate and realistic lawmakers and politicians. Their
aim, the Picayune wrote, was not to arrest the commission
movement (as early as February, 1912, the Item reported a
ground swell among the Regulars and their supporters for a

8,7Ibid.
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commission council), but to defeat a terribly flawed and im
practical commission council bill.®8
Events proved the Daily Picayune correct. The day after
Generally*s outburst, he met with Raoul Sere, William H.
Byrnes, and Robert Roberts, Hall's legislative floor leader
in the House of Representative, to work out a compromise,
assuring passage of a commission council charter for New
Orleans. Generally would allow Sere to withdraw his bill
from consideration without formal comment from the CCA. In
exchange for this courtesy, Sere and Byrnes, the League's
leader in the Senate, agreed to a joint conference commit
tee on the commission council plan. Sere and Byrnes acknowl
edged that the League's bill was impractical and in need of
wholesale revision, and they welcomed the help of the
Regulars to salvage the commission plan. The Regulars
readied themselves for the conference, but the League's
leadership in New Orleans disavowed the commitments of
Sere and Byrnes. The League announced it was unwilling to
discuss the commission bill with the Regulars. Instead, it
planned to introduce into the Senate its own "revision" of
the original Sere bill.88
The League's revision made only one major concession to
the Regulars. It deleted all provisions pertaining to the

®aNew Orleans Item, February 2, June 14, 1912; New Or
leans Daily Picayune. June 14, 15, 1912.
°®New Orleans Item. June 14, 15, 17, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. June 15, 17, 1912.
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appointment of parochial officials, but it retained the sec
tion subjecting the commissioners to nonpartisan elections.
Senator Byrnes was irate over the League's "revised" bill.
If the League's leadership in New Orleans was serious about
obtaining a practical commission charter and not a campaign
issue, Byrnes told reporters, then they would have to remove
provisions concerning nonpartisan elections, the reduction
of the mayor's and commissioners' salaries, and all other
provisions requiring constitutional amendments. Byrnes
agreed to introduce the bill into the Senate but promised
to work against the bill in committee hearings and on the
floor of the Senate."0
When the Senate CCA began hearings on June 18, the
League leadership, as promised, was in greater numbers, but
it was hardly better prepared. The CCA's chairman, the acer
bic Henry L. Favrot, told the League's witnesses that their
bill was an insult to the General Assembly, the legislative
process, and an affront to the people of New Orleans. Is the
Senate of Louisiana, Favrot asked, expected to pass a bill
into law merely on the word and at the pleasure of forty men
from the city's self-proclaimed "better element"? The League
ignored the objections of the House of Representatives and,
adding insult to injury, ridiculed the efforts of its own
leadership in the House to salvage the charter reform bill.

®°New Orleans Item, June 17, 19, 21, 22, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune June 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 1912.
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The GGL's charter bill, he said, scoffed at their principles
of democratic rule and sought not a better form of govern
ment but rank political advantage.91
H. Dickson Bruns, appearing for the League, answered
that 3,000 citizens of New Orleans who attended the April 4
rally at the Winter Garden Hall testified to the popular
support of the Sere-Byrnes bill. Favrot disputed Bruns's
claim. The three thousand citizens who attended the rally
constituted but six percent of the registered voters of New
Orleans, and, if the newspaper accounts were correct, few of
the three thousand knew in advance the undemocratic nature
of the League's commission charter.92 Claiming that the
Byrnes bill was inherently more democratic than the "wardboss" system, John Parker argued that the nonpartisan ballot
did not disfranchise the voter, but only the professional
politician. Favrot labeled Parker's reasoning as pure soph
istry, and promptly shut off debate. Parker, incensed at
Favrot's rude treatment of the League's witnesses, told the
committee that if the General Assembly defeated the Byrnes
bill, he would take the issue to the streets of New Orleans,
"crushing" all opposition in the next municipal election.
Then, in 1914, with the help of a friendly mayor and a duti
ful legislature, he would enact the Sere-Byrnes bill into
law. Favrot and the CCA ignored Parker's blustering remarks
91New Orleans Item, June 19, 21, 22, 1912; New Or
leans Daily States, June 19, 21, 22, 1912.
92Ibid.
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(Parker often spoke and acted before he thought) and voted
to delay action on the Byrnes bill, pending the introduction
of another charter reform measure by the Behrman administra
tion.*3
A week later. Senator Favrot introduced another commis
sion charter bill into the Senate. The new charter bill,
written by City Attorney I. D. Moore and attorneys Joseph
Gleason and Hugh Cage, comformed to the basic principles of
the commission council system. The bill provided for a fivemember council, elected on an at-large basis and vested with
the full executive and legislative authority of the City of
New Orleans. The new charter enhanced the power of the com
mission council over the general administration of the city,
the civil service commission, the police and fire boards,
and the city health board. It deleted all references to non
partisan elections, restored the mayor's (not the commis
sioners') salary to its earlier and higher figure, and sub
jected the city's direct democracy provisions to state
law.**
The new charter plan departed from the Sere-Byrnes pro
posals on several important features. By design, the admin
istration charter did not grant the council "plenary power"
over the numerous boards and commissions that formed a sepa
rate, independent branch of city government. The granting of
*3New Orleans Item, June 21, 22, 24, 25, 1912.
**New Orleans Item. 28, July 4, 6, 8, 1912; New Or
leans Daily Picayune. June 26 and 27, July 2, 5, 6, 9, 1912.
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plenary power over these boards would have required several
complicated and cumbersome constitutional amendments and
separate referenda on each proposal. Rather, as we shall
see, the Behrman administration sought to gain "plenary"
power over the boards and commissions on its own initiative,
following the logic of "centralization" so apparent in the
commission system. The commission system, as we have seen,
by definition and practice, divided executive power and
responsibility among the commissioners. In theory, each
of them and all of them would execute the collective will
of the council, permitting for the development of a more
coordinated municipal administration. In practice, however,
no one held true executive authority. As early as 1910, if
not before, critics and even advocates recognized the fail
ure of the commission system to provide effective executive
leadership. It seems likely, though there is no extant
documentation to that effect, that Behrman, Moore, and the
other authors of the new charter were aware of the systems
problems. The 1912 charter vested all executive power for
merly held by the mayor and other executives in the commis
sion. But the new charter also created a very powerful and
intrusive chief executive in the mayor.
The administration charter, like the Sere bill, granted
the mayor overall "oversight" of all city departments and
boards. In addition, the administration charter made the
mayor president of the Sewerage and Water Board (SWB), the
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Public Belt Railroad Commission (PBRRC), and a voting member
of the Board of Liquidation City Debt (BLCD), and the New
Orleans Board of Health. Though the mayor had fulfilled
these duties under the old charters, the commission charter
proposed by the city administration enhanced the power and
influence of the mayor, expanding his place and role in city
and parish governments; in effect, making him "the co-ordi
nating agent" for the various departments and commissions in
municipal government, speaking to each and for all of their
related problems.93
Finally, the two charter proposals differed in their
approach to the regulation of public utilities, in particu
lar, the regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light Com
pany (NORLC). The G6L was never comfortable with the idea of
public regulation of "private concerns," and its initial
charter proposal reflected the League's discomfort. The
original Sere bill, in fact, did not provide for the direct
regulation of NORLC by the city administration. To the con
trary, in granting the city the power of expropriation, the
Sere bill in effect removed the power of regulation from the
city administration, placing regulation under the jurisdic
tion of the courts. Most utility experts at the time con
sidered expropriation a costly and elaborate legal

"Rice, Progressive Cities. 90-91; Administrative Survey
of the Government of the Citv of New Orleans. 12-13; Act No.
159 Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana
at the Regular Session. 1912.
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procedure, an uncertain and regressive manner of utility
regulation. Under pressure from the Regulars and from
reformers within the League, the leadership of the 6GL,
abandoned the expropriation provision, leaving the matter of
utility regulation to the legislature and the experts.*®
Though Regulars were more certain of their stance on
public regulation, favoring a vigorous regulation of NORLC
by the city administration, they were uncomfortable with the
idea of defining and confining the city's regulatory powers
within the charter. The Favrot charter did not "enhance" the
council's powers of regulation, retaining the language of
earlier charters. The city administration decided to acquire
direct regulatory power over NORLC through legislative
statute and municipal ordinance. In brief, the Behrman ad
ministration would regulate NORLC by following the precepts
of home rule and the logic of the commission council system.
Apart from these distinctions, the Favrot bill hardly
differed from the Sere-Byrnes bills, and it raced through
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. For the
most part, opposition to the Favrot act among the voters of
New Orleans was unorganized and outmanned. The Socialist
party in New Orleans decried any "structural" device that
wittled away minority particiapation in politics and repre
sentation in government. At-large elections, argued Social*"New Orleans Item, June 17, 19, 21, and 22, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. June 13, 18, 19, 21, and 22, 1912;
Schott, "John M. Parker," 184.
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ist leader T.E. Brenan, favored the well-heeled and the
well-known, and virtual representation was a fallacy, a ru
bric for expressing the domination of the social and commerical elites over the working classes. Among the working
classes, only one other group expressed opposition to the
commission plan. The Central Trades and Labor Council, a
craft association, agreed with the socialists about the in
tent and effect of the commission council system. The Coun
cil, however, made no known attempt to join with the social
ists in opposing the act .3,7
Criticism of the commission act was not confined to the
working class alone. Among the propertied classes, a name
less "taxpayers’ association" joined the socialists and the
Council in opposing the Favrot act. The association's com
plaint was not political or sociological in nature, but
legal. According to the association's "brief" filed in the
local press, the state constitution required the election of
any municipal official whose duties called for the exercise
of the "police powers" of the city.*" The association
alleged that the new charter violated this provision of the
state constitution, authorizing the council to appoint of

*7New Orleans Item June 28, July 2, 6, 8, August 28, 30,
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 6, 27, July 2, 5, 6,
9, 13, 26, August 29, 1912; Rice, Progressive Cities. 29,
43, 90-91.
*"Police powers, of course, refer to the powers inherent
in government to exercise reasonble control over persons and
property within its jurisdiction in matters concerning their
general health, safety, morals, and welfare.
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ficials whose duties required the exercise of the inherent
powers of the city government. These assertions were, of
course, without substance since the charter vested the
commission council with all powers inherent in the City of
New Orleans. The appointment of several officials, like the
treasurer or City Engineer, did not violate the state con
stitution. 39 The association did not press the issue in the
courts and its objection went unnoticed by the public.
The new charter had its more ’’traditional1’ detractors,
however. The Item, perhaps sensing a campaign issue, lam
basted the Favrot act as a cynical and calculated betrayal
of the municipal reform movement. The Regulars, the Item,
charged, bastardized the commission council movement by
deliberatly removing the nonpartisan primary provision and
by refusing to modernize the municipality's cumbersome and
ineffective administrative system. The newspaper claimed
that the Favrot charter was not a true commission charter
but a clever facsimilie which the Regulars ’’superimposed''
over the old and corrupt ward system of politics. The result
of this makeshift reform, the Item concluded, would be the
continuation of factional, divisive politics and inept
municipal rule.100

" N e w Orleans Item. July 4, 6, and 8, August 28 and 30,
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. August 29, 1912.
xooNew Orleans Item, August 30, 31, December 2, 4, 14,
1912; Ethel Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience Under Commis
sion Government," National Municipal Review, 6 (January
1917), 74.

Other critics of the Regular Democrats and the Behrman
administration argued that the momentum of the municipal re
form movement compelled the Behrman administration to adopt
a commission council charter. They argued that the Favrot
charter imposed a commission council system on New Orleans.
The charter obviously united the executive and legislative
branches of the municipal government, provided for the atlarge election for the council, reduced the number of
elected city officials, and promised, at least on paper, to
untangle the lines of municipal authority and to fix the
burden of responsibility on the five councilmen. Despite
some "painfully weak" provisions, particularly in the area
of utility regulation, these "friendly critics" believed
that the system would work more or less as promised. In
their view, the charter would force the Regulars to select
candidates of "new vision," dedicated to the ideals of "pub
lic service" and civic advancement. These men, these cri
tics believed, would introduce business ethics and proce
dures to city government, fostering among the other elected
and appointed government officials a sense of common pur-
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pose that placed civic advancement above political consid
erations.101
Still other commentators were less sanguine about the
virtues of the commission system. These critics agreed that
the commission system would alter the political arrangements
in New Orleans, but they feared that those changes would not
be for the better. The logic of politics and the commission
system, they contended, would compel the Regulars to select
businessmen as candidates for the council, eliminatating
popular ward leaders from positions of importance and influ
ence in city government and in the RDO. Without popular con
trol at the governmental and political levels, the council
and the mayor— and those they represented— would define the
public interests to suit their own needs, ignoring the con
cerns of local interests. These opponents were also concern
ed that a commission council of businessmen would turn the
city government over to a battery of "experts" hired to man
age the city's affairs, reducing politics and government to
concerns of accountants and lawyers.102
Contrary to both contemporary and historical accounts,
the Behrman administration did not design the Favrot charter
101New Orleans Item, August 30, 1912; Hutson, "New Or
leans* Experience Under Commission Government," 74-79. In
1920, City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge, an anti-Regular re
former, praised the Favrot charter as a precise and thought
ful piece of legislation. See Ivy G. Kittredge to (Commis
sioner of Public Utility) Paul H. Maloney, December 20,
1920, vol.14, City Attorneys Opinion. City Archives, New
Orleans Public Library; hereafter cited as CAP. CA, NOPL.
102New Orleans Item, August 30, 1912.

to compromise the municipal reform movement or to disguise
its own intentions. From the beginning of the commission
issue, the Behrman administration and the Regular Democrats
showed a keen and intelligent interest in the commission
system of government. They understood its potential for
greater coordination and efficiency in municipal administra
tion. They favored the basic contours of the commission sys
tem, the unification of the executive and legislative powers
of the city government, the displacing of the old-style city
council and the strenghtening of the executive. They also
grasped many of the limitations and potential dangers in the
commission system, especially the plan proposed by John
Parker and the G6L. From the start, the RDO and the Behrman
administration opposed nonpartisan elections and the
appointment of all but a few public officials. At the regu
lar session of the General Assembly, the Regulars did not
hide or disguise their opposition to the "partisan" sections
of the Sere-Byrnes bills.
They also seemed to understand (or were at least will
ing to admit) that no commission charter bill could assure
the establishment of a fully competent and efficient muni
cipal government or guarantee that any municipal administra
tion would be free from the political and sociological con
siderations of the modern American city. In a speech before
the City Federation of [Woman's] Clubs in 1916 Mayor Behrman
spoke to that issue. He acknowledged the many improvements
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and the advancements in municipal administration under the
commission council charter, and he spoke enthusiastically
about the promise for further improvements under the 1912
charter. It was, he said, the practical intelligence and
democratic character of the commissioners and the RDO that
made the commission system a flexible and responsive part
of popular government.xo3
The Favrot charter did accentuate the role of profes
sional businessmen played in the city administration, but it
did not compel the leaders of the RDO to recruit them for
office. There were no social or occupational barriers for
"membership11 in the Regular Democratic Organization. Several
notable businessmen like William Bess Thompson, Arthur J.
O'Keefe, Martin H. Manion, and Harold H. Newman belonged to
the RDO, serving the city administration at times in posi
tions of authority and importance. As a rule, even before
the enactment of the Favrot charter, the Regulars selected
businessmen and other professionals for executive positions
within city government. By definition and design, the com
mission system was essentially executive government; with
its adoption by the city, the RDO merely continued with its

x°3New Orleans Item. November 28, 1916.
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established practice of choosing professionals and business
executives for executive positions in city government.3-0'*
Though the commission reduced the visibility of the
professional politicians in city government, it did not di
minish their importance or weaken the standing of the RDO in
city affairs. Professional politicans like Criminal Sheriff
Matthew Long, Michael James McKay, a clerk in the criminal
court system. City Attorney I. D. Moore, and Arthur O'Keefe,
the deputy Commissioner of Public Finance, served the city
under the commission charter as "minor" officials. They held
positions of authority and importance in the municipal gov
ernment, contributing to the formulation and conduct of pub
lic policy and lending their own significant measure of pro
fessionalism to the municipal government. The commission
system did not change Martin Behrman's approach to city gov
ernment and administration, either. Though he insisted on a
public display of solidarity by his colleagues and subor
dinates, in private Behrman welcomed independent thought and
initiative by the members of his administration. Under the
commission council, as with past administrations, Behrman
relied heavily on each member of the administration in de-

xo^Teaford, Unheralded Triumph. 42-66; Haas, "John Fitz
patrick and Political Continuity in New Orleans, 1896-1899,"
7-29; Brian Gary Ettinger, "John Fitzpatrick and the Limits
of Working-Class Politics in New Orleans, 1892-1896," Loui
siana History. XXVI (Fall 1985), 341-67. Despite the conten
tions of Haas and Ettinger, the RDO appealed to classes
other than the working class, and many of its leaders, in
cluding Fitzpatrick and Behrman, were "businessmen".
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terming public policy. In the purely political realm, he
continually sought the sense of the RDO caucus, and, though
Behrman was its dominant personality, the caucus remained
the governing body of the RDO.103
As Behrman*s statement makes clear and as the evidence
at hand suggests, the commission structure made only a
modest difference in formulating public policy, and in no
way impaired the influence of "politics" on the municipal
government. The official correspondence of the Behrman ad
ministration and other contemporary accounts, before and
after 1912, indicate that "public considerations," not the
form of city government, shaped municipal policy on such
issues as sanitation, paving, zoning, public transportation,
gas and electric service, and public finance. The Behrman
administration gave public expression to the concerns of the
city, but its voice was not the voice of a single class or
of a business elite, but rather a chorus of interests, pre
judices, and ideals. The commission system, however, as part
of a general movement toward a more accomplished and invol-

xosThese statements are based on my reading of the vari
ous letters, reports, and legal opinions written during the
Behrman administrations, 1904-1920; 1925-1926. See Mayors1
Correspondence. Mayors* Letters. City Archives, New Orleans
Public Library, hereafter cited as MCML.
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ved municipal government, made the city administration a
discrete and decisive member of that chorus.xo°
The change in the form of government, then, did not af
fect substantially how the Behrman administration arrived at
or carried out municipal policy, or affect the general com
position of city government, or alter the influence of poli
tics on the municipal government. The question becomes,
then, why the Regulars adopted the Favrot commission charter
bill. The standard explanation to this question is that the
Regulars, anxious to retain their dominance over city gov
ernment, adopted a charter that resembled the commission
form that allowed them to pacify a majority of the commer
cial and social elite that demanded a more honest and re
sponsive city government and yet permitted the RDO to con
tinue politics as usual.10-7 This account is only plausible
if we accept the notions that progressive reforms like the
commission council served only the interests of the socalled professional and commerical elite and that the
Regular Democratic Organization was a wholly reactionary
faction immune to the spirit and necessity of "good govern
ment" .
xoaHutson, "New Orleams* Experience,” 79; Schott, "John M.
Parker," 106-07; Schott, "The New Orleans Machine," 141-53;
Williams, "Martin Behrman," 63-64. Again, I have based my
assessment on the official correspondence of the city gov
ernment and on its response to several important issues
from 1900 to 1926.
xo-7Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience," 73-79; Rice, Pro
gressive Cities. 98; Reynolds, Machine Politics. 104-06,
255.

The Regulars did not respond to the commission issue
out of fear of losing City Hall to Parker and the G6L or
from a fawning desire to please the commercial establishment
of the city. The Regulars had the support of a substantial
majority of the voters of New Orleans, and, as we have seen,
the nonpartisan components of the commission system did not
jeopardize the political integrity of the RDO. And, although
the initial impetus for the adoption of the commission coun
cil plan came from the reform press and allied elites, the
demand for effective city government was not confined to
them, but, as a rule, shared by the entire community. De
spite their opposition to the Sere and Byrnes bills, the
Regulars displayed a genuine interest in the commission
form. The commission idea won the qualified endorsement of
two New Orleans

newspapers, the Daily Picayune

and the

Daily States, the Board of Trade, the Progressive Union,
several ward and precinct leaders, and a number of neighbor
hood improvement associations. For these interests and
groups, the Favrot charter offered a workerable plan that
promised them a more accessible, professional, decisive, and
capable municipal government than the slow-moving and

amateurish aldermanic system.10" The party professionals,
like Behrman and Robert Ewing (at first), favored the com
mission idea precisely because it attracted the attention
and support of diverse municipal interests and because, as
John Parker feared initially, it promised to enhance the
power and standing of the city administration. With the
support of the city administration and the endorsement of
several important components of city politics, the voters of
New Orleans adopted the Favrot charter. The new charter took
effect in December, after both the parochial and municipal
elections of 1912.

loaNew Orleans Daily Picayune. August 31, December 2,
1912; New Orleans Daily States. August 20, 1912; New
Orleans, February 2, May 1, 1912; Daniel T. Rodgers, "In
Search of Progressivism," Reviews in American History,. 10
(December 1982), 113-42; Buenker, Urban Liberalism, passim;
Buenker, "The Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis,"
Mid-America, 51 (July 1969), 175-93; Jon C. Teaford, "Finis
for Tweed and Steffens: Rewriting the History of Urban
Rule," Reviews in American History. 10, (December 1982),
133-49.

Chapter Two

In the Land of Dreams

With the defeat of the Sere and Byrnes bills in the
House and Senate, the 66L abandoned the legislative session,
turning its full attention to the parochial and municipal
elections. The parochial elections, scheduled for September,
preceded the municipal elections (the first conducted under
the commission council charter) by less than a month, and
both the 6GL and the RDO viewed the parochial elections as
the second phase of the municipal elections. Before the
parochial campaign began, however, the divisions and con
cerns of national politics intruded on the municipal elec
tions. Late in June, after the defeat of the GGL charter
proposals, John Parker announced his intention of conducting
a "June to October" campaign against the "bosses" of New
Orleans. But, when questioned about his commitment to the
third party movement of Theodore Roosevelt, Parker grew very
defensive. He assured his colleagues in the GGL that his re
lationship with Roosevelt and the Progressive Party would
not affect his standing with the GGL or lessen his resolve
to bring progressive reform and good government to the city.
Two weeks later, however, in July, Parker signed a resolu
tion calling for a Progressive party convention that would
nominate Theodore Roosevelt as its candidate for president.
94
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Parker again assured his followers that his pledge to elect
Roosevelt as president did not jeopardize or alter his com
mitment to municipal reform or to the Democratic party in
Louisiana. "I am a Democrat," he said, "in state and city
politics." There were, though, many other Democrats inside
and outside the GGL who thought otherwise.1
The New Orleans Item could not find a "logical reason"
why Parker's decision to support Roosevelt and the Progres
sive party should bar him from leading the city's indepen
dent political reform movement. There was, however, the Item
wrote, a very important and compelling "practical" reason
why Parker should not remain as the leader of the Good Gov
ernment League. The Democratic party, the Item reminded its
readers, was the dominant political institution in the state
and the city; no reform movement, no matter how compelling
its message or well-organized its supporters, could succeed
outside its ranks. By endorsing Roosevelt, Parker chose to
ignore a cardinal precept of Louisiana's otherwise volatile
politics. Parker would better serve the cause of municipal
reform, the Item wrote, by "subordinating his convictions
and his personal loyality in this respect to the demands of
his position at the head of the city's protest against Gov
ernment by Boss."3
xNew Orleans Daily Picayune,. June 25, July 7, 12, 1912;
New Orelans Item. July 8, 12, August 13, 1912; New Orleans,
Times-Deroocrat. July 9, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker,"
184-89.
3New Orleans Item. July 12, 1912.

Most members of the GGL agreed with the Item1s
assessment and they urged Parker to withdraw his endorsement
of Roosevelt.3 Leland Moss, a long-time Parker supporter
from Lake Charles, pleaded with Parker to remain with the
Democratic party. Within the ranks of the RDO, Moss wrote,
"your name signed to the Roosevelt call was received with
derisive shouts of joy, as furnishing positive proof of all
the charges made against you and against the Democratic Good
[Government] League in the last fight, as being made up
largely of republicans [sic] instead of democrats [sic]. I
am sure that your action will materially affect the success
of any progressive movement in the city of New Orleans, and
I know that the success of any such movement is very dear to
your heart." Moss went on to tell Parker that if he desserted the Democratic party and the GGL, he forfeited any
chance of reforming the party along lines favorable to the
interests of the GGL, and, with it, lost any hope of ending
ring rule in New Orleans.4
Parker resigned as the chairman of the City Campaign
Committee, but remained a member of the GGL. He told the

3Frank T. Guilbeau to Parker, February 6, 1912, J.
Austin Fontenot to Parker, July 11, 1912, Parker Papers,
USL; W.E. Allen to Parker, July 12, 1912, Parker Papers,
UNC.
4Moss to Parker, July 9, 1912, Parker Papers, USL. Some
members of the League, of course, found no fault with
Parker's decision. But only a few League members followed
Parker into the Progressive party. See Sidney Story to
Parker, July 18, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. August 6, 13, 1912.

League's executive committee that he was still interested in
the reform movement in the city and would continue active in
it irrespective of his party affiliation. He insisted that
his principles were those of the true Democrat: white
supremacy, federally funded flood control of the lower
Mississippi River Valley, and antiring rule. Parker insisted
that the Regulars, not he, had deserted the tenets of the
Democratic party in Louisiana, and he accused Behrman and
the RDO of being "revenue Democrats," concerned solely with
patronage and political advantage. God save Louisiana, he
wrote, "when [the] Office Holding, Ballot Box Stuffing, Law
Deriding Ring of New Orleans sits as the Supreme Court to
pass on the qualifications of Independent American Manhood."
"In my humble judgment," he wrote to Governor Hall, "every
ringster and every man who supported the ring should be made
to walk the [political] plank as promptly as possible. The
ring would crush you and your policies without a second's
hesitation; they have no regard, no loyalty, no principle,
and no fealty to party. They are Democrats for office and
office only. They have never hesitated to sacrifice the
State of Louisiana for their personal aims; they would not
hesitate for an instant to ruin the City of New Orleans if
it meant their perpetuation in power.""
"Parker to J. Austin Fontenot, July 11, 1912, Parker
Papers, USL; Parker to Executive Committee, Parker to Hall,
August 12, 1912, Parker Papers, UNC; Schott, "John M. Par
ker," 186-87.

Such shrill language and rash behavior charcterized
much of John Parker's political correspondence and public
life, and it is tempting to dismiss his endorsement of
Roosevelt and his resignation from the G6L as the actions
and words of an ill-tempered and frustrated man. And, to a
certain degree, there is some truth to that judgment. But
Parker's actions and remarks reveal something more profound
than his affection for Roosevelt or his contempt for the
Regular Democratic Organization. There were other reasons
for Parker's departure from the Democratic party and the
G6L. Parker was dissatisfied with the tincture and direction
of the modern Democratic party. He distrusted and disliked
William Jennings Bryan, Woodrow Wilson (at least the candi
date Wilson), and what he considered the "populist" wing of
the Democratic party. Bryan and Wilson pushed the Democratic
party to the "left," catering to labor, assailing the priv
ileges of business and finance, and threatening to end the
Democratic party's dependence on the conservative white
South and the financially important (to the New South Demo
crats like Parker) northeast.® Parker was uncomfortable in
this new, "populistic" Democratic party, and his leaving was
an indication of his dissatisfaction with the party. The

®Moss to Parker, July 9, 1912, Parker Papers, USL;
Schott, "John M. Parker," 39-90; Schott, "Huey Long: Pro
gressive Backlash?," Louisiana History. XXVII (Spring 1986),
133-45; Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest. 120-25, 127-30;
LeRoy Ashby, William Jennings Brvan Champion of Democracy
(Boston, 1987), 41-125.

99
Democratic party, at home and in the nation, had moved be
yond Parker and his variety of New South progressivism.
So too had the state and municipal reform movements.
Parker seemed obtuse to the political and social issues and
demands that concerned the citizens of Louisiana and New Or
leans. Parker stressed only the "political and procedural
objectives" of the reform movement, ignoring other, more sa
lient issues. While Parker and the "conservative" reformers
preached about the menace of ring rule and advocated ballot
reform, other League members and Regular Democrats called
for greater regulation of banking, corporations, and utility
companies; woman's suffrage; workmen's compensation laws; a
corporate and personal income tax amendment; and a revision
of the state and parish tax and assessment policies. These
issues and demands indicate the extent to which the munici
pal and state reform movements had moved beyond Parker's
narrow and confining definitions of reform.7
It would be a mistake to conclude, however, that Parker
and the more "conservative" reformers were without influence
in municipal politics or the reform movement. John Parker
7Schott, "John M. Parker," 112-13, 164-70, 182-88;
Schott, "Huey Long: Progressive Backlash?," 138-40. Profes
sor Schott does not "make much of" the interpretations of
progressivism that have become "fashionable" in the 1970s
and 1980s. His definition of the movement identifies pro
gressivism with "elitist, entrepreneurial, or professional
interests groups...who favored varying degrees of support
for increased governmental responsibility in dealing with
social problems, and advocated increased bureaucratic con
trols with centralization or concentration of governmental
structures to achieve efficient administration."
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may have "forfeited" a personal opportunity to direct the
course of reform politics in New Orleans, but the "conser
vatives" still controlled the reform organization and man
aged to define the new reform issues, like woman suffrage,
tax reform, and utility regulation, in terms of ring rule.
Municipal politics and reform issues may have moved beyond
Parker and the "conservative" reformers, but politics and
reform in New Orleans could not move without them.

The parochial campaign began in earnest in late July,
(news of Parker's resignation and the unsettling affect it
had on the League delayed the selection of candidates and
distracted, at least for the moment, the public's interests
in the parish races), and, as expected, the League concen
trated its campaign on the issue of "ring rule" and pinned
its hopes of victory on selecting the "best qualified" can
didates and on effectively reducing

the voting rolls.

Confident of victory, the Regulars hardly campaigned at all.
Their only concern was finding the best candidate for Dis
trict Attorney of Orleans Parish, the highest ranking paro
chial official in metropolitan New Orleans.
The RDO caucus favored retaining incumbent District
Attorney J. St.Clair Adams, a fiercely independent and ex
ceedingly competent man with both social and political con
nections. Adams wished to return to private practice, how
ever, and so declined the invitation to seek reelection.

I
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The Regulars considered several other candidates but finally
settled on Chandler C. Luzenberg, a former DA of Orleans
Parish as their candidate.8 Luzenberg was a quality candi
date and a superior criminal attorney. The Item described
him as a "latent" reformer; tough, exacting, honest, and
politically impartial. He was, in the Item's words, a man
with an exceptional pedigree, "considerable ability, an
honorable name in [his] profession, and a pleasing person
ality". As the ring's candidate, however, Luzenberg was
unacceptable to the Item and to unbossed, "independent
manhood" of New Orleans.8
The GGL nominated its new executive chairman, fortytwo year old Donleson Caffery for District Attorney of Or
leans Parish. Born in St. Martin Parish in 1870, Caffery
attended Roanoke College and the United States Naval
Academy. He received a law degree from Tulane Law School,
and later served as District Attorney for St.Martin and
Terrebonne parishes. In 1900, in a period of Republican
resurgence in Louisiana's sugar bowl parishes, Caffery
stood as the Republican candidate for governor, though,
like Parker, he claimed to be a "Democrat in faith," if
not in name. Later, with the help of Parker, Thomas S.
Wilkinson, and T. Marshall Miller, Caffery founded the
Democratic Good Government League in 1908. Dispite Parker's
"New Orleans Item, 17, 18, 19, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. July 19, 1912.
"New Orleans Item. August 10, 22, September 15, 1912.
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disaffection from the League, Caffery promised to continue
the reform program "mapped out by Mr. Parker",xo
Angered at being bypassed by the Regulars, Joseph Gen
erally qualified as a candidate for District Attorney— no
mean feat without organized support— and stood for election
as an independent Democrat. At thirty-nine, Generally looked
older than his years. Scholarly in appearance. Generally was
a hardened campaigner with a solid and impressive constitu
ency (the Item called him the "darling of the Creole" com
munity). Generally attended the College of the Immaculate
Conception ( the forerunner of Jesuit High School), known
for its rigorous and classical Jesuit education and as the
classroom for future civic and political leaders of New Or
leans. As a young man. Generally "read the law," and was ad
mitted to the Louisiana bar. He married Alice Sarpy, the
daughter of an old and well-placed Creole family. Generally
strenghtened his familial and professional credentials when
his sister married Lionel Adams (no relation to St.Clair
Adams), a prominent attorney who later became Generally's
law partner. Generally, then, like Luzenberg and so many
other members of the Regular coalition, did not fit the
XQNew Orleans Item. July, 12, August 4, 1912; Schott,
"John M. Parker," 186-87. Why Caffery did not challenge
Martin Behrman in the municipal elections is a matter of
some question. Perhaps, like Parker, Caffery believed that
the commission system would force Behrman and the other pro
fessional politicians to retire. The choice of a mayoral
candidate was not nearly as important a choice, then, as the
selection of five compatible and progressive businessmen to
serve as commissioners.
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reformers' description of the crass and unlettered
"ringster". Yet, the League's leadership and the reform
press discounted Joseph Generally and saw no significance in
his candidacy, dismissing him as a spoiler or "dummy" candi
date. This appraisal was a harsh and inapproriate judgment,
indeed, particularly since the GGL had at one time con
sidered Generally its prime candidate for District Attor
ney.11
In addition to the candidates for District Attorney,
each faction fielded a complete slate of candidates for a
battery of parish offices, all proportioned neatly among the
various wards and precincts of the city. The most intriguing
race, apart from the DA's contest, was the race for Criminal
Sheriff of Orleans Parish. The campaign matched three Re
gulars (all from the Third Ward, as custom and politics de
manded) and the League's M. T. Breslin, himself a former Re
gular. The pre-campaign maneuvering among the Regulars, in
cumbent Matthew Long and challengers Michael J. McKay and
Edward M. Comiskey, testified to the competitive structure
of the RDO. Unlike the GGL, whose leadership from necessity
handpicked its candidates, the Regulars encouraged (and in
some cases, could not discourage) competition, and selected
their candidates on their appeal to the ward leaders and the
voters. The system favored incumbent office holders, and, at

xxNew Orleans Item. July 18-23, August 1, 11, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune, July 17-22, August 10, 13, 1912.
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times, resulted in "bolts" from the RDO. For the successful
"bolter," however, there was always room at the RDO's caucus
table.
The Regulars nominated Matt Long as their candidate,
but there was serious and organized opposition to him with
in the caucus. Long was a hot-tempered and impulsive man,
known for his quick fists and strong-armed tactics around
the polling booths. The press intimated some sort of scandal
in his office, and not a few Regulars, Mayor Behrman among
them, wanted to "dump" Long. Long was a successful cam
paigner, though, and protege of former mayor John Fitz
patrick, the aging leader of the Third Ward. Challenging
Long and Fitzpatrick for control of the ward were two other
Irish politicians whose names were synonymous with politics
in the Third Ward, the polished and popular McKay and the
pugnacious Edward Comiskey.
At fifty-four, McKay was the "quiet man" of Third Ward
politics. He was a meticulous and immaculate dresser and he
served the criminal district court with equal precision and
care for detail. Many Regulars considered McKay the most
capable and appealing of the candidates, though many other
Regulars believed he was too much a gentleman to be a poli
tician and the Criminal Sheriff. McKay persisted, though,
challenging the Regulars and Long without organized support
or much money. After weeks of campaigning, however, McKay
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withdrew from the race in the name of Democratic party
unity.3-2
Edward Comiskey, however, showed a different mettle.
Comiskey, too, like Long, was a favorite of "Old Fitz," and
with his help won a seat in the state General Assembly in
1908 and again in 1912. When the Regulars settled on Long,
Comiskey left the RDO and allied with the League, which, un
fortunately for Comiskey, had already endorsed M. T. Breslin
as its candidate. The GGL and the reform press were over
joyed with Comiskey's departure from the RDO. Men like Ed
ward Comiskey and his brother James were welcomed additions
to the League's faltering ranks. The Comiskeys were hardnosed and capable politicians and reportedly controlled a
sizeable portion of the Third Ward's massive vote. But,
instead of celebrating the acquisition of the Comiskeys, the
GGL should have taken careful note of Michael McKay's quiet
return to the RDO.3-3
The League's leadership, though, seemed bent on dis
tracting itself in another witless assault on the voting
rolls and the voters of New Orleans. In May, the new Regis
trar of Voters, Samuel A. Montgomery, a League stalwart,
ordered his staff to conduct a thorough and "systematic re-

X2New Orleans Item. July, 18-23, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. July 17-22, August 10, 13, 1912. I would like
to thank Mr. James F. McKay, Sr. and Mr. John Donellan Fitzmorris, Jr. for their help in defining the character of
Michael McKay.
“ Ibid.
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view" of all registration documents, erasing the names of
all voters not properly or legally registered. He instruc
ted the canvassers to consider any flaw or discrepancy on
an application as an indication of willful fraud. A GGL
spokesman justified Montgomery's actions as legal and pro
per, assuring the voters of New Orleans an honest and fair
election.
The Regulars acknowledged that duplications and cleri
cal errors existed, but they disputed the notion that such
errors constituted willful fraud. The Regulars filed several
suits in Civil District Court blocking Montgomery's orders.
In the most important suit, attorneys for Anthony Herrle ad
mitted that Registrar Montgomery could strike names from the
voting lists, but only in strict compliance with the regis
tration act of 1908. The act permitted the Registrar to
erase the names of those voters who had died, been convicted
of a felony, or been judged mentally incompetent. Judge
Porter Parker, John Parker's brother, agreed with Herrle's
demurer and issued a permanent writ preventing Montogmery
from removing Herrle's name from the rolls.13
The League's response to Judge Parker's ruling was
swift and harsh in its condemnation. The Item damned the
decision as "judicial hocuus pocus". "There is no equity and
no right," the Item editoralized, "in a judicial order that
x *New Orleans Item, May 9, July 27, 29, August 21,
1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 119-20.
lsNew Orleans Item, August 8, 10, 15, 17, 18, 1912.
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prevents by technicality the carrying out of the real intent
of the law of the state." Judge Parker's decision, the Item
concluded, had stepped beyond the bounds of judicial impar
tiality and propriety into the realm of partisan politics.
As a means of combating "politicalized" judges, the Item
called for a constitutional amendment subjecting all state
and municipal judges to the direct recall of the voters.
Donelson Caffery, however, urged a more direct and immediate
approach. Caffery suggested that Montgomery ignore the
court's ruling and continue removing the names of voters
registered illegally. "The time has arrived," he said, "to
serve notice that an injunction by a court cannot rob the
people of their rights."1®
Montgomery ignored Caffery's advice and, as expected,
appealed Parker's writ to the Louisiana Supreme Court. With
the final court ruling not expected until after the parochi
al elections, the Regulars and several less strident but in
fluential League members met to set the ground rules for the
elections. The two factions argeed, at least for this elec
tion, that only those voters with valid registration papers
and poll tax receipts would be allowed to vote. They also
agreed that an illiterate voter registered in error under
the education provision could seek assistance in marking his
ballot. The agreement changed nothing about the eligibility
ieNew Orleans Item, August 14, 17-22, 1912. Montgomery
removed only 338 of the 50,000 voters registered in New Or
leans .
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of the voters, and its political effect clearly favored the
Regulars. The agreement acknowledged that the duplication of
records and clerical error were not grounds for removing a
voter from the rolls and that illiteracy should not bar some
one from voting. The agreement also meant that a visible and
important segment of the League was disgusted with the tac
tics and rhetoric of the Parkerites, in effect, questioning
the old-line leadership of the GGL.17
Publicly, Caffery accepted the terms of the agreement,
but he was dissatisfied with it. He told a rally of League
supporters and interested observers that if on election
day the Regulars violated the primary election law, he and
the GGL stood ready to act as judge, jury, and, if need be,
coroner. The League did not condone violence, he said, but
it would not back away from it when faced with a threat of
fraud and intimidation at the polls. The League would take
every precaution, Caffery blustered, to ensure the safety of
its workers and the sanctity of each ballot.18
In trying to reassert his command of the GGL and rally
its supporters, Caffery lost some valuable support. The New
Orleans Daily Picayune, which had endorsed Caffery, now cen
sured him as a reckless "fire-eater8 and a man unworthy of
public office. Since there was no substance to Caffery's

17New Orleans Item, September 1, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. September 2, 1912.
18New Orleans Item. 21, 30, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. August 16, 21, 1912.
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charge, the Picayune concluded that he designed his remarks
to discourage ordinary citizens from voting, enhancing, as
he saw things, his own chances of election. The Regulars
agreed with the Picayune. The League's leadership, the
Regulars contended, had no useful proposals or timely issues
to present to the people of New Orleans. The League's entire
campaign centered on the tiresome and meaningless issue of
ring rule, homespun cliches (Caffery's campaign slogan was
"home, family, and the City of New Orleans"), and the fading
recollections of nineteenth-century politics. The GGL de
liberately engaged in idle talk and veiled threats to excite
the public, discourage voters, and provide itself with a
convenient excuse for losing the parochial elections.x"
The League's campaign tactics and rhetoric had no visi
ble effect on the "ordinary" voters of New Orleans, but they
aroused considerable concern and agitation among the city's
commmerical leaders. Even before Caffery made his revealing
remarks, a number of prominent businessmen and civic leaders
on both sides of the contest expressed their concerns to
Mayor Behrman about the direction and demeanor of the paro
chial campaign. On August 5, they addressed a letter to
Behrman detailing their worries and suggesting to the mayor
that he appoint a special police force to keep the peace and
enforce the voting laws on election day. Soon after deliver-

x,New Orleans Daily Picayune. August 16, 21, 27, 30, 31,
1912; New Orleans Item. August 30, 1912.
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ing their letter to Behrman, the group's chief spokesmen,
Hugh McCloskey, the president of New Orleans Railway and
Light Company, and Edwin T. Merrick, called on the mayor at
City Hall. Behrman told them that before committing himself
to their suggestion he wanted to consult with City Attorney
I. D. Moore about the legal aspects of their plan. The mayor
suspected that legal and financial complications would pre
vent the formation of a "special" police force. But, more
importantly, he feared that a special police force appointed
by an incumbent mayor might be seen as a partisan "goon
squad," giving credence to Caffery's charges and tarnishing
the city's reputation.20
City Attorney Moore rendered his opinion a week later.
According to Moore, unless there was a "clear and present
danger" of violence or a total collapse of the civil author
ity, the mayor had no power to create an extralegal police
force. Until such occurences, the city administration and
the businessmen had to depend on the New Orleans Police De
partment and the common sense and integrity of the people to
keep peace and order on election day.23L Moore's opinion de
lighted the mayor, but McCloskey and Merrick believed
Moore's findings overly legalistic and unmindful of the
city's serious political troubles. The businessmen appealed

2°New Orleans Daily Picayune. 27, 30, 31, 1912; New
Orleans Item. August 30, 1912.
zlMoore to Behrman, August 11, 1912, vol. 5, CAP, CA,
NOPL.
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to Behrman again, but the mayor, armed with Moore's persua
sive opinion, declined to reconsider their request. Undeter
red, McCloskey and Merrick went to Governor Hall for assis
tance. Hall pressed Behrman for an accounting of the situa
tion. The mayor, irked by McCloskey and Merrick's pleas to
the governor, told Hall that the businessmen were overre
acting to Caffery's idle remarks and, as a consequence, were
misinforming him about the political situation in New Or
leans. There was, Behrman told Hall, no real threat of vio
lence and no likelihood of fraud occuring at the polls. The
city administration was capable of protecting its citizens
and preserving the public order without the assistance (or
interference) of the state government or a special, politi
calized police force. The Democratic party in New Orleans,
Behrman said, was capable of conducting its own elections,
rendering a fair and accurate count, and was willing to
abide by the results of those elections.22
On election day, September 3, the reform press reported
"unusually" heavy voting throughout the city, a sure sign,
it boasted of the League's impending victory. The Item was
surprised and pleased to report that the Regulars were
"manifesting an unusual disposition to play it fair". Obvi
ously, the Item wrote, the presence of Governor Hall in New
Orleans and the "visible" determination of the League to

22New Orleans Item, September 1-3, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. September 1-3, 1912.
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assure a fair election cowed the Regulars and lessened the
chances for violence and fraud at the polls. There was but
one serious incident and that, acccording to the Item, ap
peared to be more a matter of race than politics. There was,
however, nothing unusual or pleasing for the League about
the results of the elections. The RDO swept the parochial
elections. Chandler Luzenberg, ignored in the press, became
the new District Attorney, winning thirteen of the seventeen
wards and holding a 5,000 vote lead over Caffery and a 1,500
vote majority over the field of candidates. Caffery won the
uptown wards, the Twelfth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seven
teenth, nearly matching Hall's performance in the guberna
torial primary. Generally fared well in the downtown wards,
and, though his candidacy did not materially influence the
outcome of the election, by eating into the Regulars'
"normal" majorities, he gave false confidence to the
League's campaign for the commission council.23
The Regulars' unspectacular but complete victory should
have given the League second thoughts about challenging
Martin Behrman in the October municipal elections. Instead,
the GGL and the Item interpreted the results of the paro
chial elections as an indication of the League's ultimate
victory. The Item even went as far as developing a fanciful
23New Orleans Item, September 1-5, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. September 3-5, 1912; New Orleans Daily
States. September 9, 1912. Luzenberg received 18,719,
Caffery 13,689, and Generally 3,575. The Regulars predicted
a 1,200 vote majority for Luzenberg.
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thesis explaining the reasons for the ring's final defeat,
confidently announcing that "the old gods are dead". Over
the past four years, the Item wrote, the Regulars' margin of
victory in important primary contests had declined drama
tically. In 1908, the Regulars gave Jared Young Sanders a
10,000 vote majority in New Orleans, but the reforms and
pressures for reform instigated by the League since then had
worked to reduce the RDO's majorities for Michael and Luzen
berg. It was apparent to all, said the Item, that the people
were increasingly dissatisfied and disgusted with ring rule;
only the influence of professional politicians and the con
nivance of the ring's "animated payroll" kept the RDO in
power.
All that would end in October. The League maintained a
solid and experienced organization and added to its strength
and numbers every day. Men like R.G."Buddy" Gregory, Robert
O'Rourke, and the Comiskeys swelled the ranks of the League
and brought new confidence, experience, and, most of all, a
large number of active workers and voters to the League's
cause. Since May, when Samuel Montgomery became Registrar of
Voters, the League had removed hundreds of illegally regis
tered voters from the rolls. For the first time since dis
franchisement, the Item reported, the rolls reflected the
true composition of the voting population. The Item antici
pated, as well, a dramatic rise in the number of men voting
= ,,New Orleans Item. September 5, 1912.
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in October, nearly all committed to the purposes o£ anti
machine reform. In the January primary, nearly 40,000 men
voted for one of the three gubernatorial candidates, but in
the parochial elections only 33,000 men voted. According to
the Item, most all of the 7,000 who failed to vote in Sep
tember were supporters of the League (they had failed to*
vote because they were out of town on summer vacation), and
could be expected to vote Martin Behrman out of office on
October 1. The Item based its conclusion on a survey con
ducted by the League that showed that 500 men in the Garden
District precincts of the Twelfth Ward had failed to vote in
the recent elections. If other precincts and wards resembled
the Twelfth Ward, and the Item was confident they did, then
the GGL had not yet tapped its full complement of voters.
The Regulars, on the other hand, as the results of the paro
chial elections showed, had spent themselves completely.23
The GGL's canvass, of course, proved only that a few
hundred residents of Garden District had not taken interest
in the parish elections (not an uncommon occurence in Uptown
New Orleans, given John Parker's voting record), and said
nothing pertinent about how the rest of the city might vote
in municipal election. The Item's inventive analysis was as
inaccurate as it was misleading. Of the 40,000 men who voted
in the governor's race, only 3,500, not 7,000 chose not to
vote in the parochial elections. And, Chandler Luzenberg,
2SIbid.
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not Donelson Caffery, suffered more from the voters' loss of
interest. Luzenberg's total was twenty percent less than
than Michel's vote, while Caffery's vote was but two percent
less than Governor Hall's percentage. Joseph Generally, not
Caffery, contributed to Luzenberg's relatively poor showing.
Generally won ten percent of the vote, most of it coming
from the RDO's strongholds. In short, the Regulars had not
exhausted themselves, and any talk of their death was great
ly exaggerated.26
Realistically, there was no exaggerating the League's
growing sense of desperation. The campaign that began more
than a year before with much confidence and hope was by
early September, 1912 at the point of complete exhaustion.
The League approached the municipal elections without an
appreciable measure of popular support, without an issue
that might swing popular opinion in its favor, without
creditable leadership, and without, at least for the moment,
anyone willing to challenge Martin Behrman in the municipal
campaign. The Regulars were, to be sure, confident of suc
cess in the city elections. They had beaten the League in
New Orleans in convincing fashion in two major contests,
had weathered partisan charges of fraud and venality, had
thwarted efforts to legislate them out of office, had suf
fered only minor and temporary defections, and, most impor
tant of all, they had a successful and popular candidate to
26Ib id .
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lead their commission ticket, the incumbent mayor of New Or
leans, Martin Behrman.
The League began its public search for a mayoral candi
date as early as November, 1911. It considered a great many
possible candidates, but few men of the so-called "better
element" of New Orleans displayed much interest in seeking
elective public office, and fewer still relished the task of
trying to unseat Martin Behrman. Some League members, par
ticularly Samuel Montgomery, Marshall Ballard, and James
Thomson, hoped to draft John Parker as the League's nominee
for mayor, but Parker declined consideration, citing a long
standing reservation against seeking public office. Parker
believed that his candidacy would introduce undue partisan
ship into the campaign, diverting attention away from the
principal issue of ring rule and municipal reform. Parker
also believed that reforms like the nonpartisan primary, the
short ballot, and the commission council would discourage
professional politicians from seeking office and encourage
men of merit and intelligence to pursue public service.27
The choice of a mayoral nominee, then, was not nearly as im
portant as the selection of five compatible and progressive
businessmen to serve as commissioners.

27New Orleans Item, November 5, 19, 1911, January 5,
February 25, 27, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 98-99,
see fn. 17; "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism,"
146, see fn. 11.
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Less sanguine than the Parkerites about the ability of
businessmen alone to govern the city, the Item urged the
League to select "first class intelligent men" who were
either themselves experts in law, public finance, municipal
administration, or engineering or who were willing to employ
experts in governing the city. The League, the newspaper
wrote, must select nominees solely on their "moral, social,
and political" contribution to New Orleans, "regardless of
[the] advantages or disadvantages of birth, education, or
wealth". Above all else, the Item advised, the GGL's nom
inees must be above party and faction and must be able to
serve without regard to the "social, family, or personal
connections which would influence them away from the line of
duty...". Not surprisingly, though, the men most frequently
mentioned as possible mayoral candidates were among the
social and coromerical elites of the city.ZB
For nearly two weeks after Caffery's defeat, the execu
tive selection committee interviewed and evaluated potential
candidates. The committee spokesman, J. Frank Coleman, ad
mitted that perhaps the League had delayed too long in
naming its ticket, but the selection committee had encoun
tered some unexpected, though not entirely unwelcomed, dif
ficulties. According to Coleman, the League had so many fine

2"New Orleans Item, July 17, August 30, September 5,
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 23, 1912. Those men
mentioned most often were Leon C. Simon, Frank B. Hayne,
Crawford H. Ellis, and Leigh Carroll.
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candidates from whom to chose that selecting the five "best
men" was extremely painstaking and difficult. In addition,
the League sought a well-balanced ticket, one that was representive of the League's true composition and that appeal
ed to all classes of voters in New Orleans. This later as
pect had proven more perplexing than the selection committee
had anticipated, but, though the commission election was
only two weeks away, the League was confident of fielding a
complete ticket and just as confident, at least in public,
of complete victory.29
Privately, however, influential League members were not
so confident or anxious to "contest" the Regulars in the
municipal elections. In mid-September, Edgar H. Farrar, the
prominent attorney and reformer, proposed that the GGL aban
don its intention of fielding its own municipal ticket.
Instead, Farrar suggested that the League offer to form a
bipartisan municipal government with the Regulars. The plan
sounded plausible and attracted some consideration from the
executive leadership of the GGL. It allowed the League to
avoid another humiliating defeat and accorded the reformers
representation on the commission council. It also forced the
Regulars into recognizing the League as a potential equal,

29New Orleans Item. September 10, 11, 13, 14, 1912;
New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 6-8, 10-15, 1912.
Later, Coleman confessed that the committee had a very dif
ficult time persuading any of the "best citizens" to run on
the League's ticket.
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condoning its words and actions over the past year and
legitimating the League's agenda for municipal reform.
The executive committee, however, had a number of seri
ous reservations about Farrar's suggestion. In proposing it,
the League appeared unwilling to accept the decision of the
voters of New Orleans and seemed more concerned with politi
cal position than with reform. Even if the Regulars consent
ed to the plan, the professional politicians would continue
to dominate the municipal government, nullifying whatever
influence the reformers had with the municipal government.
As a minority on the commission council, the GGL would not
be able to set and direct public policy, but, as part of the
administration, the League would be accountable to the
public for the general tone and calibre of the city
government.
The executive committee was willing to "submit” to a
bipartisan government, but it was not willing to share power
with Martin Behrman. The League advised Behrman (not direct
ly, but through the reform press) that it would accept a bi
partisan municipal administration of three Regulars and two
League members, provided, however, that Behrman step down as
mayor. The Item termed the League's offer "serious and gen
erous," but Berhman rejected it, calling the proposal "friv
olous and insulting” . The League's plan, the mayor said, was
nothing more than a desperate attempt by the League to fore
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stall a final humiliation at the polls and to finagle itself
into office.30
On September 17, three days after the Regulars rejected
its "serious and generous" offer for a bipartisan city gov
ernment, the League announced its ticket. Four of the five
nominees were businessmen, but none of the four was from the
commerical elite of the city. The fifth nominee, Charles F.
Claiborne, was a lawyer, the lone "professional" on the tic
ket. With the exception of Claiborne, the League's nominee
for mayor, none of these men was well-born or particularly
well-educated. Though the reform press lionized them as
"sound, substantial, [and] eminently qualified" to serve on
the council, none of them was an expert in public law, fi
nance, management, or municipal government. Though four of
them served in prior reform administrations, their experi
ence in government was limited. These men did not come from
the commerical, managerial, or social elite (again excepting
Claiborne), but from the ill-defined and volatile social and
commerical middle class. And the League chose them, it would
seem, not because the dynamics of progressive reform dicta
ted their selection, but because political necessity forced
the hand of the GGL. These men alone agreed to run on the
League's ticket. They had previous, though limited, campaign
experience, and had served in city government before (again

3°New Orleans Item, September 14, 17, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. September 14, 17, 20, 1912.
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in limited and minor capacities), and they could, or so the
League hoped, appeal to every category of voter in New
Orleans.
Charles F. Claiborne was not the League's first (or
even second) choice for mayor, though from the beginning of
the metropolitan campaigns, he remained among the League's
prime candidates. Imperious in appearance and manner (he
looked and acted like a Creole grandee), Claiborne's quali
fications for mayor did not extend beyond his uncommon
family heritage (his grandfather was William C. C. Clai
borne) and his commonplace association with the antimachine
reformers as an "implacable foe of corrupt bosses and dis
honest politics". Despite his social pedigree and courtly
Southern mannerisms, the reform press portrayed him as a man
removed from the shallowness of "club life," who moved free
ly among all classes and character of citizens and who
shared the concerns and understood the needs of the common
man.32
Claiborne's public career and private concerns give
little indication that he shared the concerns of the ordin
ary citizens of New Orleans. As councilman from the Seventh
Ward (1888-1892, 1896-1900), Claiborne served as the chair-

31New Orleans Item, September 18, 19, 22, 23, 1912;
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 38.
32New Orleans Item, September 18, 19, 22, 23, 1912.
The League's selection committee wanted Leon C. Simon, a
securities magnate, as its candidate, but Simon refused to
leave his brokerage firm, Kohn, Weil, and Simon.
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man of the budget committee, a committee that did not formu
late the budget, but merely sanctioned its priorities and
expenditures. Later, as a member of the City Park Commis
sion, he and the other commissioners (all from the social
and commerical establishment) were responsible for making
the park more accessible and appealing to the public. These
achievements were the extent of Claiborne's public career,
a career confined to minor pursuits and interrupted by
twelve years of inactivity. Claiborne did nothing to dispell
these facts. He was a distant and ineffective campaigner,
content with repeating the League's antimachine slogans and
appealing to "the intelligent and thinking voters of New
Orleans". He was, in effect, no match for Martin Behrman.33
The other four League candidates, Louis Pfister, George
M. Leahy, Oscar Schumert, and Andrew J. McShane, were all
self-made businessmen and amateur politicians. Louis Pfister
was a second generation German immigrant, born in New Or
leans and educated in the Catholic school system. He served
as a member of the Orleans Parish Levee Board, the city
council, and the Public Belt Railroad Commission, under both
reform and Regular administrations. As a member of the coun
cil and the railroad commission, he urged the active and
strict regulation of all public utility monopolies, a common
concern of every administration since 1896. George Leahy too
was a native of New Orleans, and, like Pfister, served on
33I b i d .
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the city council from 1896-1900. Leahy was the president of
the Contractors and Dealers Exchange (the only "exchange"
member on the League's ticket) and president of the Security
Building and Loan Association. The Item called Leahy a man
of "well-balanced, sane, conservative, progressive, and sym
pathetic qualities," but made no mention of any public con
viction apart from his opposition to ring rule. Oscar Schumert, like Leahy, was the president of a savings and loan
association. Unlike the other candidates, though, Schumert
had no previous political exposure and experience. Andrew J.
McShane, a future mayor, was the best known and qualified of
the League's candidates. Hot-tempered and fearless (some ob
servers said senseless), McShane began and ended his politi
cal career as steadfast antimachine reformer. A serious and
sober campaigner, McShane was mindful of the League's disablities and limited appeal.
Ideally, these men were not the sort of ticket the GGL
selection committee had envisioned or that the League's
supporters had expected. With the exception of McShane, none
of these men, especially Claiborne, was particularly wellknown or, for that matter, recognized by the League member
ship as a leader in the antimachine movement. Their records
of public service and civic accomplishment were stale and
unexceptional, and they seemed content to rely on the tired

3,*New Orleans Item. September 18, 20, 22, 23, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 19, 20, 1912.
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adages and

remedies of the antimachine consensus for their

political guidance and support. They were, after all, little
more than afterthoughts; campaigning not so much to win the
election as to keep the reform movement from falling
apart.33
The RDO caucus met the week of September 11 to select
its commission council ticket. Amisdt rumors of dissent and
hard feelings, the caucus promptly renominated Mayor Behrroan
once again— and for obvious and compelling reasons. In addi
tion to being the recognized leader of the RDO, Behrman was
a man of immense personal and political popularity, a hard
working and progressivs mayor, and a proven campaigners.
Over the course of the week, the Regulars named the other
four remaining nominees. As expected, all four were busi
nessmen of substantial social and commerical reputations.
Although they were fairly active in municipal politics (one
of them had been a Citizen Leaguer and another a one-time
candidate for mayor), they were not tied formally to the
RDO. Only one of the four had held elective office before,
and, like the men on Claiborne's ticket, none of them had
direct or appreciable experience in modern city government.
Why, then, did the RDO caucus select these men for the com
mission council? Their selection suggests that the Regulars,
like the reformers, were committed to reform in municipal

33New Orleans Item, September 18-23, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune,. September 19-20, 1912.
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government. The modern municipal government demanded execu
tive experience and expert knowledge in the certain special
ized fields. But municipal politics required an appeal to
the demands of special interests and local considerations.
The business executive came closest to fulfilling those de
mands and requirements. In addition, in selecting business
men and other executives for office, the Regulars were
merely following precedent. Executive office required men
with executive ability and experience.2,6
William Bess Thompson, like Martin Behrman, was born
outside New Orleans, and he too was a large and generally
unattractive man. But apart from these similarities and
his love for the city, William Bess Thompson was everything
Martin Behrman was not. Thompson's father was a wealthy cot
ton factor who provided William with all the advantages and
trappings of wealth. Thompson attended New Orleans's ex
clusive private academies and later graduated from the Uni
versity of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee. Thompson studied
history and political economy under Herbert Baxter Adams and
Richard T. Ely at Johns Hopkins University, later receiving
a law degree from Columbia Law School. His academic years
behind him, Thompson returned to New Orleans to manage his
father's cotton firm, adding considerably to the family's
already substantial wealth. The New Orleans Cotton Exchange
3SNew Orleans Item. September 11-13, 15-17, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune,. September 11, 12, 15-17, 19, 1912;
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 39-41.
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(NOCE) elected Thompson its president first in 1907, then
again in 1909. In 1911, after resigning as president of the
NOCE, Thompson became president pro tempore of the Public
Belt Railroad Commission, a commission he and Behrman plan
ned to bring under the authority and control of the commis
sion council. Thompson's social standing as a member of the
Boston, Pickwick, and Southern Yacht clubs did not preclude
him or many men like him from endorsing Martin Behrman and
the RDO with their votes, money, and service.37
Harold W. Newman, too, was a wealthy and educated busi
nessman and an ambitious politician. He was the son of
Morris W. Newman, a banker and broker in utility securities,
whose large and commerically active family had at one time
controlled a large portion of the city public utility sys
tem. Harold Newman attended Tulane University, where he re
ceived a law degree in 1904. As a young man, Newman became
president of the New Orleans Stock Exchange. Despite his
family's existing and former ties with the public utility
monopoly, Newman called for a more formal and exacting
municipal regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light
Company.
In addition to his business activities, rather because
of them, Newman became interested in city politics and go-

37New Orleans Item, September 17, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. September 17, 20, 1912; New Orleans
Daily States, September 22, 1919; Hutson, "New Orleans' Ex
perience Under Commission Government,” 78-79.
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vernment. In 1908 Newman left the Democratic party, joining
the "Customhouse" wing of the Republican party (provoking
the Item to refer to Newman as a "political pharisee").
Newman's sojourn with the Customhouse Republicans lasted but
a few days. Later in 1908, Newman rejoined the Democrats,
announcing his availability for mayor of New Orleans. Four
years later he reestablished his party regularity by endor
sing John Michel for governor and supporting the Regulars in
the parochial elections. Despite his movement toward poli
tical orthodoxy, Newman kept his distance from the Regular
professionals. He would accept the RDO's nomination, he
said, only if the Regulars assured his complete independence
in office.30
Adolph G. Ricks was eighty years old in 1912, by far
the oldest candidate, and, besides Behrman, the only other
Regular with previous experience in municipal government.
Ricks came to America from Germany at the age of ten, set
tling in Paris, Texas, a cotton community on the Red River.
Ricks later moved to St. Helena Parish, then to New Orleans.
After the Civil War (Ricks was a Confederate veteran), Ricks
joined John Franks in the hides and leather business. From
his association with Franks, Ricks branched into brewing and
banking. He was the president of the New Orleans Brewing As
sociation, the Mutual Bond and Homestead Association, Title
Mortgage and Guaranty Corporation, and the Metropolitan Bank
38I b i d .

128
and Trust Company. His only other foray into city politics
came in 1896 as a member of the Citizens League and the city
council.3*
Edward E. Lafaye (pronounced laa fi), the Regulars
final choice for the commission council, came from an old
and respected Creole family. The Lafayes belonged to the
most exclusive social organizations and held offices in
several prestigious commerical and banking insitutions in
New Orleans. Lafaye, known throughout the city as E. E., was
a wholesale grocer and real estate developer, and, at
thirty-two, the youngest and least experienced candidate in
the campaign. The Item considered Lafaye a fairly competent
and progressive candidate, but far too young and inexperi
enced for such an important and exacting position in city
government. The Regulars' ticket, the Item wrote,, possessed
outstanding individuals with impressive credentials and
solid characters— they were, after all, from the business
and social elites of New Orleans. As a ticket, paired with
Martin Behrman and the RDO, however, they were but a "shirt
front," an admission of the failure of the ward-boss system
in general and the Behrman administration in particular to

39New Orleans Item, July 9, 1911, September 17, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 19, 1912; New Orleans
Daily States, September 22, 1912; Hutson, "New Orleans' Ex
perience Under Commision Government," 78.
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provide the type of leadership needed to make New Orleans a
modern/ progressive city.*0
The municipal campaign was mercifully short. After al
most two years of continuous campaigning, there was little
left to say. What was said and debated took place in the
newspapers and a few campaign rallies. The reformers took up
their familiar chant of ring rule, and the Regulars recited
their litany of accomplishments.
Martin Behrman, as the leader of the RDO and as the
chief executive of "government by boss," epitomized the
failures and inequities of the old politics. The ward-boss
system, the Item wrote, allowed likeable but shallow men,
like Martin Behrman, to rise above their station and talent,
corrupting politics and government by encouraging mediocrity
and rewarding incompetence. Behrman, the newspaper said,
"never was anything but a small-bore politician and chronic
office holder, (who] has demonstrated nothing but tempera
mental unfitness and utter incompetence in every large af
fair in which he was personally engaged..." His accomplish
ments in office were due to the foresight, initiative, and
skill of the "better elements" of New Orleans. Behrman and
the Regulars were not "evil men," the Item graciously ad
mitted, but were simply unlettered and unremarkable men.

*°New Orleans Item, December 15, 1911, February 22, Sep
tember 16, 17, 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. September
18, 19, 1912; Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience Under Com
mission Government," 73-79.
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"offensively swollen with the assumed right to control bet
ter men holding commission direct from the people" and fun
damentally incapable of administering a "great business like
the affairs of a city".*1
At issue was not just the selection of the five best
individuals or even the better ticket, the Item contended,
but the better system of politics and government. The wardboss system, the Item intoned, encouraged inefficiency and
corruption in government, retarding economic progress and
depriving the citizens of New Orleans of the benefits of
modern city life. It closed government to the people, dis
couraged participation in politics, and, as a consequence,
made a mockery of the democratic process. In the public
sphere, ring rule meant a "politicalized" assessment and
taxation system, unpaved and dimly lighted streets, uncol
lected garbage, high utility rates and fares, and poor pub
lic service. In the "private sector," political favoritism
shown to certain businesses and interests discouraged in
vestment and growth, kept prices arbitrarily high and wages
unnecessarily low, and placed the honest businessman under
the influence of corrupt public officials.*2
The very purpose of the League's metropolitan campaign,
the Item concluded, was the elimination of these wrongful
*1New Orleans Item, August 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. August 15, 1912; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor
and Political Boss," 35-36.
*2New Orleans Item. September 21-22, 24-26, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. September 26, 1912.
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political considerations and the establishment of a politi
cal system committed to public service and democractic prin
ciples and ideals. As long as "political" considerations
continued to warp the legitimate concerns of the people, New
Orleans would never reclaim its position as the "cultural
center" of the South or take its natural place among the
nation's premier cities .**
Martin Behrman responded to the Item's and the League's
criticisms and slurs with a simple recitation of the major
accomplishments of his administration. In his only major ad
dress of the campaign, Behrman took credit (with sufficient
justification) for the financial and physical improvements
in the city over the past eight years. Over the course of
his two terms, Behrman said, his administration gave the
city an improved financial and economic standing, extended
the water, drainage, and sanitation system, initiated major
improvements to the port, made the belt railroad a reality,
paved and lighted many streets, and made city government
more accessible, efficient, and expert. There was, in short,
the mayor said, no substance to the League's allegations of
mismanagement or political favoritism. The issue in this
campaign, Behrman concluded, was the difference between the
administration's proven ability and record of achievement

«3Ibid.
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and the League's meaningless sloganeering and its visible
inexperience.'■'•
Rain marred the final week of the campaign and threat
ened again the morning of the election. But by mid-morning,
the threat had passed, the clouds and rain moving rapidly to
the south and east. The rest of the day remained cool and
dry, and uneventful. The election was, despite predictions
to the contrary, never in doubt. Mayor Behrman and the Regu
lars won in impressive fashion, outpolling the League ticket
by nearly forty-two thousand votes and sweeping all five
commission positions. The mayor won all but two wards,
losing the Twelfth Ward by three votes and the Fourteenth by
only 210 votes. The other Regular candidates also won with
comparative ease. Harold Newman, who among the Regulars re
ceived the fewest votes, outpolled Andrew McShane, the
League's best performer, by more than five thousand votes.
Claiborne's performance was an embarrassment. Though he re
ceived thirty-seven percent of the vote, roughly the average

‘•‘•New Orleans Item, September 26, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. September 20, 21, 24, 26, 1912;
Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 45,
70-81; Schott, "The New Orleans Machine and Progressivism,"
144.
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for the League in New Orleans, two of his running mates,
Schumert and McShane, garnered more votes than he did.*9
As the mayor and the new commission council prepared
for a new administration, the Item consoled the League and
its supporters. The League's defeat in the municipal pri
mary, wrote the Item in a customary postmortem, did not
signal the end of the municipal reform movement in New
Orleans. Granted, the Item wrote, the League had a number of
organizational problems and some serious character flaws,
most notably its closed view of municipal reform and its
narrow "class" appeal. Its "natural" leader abandoned the
movement in mid-course, compelling secondary figures to
assume command. The League "compromised" its reputation and
credibility by conducting its campaigns on a single and
suspect issue, personal slurs, and false accusations.*6
There were, however, encouraging signs of the permanance and vitality of the municipal reform movement, the Item
wrote. Already, there were plans for the creation of a more

*9New Orleans Item. September 30, October 1-3, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. October 1-3, 1912; Williams, "Martin
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 46-47.
Regulars
League
Behrman: 23,371
Claiborne: 13,917
Thompson:23,039
McShane:
16,216
Lafaye: 22,267
Schumert: 13,962
Ricks:
22,035
Pfister:
13,493
Newman: 21,492
Leahy:
12,686
112,204
70,274
*sNew Orleans Item. September 30, October 2, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picavuner October 3, 1912; Williams, "Martin
Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss," 46-47.
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permanent and democratic reform organization. The new, yet
unnamed, organization would be a citizens' lobby and a per
manent political organization. As a citizens' lobby, the new
organization would promote the social and commerical inter
ests of the people of New Orleans. And, as a political or
ganization, it would contest the Regulars for control of the
municipal government.*'T
Despite its numerous difficulties and obstacles, the
Item remarked, the municipal reform movement achieved most
of its objectives. It elected an antimachine reformer as
governor, forced the enactment of a commission council char
ter, and compelled the RDO to nominate and elect businessmen
to the commission council. True, the League failed to remove
Martin Behrman and the RDO from power. But the League suc
ceeded in defining the issues and influencing the course of
municipal politics and government. It learned the limits of
"antimachine" reform, the strengths and weaknesses of the
Regulars, and something of the true composition of politics
in New Orleans. The League may not have "smashed" the ring,
the Item wrote, but it surely propelled the RDO in the di
rection of good government, and, in the process, weakened

‘,7£bid. The new organization did not last. Its "charter"
members, Donelson Caffery, J. Frank Coleman, H. Dickson
Bruns, Andrew McShane, J. Zach Spearing, and Charles F.
Claiborne could not sustain interest in the organization.
After a brief effort to rekindle interest failed, the or
ganization collapsed. See New Orleans Item. March 7-9, 1913.
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the foundation of ring rule and partisan politics in New Or
leans .‘•a
The Item's assessment of municipal politics and reform
needs qualification. After all, it was the Regulars, not the
League, that won all three primary contests in the city, ex
posing the limited popular appeal of the anti-machine munic
ipal reform movement. The new structure of city government,
crafted by the Regulars, promoted the demands for greater
public accountability and governmental efficiency without
threatening the principles and values of representative
municipal government. The election of Martin Behrman and the
new council assured the continuing influence of the RDO on
the content and course of public policy and municipal reform
in New Orleans. But, even more importantly, the election of
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organization
assured the continuing influence of every sort of political
interest, including that of the antimachine reformers, on
the content and course of city politics and municipal reform
in New Orleans.

'•"New Orleans Item, October 2, 1912; New Orleans, Daily
Picayune. October 3, 1912; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor
and Political Boss," 35; Schott, "John M. Parker," 120-12;
186-88, 204, 243-44; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Or
leans . 206-07.

Chapter Three

The Plying Horses

For Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organiza
tion, the mandate of 1912 was clear and unmistakable. The
Regulars had won three convincing and important primary vic
tories in New Orleans and had restructured the city govern
ment to satisfy the demands of popular politics and the re
quirements for a more effective municipal government. But
for Martin Behrman and the RDO the events of 1912 were more
than a popular affirmation of the policies and achievements
of past administrations. They were, as Behrman and the com
mission council envisioned them, a mandate for a popular re
distribution of political power among a greater array of
individuals and interests. The mandate of 1912 also demanded
the extension and consolidation of public authority in the
hands of the municipal government, allowing for a greater
public ordering of "private" concerns, particularly in the
areas of essential municipal services like gas, electricity,
and transit.
The redistribution of political power and the consoli
dation of public authority, however, were elusive reforms.
The mandate built by Martin Behrman and the RDO was so broad
that it lacked a clear and precise definition. As a conse
quence, the Behrman administration was all things to all
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people, incorporating every concern and every interest
under the broadest definition of the public interest. The
same political and social arrangements that permitted the
RDO to construct its coalition and enunciate its mandate
also allowed private individuals, independent public author
ities, and corporations to challenge or redefine in their
own interest the "public" mandate. As a result, an associa
tion of interests, both private and public, defined and
determined the course of municipal policy in New Orleans.
The formulation of public policy in New Orleans in the pro
gressive period was, then, hardly the workings of a calcula
ting, relentless, and indifferent machine. Indeed, the oppo
site appears to be true. Public policy in New Orleans may
not have been efficient, but it was democratic.
Meeting the demands of public policy and sustaining the
mandate for municipal reform, of course, fell to the new
commission council. When the council met for the first time
in December, 1912, it had to reshape the city administration
to suit the sense and provisions of the new charter. Though
the charter specified the various departments and divisions
in city government and defined some of the powers and re
sponsibilities of the government, it left the task of
creating the administration to the council. As the charter
required, the council assigned four commissioners (under
the charter, the mayor was the Commissioner of Public
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Affairs) to a particular position.x The council assigned A.
G. Ricks to Finance, William Bess Thompson to Utilities,
Harold W. Newman to Safety, and E. E. Lafaye to Property.
Then, with the assignments made, the council adopted its
first ordinance, installing the four commissioners, creating
all necessary departmental divisions, and prescribing the
powers and duties of all city officials and employees. With
in a matter of days, the council had "recast" the entire
city administration. The recasting of the city administra
tion, however, went beyond the installation of the commis
sioners or renaming the departments to suit the sense of the
commission system.2

In 1900, after several years of intense and often
bitter political debate, the city government under the RDO
created the Public Belt Railroad of the City of New Orleans
(PBRR) to further the flow of commerce from the port and to
xAct 159, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1912. There
were five departments: Public Affairs (mayor). Finance (vice
president of the council and acting mayor). Safety, Proper
ty, and Utilities. Early in the development of the commis
sion system, most charters did not require candidates to run
for a specific commission position. Rice, Progressive
Cities. 30.
2Most of the department and division heads were hold
overs from the previous administration. For example, Arthur
J. O'Keefe remained a fixture in the department of finance
as Deputy Commissioner of Finance, former councilman Alex
Pujol became Deputy Commissioner of Public Property for pub
lic buildings, and W. J. Hardy remained as City Engineer.
Ordinance Number 1, Commission Council Series, hereafter
cited as CCS: New Orleans Item. December 2, 18, 1912.
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prevent the major railroad lines from dominating the princi
pal industry in the city. The ordinances creating the Public
Belt Railroad also established a special governing body for
the belt railroad, the Public Belt Railroad Commission
(PBRRC). Upon the recommendation of several of the most im
portant commerical exchanges and business associations, the
mayor, with the consent of the council, was to appoint ele
ven of the sixteen members of the PBRRC (the mayor appointed
the other five, but those members represented the city and
its principal subdivisions). Operating through the PBRRC,
the city would construct, maintain, and operate the belt
railroad.3
In 1908, after several more years of debate and litiga
tion, the state legislature extended the protection of state
law and the state constitution to the belt railroad and the
PBRRC. The law, which later became part of the state consti
tution, authorized the Public Belt Railroad to issue con
struction bonds secured by revenue generated by the PBRR and
underwritten by a special city tax should those revenues

30rdinances 147 (1900) and 2683 (1904) New Council
Series hereafter cited as NCS. Bloomfield v .Thompson,. 64
Southern Reporter. 855; Behrman v. Louisiana Railway and
Navigation Company. 127 Louisiana. 775; Schott, "John M.
Parker," 58; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss,"
64-67. Three members of the PBRRC came from the Board of
Trade, two each from the Cotton Exchange, the Sugar Ex
change, the Progrssive Union, and the Merchants, Dealers,
and Lumberman Exchange. Three of the at-large representa
tives came from above Canal Street and the two remaining
commissioners were to represent the areas below Canal
Street.
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prove insufficient. The PBRR act of 1908, at the insistence
of the bondholders, vested "exclusive" control over the belt
railroad in the PBRRC and its executive officer, the presi
dent pro tempore. (Under city ordinance, the PBRRC selected
its executive officer from among those "appointed upon the
recommendation of the business exchanges". The president pro
tempore, in other words, could not be a direct appointee of
the mayor and council.) In effect, as several members of the
PBRRC argued, the act of 1908 wrested control of the PBRR
from the city administration, making the PBRRC an indepen
dent public commission similar to the Dock Board or the
Board of Liquidation.*
The Behrman administration, with its own proprietary
claim to the PBRR, disagreed with that interpretation of the
intent and effect of the 1908 law. The city administration
contended that the 1908 act gave the city the vested right
to operate the PBRR "through and by means of" the PBRRC as
organized and established by city ordinances. Those ordi
nances permitted the city to reorganize or reconstitute the
PBRRC as it saw fit. In effect, the Behrman administration

■•Act 179, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1908; Bloomfield
v. Thompson, 64 SR 854-56; Ordinances 147 and 2683 NCS.
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argued, the PBRR was not a public corporation, but a depart
ment of the municipal government.3
The Favrot charter of 1912 furnished the Behrman admin
istration with the opportunity of "reconstituting" the PBRRC
and asserting its authority over the PBRR and perhaps other
municipal utilities. The charter placed the PBRR under the
general supervision of the Commissioner of Public Property,
but the commission council, using its "discretionary
powers," authorized the Commissioner of Public Utilities
(CPU) to take "full and active charge, management, di
rection, operation, and control" of the PBRR. In short, the
CPU, by virtue of his office, would be the president pro
tempore of the PBRRC. The current president pro tempore was
William Bess Thompson, the Commissioner of Public
Utilities.6
The response of the commercial exchanges to the re
structuring of the PBRRC was swift and critical. In a letter
addressed to the entire council, the executive officers of
3John F. C. Waldo, assistant City Attorney to W. F.
Clarke, Secretary, Editorial Department, Atlanta Constitu
tion. December 27, 1910, vol. S, CAP. CA, NOPL. Though the
Exchanges could recommend appointees to the mayor and the
council, neither they nor the PBRRC had any authority
over appointments to the board. The laws and ordinances
governing the PBRR, wrote City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge,
did not invest the Exchanges or the PBRCC with a "vote or
right to determine either the qualifications of or who shall
be the members of that Board." See Kittredge to Mayor Andrew
McShane, March 11, 1922, vol. 9, CAO, CA, NOPL.
"Act 159, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1912; Ordinance
Number 1, CCS: New Orleans Item. December 19, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 20, 1912.
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the Board of Trade, the Progressive Union, and the exchanges
called on the council to repeal all provisions of the recent
ordinance concerning the PBRRC. Those provisions, the commerical executives contended, violated state and local laws
and ran counter to the original understanding of those who
furnished the funds for the PBRR. The true intent of the
original laws, they wrote, was to prevent any one person or
group from determining the policy of the PBRR and to remove
the decisions of the PBRRC from the common course of poli
tics .
The new ordinance jeopardized those considerations. It
concentrated power over the PBRR in the office of the CPU,
reducing the PBRRC to the level of an advisory board whose
advice was not sought and whose consent was not needed. As a
member of the commission council, the CPU served at the con
venience of the other four councilmen and at the pleasure of
a host of political considerations. The ordinance, then, did
not safeguard the PBRR; it could not clothe any person or
body with the necessary wisdom or political independence to
operate so vital a public utility.
The Item was more succinct. In its opinion, the com
mission council was without legal and "ethical" right to
operate the PBRR. The Behrman administration, the Item
stated, was not interested in public efficiency or in the

7New Orleans Item. December 19, 27,
30, 1912; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 31, 1912.
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"rightful centralization" of public power. The administra
tion merely wanted the political advantage that went with
controlling the PBRR. The logic of the commission council
system and the demands of the age, the Item intoned, re
quired greater efficiency and concentration of power in the
hands of the municipal administration, particularly in the
area of public utilities. But under the present circum
stances, as long as the Regulars controlled city politics,
to extend or concentrate authority and power in the munici
pal government would be a mistake. The best policy for the
administration would be to repeal all pertinent provisions
of the ordinance and to return control of the belt railroad
to the PBRRC.®
The city administration consented to hear the objec
tions and recommendations of the commercial exchanges. The
executives urged the commission council to repeal those por
tions of the ordinance dealing with the PBRR. Despite the
often clumsy and insulting remarks from the advocates of
repeal, the council agreed to set aside the ordinance. The
council insisted, however, on replacing the old ordinance
with one that satisfied the demands of the city government
and that addressed the concerns of the commercial exchanges.

°New Orleans Item. December 19, 22-24, 1912; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. December 20, 21, 31, 1912.
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Both sides agreed to meet soon after the new year to com
plete discussions on a "compromise" ordinance."
The conference collapsed soon after it began. The city
administration offered a new ordinance, which, it main
tained, accorded the city a more direct role in the opera
tions of the belt railroad but respected the authority of
the PBRRC over the general policy of the PBRR. The repre
sentatives for the commercial exchanges rejected the pro
posal, insisting that the sole purpose of the conference was
to ease the way toward repeal. Mayor Behrman was incensed.
The city administration sought a reasonable compromise with
the PBRRC, but the commission and the commercial exchanges
it represented, he said, acted in bad faith. The mayor an
nounced that the council would repeal the old ordinance
(thus keeping faith with the commercial exchanges and the
belt railroad commission), but would tie repeal to the en
actment of the "compromise" ordinance.xo
The new PBRR ordinance passed without opposition. The
ordinance made the Commissioner of Public Utilities an ex
officio member of the PBRRC, abolished the office of presi
dent pro temporer and created the position of "acting presi"New Orleans Item. December 30, 31, 1912, January 8,
1913; New Orleans Daily Picayunef December 31, 1912, January
9, 1913. The council selected Mayor Behrman, Thompson, and
Commissioner of Public Safety Harold Newman as its represen
tatives; the exchanges chose S. Locke Breaux of the Board of
Trade, William B. Bloomfield of the Sugar Exchange, and J.
W. Porche of the Progressive Union.
xoNew Orleans Item. January 8, 10, 11, 1913; New Orleans
Daily Picayune. January 9, 10, 1913.
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dent". The CPU would, by virtue of his office and position
with the PBRRC, serve as acting president. The ordinance
gave the acting president the "active charge, management and
control of the detailed operation" of the PBRR. Under the
new ordinance, the PBRRC would continue to set general
policy, but the CPU-acting president would be the sole
executive charged with carrying out the "general directory
powers" of the PBRRC.xx
In explaining its reasons for enacting the so-called
Thompson ordinance, the city government was both candid and
disingenuous. The city administration maintained that the
ordinance merely followed the logic and objectives of the
commission council system. It placed the administration of
PBRR under a single municipal executive, vested with powers
sufficient to make the belt railroad more efficient and pro
fitable. In another sense, the council agreed that the
Thompson ordinance hardly changed the relationship between
the city administration and the PBRRC. The CPU-acting
president held the same powers and the same responsiblities
as the president pro tempore of the PBRRC. As acting presi
dent, the CPU was accountable only to the railroad commis-

xxOrdinance Number 74, CCS; Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64
SR 856; I. D. Moore to Martin Behrman and the Commission
Council of the City of New Orleans, undated (probably
February 10, 1915), vol.7, CAP. CA NOPL; New Orleans Item.
January 14, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 11,
22, 1913.
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sion and was charged with carrying out the policies estab
lished by the PBRRC, not the city council.12
The ordinance clearly advanced the interests of the
Behrman administration. It brought the PBRR under the exe
cutive authority of the CPU and the control of the commis
sion council. The city administration would direct all as
pects of the belt railroad, regulating its development, man
aging its business affairs, and determining its labor poli
cies. The ordinance also relegated the PBRRC to an advisory
role, denying it the opportunity of selecting its own execu
tive officer and giving it only "directory powers". In its
application and effect, the ordinance made the PBRR— and by
implication, all other public utilities— subject to the
authority and power of the city administration, removing it
from the control of "private" concerns.
CPU Thompson admitted as much in explaining the coun
cil's rationale for passing his ordinance. The purpose of
the ordinance, he said, was to preserve the public ownership
of the PBRR. The belt railroad belonged to the city, not to
the PBRRC or to the bondholders. If the project failed, the
city, not the PBRRC, was responsible for the mortgage. But,
Thompson revealed, the PBRRC looked on the PBRR as its pri
vate reserve and concern. It ignored the inquiries of coun
cil and the mayor for information on the conduct of the belt

12New Orleans Item. December 19, 1912, January 14, 1913;
New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 20. 1912.
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railroad, refused to acknowledge the role of the municipal
government in the operation and development of the PBRR, and
defied the efforts of the city government to reassert its
authority over the PBRR. The position of the protesting ex
changes and the PBRRC, Thompson said accusingly, "is not
only a menace to the successful operation of the commission
system, but it is [also] antagonistic to the fundamental
principles of any just system of government".3-3
With the passage of the Thompson ordinance, the protest
of the exchanges and the PBRRC took another form. William B.
Bloomfield, a member of the PBRRC and the New Orleans Sugar
Exchange, filed suit in Civil District Court in New Orleans.
Bloomfield's attorney, Charles I. Rosen, a former Regular
and now bitter opponent of Martin Behrman, argued that with
the passage of the 1908 PBRR act, the city council was
"absolutely impotent and powerless" to reorganize the PBRRC.
The Thompson ordinance, he contended, was illegal because
it divested the PBRRC of the "control, administration, man
agement and supervision of the maintenance, operation, and
development" of the PBRR, thus violating state and city law
and jeopardizing the "pecuniary interests" of the bond
holders .

X3New Orleans Item, January 14, 1913.
X4New Orleans Item. January 13, 14, 23, February 24,
1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 14, 23, Febru
ary 25, 1913; I. D. Moore to Behrman and Council undated
(probably February 10, 1915) vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; Bloom
field v. Thompson. 64 SR. 856.
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City Attorney Moore, arguing for the council, disputed
Rosen's line of argument. The council authorized and under
wrote the construction and operation of the PBRR, he argued,
and, in two separate ordinances, created the PBRRC to carry
out the policies and operations of the PBRR. State law con
firmed the council's perogative to "reorganize" the PBRRC.
The council's recent actions did not "divest" the PBRRC of
control over the PBRR but merely exercised the council's
authority to reorganize the composition of the PBRRC and
to prescribe its duties and obligations in light of change
in the form and character of the municipal government.13
Early in April, after considering the case for more
than a month, Judge George H. Theard ruled for the city.
The city council, Theard wrote, possessed the authority and
power to reorganize the PBRRC and to define its powers and
duties. The commission council altered the composition of
the PBRRC, eliminating the position of the president pro
tempore, creating the position of acting president, and
making the the CPU the acting president. Though the council
could reconstitute the PBRRC and redefine its powers and
duties, exclusive control over the operation of the belt
railroad, Judge Theard said, must remain with the PBRRC.
The ordinance in question recognized that subtle relation
ship, "jealously" guarding the commission's authority over

13New Orleans Item, February 24, 1913; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. February 25, 26, 1913.

149
the general policies of the PBRR. The acting president pos
sessed powers that were only technical and operational, that
no commission, by its nature, could perform. The PBRRC, how
ever, retained ultimate power because it held thepowers of
review and approval over the actions of the acting presi
dent .X6
Meeting at the insistence of Mayor Behrman and CPU
Thompson and anticipating an appeal of the case to the
Louisiana State Supreme Court, the PBRRC refused to recog
nize the validity of the ordinance and the court's judgment.
The state Supreme Court initially declined to hear the case,
citing its lack of jurisdiction. But when the New Orleans
Board of Trade joined Bloomfield in his suit, the high court
agreed to hear the case on its merits.3-’7
As in the earlier hearing in the New Orleans Civil
District Court, the city argued that the ordinance did not
wrest control of the PBRR from the PBRRC, but only made a
distinction between the "detailed and technical" operations
assigned to the Commissioner of Public Utilties and the

16New Orleans Item, April 2, 1913; New Orleans Daily Pic
ayune. April 3, 1913.
^ W h e n Bloomfield appealed to the Supreme Court, the City
Attorney filed a petition claiming the court did not have
jurisdiction in cases involving less than $2,000. Bloomfield
claimed that te value of his bonds exceeded $2,000 because
the city ordinance would substantially lessen the market
value of his bonds and increase his tax burden. The court
found no validity in Bloomfield's argument. Bloomfield v.
Thompson 64 SR 659-60, 634-65; Moore to Behrman and Council,
undated, vol 7, CAO, CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. May 26,
1913.
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broad, directory powers of the PBRRC. Bloomfield argued,
as he had in Civil District Court, that state law precluded
the commission council from reconstituting the PBRRC under
any circumstances. In a divided decision, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Oliver O. Provosty, ruled for Mr.
Bloomfield and the Board of Trade. According to the high
court, state law and city ordinance required the PBRRC to
select its executive officer from among those commission
members recommended by the commercial exchanges and
appointed by the mayor. Nor could the council make a dis
tinction between the "detailed and technical" operations and
the "directory" powers of the PBRRC.xa
The burden of the court's opinion, however, focused on
the "political" intentions and effects of the Thompson or
dinance. The council, Provosty wrote, sought to wrest exclu
sive control of the PBRR from the commission, making the
PBRR a mere department within city government. Clearly, he
intimated, such action violated the original intention of
the earlier arrangements and compromised the understanding
between the city and the principal bondholders that a
special, independent commission would operate the belt
railroad. Finally, in what was unquestionably a gratuitous
remark. Justice Provosty found it "noteworthy" that the sole
beneficiary of the ordinance would be CPU William Bess
Thompson. As president pro tempore of the PBRRC, Thompson
18Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64 SR. 854-58.
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served at the pleasure of the commission; under the Thompson
ordinance, as CPU-acting president, Thompson would be com
pletely independent of the PBRRC. Justice Provosty con
cluded, then, that the sole purpose of the ordinance was to
"emancipate" Thompson from the control of the commission.x®
In declaring the Thompson ordinance unconstitutional,
though, the court did not state that the commission council
lacked the requisite authority to reorganize the PBRRC, but
only that there were severe limitations to the council's
powers of reorganization. Those limitations, however, im
plied that the council retained a measure of control over
the PBRRC, its detailed and technical operations and its
general directory powers. At the request of City Attorney
Moore and "in the public interest," the court sought to
clarify its decree annulling the Thompson ordinance. The
court declared that its decision annulled the Thompson or
dinance "only in part" and only "insofar as" the ordinance
undertook to make the Commissioner of Public Utilities the
"forced agent" of the PBRRC and only "insofar as" the ordin
ance divested the PBRRC of exclusive control and vested ex
clusive control in the Commissioner of Public Utilities.20
x"Bloomfield v. Thompson. 64 SR 857-63. Thompson main
tained that certain exchange members attempted to sabotage
his administration as president pro tempore by blocking
needed reforms in finance and management with "vexatious"
delays. Bloomfield claimed that Thompson wanted to and did
raid the PBRRC's treasury, burdening operations with a
sizeable deficit. New Orleans Item, January 4, 5, 1913.
2°Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, CAP, CA,
NOPL.
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The court had not spoken definitively on the city's au
thority to reorganize the PBRRC, but City Attorney Moore was
convinced that "at least inferentially,...the power to reor
ganize existed.” Apparently, William Bloomfield drew the
same conclusion. He sought a rehearing on the court's clari
fying declaration. The Supreme Court denied him a rehearing,
but Bloomfield found remedy in appealing Judge Theard's
original ruling to the Orleans Parish Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals nullified the Thompson ordinance, but it
based its ruling on the same grounds as the Supreme Court.
”It may well be stated at this time," the court wrote,
"that had a majority of the [Supreme] Court been of [the]
opinion that Act 179 of 1908 vested absolute and sole con
trol of the Belt Railroad in the Board of Commisioners, ex
clusive of any further authority over [it] in the City
i t s e l f . t h e Court would in that event have rested its
opinion on those grounds, as logically it should have done
had such been its view."21
"I am firmly of the opinion,” wrote City Attorney Moore
to the council, "from the several judgments rendered in this
case by the Supreme Court of the State and the Court of
Appeals, that the right of the council to reorganize the
Public Belt Railroad Commission undoubtedly and inquestionably exists, and that these decrees point unerringly to this
21Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, C AP. CA,
NOPL; New Orleans Times-Picayune. April 15, 17, June 16, 17,
1914.
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conclusion." But there were, as the courts reiterated often,
limitations to the council's powers over the PBRRC. "The
power to reorganize the Commission," wrote the Supreme Court
in its final declaration in the case, "does not vest any
jurisdiction in the Council to appoint the members thereof,
or to administer the Belt Railroad Commission otherwise than
through a Commission appointed by the mayor with the consent
of the Council." If the council decided to reorganize the
PBRRC, Moore cautioned, then it must avoid the objections of
the courts. The council could not create an ex officio posi
tion on the PBRCC; all members of the PBRRC (with the excep
tion of the mayor) had to be named specifically by the mayor
and confirmed by the council. The council also had the
authority to "prescribe" the powers, duties, and functions
of the PBRRC, but only the commission could carry them out.
The reorganization of the PBRRC, then, was a matter of
public policy— not legislative prerogative. As the courts
ruled (and as Bloomfield suggested in his suit), the only
proper way for the city administration to influence the
development of the PBRR was through appointment and other
political considerations— the very action the PBRRC and its
allies in the municipal reform movement wanted to eliminate
from public affairs.32

22Moore to Behrman and Council, undated, vol.7, CAO, CA,
NOPL; New Orleans Times-Picayune. October 25, 1914, February
10, 1915; New Orleans Item, February 11, 18, 1915.
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Mayor Berhman and the council obviously favored legis
lative

reform, as more than two years of litigation by the

administration showed, and they were not averse to using
political influence to gain control of the PBRRC.

They also

understood the dangers inherent in a forced reorganization
of the PBRRC.

Such action could prompt wholesale litigation

(could

the mayor, for instance, remove a member of the

PBRRC,

particularly one nominated by the commercial

exchanges?), exhausting the city's resources and diverting
its attention from other pressing matters.

Forcing the

resignations of uncooperative commissioners could open the
administration to charges of tampering with a vita public
utility for partisan reasons, an accusation to which the
Behrman administration was extremely sensitive.
Despite these misgivings, Mayor Behrman announced his
intention of reorganizing the PBRRC by forcing the resigna
tions of recalcitrant commissioners and by forcing the PBRRC
to recognize William Thompson as the commission's executive
officer.23

Charles Rosen, the counsel for the PBRRC, argued

that the mayor and council were without the legal power or
the ethical authority to reorganize the PBRRC, and he warned
the commission and the public of the administration's desire

23Late in 1913, after the Supreme Court rendered its
initial decree in the Bloomfield case, the PBRRC removed
Thompson as president pro tempore. New Orleans Item.
December 19, 23, 1913, February 11, 18, 1915; New Orleans
Times Picayune. February 11, 1915.
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to "politicalize" the PBRR and its commission.

Without

friends on the PBRRC and sensitive to accusations of poli
tical tampering, the Behrman administration could not force
the reorganization of the PBRRC.

William Thompson, deprived

of his position of executive authority on the PBRRC,
resigned from the PBRRC, his place taken by an associate
from the Cotton Exchange.2*
The commercial exchanges were determined to prevent the
"politicalization" of the PBRR and the commission.

For them

the PBRR was a "private" conveyance, one that they and the
city established and promoted for their convenience and
profit.

State law and the state courts protected them,

insulating their interests from public considerations.

They

had, in short, ample private and public power and authority
to resist the city government.

Their interest was also

sufficiently narrow and "partisan" as to not arouse public
suspicion or passion.

For a majority of the public, it

seems, the belt railroad dispute involved two established
elites— the private commercial exchanges and the city gov
ernment— jockeying for political and legal advantage.
public service was not at stake.

The

Sanitation, clean water,

streets, and public transit were essential services; largescale, commercial railroad service was not.
The controversy over the control and direction of the

2*New Orleans Item, February 19, 20, 23, 24, 1915;
Orleans Times Picayune. February 19, 20, 23, 24, 1915.
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belt railroad and the Public Belt Railroad Commission was
not, however, an isolated issue.

Rather, the dispute

between the Behrman administration and the PBRRC fit into
the larger public controversy over the character, control,
and direction of essential public services.

Beginning in

the 1890s, the commercial classes of New Orleans attempted
to define the character and to control the distribution of
those services considered genuinely public matters: water,
drainage, levee protection, the belt railroad.

With the

advent of the twentieth century, as inequities in service
and costs became more appartent, the citizens of New Orleans
demanded that the city government take a more active and
direct part in the distribution of public services.
For the city administration to take a more concerted
part in the distribution of basic city services, it had to
consolidate its political power and extend its governmental
authority over those independent boards and commissions that
lay beyond its reach.

That is, the Behrman administration

had to "politicalize" public services.

The Behrman adminis

tration believed, apparently, that the commission chater and
the selection of businessmen to the commission council would
allow it to consolidate authority and overcome the objec
tions of the commercial establishment to the "politicaliza
tion" of municipal policy and service. Such was the case
with the Public Belt Railroad Commission.
The PBRRC issue, however, did not compel the city ad-
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ministration to abandon its re£orm efforts.

Rather, the

Behrman government continued its efforts to bring other, in
some cases, less well-entrenched, public services under the
control of the city government.

The success of the adminis

tration in this area depended on its ability to command
legal and political authority over public services, gain the
cooperation of the business and profressional classess, and
meet the demands of a disparate community.

It was in and

under the streets (literally) that command and reform were
most elusive.
If the city administration could construct and operate
an immense public utility like the Public Belt Railroad,
could it also operate other public services carried along
the city streets?

It was a lesson not lost on the Behrman

administration or on a variety of "private" interests.
Whoever could define the character and direct the course of
the public services that traversed the city streets, could
determine the course of public policy in New Orleans.
The city government already possessed the "inherent"
and constitutional authority to determine the use of the
streets.

The basis of that authority, the so-called police

or inherent powere, wrote City Attorney Moore:
is predicated [on] the repeatedly affirmed proposition
that organized government has the inherent right to
protect the health, life and limb, individual liberty
of action, private property and legitimate use thereof,
and provide generally for the safety and welfare of its
people; not only does this right exist, but [also] this
obligation is imposed upon those clothed with the
sovereign power.
It is a duty sacred and cannot be
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evaded, shifted, or bartered away without violating
a public trust.
The City of New Orleans, by virtue of the authority dele
gated to it in the state constitution, specific legislative
acts, and the city charter, also possessed the power to
"enact and enforce all laws for the maintenance, advance
ment, and protection of life, safety, morals, comfort,
quiet, welfare, and prosperity of the people". The regula
tion of the city streets clearly fell under the council's
"inherent" power, Moore argued. "The use of the streets or
public highways is a right inherent in the people," wrote
Moore, but, "the manner and mode of using them may, however,
be the subject of proper regulation" by the city council.
The rights of private citizens and corporations to use and
profit from the use of the streets, the City Attorney's
office argued, were always subordinate to the rights of the
city to control and regulate the use of the streets.23
The right of regulation, however, was as Moore con
ceded, circumscribed the provisions of the state and fed
eral constitutions and the authority of the courts— and,
he could have added, subordinated to the interests of pri
vate citizens.

"The power to regulate invests the [council]

with a large discretion to determine what measures are
necessary to preserve the public interest and protect pri
23Gilmore to City Engineer W. J. Hardee, March 11, 1909,
vol.5, Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, vol.7, CAP. CA,
NOPL.
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vate rights," Moore remarked.

But, he added, "to justify

the [council] in interposing its authority on behalf of the
public, it must appear that the interest of the public
generally, as distinguished from a particular class, re
quires, such interference, and that the means are reasonable
and necessary for the accomplishment of the designed pur
poses and not unduly oppressive on the individual.

Thus,

the [council] cannot, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions
upon individual liberty, lawful occupation, or its use of
property, or the overthrow of vested rights."26
The city council, Moore explained, could choose the
occasion (the exigency he called it) for exercising the
police power of the city. But "under our constitutional
system, the judiciary determines the subjects and objects
upon which the power is to be exercised, and the reason
ableness of that exercise".

But the courts were incapable

of defining the police power of the state with any clarity
or precision, preferring to test each case on its merits
rather than constructing an abstract, and unenforceable
definition of the police power.

"Hence," concluded Moore,

"the difficulty when we come to discuss the proposition of
novel... regulations... and of knowing just what might or
might not be considered by the courts to be within the

26Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, ibid.
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'police powers' [of the city], and as to the reasonableness
of [its] regulations.nz7
For much of the first two decades of the twentieth
century, then, the city government of New Orleans could not
formulate a comprehensive and coherent policy concerning the
commerce and services carried over the city streets. The
methodical consolidation and eventual monopolization of the
public utilities industry in New Orleans from 1905 to 1916
compelled the Behrman administration to reexamine and, to
some degree, reconstructure its public utilties policy.
Beginning in 1912, the city administration sought a more ex
tensive regulation of the public service industry. Con
fronted by the concerted opposition of both private citizens
and public authorities, the Behrman administration achieved
only a few modest successes.2"

27Moore to Thompson, March 26, 1915, ibid.
zaGilmore to Hardee, January 25, 1906, vol.4, March 11,
1909, Moore to Hardee, November 12, 1909, Waldo to Moore,
May 14, June 16, 1910, Moore to Commissioners of Streets and
Landings, December 8, 1910, vol.5, Moore to Behrman, October
19, 1913, vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL.

Chapter Four

September Storms

Late in September, 1912, as the municipal campaign came
to an end, William Bess Thompson, the future Commissioner of
Public Utilities in the Behrman administration, spoke before
a modest crowd of supporters and newspaper correspondents
about the difficulties of public utilities regulation. If
the City of New Orleans was to become a modern, progressive
city, he stressed in his talk, then the next administration
(the first under the commission council charter) must demand
a more efficient and enlightened management of the public
utilities industry. The progressive management of companies
like New Orleans Railway and Light Company (NORLC) and New
Orleans Gas Light Company (NOGLC) required the city adminis
tration to fashion a reasonable and comprehensive policy of
municipal regulation that assured service at reasonable cost
and protected legitimate investment.x
The commission council under Mayor Behrman, Thompson
assured his audience, had no illusions about the difficul
ties of formulating and implementing a comprehensive and co
herent utilities policy. The mayor, the council, and the
RDO, Thompson said (he was, after all, confident of winning
the municipal election), were aware of the desperate need
xNew Orleans Daily States. September 26, 1912.
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for essential public services throughout the city. But
some areas of town, most notably the business and retail
sections clustered around Canal Street and the residential
areas in the uptown portion of New Orleans, were overdevel
oped, while many other less populated neighborhoods lacked
sufficient services. The city administration had to resolve
two serious problems before it could extend services to
those "undeveloped" sections of the city. First, the council
had to "persuade" NORLC and

NOGLC to extend service to the

underpopulated areas of the

city, foregoing an immediate and

discernible return on their investments in those areas.
Second, should NORLC and NOGLC require additional revenues
to fund expansion, the council had to convince the residents
living in the more populated sections of the city that any
increase in fares and rates

that funded the expansion of

services benefitted them as

well. In short, the Behrman

administration had to build a consensus that expansion of
these services was essential to the development and well
being of the utility companies and to a skeptical city.2
There were, Thompson suggested, even more immediate
considerations that had to be addressed before the Behrman
administration could devise a comprehensive utility policy.
The Behrman administration recognized that neither NORLC nor
NOGLC would submit willingly to regulation; indeed, the two
utilities had for years ignored the wishes and demands of
aIbid.
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the city government for better service, displaying their
contempt for regulation of any variety or capacity. Mayor
Behrman and the council did not condone the utilities' open
disregard for their obligations, Thompson said, but the city
government did not possess the "regulatory" authority to
force compliance. New Orleans, like other cities, attempted
to regulate the public utilities industry through three sep
arate methods: competition, taxation, and the contract fran
chise. None of these methods were at all effective, for they
did not guarantee service or compel compliance of the terms
of the franchise.

(Writing to the council in 1905, following

the final consolidation of the public services. Mayor Behr
man summarized the city's predicament. It was his experi
ence, he said, that the street railways company would appeal
to the sanctity of contract when it suited its interests and
would seek exemption from the obligations of contract when
those obligations threatened its interests. The only re
course open to the city government to compel service was,
he suggested, to sue for forfeiture of the franchise, surely
an empty and counterfeit public policy.)3
The consolidation and monopolization of the public
utilities industry in the first decade of the century accel
erated the reexamination of the "regulatory" policy and
practices of the city government. The public was increas
3Ibid.; Martin Behrman to City Council, August 12, 1905,
Mayor's Correspondence. Letters Mayor's Office, hereafter
cited as MCLCO, vol., 90, CA, NOPL.
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ingly dissatisfied with the quality and cost of service,
and with the inability of the city administration to compel
better service and to regulate costs. Though the public de
manded reform, Thompson said, it was confused and disturbed
by the welter of reforms urged by students of the public
utilities industry. The public's confusion was justified,
for there was serious and legitimate disagreement among ex
perts over the most efficient and expedient form of regula
tion. Students of the public service industry proposed three
basic forms of regulation: state government regulation, mu
nicipal government regulation, and a combination of state
and municipal regulation that served as a transition between
regulation and municipal ownership. Each of these reforms
promised the effective regulation of the public service in
dustry, compelling the utility companies to furnish essen
tial services at reasonable costs and at a legitimate profit
and, as students asserted, ending the abusive practices long
associated with utility investment and management.4
These reforms also had a residual effect. Each of them
promised that it would "depoliticalize" the public utilities
industry, reducing, if not eliminating, the corrupt influ
ence of the utility companies on the municipal government
and city politics. Advocates of these reforms claimed that a
4New Orleans Daily Picayuner September 26, 1912; David
Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 219-36; Delos F.
Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Franchises,"
National Municipal Review, hereafter cited as NMR. 3 (Jan
uary 1914), 13-27.
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select, independent board of regulators could determine the
quality and cost of service and set the standards of finan
cial conduct for the utilities companies without reference
to politics as usual. What distinguished one form from an
other was the extent and degree of influence "politics as
usual" would have on the regulation of public service util
ities. Advocates of state regulation (most of whom were
critics of the Behrman administration or managers of NORLC
and NOGLC) contended that municipal regulation under the
Behrman administration would not remove politics from the
regulation of the utility companies but only further "polit
icalize" and corrupt the public service industry. The Behr
man administration, as Thompson explained, viewed municipal
regulation as a more forceful and expedient form of regula
tion, permitting the city government to exert a more direct
and immediate influence on rates, fares, and service (Thomp
son made no reference to labor-management issues) than state
regulation. And it dismissed as partisan suggestions that
municipal regulation meant the "politicalization" of public
service and the public service companies. As Thompson and
the Behrman administration understood, the intention of mu
nicipal regulation was to bring the public utility companies
under the direct and expedient review and control of those
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people most affected by them.B
The Behrman administration, however, could not dismiss
with easy assurance allegations suggesting that it favored
municipal "regulation" for its own interests. Critics of the
Behrman administration accused it of entering into an "un
holy alliance" with NORLC and NOGLC against the interests
and needs of the citizens of New Orleans. These critics
charged that the Behrman city government stood by idly as
the two giant, "alien" corporations (NORLC was an holding
company owned by "Yankee" banks and investment houses and
NOGLC had its beginnings in the 1870s under the Radical Re
publicans during Reconstruction) absorbed the smaller, more
competetive, locally-owned streetcar and electric companies.
The Regulars, opponents alledged, permitted NORLC and NOGLC
to ignore or abuse their franchise obligations, tolerated
their financial excesses, favored them with scandalously low
tax assessments, and allowed the two companies to siphon
millions of dollars in bloated revenues from the citizens of
New Orleans in return for deficient and, at times, dangerous
service. In exchange for these favors, NORLC and NOGLC fun
nelled thousands of dollars into the political campaign
chest of the Regular Democrats, giving them yet another un-

BNew Orleans Daily Picayune, September 26, 1912. Though
from time to time the Behrman administration considered the
benefits of municipal ownership of the transit, electric,
and gas services, it dismissed municipal ownership as infea
sible given the city's brittle financial conditions.
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fair and unscrupulous advantage over the forces of reform.*
When the residue of this corrupt alliance became appar
ent in the form of high rates and inferior service, critics
asserted, the RDO and the Behrman administration, anxious to
turn the utility reform movement to their own advantage, be
came the advocates of utility regulation. The Regulars and
the city administration, of course, opponents contended,
were never serious proponents of utility regulation. In the
debate over the commission council charter, the Regulars, at
the direction of Martin Behrman and City Attorney Moore, de
liberately scuttled the original municipal regulation pro
vision that allowed for the expropriation of NORLC and
NOGLC, substituting instead a provision that gave the coun
cil only the power to revoke existing privileges. The
authors of the original provision claimed that expropriation
was the most prudent means of acquiring municipal ownership,
and that without the right of ownership the city could never
regulate public services. Municipal regulation under the
Favrot charter and the Behrman administration, they said,
meant the continuation of the abuses of the past and, prob
ably, the "politicalization" of the employees of NORLC and

"New Orleans Item, October 30, November 2, 4, 1911, Feb
ruary 22, 1912; Schott, "John Parker," 107-08; Reyonlds,
"Machine Politics," 48-9; T. Harry Williams, Huev Long. (New
York, 1969), 284-5, 200-303; Adam Fairclough, "Public Ser
vice," 45-51.
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NOGLC.
These allegations were themselves partisan and without
foundation, portraying the Behrman administration as both
the corrupt master and the slavish agent of NORLC and NOGLC.
Nevertheless, several knowledgeable and sympathetic histori
ans of the Behrman administration have accepted these accu
sations with only a few modest revisions. These historians
contend that the Behrman administration was not completely
subservient to the two utility companies, but that it enjoy
ed a "most cordial," indeed almost "too cordial" relation
ship with them. The rationale for this cordial relationship,
they argue, was neither corrupt nor political, but ideolog
ical. According to these scholars. Mayor Behrman and his
associates in the RDO possessed "an almost naive faith" in
the practical and civic virtue of businessmen and the city
administration and the Regulars considered their alliance
with NORLC and NOGLC as "both natural and in the best inter
ests of the community as a whole” . As a consequence, the
commission council under the Behrman administration acceded
to the wishes of the utility companies in opposing state
regulation, ignoring the legitimate concerns of consumers
''New Orleans Item. September 25-27, 1912; Ethel Hutson,
"New Orleans’ Experience Under Commission Government," NMR.
6 (January 1917), 74; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and
Boss," 81-4, 154. The charge leveled at the RDO concerning
the expropriation provision was groundless since expropria
tion was an unsound and ineffective means of achieving mu
nicipal ownership. In an expropriation suit, the court, not
the council, would set the ultimate price for the utility
companies.
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and just demands of labor, and defeating efforts to "munici
palize" transit, gas, and electric service. 8
These contentions too are without foundation, and are
based, apparently, on a cursory review of the documentary
evidence and political circumstances concerning the regula
tion of the public utilities industry in New Orleans. The
Behrman administration, as we will see, did not form any
alliance, unholy or otherwise, with NORLC and NOGLC, and its
relationship with the two utility companies, though never
antagonistic, was never amiable or "too cordial". Though the
Behrman administration relied on the expertise and advise of
businessmen in civic and political affairs (businessmen com
prised a majority of the new commission council and sat on
the major independent boards and commissions of the munici
pal council), the mayor and the RDO did not profess a naive
faith in the ability of businessmen as a class of citizens
nor did the administration believe that the business commu
nity possessed dispassionate commitment to the general wel
fare of the community. The events of the past twenty years,
in particular the consolidation and, in 1905, the monopoli
zation of public utility service, the steady erosion in the
quality of service and the increase in rates, the growing
dissatisfaction of consumers and riders, and the constant
antagonism between labor and management dispelled any

"Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss," 81-4, 154;
Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 49-50.
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notion on the part o£ city o££icials that the businessmen
who managed the public service utilities sought the "best
interests of the community as a whole".9 These events— and
not the corruption of an indifferent political machine or
the naive and feckless belief in the civic virtue of the
management of NORLC and NOGLC— determined the response of
the Behrman administration to the difficult circumstances
and problems of public utility regulation.

In the early 1890s, prior to the introduction and de
velopment of the electrified streetcar in New Orleans,
eight, independent, and relatively competitive street rail
way companies controlled the mass transit system of New Or
leans. By 1901, after the electrification of the streetcar
system, there were but two utilities companies, and between
them they controlled the electric power companies and the
lone gaslight company. By the end of that year, in 1902,
there was but one utility company (the gaslight company re
mained an "independent" subsidiary until the 1920s), and
ownership had passed from local businessmen to regional and
national holding companies controlled by New York and Phila
delphia investment houses. Technology, in the form of the
electric streetcar, and innovations in the realm of business
"Behrman to the City Council, August 12, 1905, vol. 90,
MCLMO. CA, NOPL; Raymond Oscar Nussbaum, "Progressive Poli
tics in New Orleans," 96-124; David Paul Bennetts, "Black
and White Workers: New Orleans 1880-1900," (Ph.D. disserta
tion, University of Illinois, 1972), 393-448.
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organization, management, and finance, in the form of the
modern corporation, and huge and steady profits from a
fortuitous combination of an expanding urban population, de
clining prices, and a guaranteed fare generated the movement
toward consolidation and monopoly in the street railway,
gas, and electric industries.3-0
Initially, electrification sharpened the sense of com
petition among the eight companies as large and small com
panies alike borrowed heavily from "local capitalists" in a
hectic, almost frenzied, effort to electrify their opera
tions and to generate higher revenues and greater dividends.
Eventually, however, electrification accelerated the move
ment toward consolidation and monopolization of the public
utilities business, for the cost and maintenance of the
electrification of the streetcar lines far exceeded the rev
enue and credit of any individual company or the "local cap
italists" of New Orleans.xx
The consolidation of the utilities industry began, at

10New Orleans Public Service Incorporated, Reclassifica
tion of Electric Plant. Statements "A" to "I" Inclusive.
(New Orleans, n.d.), 15-17, 28-31; Fairclough, "Public Util
ities," 45-48; New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919; Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American
Business," Business History Review. 33 (Spring 1959), 1-31;
Charles Hoffman, "The Depression of the Nineties," The Jour
nal of Economic History. XVI (June 1956), 145. The eight
street railway companies were: New Orleans and Lake, Cres
cent City, Canal and Claiborne, New Orleans and Carrollton,
Jefferson and Lake Pontchartrain, St. Charles Street Rail
road, Orleans and Jefferson, and Orleans Railroad.
ia-New Orleans Item, April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public
Utilities," 45-47.
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least at first, at home and under the direction of two
groups of local investors. Late in 1892, on the eve of elec
trification, C. D. Wyman and several associates formed the
New Orleans Traction Company (NOTC), a quasi-operating and
holding company, capitalized at nine million dollars.12 With
this initial issue of stock, NOTC bought the controlling in
terest in two street railway companies, the New Orleans City
and Lake Railroad and the Crescent City Railroad. NOTC "pur
chased" control of the two "traction" companies by manipula
ting the purchase of their stock. The stockholders of the
two "underlying companies" would not agree to unification
unless NOTC gave their stock a "preferred basis of securi
ty," turning common and preferred stock into bonds and pay
ing dividends to stockholders in the form of rentals on pro
perty leased from the two underlying companies.13
The common practice of turning stocks into bonds with
guaranteed rates of return added more debt— and little real
investment— to NOTC. With the purchase of the two underlying
companies, NOTC had no money to electrify the 115 miles of
track now under its control. To carry out the electrifica-

12NOTC issued capital stock of $7.5 million ($5 million
in common stock and $2.5 million in preferred stock) and a
bonded debt of $1.5 million bearing six percent interest.
NOTC offered the bonds and the preferred stock at "liberal
discounts," issuing common stock as a bonus to those who
purchased bonds and preferred stock. Many local financiers
took advantage of the opportunity to "earn" dividends on
the inflated stock value, an opportunity they soon came
to regret.
“

Ib id .

f
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tion of the streetcar system, NOTC borrowed nearly $10 mil
lion from New York trust companies. The weight of NOTC's do
mestic and "foreign" debt proved too heavy for it to bear.
In 1898 NOTC defaulted on its local debt, failing to pay its
"rental dividends" to the underlying companies. To stave off
bankruptcy , NOTC bondholders levied a $1 million assessment
against themselves to meet the rental and interests payments
to the stockholders of the underlying companies. The assess
ment prevented the collapse of NOTC, but it did not end the
financial crisis facing the company. In February, 1899, in
vestors in the NOTC, under the guidance of Robert M. Walmsley, the president of the Louisiana National Bank and the
vice-president of NOTC, reorganized NOTC as the New Orleans
City Railroad Company (NOCRC). The NOCRC absorbed the debt
and obligations of the NOTC by turning stocks into bonds and
offering common stock in NOCRC as a bonus for the purchase
of preferred stock and secured bonds in NOCRC. The New Or
leans Item estimated that Walmsley's NOCRC pumped an addi
tional $4.2 million of watered stock into N O C R C . D e s p i t e
its financial difficulties, NOCRC controlled and electrified
a major portion of the street railway system of New Orleans,
owned and operated its own "power house" (the New Orleans
Power House Company, Limited), and promoted the consolida-

x*New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public
Utilities,"48-49. Between 1893 and 1899, NOTC-NOCRC pur
chased the St.Charles, the Orleans, the Orleans and Jeffer
son railway companies.
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tion of the electric street railway industry in New Orleans.
The NOTC-NOCRC also served as a model for a second
group of local investors eager to consolidate the ownership
and operation of the remaining independent companies under a
single ownership and management. In the early 1890s this
second group of investors, led by the powerful brokerage
firm of Isadore Newman and Sons, owners of the New Orleans
and Carrollton Railroad Company, began the electrification
of the lines of the New Orleans and Carrollton (the oldest
line in the city), the Canal and Claiborne, and the Jeffer
son and Lake Pontchartrain.

By 1899, Newman and the other

investors had absorbed the Canal and Claiborne line (the
Jefferson and Lake remained a subsidiary) and had made plans
to buy two "electric light" companies. In 1901, the consor
tium of investors formed the New Orleans and Carrollton
Railroad, Light and Power Company (NOCRLPC), purchasing the
New Orleans and Carrollton, the Merchants Electric Company,
Limited, and the Edison Electric Company. The Newmans and
their partners capitalized the NOCRLPC at $7.5 million and
were careful not to issue securities that exceeded the
earning power of the underlying companies.3-9
19NOPSI, Reclassification. 15-17; New Orleans Item. April
6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47. In November,
1900, the Merchants Electric Light Company reorganized as
the Merchants Electric Company. The Edison Electric Company
was the result of the consolidation of the Edison Electric
Illumination Company and the Louisiana Electric Light Com
pany. The merger and absorption of these two companies into
the NOSCRLSPC was so successful that preferred stock sold at
par and common stock at eighty percent of its face value.

In general, however, consolidation of the utilities in
dustry increased capitalization by geometric proportions. In
1888 capitalization for all New Orleans utility companies
did not exceed $5 million. But, by 1897, at the height of
the electrification movement, capitalization stood at $22
million, and in 1901, on the eve of monopolization, capita
lization for both of the major utility companies probably
exceeded $36 million, a sum critics charged exceeded the
"actual" value of the investment in the operating companies.
The businessmen who fabricated the consolidation of the
utility industry in New Orleans defended consolidation as
a practical business consideration and as a civic virtue.
Consolidation, they claimed, promised greater business effi
ciency and progressive economies, permitting the utility
companies to plan the extension of services, improve the
quality and reduce the cost of service, and generate higher
profits for the company and dividends for stockholders. (A
large proportion of the profits would, presumably, be
returned to the community in the form of improvements in
service or a decrease in rates. The increase in profits
would also be returned to the community in the form of addi
tional investments.) Consolidation would perforce promote
the expansion and development of New Orleans, virtually as
suring the city of greater tax revenues to fund necessary
social services like schools, libraries, roads, street
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lighting, and sewerage and drainage systems.a-**
The consolidation of the street railway companies, con
trary to the public expressions of the new utility managers,
did not improve service, lower costs, initiate greater effi
ciency, practice "progressive economies," or promote the
civic and social advancement of New Orleans. The sole design
and purpose of merger and consolidation was to gain control
of the market; to expand the investment opportunity of local
and "foreign" (northeast) capitalists. After the consolida
tion of the streetcar lines, service remained incidential to
revenue and profit. The financial obligations of the new
corporations compelled them to ignore the obligations of
their franchises (consolidation and merger did not relieve
the new companies of the franchise obligations of the under
lying companies), curtailing service without the consent of
the city council, refusing to honor the "transfer" system,
and avoiding their paving obligations. Least of all, consol
idation failed to advance the physical and social betterment
of New Orleans, consolidation did not win the good will of
the people or government of the city. Throughout the 1890s
and well into the next century, the utility compamies and
the public bickered over the quality and cost of services.
The companies resisted efforts to improve or maintain the
level of services, willfully ignoring the terms and
xaThomas Ewing Dabney, "Public Services of New Orleans"
(typescript in the possession of New Orleans Public Service,
Incorporated, n.p. n.d.).
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restrictions of their franchises. The city government, oper
ating within the limitations set by law and precedent (and
working under both "machine" and reform administrations),
achieved only grudging compliance from the streetcar and
utility companies, often resorting to expediency and compro
mise in dealing with public service.17 The attitude and be
havior of the utility companies (and the success of the
municipal ownership movement under the Sewerage and Water
Board) convinced some influential members of the municipal
government that the city should own and operate transit,
gas, and electric services.x*
The consolidation of the public service utilities did
not result, however, in the municipalization of the street
railway and utility companies, but in the loss of local own
ership and management, the erosion of public control over
the essential services of the city, and the monopolization
of those services by a single corporation, itself operated

X7Nussbaum, "Progressive Politics," 114-24; Gavin Wright,
"Regulation in American History:The Human Touch," Reviews in
American History. 14 (June 1986), 166-67. The two notable
exceptions were the city government's response to the two
bitter and costly street railway strikes of 1892, which pre
ceded a general strike, and 1902. In both instances, the
city administrations of John Fitzpatrick (1892-96) and Paul
Capdevielle, both Regular Democrats, compelled the companies
to settle the strikes in favor of the union. (In 1892, the
companies and the reactionary press dismantled Fitzpatick's
settlement by appealing to the governor to break the
strike.)
x"Walter C. Flower to Leonard Darbyshiere, October 6,
1897, vol., 72, HCLMO. CA, NOPL; Flower to James Higgins,
April 25, 1900; Paul Capdevielle to James C. Henriques,
June 25, 1900, vol., 79, ibid.

for the benefit and profit of "alien" stockholders and com
mercial bankers. Late in the fall of 1901, the New York Se
curity and Trust Company sought the consolidation and con
trol of NOCRC, NOCRLPC, New Orleans Gas Light Company, and
the four other independent street railway companies. By
early 1902, the trust company had acquired a majority of
the capital stocks in the streetcar companies to justify
the creation of company to manage its holdings and operate
the underlying service companies. In January, 1902, the New
York Security and Trust obtained a charter from the State of
New Jersey, incorporating the New Orleans Railways Company
(NORC) at a

mere $5 million. NORC offered the security

holders of NOCRC, NOCRLPC, and the other companies the
option of selling their stocks and bonds at a price fixed
at five dollars above their local selling price (at the
time New Orleans had its own stock exchange) or of exchang
ing one stock for another. Since NORC preferred exchanging
one stock for another, it proposed converting preferred
stocks into bonds, discounting its preferred stock, and
issuing common stock as a bonus on all exchanges.3-"
By early Hay, with the consolidation plan near comple
tion, the New York investors recapitalized NORC at more than
$72 million. (Estimates concerning the precise recapitalizaX3Reclassification, 28; New Orleans Item. April 6, 1919;
Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47. Most security holders
exchanged their securities for those of NORC. The notable
exception was the Newman family, who demanded and received
cash (rumored to be in gold) for its holdings.

tion are muddled and confusing, ranging from a low of $72
million to a high of $98 million.)20 Under the terms of the
recapitalization plan, each of the "constituent" or under
lying companies— the streetcar and electric companies and
NOGLC— retained its own corporate identity and maintained
legal ownership of the franchises and the physical proper
ties. In practice, however, NORC owned and controlled each
of the operating companies, holding nearly all the mortgage
bonds and the preferred and common stock and operating the
underlying companies through interlocking management and
boards of directors.23The underlying companies, however, could not generate
enough revenue to operate the system and satisfy the demands
of NORC's bloated bonded debt. Within two years of the com
pletion of the consolidation and monopolization plans, the
New York Security and Trust Company, renamed the New York
2°The recapitalization estimates compiled by successor
companies show that NORC issued $40 million in bonds to
purchase the securities of NOCRC and NOCRL&PC, make improve
ments, and buy the securities of the underlying operating
companies and NOGLC. Company "records" show that NORC issued
$10 million in preferred and another $30 million in common
stock for a total of $80 million for recapitalization. The
Item reported that NORC spent $58 million for the purchase
of the securities of the underlying and holding companies
and floated $40 million to capitalize NORC. New Orleans
Item, April 6, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 47.
21By 1903, NORC owned ninety-two percent of the stocks
and bonds of all underlying companies. By 1916, NORLC, the
successor company to NORC, owned all but 222,000 shares in
all subsidiaries. Reclassification, 31; Simon Borg and
Company v. New Orleans Citv Railroad Company, et. alia..
244 Federal Reporter 617, hereafter cited as Borg v. NOCRC:
New Orleans Item, March 17, 1916; New Orleans Daily States.
April 5, 1916; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 46-47.

Trust Company, petitioned a federal court in New Jersey to
place an embattled NORC into the hands of a receiver. The
court obliged the trust company, appointing Elwin C. Foster,
the president of NORC, as the receiver. Several days later,
the federal district court in New Orleans joined the pro
ceedings, appointing New Orleans businessman Pearl Wight as
receiver and relegating Foster to the role of "ancillary*1
receiver.22
Soon after NORC went into receivership, the new State
Attorney General, Walter Guion, brought suit against NORC,
contending that NORC violated the incorporation law of the
state. The receivers and Guion settled the suit out of
court, agreeing to incorporate any successor corporation
under Louisiana law and to reduce capitalization to $60
million— a $12 million (or $38 million) reduction in capi
talization. The reorganization and refinancing plan, under
the supervision of the New York Trust Company, called for
the incorporation of a successor company, the New Orleans
22In September, 1902, union workers for NORC struck the
company for more money and an open shop contract. The union
immoblized the streetcar system, blocking lines and cutting
power lines. Despite these tactics, the union had the sup
port of the public and the city administration. Unable to
run its cars or to break the strike, NORC agreed to the de
mands of the union. Dismayed by the strike and by the pyra
miding of stocks by the company, Attorney General Omer
Villere brought suit against NORC. He later dropped the suit
when NORC agreed to settle the strike and to refrain from
issuing more stock. Reclassification. 31; New Orleans Item,
April 4, 1916; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 50-51;
Charles G. Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike
of 1929-30," (M.A. thesis Tulane University, 1970), passim.
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Railway and Light Company, that would assume the financial
and contractual obligations of the old corporation. The plan
allowed NORLC to issue $30 million in bonds to secure the
bonds of NORC and its underlying companies and to make a
series of physical improvements. The new company also issued
$30 million in stock ($10 million in preferred, $20 million
in common) to buy the remaining securities of NORC and to
meet the expenses of promotion in the "formation and organi
zation of this corporation and in acquiring and bringing
about the purchase of the property rights and franchises" of
NORC and its constituent companies.23
NORLC, like its predecessor, was both a holding company
and an operating company. NORLC did not own a single street
car, a foot of track, utility poll, power house, or repair
shop. NORLC owned nearly every piece of common and preferred
stock in each of the underlying, operating companies, con
trolling those companies through a single board of directors
and management staff. NORLC operated the lines and services
of the underlying companies by leasing the streetcar lines
a3Reclassification, 31-36; New Orleans Item. April 2, 15,
1915, April 6, 13, 1919; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 47.
Despite the sizeable "reduction" in capitalization of NORLC,
several critics, in particular, Dr. Valentine K. Irion, the
founder of the Municipal Improvement League, argued that the
latest settlement retained $24 to $25 million in "watered
stock". An audit conducted by Charles E. Wermuth in 1919
was unable to determine the precise valuation of NORC and
its constituent companies. But, as Adam Fairclough points
out, with a funded debt of $159,000 for every mile of track
and $9.00 in "investment" for every dollar earned, there is
little doubt that a sizeable portion of the stock of NORLC
was water.
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and other facilities owned by those companies and paying
rent in the form of dividends on the preferred and common
stock. For example, NORLC owned 98.94% of the preferred and
97.23% of the common stock of the New Orleans City Railroad
Company, controlling the voting interests of that company.
New Orleans City Railroad owned and operated fourteen separ
ate street railway franchises which it leased to NORLC. In
lieu of rent, NORLC paid yearly dividends of $62,500 on the
preferred stock and $50,000 on the common stock. Those divi
dends, of course, went to the company that owned the common
and preferred stock— NORLC .**
At first, Elwin Foster, the president of NORLC and the
receiver for NORC, convinced new the board of directors for
NORLC and the public that the latest reorganization had in
deed worked a financial miracle, making NORLC into a profit
able and efficient venture. In fact, from the start, NORLC
was on the verge of collapse. The underlying companies could
not produce enough revenues for NORLC to meet its "rentals"
and other operating expenses. Between 1905 and 1907, NORLC
paid its "fixed charges" and unearned dividends with money
secured from the sale of bonds. When the recession of 1907
closed off bond sales, the management of NORLC faced yet
24Simon Bora v .NOCRC 617; New Orleans Item, March 17,
May 22, 23, November 26, 1916; New Orleans Daily States.
April 4, May 22, 23, July 24, 1916. The NOCRC operated the
Tchoupitoulas; Annunciation; Colisium; Dryades; Peters; Mag
azine; Camp and Prytania; Rampart; Dauphine; Levee and Bar
racks; Canal; Bayou St.John; Esplande; and the Lake and Villere.

183
another financial crisis. Only the acquisition of an emer
gency loan from the Interstate Bank and Trust Company and
the tireless work of Hugh McCloskey, the chairman of the
board of directors for NORLC staved off bankruptcy. The loan
permitted NORLC to meet its immediate financial obligations
and McCloskey's dedication and tight-fisted management
allowed NORLC to borrow additional, larger sums from New
York and Philadelphia banking and investment houses for the
rehabilitation of NORLC and its underlying companies.29
Despite the efforts of local bankers and businessmen,
like Hugh McCloskey, the rehabilitation of NORLC and its
underlying companies never really took place. In effect, the
so-called rehabilitation allowed investment bankers to con
solidate their hold on the utility industry in New Orleans
and the South. In 1908 the Philadelphia firm of Bertron,
Griscom and Company (reportedly with the aid of loans from
the Standard Oil Company) began acquiring the capital stock
of NORLC.

(Bertron, Grison also purchased a sizeable portion

of the Consumer's Electric Company, the only remaining inde

29New Orleans Item, September 26, 1911, February 16, 29,
1912, February 21, 1918, April 13, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States. November 11, 1913.

f
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pendent utility in New Orleans.)2® By 1911, Bertron, Griscom
(now Bertron, Griscom and Jenks), through its holding com
pany, American Cities Company (ACC) had acquired through
purchase eighty-eight percent of the preferred and ninetyseven percent of the common stock of NORLC. With its
holdings in NORLC, ACC mortgaged the underlying companies
and NOGLC, draining them of their earnings and compelling
NORLC to borrow additional funds to meet its "fixed" obliga
tions to its stockholders, namely, the American Cities Com
pany. With the dividends it received from NORLC, ACC pur
chased control of utility companies in Birmingham, Houston,
Knoxville, Little Rock, and Memphis.27
The success of ACC in consolidating its holdings and
managing its properties naturally attracted the attention
and interest of larger, more resourceful companies. Near the
end of 1912, two large holding companies. International

2®Reclassificationr 37; New Orleans Item, February 14,
16, 1912, November 16, 1913, February 19, 1918, April 13,
1919; New Orleans Daily States. February 19, 1918. In 1903
several New Orleans businessmen, among them Maurice J. Hart,
a former councilman with interests in several streetcar com
panies, and former mayor, John Fitzpatrick, formed the Con
sumer's Electric Company. The company faltered under the
competitive advantages of NORLC, and in 1908 filled for
bankruptcy. The courts appointed Samuel Insull as the re
ceiver for Consumer's. Insull attracted investment for out
side the city and reorganized the company under the name
Consumer's Electric Light and Power Company. The CEL&PC be
came part of NOPSI in 1926.
37American Cities hoped to exchange its stock for the
stock of NORLC, but the offer was complex and unsatisfactory
to the owners of NORLC. New Orleans Item. December 12, 13,
1911, February 29, 1912, February 19, 1918, April 13, 1919;
New Orleans Daily States. February 19, 1918.
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Water Power Company of London (IWPCL) and United Gas and
Electric Corporation (UGEC) began efforts to control ACC and
all its underlying companies, including NORLC. The IWPCL, as
its name implies, sought to develop and promote the use of
hydroelectric power in the United States, particularly in
the southern states with their great supply of water and
their even greater need for electric power. Though IWPCL
hoped to generate thousands of hours of hydroelectric power,
it had no large and reliable network of buyers for its
power. The purchase of ACC would, of course, resolve that
problem.28
United Gas and Electric already controlled several
utility companies in the northeastern United States and
wanted to control more. In the summer of 1912, Bertron,
Griscom and Jenks, in need of more capital for its utility
ventures, agreed to a merger of its Susquehana Railway,
Light and Power Company, a holding company that held the se
curities of Consumer's Electric Light Company, and

United

Gas and Electric Company. The merger would allow Bertron,
Griscom and Jenks to "rehabilitate" its holdings and for the
new company. United Gas and Electric Corporation, to absorb
ACC. The interests of IWPCL complicated the rehabilitation
and absorption of ACC. IWPCL purchased one-third of the com
mon stock of ACC and held an option on the remaining stock.

2BNew Orleans Item, November 15, 19, 1912, August 12, 16,
20, 31, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. November 19, 1912.
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IHPCL declined to exercise its option, and was content with
its position as a "limited partner". UGEC eventually absorb
ed American Cities, gaining control of an immense network of
public utilities, including those operated by NORLC.2"
The public and fulsome promises of monopolization, like
the promises of consolidation, were never fulfilled. Monopo
lization did not further the financial and physical rehabil
itation of NORLC and its constituent companies or improve
services and lower costs or restore public confidence in the
public utility industry.30 To the contrary, monopolization
accomplished none of those ends. The financial excesses and
corporate arrangements of monopolization saddled NORLC with
an exorbitant debt (reported to be $72,000,000), a debilita
ting set of obligations, and a "foreign" ownership that de
prived the New Orleans public service companies of the reve
nues needed to underwrite the costs of improving service.
2"Reclassification. 38; New Orleans Daily Picayune.
August 9, 1913; New Orleans Itemr August 23, 1912, August
11, 20, November 16, 1913. The franchise of the Consumer's
Electric Company prevented its sale or transfer to any com
petitive company. Since ACC owned and operated NORLC, it
could not purchase Consumer's Electric. Bertron, Griscom and
Jenks had Susquehana Railway, Light and Power purchase Con
sumer's Electric, bringing all utility companies in New Or
leans under the control and eventual management of a single
corporation.
3°In 1916, ACC and UGEC consented to the consolidation of
NORLC with its underlying companies. In essence, the plan
allowed NORLC to assume actual ownership of the operating
companies. Officials for NORLC and ACC explained that the
new arrangement merely allowed NORLC to better manage its
properties, replacing an informal business arrangement with
a formal and structured arrangement. Boro v. NOCRC 244 FR
617-21; New Orleans Item. March 17, April 22, May 22, 23,
July 19, November 26, 1916.
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Under the monopoly enjoyed by NORLC, the quality of public
service deteriorated and the cost of service increased, an
tagonizing an already skeptical public and galvanizing it
and the municipal government to the threat monopoly posed
to public service and to local self-government.31

In September of 1911, the Consumer's Electric Light and
Power Company, without the knowledge or consent of the city
council or any other civil authority, raised its rates for
electric lighting and power by an average of seventy-five
percent. When local merchants and manufacturers complained
about the unexpected and, in their view, unwarranted in
creases, Consumer's Electric, confident of its position,
threatened to discontinue service until customers agreed to
the new rates. Several merchants and manufacturers contacted
NORLC about electric light and power service, but NORLC, os
tensibly the principal competitor of Consumer's Electric,
denied service to the businessmen, compelling them to sub-

3XTestimony of Jacob K. Newman, Proceedings of the Feder
al Electric Railway Commission. vol.l, 566; New Orleans
Item. November 11, 1913, June 14, 25, 1914; Fairclough,
"Public Utilities," 46, 53. The Behrman and McShane adminis
trations consistently disputed claims by NORLC that its
valuation exceeded $72 million. City officials placed the
actual investment and value of NORLC at $45 million. For a
more detailed account of the valuation issue, see Chapters
Five, Six, and Ten. For the decline in service, see the
numerous letters written to the Commissioner of Public Util
ities in Petitions and Coorespondence, Department of Public
Utilities, vols. 1 and 2, CA, NOPL. See also John F. C.
Waldo to Moore June 30, 1910, vol.5 CAP. CA, NOPL and Moore
to Thompson, January 6, 1913, vol.6 ibid.
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mit to the rate increases imposed on them by Consumer's
Electric. Angered by the actions and tactics of the two
power companies, individual merchants and the Merchants and
Manufacturers Exchange complained about the quality and cost
of electric service to the Progressive Union, an association
of businessmen, professionals, and civic leaders.32
Appearing before the Board of Directors for the Pro
gressive Union, the protesters accused the utility companies
of conspiring to drive up their prices in willful violation
of the terms of their franchises and in total disregard for
the best interests of their customers and the welfare of the
city. There was, they argued, no justification for raising
the electric rates; the costs of production had remained
steady for some time, NORLC and Consumer's Electric already
enjoyed "virtual monopolies" in New Orleans, and rates in
New Orleans were already higher than in other cities of com
parable size and population. The terms of the franchises
prohibited them from increasing rates without the consent of
the city government, and that consent surely required the
good will of the people of New Orleans. Finally, the pro-

32New Orleans Item, September 8, 13, 15, October 30,
November 3, 1911, February 16, 1912. The Progressive Union
was, like so many other business and professional associa
tions, quite active in the civic and "political" affairs of
the city, though the Progressive Union was careful to avoid
partisan politics. In 1913 the Progressive Union reorganized
as the Association of Commerce, and, though its membership
and leadership remained unchanged, it became an opponent of
the Behrman administration. See New Orleans Item, December
14, 1911 and May 4, June 26, 1913.
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gress and well-being of the city depended upon the public
services provided by the utility companies. High rates for
basic services did not promote the expansion of services or
the improvement of existing ones. The first priority of the
public service companies, then, was service, and only by
meeting the demands for quality service would the utility
companies prosper.

(Neither the board nor the merchants

seemed anxious to offer a specific reason why Consumer's
Electric and NORLC were compelled to raise their rates.33
And no one questioned the "authority" of the Progressive
Union to behave like the city government in investigating
accusations against the utility companies.)
The utility companies denied allegations that they had
conspired to raise rates and they asserted that there was
precedent— and justification— for raising rates without the
consent of customers and the local civil authority. Hugh
McCloskey, the president of NORLC and chairman of its board
of directors, insisted that NORLC and Consumer's Electric
were competitors, intent on providing service to their cus
tomers and producing a profit for their stockholders. But
neither NORLC nor Consumer's Electric could continue provid
ing service or producing profit without an increase in the

33It was apparent to most observers and critics of the
utilities industry in New Orleans that the financial obli
gations incurred during the reorganization and consolidation
of Consumer's Electric and NORLC forced the increase in
rates for electricity and gas. New Orleans Item, February
11-14 1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 14, 1912.
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rates charged for electricity. In many ways, McCloskey told
the members of the Progressive Union, unrestained competi
tion and politics were responsible for the present condi
tions in the utilities industry in New Orleans. When Consummer's Electric began operations, it set its rates below
the cost of production, hoping to entice customers to use
its services rather than those of NORLC. Its tactic failed,
and Consumer's Electric petitioned the federal courts for
relief. The federal district court in New Orleans granted a
rate increase to Consumer's Electric which placed its rates
still below those of NORLC. Political pressure from the
Board of Trade and the commerical exchanges for a system of
"uniform" rates and fees, forced NORLC to reduce its rates
for electric service. Because of the loss of revenue,
brought on by unwitting competition and unremitting public
pressure, McCloskey said, NORLC was forced to postpone im
provements and expansion to meet current needs. With the de
mand for more and better service increasing, McCloskey con
tended, neither the city nor the utility companies could
survive with rates that impaired service and undermined in
vestment. Service, McCloskey remarked, was secondary to in
vestment; there could be no service without the unqualified
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protection of investment and profit.3*
Neither the merchants nor the utility companies offered
any specific evidence about electric rates and service, and
the Progressive Union declined to express an opinion or to
pass judgment on the matter. The Progressive Union was con
cerned, however, with the quality and cost of electric ser
vice in New Orleans and it instructed its Municipal Affairs
Committee (MAC), chaired by music store impresario Philip
Werlein, to make a careful study of service in New Orleans
and to compare it with service and costs in other major
cities in the region and the nation. Werlein promised to
conduct a thorough and judicious investigation, affording
every one a fair and considered hearing and providing the
MAC with the time and evidence to complete its study and to
make sound recommendations.39
The Werlein committee, however, was thorough and judi
cious to a fault. The committee met infreguently and always

" N e w Orleans Item. November 3, 8, 9, 12, 1911.
McCloskey's rendition is at variance with the public record.
Consumer's Electric petitioned the federal court to initi
ate a rate increase for electric service. When the court
approved the increase for Consumer's Electric, NORLC raised
its rates without petitioning the courts or the council. In
stead, NORLC sought the "approval" of the Board of Trade.
Despite its objection to the increases for service, the city
administration was unable prevent the increases. Later,
though, the Behrman adminsitration learned that Consumer's
Electric had overcharged customers and the mayor and council
ordered a refund. Consumer's Electric eventually reduced its
rates.See New Orleans Item. November 1, 1910, April 26,
1912, April 15, 1913, November 16, 1914.
" N e w Orleans Item. October 30, November 3, 1911.
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behind closed doors. The pace and conduct of the investiga
tion aggravated the merchants and manufacturers. Early in
November they formed the New Orleans Electric Rate Associ
ation (NOERA) and began their own study. The NOERA did not
conduct an exhaustive study of the utility industry in New
Orleans, but its observations were perceptive and its recom
mendations sound. The NOERA acknowledged that service and
investment were related, and it conceded that Consumer's
Electric and NORLC were entitled to a reasonable rate in
crease, ranging between ten and twenty percent. The utility
companies, however, demanded increases of between sixty and
one hundred percent. The explanation for these outrageous
demands, the NOERA explained, was simple. Electric and gas
rates were not based on the cost of service, but on the cost
and demands of investment. The excessive cost of service
was, as the NOERA claimed, imposed "from above" by the com
panies that held the securities of NORLC. The regulation of
the quality, extent, and cost of service, then, depended on
the regulation of the internal workings of the public ser
vice utilities. Clearly, the NOERA declared, no ad hoc
association of businessmen possessed the authority or the
mandate to regulate the public utilities industry. That
responsibility, the association believed, fell to either the
state or municipal governments, and it recommended the
creation of a public service commission to regulate the
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public actions

of the

utility companies

and to assure the

well-being of the people of New Orleans.38
The NOERA

did not suggest, however, that the Progres

sive Union or the

MAC abandon

their efforts

while waiting

for the state legislature or the city administration to form
a public service commission. The merchants and manufacturers
recommended that the Progressive Union and the NOERA conduct
a joint investigation of the electric rates in
hoping to

wrest some

New Orleans,

immediate concessions and relief from

NORLC and Consumer's Electric. The NOERA also suggested that
the two associations commission a professional survey of the
entire utility business in
need for

New Orleans

as evidence

a public service commission in New Orleans.37

The businessmen who formed the Progressive
on the

Union were,

whole, skeptical about the municipal regulation of

the utility industry in New Orleans.
were anxious

they were

practices of

NORLC and

its competitors, but

reluctant to invest such power in a "politicized"

authority

recognized

In general businessmen

to impose stability and order on the corporate

and financial

public

of the

that

like
high

the

Behrman

utility

rates

administration.

They

and marginal service

3BNew Orleans Item. November 3, 8, 9, 11, 12, 1911, Feb
ruary 22, 1912. Werlein defended his methodical approach to
the regulation of rates, claiming that it was his belief,
impressed upon him by the officers of NORLC, that a reduc
tion in the rates for commerical users would result in a
rate increase for domestic customers.
37New Orleans Item, November 11, 12, December 14, 15,
1911, February 22, 1912.
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placed the city at a "competitive

disadvantage" in attract

ing new businesses and jobs to New Orleans, jeopardizing the
"growth and development" o£
quality of

the

city

diminishing the

life of its citizens. Convinced that the manage

ment of NORLC and Consumer's Electric
ation of

and

shared their appreci

the "public good," the leaders of the Progressive

Union suggested that NORLC
their rates

and

Consumer's

Electric reduce

to the levels before the "recent adjustment".3"

The Progressive Union, however, expressed no

desire to

question the financial policies or the business practices of
NORLC and its parent companies, or to acknowledge

the rela

tionship between service and investment, or to recommend the
creation of a public service commission for New Orleans. The
majority of the men who formed and led the Progressive Union
possessed many of the same beliefs,
as the

interests, and dislikes

men who managed NORLC and Consumer's Electric. Un

doubtedly, many of these men considered regulation an
necessity that

confirmed the rights of private property and

assured property a dominant voice in the public
When Hugh

discourse.

McCloskey announced that the rights of the stock

holders were his principal concern and that service
city was

evil

to the

secondary to that concern, no one in the Progres

sive Union challenged him or his statement. When,
1912, NORLC

in early

"adjusted" its rates for commercial and indus-

3®New Orleans Item, November 11, December 14-16, 1911,
February 22, April 10, 1912; Schott, "John M. Parker," 11215, especially footnote 46, 114-15.
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trial customers without the knowledge or "consent" of

the

Progressive Union, few members protested and only one member
called for public regulation of NORLC.39
There was,

as well, a financial and personal relation

ship between the Progressive
companies. NORLC

was a

Union

and several

successor, the Association

contributed to

the Progressive

members of the Progressive Union's board of

directors had interests in the utilities
Closkey, the

other utility

leading banks, with vast holdings

in utility securities, also
Union. Several

the

consistent and generous contributor

to the Progressive Union and its
of Commerce,

and

industry. Hugh Mc

president of NORLC and chairman of its board,

along with several other members of the board, were also
members and

officers of the Progressive Union.90 The pres

ence of these men in the
effort of

Progressive Union

impeded the

the Werlein committee to investigate the public

service industry in New

Orleans and

to bring

industry under

the utilities

jaundiced the attempts
public regulation.

Finally, despite their cordiality, the Progressive Union and
the Behrman

administration were for some time suspicious of

39New Orleans Item. February 13, 16, 29, 1912; New Or
leans Daily Picayune. February 15, 29, 1912. When NORLC
raised its rates, several members wanted the Werlein commit
tee to broaden its study, and they requested to see the
"books" of NORLC. To their shock, NORLC refused to disclose
its financial records, and the investigation ended.
9°New Orleans Item December 14, 15, 1911, February 22,
1912, May 4, June 26, 1913. New Orleans Progressive Union
Roll-Call of Members. Directors, and Committees, film 1861,
Division of Microfilms and Newspapers, Troy H. Middleton
Library, Louisiana State University.
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(at times

hostile toward)

each other. And even among those

in the Union who favored the public regulation
the other

of NORLC and

utility companies, there was an open and abiding

distrust of the Behrman administration and the Regular Demo
cratic Organization

that frustrated the effort of the Pro

gressive Union and other civic associations to influence the
policies and practices of NORLC and other utility companies.

The Behrman administration felt frustrated by its rela
tive inability to affect the quality of service or influence
the conduct of the public utility corporations that
New Orleans.

served

The administration understood, perhaps better

than its critics realized or admitted, the complexity

and

perplexity of the public utility question. The mayor and the
council, as we have seen, recognized
need

for

quality

utility

the city's

service at rates and fares that

were reasonable and beneficial to the public and
tors. Efficient

desperate

the inves

and effective public service, the adminis

tration reasoned, contributed immeasurably to the growth and
development of the city, extending and improving the quality
of life

in New

consistently for

Orleans. The
rates and

Behrman administration argued
fares based on the cost of ser

vice, but it argued with equal
turn on

fervor for

a reasonable re

"actual" investment. "Reasonable" rates would bene

fit every one in the city. Reasonable rates made for

a more

competitive New Orleans, sustained commerce, attracted busi
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ness and industry, advanced
service, and

the

expansion

and

quality of

assured a consistent profit for the company.

The Behrman

administration understood,

then, the con

nection between service and investment and it recognized the
necessity of
through the

promoting

service

and

protecting investment

public, municipal regulation of both. The city

administration under Martin Behrman did not, however, as its
critics charged, advocate municipal regulation to either ad
vance its own partisan interests or those of NORLC or to
circumvent the

demands for municipal ownership. As we shall

see, the Behrman commission council advocated

public, muni

cipal regulation as the most direct, effective, and democra
tic means of curbing
tions. And,

the excesses

of the

utility corpora

though it seriously considered municipal owner

ship for gas, electric, and transit service, the Behrman ad
ministration discarded

the idea as impractical for New Or

leans. The Behrman administration

considered municipal own

ership too expensive; the city could not afford the costs of
purchasing or reproducing the gas, electric, and transit
systems. (From

time to time the council discussed buying or

reproducing the gas and electric systems, leaving transit in
private hands.) There was no guarantee, either, that munici
pal ownership would immediately and immeasurably reduce
rates or

expand and improve service.

Consolidation and
as municipal

monopoly promised

the same benefits

ownership— quality service, cheap, competitive
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rates, consistent, reliable revenues that could fund the ex
pansion and

development of services— without the financial

expense or political liability. But,

as

the

needs

of the

city went unmet and as costs rose, the administration became
skeptical of the so-called benefits of consolidation and
and monopoly.

Consolidation and monopolization did not fur

nish greater and more efficient service or promote the phys
ical and

social development

of the city. It promoted stock

manipulation and contributed to declining services,
prices, and

rising

the increasing disregard for the obligations of

franchise and the values of good citizenship.
Despite its

skepticism, the Behrman administration had

relatively little influence over the course
of consolidation

and development

and monopolization. They simply lay beyond

the authority of city government. The Behrman administration
had no authority over the formation or conduct of investment
banks and

holding companies

outside Louisiana

(or, for

that held

their charters from

that matter, inside Louisiana).

The Behrman administration had no legal authority over stock
issues and

it had

no authority

to prevent or sanction the

purchase of the New Orleans utility system to
side investors.

It had no recognized authority to set rates

and fares except through
terms and

local or out

its limited

authority to

set the

conditions of utility franchises, levy taxes, and
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contract for services.'*3Before consolidation

and monopolization, regulation of

the public utilities industry
in the

in New

Orleans, as elsewhere

urban United States, consisted of the enforcement of

the obligations of franchise,
were designed

taxation, and

contracts. All

to promote the development of public services

and protect private investment without compromising the pub
lic

interest.

Even

before consolidation, however, though

surely not obsolete, conventional
responses to

methods proved inadequate

the question of utility regulation. Though

franchises contained specific terms and obligations,— fares,
schedules, number

of cars at rush hour, paving and lighting

requirements, bans

on overcrowding— they

were often diffi

cult to enforce. The only remedy for chronic or willful dis
regard for the terms
forfeiture of

of the

franchise was

for the

the franchise. The utility companies also ar

gued for a literal interpretaion of
chise (when

to sue

the terms

of the fran

it suited their interests), asserting that they

■^George T. Bartley, Assistant city Attorney to Moore
October 14, 1910, vol.6, Moore to Behrman July 24, 1911
vol. 6, Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between Febru
ary 13 and 19, 1916, vol.7, Moore to Commissioner of Public
Utilities E. J. Glenny, February 28, 1917, vol.8, CAP. CA,
NOPL; Unsigned and undated letters to Board of Directors,
Progressive Union, Street Railway Union Collection, box 1,
Special Collection Division, Howard-Tilton Library, Tulane
University, hereafter cited as SRUC. SCDTU; New Orleans
Item, February 7, 13, 1912, November 5, 1913, July 27, 1915.
In 1900, the city council passed an ordinance regulating the
rates of the telephone companies. The issue lingered into
the 1920s, when the courts determined that the state had au
thority over telephone service. See Nussbaum, "Progressive
Politics," 111-113; Williams, Huev Long. 153-5, 162-73.
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were under no other obligations except
tained in

those expressly con

the franchise or contract.*2

At times the Behrman administration also argued for
literal interpretation

of utility franchises and contracts,

especially on issues of scheduling, routing,
paving. The

lighting, and

city administration, however, did not believe

that the bonds of contract and franchise were
ficient and

a

the only suf

reasonble methods of protecting the public in

terests. The Behrman government acknowledged that the public
service corporations held exclusive franchises that invested
them with many "special legal privileges" but with

few ex

pressed obligations. But, the administration argued, the ex
clusive franchises and the actual monopoly enjoyed by
utility companies

the

contained "corresponding obligations in

favor of the taxpayers, who are the principals from whom
these [exclusive]

rights...originate." The public service

corporations, then, "in good faith and [in] enforceable
equity...is bound

to furnish them with the desired utility

and public commodity." Assistant City Attorney John F.

C.

*2Moore to Behrman July 24, August 14, 1911, vol.6, CAP.
CA, NOPL. NORLC and its underlying companies openly and con
sistently ignored their paving obligations. The city con
stantly pressed for compliance, arguing that NORLC's rights
to use the streets were limited and inferior to the city,
and that the franchises required NORLC and the other compan
ies to keep the streets "in good order and condition" and to
pay for all costs in paving. Between 1909 and 1916, there
were sixty separate opinions from the City Attorney on the
paving obligations of NORLC. See in particular, Samuel Gil
more to W. J. Hardee March 11, 1909, vol.5, Moore to Hardee
November 12 1909, Waldo to Moore May 14, 1910, CAP. CA,
NOPL.
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Waldo, writing

to City Attorney Moore, believed that the

legal privileges enjoyed by the utility

companies imposed a

special social and political obligation on the companies and
on the city government. "The exercise of franchise rights by
the public

utility corporations is after all, when resolved

to its final...analysis," Waldo wrote, "nothing
great trusteeship

held for

whom these

rights

were

quired...."

The

utility

committed to hold and
service for

the account

originally
companies,

administer

the benefit

of the people from

and

conditionally ac

he said, were legally

property

and

to provide

of others (though as trustee NORLC

was entitled to a "reasonable, safe"
ment), and

else than a

return on

its invest

the city government, by virtue of its political

mandate and social trusteeship, was obliged to formulate
public utility

policy that served the public good.*3

The legal opinions of the City Attorney and
tants, however,

a

no matter

his assis

how compelling or resourceful in

their arguments, were not the equivalent of law. The Behrman
administration, in

the wake of monopoly, declining service,

rising rates, and at the suggestion of the
the city

Item, NOERA, and

attorney, advocated revising the utility franchise

law and establishing a

municipal public

service commission

*3Bartley to Moore, October 14, 1910, (first quotation);
Waldo to Moore, April 17, 1911, vol.6, CAP, CA, NOPL.
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to regulate the utilities industry in New Orleans.■•■• Mayor
Behrman and

the council wanted the city government to have

the authority to set the standards
late the

the cost

of service

and to regu

of service without reference to the pro

visions of specific franchises. The council urged the legis
lature to

place that authority into the hands of either the

commission council itself, the Commissioner of
ities,

or

an

elected

independent

commission. Before the

Behrman administration could articulate
law, however,

it had

these concerns into

to win the support of its traditional

adversaries in the press and
overcome the

the

civic

reform

municipal regulation

further the partisan interests of the administra

tion or the financial interests of
for even

to convince

that it was not in league with NORLC, that it

was sincere about regulation, and that
would not

groups and

concerted opposition of NORLC and its influen

tial supporters. The Behrman administration had
the reformers

Public Util

NORLC— a formidable task

the most masterful of politicians and the most re

sourceful of organizations.
The New

Orleans city

government, like

most others in

the United States, utilized taxation as one of its principal
methods of

regulating the

public utility industry. Critics

of the administration charged, though, that the mayor,

the

‘•'•Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between February
13 and 19, 1916, vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item.
November 11, 12, December 14, 15, 1911,February 22, 1912,
April 8, 17, 18, June 14, 17, 1914; New Orleans Times-Pica
yune, April 18, 1914.
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council, and

Board of assessors allowed NORLC and its sub

sidiaries to avoid their just share of taxes.

Low taxes for

the utility companies, critics said, would be understandable
if NORLC reinvested its
habilitating and

revenues in

expanding the

improving service, re

system, and lowering rates.

NORLC did not use its revenues to improve the quality of
service, but to satisfy the endless demands for dividends by
the New York and Philadelphia bankers. For its

role in this

unethical arranagement, critics asserted, the Behrman admin
istration and the RDO received steady and sizeable contribu
tions to

their campaign chests.49

There was, to be sure, no
to 1916,

such arrangement.

the Behrman administration raised NORLC's assessed

value from slightly over $17 million to nearly
and it

From 1913

$22 million

increased the company's tax burden from $400,000 a

year to $780,000, an increase of almost two hundred percent.
The city administration and the giant utility monopoly quar
reled continually and publicly over assessment
practices,

NORLC

complaining

that

it did not receive the

same favorable treatment accorded other "public
and

demanding

a

more

favorable,

and taxation

less

utilities"

costly assessment

policy based on net earnings. The Behrman administration in
sisted that its assessment and taxation practices were equi
table and impartial and, though on occasion it

adjusted the

49New Orleans Item, April 15, 1915; Nussbaum, "Progres
sive Politics," 119-20; Williams,
"Martin Behrman," passim;
Reynolds, Machine Politicsr passim.

204
assessed value

and the

taxes of NORLC, it refused to alter

its policies and practices to suit the interests of NORLC.
In the

spring of 1913, the Board of Assessors for the

Parish of Orleans set the assessed value of
$23,600,000, an

increase of

NORLC at nearly

$6,426,000 over

1912. The tax

resulting from the new assessment was in excess of $400,000.
The board

gave no specific reason for the increase, but the

increase may have
power"— a result

represented
of its

NORLC's

purchase by

greater "mortgaging
ACC and

event, NORLC protested to the Assessment
(ARC) of

the city

UGEC. In any

Revision Committee

council what it considered an exorbitant

and pernicious tax. A battery of company officials

and sev

eral leading local bankers appeared before the ARC complain
ing about the size of the increase (wisely,
men questioned

these

the justice of increasing the tax burden of

NORLC). The

principal

banker

Wexler,

Sol

none of

spokesmen
the

Bank. Wexler told the ARC

for

president
that

he

this

assemblage was

of the Whitney Central
and

the

other bankers

feared that the increase contemplated by the city would dis
courage investment in NORLC at a time when

it required more

investment to fund the rehabilitation of the underlying com
panies. Mayor Behrman, who was

not

a

member

of

the ARC,

“■"New Orleans Item, April 10-17, 1913, March 16, 23, 25,
April 1, 7, 8, 9, June 25, July 23, 1914, March 25, 26,
1915, March 19, 1916; New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 11,
12, 16, 17, 1913, March 17, 24, 26, 1914; New Orleans TimesPicavune. April 8, 9, June 23, 27, July 23, 1914; New
Orleans Daily States. March 19, 1916.
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agreed with Wexler, and
assessment

to

a

level

urged the

committee to

reduce the

where NORLC's tax would not exceed

$400,000.
Despite

the

apparent

influence of the witnesses, the

ARC, with William Thompson, Harold Newman, and A.G. Ricks as
its members, remained skeptical and divided. Commissioner of
Public Finance Ricks and Commissioner of

Public Safety New

man

and Mayor Behrman,

doubted

the

arguments

of

Wexler

though Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson
convincing. Ricks

and Newman

character and increasing

value

found them

contended that the changing
of

the

utilities industry

justified a substantial increase in the assessment of NORLC.
The two commissioners argued that NORLC held an

actual mo

nopoly in transit and gas services and a virtual monopoly in
electricity (the commissioners were aware of

the connection

between Consumer's Electric, NORLC, ACC, and U6EC), and that
a low assessment was no longer justified in the absence

of

competition. Equity, they argued, played a role in the Board
of Assessor's decision. Since the consolidation of public
services, NORLC

has sent millions of dollars in revenues to

stockholders, ignoring the needs of the public for

more and

better service. The increase in taxes, then, represented the
attempt by the city to recoup some of
them to

those revenues, using

extend and improve city services. There was, they

■*7New Orleans Item, April 10, 1913; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. April 11, 12, 17, 1913.
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said, no basis to NORLC's argument that the city had treated
it unfavorably or that the city's action would

dissuade in

vestors. Commissioner Ricks observed that taxes were usually
absorbed by customers and never passed on to
What

interested

stockholders

stockholders.

was earning power, and NORLC

earned between six and eight percent on its investment, a
percentage that

would surely attract investors. Finally, as

Commissioner Newman pointed out, in the past few years NORLC
had increased

its valuation to $66 million, though its true

worth was about $46 million. If the Board of Assessors
plied

the

proper

assessment

NORLC, its assessed value

ratio

would be

to

ap

the true value of

$27 million

instead of

$23 million.
Unconvinced by the arguments of Ricks

and Newman, Com

missioner Thompson recommended the reassessment of NORLC and
a corresponding decrease in its taxes. Thompson urged
commission council,

the

which had the authority to reduce any

assessment, to place the assessed value of NORLC at $21 mil
lion, a decrease from the recoomendation of the Board of As
sessors, but an increase over 1912 of three and one-half
million

dollars.

Mayor

Behrman and commissioners Thompson

and Lafaye convinced Ricks to agree to the

Thompson compro

mise. Though he remained unconvinced, Harold Newman consent
ed to the will of the majority of the council, stating that

■•■New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 12, 1913; New Orleans
Item. April 16, 191*3.
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the public and the press favored the compromise and that he
would not object to it.*"
The next spring, the Board of Assessors again increased
the assessed value of NORLC to $22 million, requiring the
company to pay $473,000 in property tax. Again, the manage
ment of NORLC alledged that the Board of Assessors had
treated the company unfairly. S. Reading Bertron, a senior
member of Bertron, Griscom and Jenks, complained that the
assessors increased the assessment of NORLC by twenty per
cent, seven times the average increase in assessment. Ber
tron also asserted that such an increase would impair the
ability of NORLC to borrow at competitive rates and, of
course, this failure would impede the development and exten
sion of public services in New Orleans. Other officers of
NORLC questioned the legality and method employed by the
board in determining its rate of assessment. C. K. Beekman
of NORLC asserted that the Board of Assessors probably did
not have the legal authority to assess NORLC. That authority
belonged, he said, to the State Railroad Commission. Bernard
McCloskey, the general counsel for NORLC and the brother of
Hugh McCloskey, did not question the authority of the muni
cipal government to assess the public utilities that served
the city. He did, though, question the formulas used by the

■"New Orleans Item. April 13, 15-17, 1913; New Orleans
Daily States. April 16-17, 1913. Newman and the council won
the universial approval for the compromise from several
civic associations and from the newspapers.

Board of Assessors. McCloskey remarked that it was the con
sidered opinion of his firm (McCloskey and Benedict) and
other attorneys familiar with utility regulation that as
sessed value should be based on net earnings. NORLC earned
$887,000 in 1913, and at a six percent rate of return, its
assessed value should be $14 million. Despite the justice of
this proposal, McCloskey said, NORLC would not press its
case in Civil District Court if the council would roll back
the company's assessed value to the level of 1912 or $17
million. Unless the council could guarantee a fair and im
partial assessment, NORLC would pursue its rights in the
courts.*0
The commission council dismissed the assertions of the
managers of NORLC as wholly self-serving, designed to intim
idate the council into reducing the company's tax burden, to
alter the basis of regulation, and to discredit the Behrman
administration and the principle of municipal regulation.
The commission council contended that the increase in the
assessed value of NORLC was fair and completely justified by
the phenomenal increase in the earnings and bonded debt of
NORLC over the past year. The Commissioner of Public Safety,
Harold W. Newman, reported that the net, "undisguised" earn
ings of NORLC exceeded $1,670,000 (almost twice the amount
claimed by NORLC), and, with that type of profit, NORLC in*°New Orleans Item, March 16, 23, 25, April 1, 7-9, 1914
New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 17, 24, 26, April 1, 1914;
New Orleans Times-Picavune, April 8-9, 1914.
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creased its bonded indebtedness another $4,000,000, acquir
ing still more financial obligations (owed to itself in the
form of consolidation bonds) and enabling it to misrepresent
"profit" as fixed charges. With that sort of earning and
mortgaging power, Newman suggested, NORLC would have no
difficulty meeting its financial and contractual obligations
to the city and still return a "substantial” profit to its
stockholders. There was, then, Newman announced, no truth to
the warnings that the increase in taxation would result in
the loss of services or impede the expansion of services.
The warnings had one immediate purpose: to intimidate the
council into reducing the taxes of NORLC, freeing it to
transfer earnings from services to dividends.81
The Behrman administration, however, was not easily in
timidated. It rejected the appeal of NORLC for a reduction
in its taxes, stating that it would not tolerate the loss or
curtailing of service or a raise in the cost of service. The
councilmen understood as well the implications that lay be
hind the arguments of NORLC. The company's demands for re
ducing its tax obligations went beyond its immediate concern
for profit and extended to the issue of public regulation.
The proposal of Bernard McCloskey sought to tie service to
the financial conditions of the company, in effect, exempt
ing NORLC from the obligations of its franchises. If service

81New Orleans Item, April 7-9, 1914; New Orleans Times Picayune. April 8, 9, 1914.
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depended on the earnings of the company, so easily masked
as financial obligations, then NORLC, not the city govern
ment, would determine the quality and cost of service. The
regulation of public services by municipal franchise, then,
would have no substantive authority or meaning.
The city council, too, wanted to move the idea of muni
cipal regulation beyond the rigid formulas of franchise and
tax obligations to include the authority to regulate stock
issues and to set rates exclusively on the cost of service.
The concept frightened the management of NORLC (and the
press), and it sought to discredit the idea of municipal
regulation by questioning its feasiblity and by impeaching
the competency of the Behrman administration. The management
of NORLC wanted to avoid regulation, but it would accept the
distant and casual regulation of the State Railroad Commis
sion rather than face the immediate and exacting regulation
of the commission council. In its opposition to municipal
regulation, NORLC found willing, though uneasy, allies in
the newspapers and the business and civic associations of
New Orleans. Once again, the principal challenge to the
public authority of the municipal government came from those
who wanted to prevent the "politicalization" of public pol
icy and private affairs. Those interests, at times divided
among themselves, challenged the municipal government over
the regulation of essential services first in the streets
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and then in the legislature and the courts.9a

In the fall of 1913, the commission council of New
Orleans, disturbed by the endless complaints from residents
and merchants over the high cost of public service and em
barrassed by its inability to manage the public service in
dustry, instructed Commissioner of Public Property Edward E.
Lafaye to study the question of the municipal ownership of
public services.93 After several months of investigation and

92Ibid. NORLC did not appeal the council's decision to
the Civil District Court. In 1915, the Board of Assessors
again increased the assessed value of NORLC. The next year,
though the assessors reduced its assessed value, NORLC paid
$780,000 in taxes. See New Orleans Item. March 25, 26, 1915,
March 19, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. March 19, 1916.
93The debate over municipal ownership predated the con
troversy over NORLC. Beginning in the 1890s, after years of
neglectful private ownership, the administrations of John
Fitzpatrick, Walter C. Flower, and Paul Capdevielle munici
palized the essential services of water, sewerage, and
drainage. The issue won the support of both the civic elite
and the broad middle class and united reformers and Regulars
alike. Despite its virtues and successes, the movement
toward municipal ownership of public services proved highly
devisive and only marginally successful. First, there was no
agreement on what constituted an "essential public service".
Water and drainage were by definition essential, but not so
gas and electricity. Mayors Flower and Capdevielle thought
that gas, electricity, and transit were essential and should
be owned and managed by the city. They could not construct a
consensus, however, principally because there was no agree
ment on how to manage those services. The civic elite wanted
essential services managed by "nonpolitical" boards staffed
by members of the commerical establishment. The Regulars
wanted an elected board staffed by professional, full-time
commissioners, arguing that an appointed, self-perpetuating
part-time board was undemocratic and ineffective regulation.
See Flower to Leonard Darbyshire, October 6, 1897, vol.72;
LaVillebeuvre to Charles F. Thayer, March 4, 1901, vol.79,
LaVillebeuvre to Carter Harrison, June 12, 1901, vol.80,
MCLMO.
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study, Lafaye issued only a preliminary report. The report
confirmed the earlier findings of the NOERA and the Progres
sive Union that electric rates were "exceedingly high" and
needed to be "substantially reduced" if New Orleans was to
remain competitive with other regional and national cities
of its size and class and if New Orleans was to improve the
quality of life for its citizens. The first priority of the
commission council, he maintained, must be the reduction of
rates and the extension of service, and he recommended that
the commission council pursue those ends without direct ref
erence to its legislative efforts to revise public utility
laws and practices.94
Lafaye reiterated, however, the urgent need for reform,
labeling the current laws and practices as inadequate and
harmful and recommending that the council consider two ave
nues of reform. Lafaye acknowledged that the municipal
ownership of electric service was desirable, but he did not
believe that it was financially and politically feasible.
The cost of purchasing the electrical system was, in his
estimation, prohibitive, though, he confessed, he had no
solid estimates of the cost of purchasing the system from
NORLC. Neither would the city gain anything from reproducing
the system. The cost of reproduction, though cheaper than
the cost of purchasing the system from the utility company,
94New Orleans Item, November 4, 1913, April 8, 17, 18,
June 14, 17, 1914; New Orleans Times-Picavune. April 18,
1914.
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was an expensive proposition. It would, as Lafaye correctly
surmised, take years to fully install the system and reve
nues may not be sufficient to maintain or expand the
system. In either instance, Lafaye asserted, there was no
guarantee that a municipally-owned electric light and power
system would reduce cost and improve service. The financial
obligations and risks were too high and the political and
social benefits too remote to justify an experiment in muni
cipal ownership. The council, Lafaye concluded, should con
sider municipalization only as a last resort .a a
The regulation of the utilities industry by an indepen
dent public commission or by the city council. Commissioner
Lafaye suggested, had few financial obligations and the po
litical and social benefits were more immediate. The modern,
public regulation of the utilities industry would grant the
public an unprecedented degree of authority and control over
rates and fares, the quality and extent of service, and the
public and private concerns of NORLC. The result would be a
perceptible reduction in costs and a visible improvement in
services. There were, to be sure, some important reserva
tions about the character and effectiveness of public regu
lation; that it would legitimate the fraudulent capitaliza
tion of the utility companies, permitting the companies to
determine the content of public utility policy, and that it
would "politicalize" essential city services, holding those
BSIbid.

services hostage to the interests o£ politicians and other
special interests. Lafaye did not discount these hazards,
for they were real political concerns for many people and
were, in part, responsible for the failure of the adminis
tration's municipal regulation bill in 1912. He did believe,
apparently, that those dangers could be avoided or modified
by selecting the type or form of public regulation that con
formed to the political needs of the city. He was not able
to make that recommendation, however, explaining that even
experts were divided on the issue and that it required addi
tional study and deliberation by the council. In the mean
time, he would seek a reduction tion in the rates charged
for electric service, predicating the renewal of NORLC's
lighting contract with the city on an agreeable and sub
stantial reduction in rates for all domestic and commerical
users.90
There were, of course, both risks and benefits attached
to Lafaye's report and analysis. The young and able Commis
sioner of Public Property dismissed the municipal ownership
of electric service (and by implication gas and transit)
without adequate study or deliberation. Apparently, he did
not regard the successes of municipal ownership in Detroit
and Cleveland as sufficient evidence that it was a practical
and reasonable alternative to private ownership of the
utilities industry. For some unexplained reason, Lafaye igSBIbid.
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nored the varied and notable achievements of the Sewerage
and Water Board and the Public Belt Railroad, both owned and
operated by the City of New Orleans and two of the principal
accomplishments of the Behrman administration. The Sewerage
and Water Board (S&WB) cost $20,000,000 to complete, oper
ated on a budget comparable to NORLC, employed hundreds of
men (NORLC employed close to 4,000 people), and managed to
maintain and expand the system on rates that Martin Behrman
and the council reduced several times. Operating under dif
ferent circumstances and on a much smaller scale, the Public
Belt Railroad, too, was an example of the benefits of muni
cipal ownership and of the competency of the Behrman adminisration. It too cost several millions of dollars to com
plete, and it also provided cheap, efficient service to the
port and to the railroad lines serving the city.
The Behrman administration was aware, then, of the
practical and social benefits of municipalization, but it
was more concerned with the political risks and dangers as
sociated with the municipalization. Despite all its virtues
and successes, the movement toward the municipal ownership
and management of public services proved highly divisive.
The city administration fought openly and constantly with
the so-called custodians of the municipally owned utilities,
the Board of Liquidation City Debt and the Public Belt Rail
road Commission. Though ostensibly committed to the public
ownership and management of public utilities, these boards

successfully resisted the administration's efforts to bring
the S&WB and the PBRR under more direct public control. Sev
eral of the bankers who served on the BLCD also served on
the board of directors for NORLC, and were opposed to any
effort to municipalize the public utilities industry in New
Orleans.97 These men and their compatriots in the business
exchanges (who controlled the PBRRC) and in the newspapers
accused the city administration of attempting to "politi
cize" the utility companies and organized efforts to dis
parage the ability of the Behrman administration to manage
gas, electric and transit service. These forces were also
extremely influential with the state legislature and the
governor, and they would work tirelessly and endlessly to
prevent the municipalization of NORLC. The proponents of
municipalization, on the other hand, were not as influential
and they too were, for the most part, uncomfortable with the
prospect of the Behrman administration managing and operat
ing the public services of New Orleans.
The Behrman administration believed, apparently, that
municipalization of the public service industry in New Or
leans was not politically feasible, and instead it advocated

97New Orleans Daily Picayune February 9, 1912; New Or
leans Times-Picavune. December 13, 1914; New Orleans Itemr
December 13, 1914. The bankers who sat on both boards were
John Gannon of the Hibernia National Bank and Trust Company,
Robert M. Walmsley of the Canal and Louisiana Bank and Trust
Company, Lynn H. Dinkins of the Interstate Trust and Bank
Company, and Charles Godchaux of the Whitney Central Bank
and Trust Company.
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the municipal regulation of the public utility companies in
New Orleans. There was, however, some uncertainty about the
the character and effectiveness of municipal regulation.
There was no guarantee that municipal regulation would in
vest the commission council or an independent public service
commission with the requisite authority to compel the pub
lic utility companies to provide quality service at reason
able prices. There was the fear that the utility companies
would dominate, if not "capture," the regulatory process,
turning regulation to their own advantage. There was, as
well, considerable apprehension among the opponents and the
friends (in their case, misapprehension) of municipalization
about the character and tenor of municipal regulation under
the Behrman administration. Their common concern was that
municipal regulation would grant the city administration
plenary power over the financial arrangements and internal
management of NORLC, politicizing both vital public services
and the workers of NORLC.
The Behrman administration was aware of the concerns
and misapprehensions concerning municipal regulation, and it
was intent on using the electric rate controversy to dispel
those concerns and misapprehensions. The rate controversy
went well beyond the issue of adjusting the rates to suit
the interests of local merchants and manufacturers and ex
tended to the issue of public regulation. The controversy
showed the need for reforming the laws and practices of
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utility "regulation," and it gave the Behrman administration
the opportunity and latitude to display its competency and
to create a coalition in support of municipal regulation.
Regretably, it took nearly two years for the city adminis
tration to resolve the rate dispute, and it was never able
to convince critics of the benefits of municipal regulation
or of its own competency and sincerity.
Four months after his initial and preliminary report on
electric rates in New Orleans, CPP Lafaye issued another
tentative "report," recounting the administration's initial
findings and explaining its position on municipal ownership
and municipal regulation. The administration dismissed muni
cipal ownership as impractical and it remained committed to
the idea of municipal regulation, dispite its failure to
convince the State General Assembly to enact a municipal
regulation bill at the recent regular session of the legisture. Commissioner Lafaye emphasized that the council's
primary interest remained the reduction of electric rates
for the commerical and domestic consumer. Apparently, Lafaye
remarked, NORLC had no intention of discussing a rate reduc
tion with the city administration. The city administration,
then, would force the matter by issuing an "ultimatum" (the
summer of 1914 was rife with ultimatums) to NORLC, demanding
that the company reduce its rates in compliance with a sche
dule devised by the city administration. At present, Lafaye
wrote in his ultimatum, NORLC charged domestic customers
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fourteen cents per kilowat hour (kwh) during the "primary"
or initial hour of use, then seven cents per kwh after the
first hour of use. Commissioner Lafaye directed NORLC to re
duce its rates over the next three years. Beginning with the
first of September, 1914, NORLC would charge domestic users
twelve cents per kwh during the primary hour and six cents
during additional hours. In September, 1915, the rates would
become eleven cents and six cents; in 1916, ten cents and
five cents.*"
Lafaye's report did not attain universal acceptance.
The New Orleans Item complained that the scope of the in
vestigation was too narrow, confining the city's interests
only to domestic users and ignoring the blatant discrimina
tion in rates between commerical and domestic use. The Item
was also dissatisfied with the rates proposed by Lafaye. The
revised rates were generous to a fault, allowing NORLC to
extract immense profits from the city without requiring the
company to improve and extend services. The Item, however,
appreciated the complexity of the problem that the Behrman
administration faced. The city did not have the authority to
force compliance of the obligations of franchise and it did
not have the financial resources or legal authority to pur
chase the company. It would take at least two years for the
city to acquire the resources and the power to buy NORLC

*"New Orleans Item. July 23, 1914; New Orleans TimesPicayne. July 24, 1914.
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(the legislature would have to grant the city the authority
to purchase and operate the public utilities and it met once
every two years) and it would require several more years to
make the municipally owned utilities a "going concern". (The
Itern did not favor purchasing NORLC if it meant placing pub
lic services under the Behrman administration and it was ad
amant in its opposition to municipal regulation under the
incumbent administration.) The city could not afford to com
pete with NORLC, either. The public utility industry, the
Item declared, was no longer a competitive industry, but had
become a "natural monopoly,” immune to the laws of the mar
ketplace. The city administration, the Item suggested, did
not have the means, the resources, or the support to compel1
the utility industry to reduce rates, encourage use, or ex
tend and improve services."
Two citizens associations, however, believed that the
city administration possessed the means, the resources, and
the public support to provide the city with efficient and
and inexpensive public service and they were not dissuaded
by fears of politicized public services. The Municipal Im
provement League (MIL) recommended that the commission coun
cil sever all relations with NORLC and that the council move
toward the municipalization of public services in New Or-

" N e w Orleans Item. July 24, 26, November 10, 18, Decem
ber 2, 3, 7, 11, 1914. The Item was an inveterate opponent
of the Behrman administration, and wanted to portray the ad
ministration as inept and disreputable.
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leans. Until municipalization became a "going concern," the
MIL suggested that the council construct a municipal power
plant to furnish cheap electric light and power to the for
mer customers of NORLC. The New Orleans Public Ownership
League (NOPOL) was more specific and realistic in its recom
mendations to the city government. The NOPOL recommended
that the council model its plan for the municipalization of
gas, electric, and transit services on the S&WB. The council
could fund municipal ownership by issuing special municipal
ization bonds underwritten by gas, electric, and transit
revenues and by a special dedication from the city’s ali
mony. A special, independent board, much like the S&WB,
would manage and operate public services in the city. The
NOPOL recognized that its plan would take several years to
complete and that the council would have to develop another
means of lighting the public streets and buildings. The
NOPOL recommended that the council offer a short-term con
tract to any legitimate interest to light public property
until municipalization was complete.eo
The management of NORLC agreed to consider the rates
and schedule proposed by Commissioner Lafaye, but it could
not, it replied, consent to his demands within the deadline
set by his ultimatum. In truth, NORLC had no intention of
complying with the councilman's demands. In its estimation,

°°New Orleans Item, July 25, 1914; New Orleans TimesPicavune. July 24, 25, 1914.

neither the Commissioner of Public Property nor the commis
sion council itself possessed the authority to determine the
cost and quality of electric service for private domestic
(or commerical) use, and it rejected the council's demands
and refused to discuss the issue with the council.sx The
commission council, however, had no intention of allowing
the company to dictate the terms and conditions of service.
The council authorized Commissioner Lafaye to broaden and
intensify his investigation and to reconsider the feasibil
ity and practicality of municipalization. Commissioner
Lafaye, Mayor Behrman, and a select committee of local civic
and business leaders met for nearly one year, interviewing
utility experts (among them Samuel Insull), private citi
zens, and local civic associations and deliberating on the
volumes of testimony and recommendations. The committee even
heard the recommendations from NORLC, which twice offered to
"lower" rates to levels approximating those offered by Com
missioner Lafaye earlier in the year. The committee reviewed
the offers suggested by NORLC, but remained skeptical about
the sincereity and effect of those offers. The committee
remarked that it would be more impressed by evidence docu
menting the claims of NORLC than by criticisms that lower
rates were unfair to investment and would not promote the
expansion and improvement of services."2

B1New Orleans Item, July 25, August 4, 1914.
6SNew Orleans Item. August 4, November 22-25, 1914.
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The select committee ended its investigation and delib
erations early in June, 1915, but waited until July to make
its findings and recommendations public. The committee per
mitted NORLC to preview its findings and recommendations,
offering the company the opportunity to accept the findings
of the committee or to submit "facts and figures" that might
persuade the committee to revise its recommendations. NORLC
countered not with "facts and figures" but with offers to
lower its rates. The committee rejected the counteroffers as
"absurd," revealing that NORLC*s proposed rates would result
in an increase in the monthly bills of most customers. Sat
isfied that it had afforded NORLC every consideration, the
Lafaye committee released its findings and issued another,
though more considered, ultimatum.®3
In some ways the report was incomplete and disappoint
ing, making virtually no reference to the dilapidated physi
cal and financial conditions of NORLC. (Apparently, the
council believed that such a study was beyond the competence
of the committee, for the council commissioned utility ex
pert Frederick W. Ballard to conduct such a survey early in
1915.) The electric and gas plants were antiquated and obso
lete, designed to service a limited number of customers and
incapable of meeting the increasing demands more efficient
and effective electric and gas service. The limited capacity

“ New Orleans Item, July 13, 14, 27, 1915; New Orleans,
Times-Picayune. July 14, 28, 1915.
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of the electric and gas plants and the insatiable demand for
dividends allowed the owners and mangement of NORLC to ex
ploit the needs of its relatively few customers, effectively
denying service to residents of moderate and low incomes and
retarding the further development of New Orleans. The com
pany lacked the resolve and the resources to modernize its
phyiscal plant; the expanding demand for service and new
technologies that made wider service possible were unwel
comed developments that threatened the profit of NORLC.66
In another sense, however, the Lafaye report was a
blistering indictment of the practices of NORLC. The commit
tee concluded (to the surprise of no one) that electric
light and power rates were "too high" and the quality of
service was inadequate. The commission council, the commit
tee reported, could no longer allow rates to be tied to the
demands of investment; instead, rates must depend on the
cost or "value" of service. Rates based on the cost of ser
vice would permit for the expansion of services and the im
provement in the quality of life in New Orleans.69 The coun
cil could not, however, assure the expansion of services
without the cooperation of NORLC. The company, despite the
enormous benefits and profits it had extracted from the
city, showed virtually no consideration for the citizens of
" N e w Orleans Item. July 14, 15, 25, 27, August 20, Sep
tember 12, 13, 1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. July 14,
1915.
" N e w Orleans Item. July 13, 14, 27, 28, 30, August 20,
1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. July 14, 31, 1915.
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New Orleans. It flaunted its disregard for the people of New
Orleans and ignored the legitimate authority of the commis
sion council. Despite the discourtesies NORLC showed to the
council and the committee, the select committee accorded the
company every opportunity to influence its recommendations.
Instead, NORLC responded with accusations disparaging the
intentions and character of the committee and its investiga
tion. The findings and recommendations of the committee, the
report stated, though not without provocation, were offered
without malice or prejudice.®®
Those recommendations may have been made without malice
or bias, but they were more damaging to NORLC than the
recommendations made by Lafaye in July of 1914. The Lafaye
committee recommended, of course, that the council not re
new the city's lighting contract with NORLC unless the com
pany agreed to reduce the rates it charged the city for
lighting public streets and buildings and unless the company
reduced the rates for domestic service. The committee also
recommended that the council extend the same conditions to
commerical customers of NORLC and Consumers' Electric Com
pany, though it did not recommend that the council end the
discrimination between commercial and domestic rates. The
select commmittee recommended that the council set domestic
rates at twelve cents per kwh for primary use and six cent

®®New Orleans Item, July 13, 14, 1915; New Orleans TimesPicayuner July 14, 1915.
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per kwh for secondary use for 1915-1916, gradually reducing
rates to seven cents and four cents by 1917-1918. The com
mittee urged the council to end all discussions with NORLC,
giving the company only two weeks to comply with its recom
mendations. If NORLC failed to comply with every provision
of the report, the committee recommended that the council
arrange for alternate sources of electric power, either by
constructing its own plant or by granting a short-term fran
chise, and that it begin preparations for the municipaliza
tion of NORLC. The council adopted the report without dis
sension .'7
Criticism of the Lafaye report, however, was more ex
tensive. The Item praised the committee for its efforts, but
ridiculed its proposals for rates and service as regressive.
The present system of primary and secondary service, the
Item remarked, which the committee did not address, was
nearly indecipherable and clearly unfair to domestic and
small commercial customers. Though the committee correctly
understood the connection between rates and consumption, the
rates it proposed would not stimulate consumption or expand
services. The rates recommended by the Lafaye committee, the
Item argued, would not invite investment and would not in
duce NORLC to compromise with the council. The Item recom
mended that the council apply a "cost-of-service" formula

aTNew Orleans Item, July 14-19, 1915; New Orleans TimesPicayune, July 14, 1915.

for determining rates of service. The plan added a specific
rate of return— in this case, six percent— to the cost of
service, permitting the company to lower cost and expand
services while guaranteeing investors a fair profit.Ba
The president of the MIL, Dr. Valentine K. Irion, ac
knowledged that the Lafaye report was "an important docu
ment, " but, he argued, the committee temporized on the issue
of rates and failed to address several essential issues. The
rates offered to NORLC under the Lafaye report were one hun
dred percent higher than the rates assessed by Cleveland's
municipally owned electric light and power company. Cleve
land did not have a primary and secondary system (such a
plan, Irion said, had "no foundation in reason or common
sense") and it did not discriminate between domestic and
commerical use, and the city furnished cheap, efficient
electric service. The committee concentrated too much, he
said, on the rate issue, virtually ignoring the deficien
cies in service and the willful disregard for the obliga
tions of franchise. But, most important of all, the Lafaye
committee ignored the need for a vigorous, independent, pub
lic service commission. Without the authority to fix rates,
to set the standards of service, or control the financial
and corporate arrangements of NORLC, the municipal govern
ment would never be able to determine the character and de-

°°New Orleans Item. July 16, 19, 23, 1915.

velopment of public services in New Orleans.09
Daniel D. Curran, the president of NORLC, declined to
comment on the content of the report until attorneys for
the company and its board of directors had the opportunity
to review the proposals and demands of the Lafaye committee.
Curran, who had become president of NORLC in February, 1915,
assured the committee that NORLC would comply with the rec
ommendations of the committee, but only if they were consis
tent with the interests of the ownership and management of
NORLC. For the next several days, the boards of directors
for NORLC, ACC, and UGEC met with the chief executives of
the Whitney Central and the Hibernia National banks to dis
cuss the Lafaye report. The directors and the bankers pro
mised to give the report thorough consideration. They were,
they said, anxious to do the "right thing by all concerned,"
particularly to its investors and employees.70
Near the end of July, three days before the deadline
set by the Lafaye committee, Daniel Curran wrote to Commis-

H9New Orleans Item, July 16, 25, November 13, 1915.
7°New Orleans Item. July 13-16, 19, 21-24, 1915; New
Orleans Times-Picavuner July 14, 16, 21-24, 1915. Curran
was born in Ireland in 1855, coming to the United States
a few years later. In 1893, after eleven years with several
steam railroad companies, Curran became the Superintendant
of the New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad. Curran's
success in the business world (he lived on Audubon Place, an
exclusive and private street in Uptown New Orleans) spilled
over to the social world as well. Within a few years of his
arrival in New Orleans, Curran joined the Boston and Pick
wick clubs, the two most exclusive clubs in New Orleans. For
biographical information on Curran, see. New Orleans Item.
December 12-16, 1914, January 9, 1915.

sioner Lafaye informing him of the "unanimous" decision of
the boards of directors. Curran wrote that the directors of
NORLC, ACC, and UGEC were mindful that "the best interest of
New Orleans and the best interest of the company are identi
cal; that prosperity of one spells the prosperity of the
other," but, he continued, "that which unjustly cripples or
injures either has its reflex in a like loss and detriment
to the other." Mindful of its obligations to its employees,
its investors, and, ultimately, to its patrons, the manage
ment of NORLC had no other choice but to reject the schedule
of rates proposed by the select committee. Those rates were
unfair to "all concerned" and would never result in the ex
pansion or improvement of services. However, Curran contin
ued, the management of NORLC and the board of directors of
parent companies recognized the need for a "material" reduc
tion in rates that would satisfy the needs of the city and
the demands of investment. Beginning with the first day of
September, Curran announced, NORLC would inaugurate a new,
flat rate schedule of nine cents per kwh for domestic cus
tomers and a primary and secondary scale of nine cents and
six cents for commerical users.71
Commissioner Lafaye responded with another scalding
arraignment of the management of NORLC. The Commissioner of
Public Property labeled Curran's offer "unacceptable" in

71New Orleans Item, July 25, 26, 1915; New Orleans TimesPicavune. July 27, 1915.
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every aspect. The "decrease* generously offered by NORLC
would result in a twenty-five to thirty percent increase in
the cost of electric service in New Orleans. Undoubtedly,
that increase would not rehabilitate or expand the present
electric plant, but would be returned to the investors (ACC
and U6EC) as dividends. Curran's proposal, Lafaye declared,
was an admission that present rates were too high, that the
company could still prosper at reduced rates, and that a re
duction in rates would not result in the loss of service.
Lafaye suspected, then, that NORLC could expand service and
return a substantial profit to investors on rates below
those suggested by the citizens committee.'72
Curran's proposal admitted to more than just excessive
electric light and power rates. It was. Commissioner Lafaye
said, an admission of the company's disregard for the legal
and political authority of the municipal government and of
its indifference to progress and reform. From the start of
the investigation, the council and the select committee ex
hausted themselves in studying every piece of available in
formation, consulted noted authorities on utilities and
utility regulation, and reviewed the latest and most pro
gressive literature on regulation. The city and its citizens
conducted this investigation with circumspection and at
great expense to public and private resources. NORLC, on the

‘72New Orleans Item. July 19, 26, 27, 1915; New Orleans
Times-Picavune. July 27, 28, 1915.
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other hand, offered no data or expert commentary, resorting
only to assertions that the city government is "unfair to
capital" and incompetent to manage public services.73
The city government, Lafaye insisted, possessed the
legal and political power to determine rates and it was com
petent to operate or regulate public services. The municipal
government, however, had to seek additional authority and
powers to revise the methods of regulation and to diminish
or remove the authority of NORLC over the public services of
New Orleans.7* Lafaye recommended two plausible alterna
tives. The council could obtain the constitutional authority
to build and operate a municipal electric light and power
plant (Lafaye still believed that the municipalization of
the entire public service system was beyond the financial
capabilities of the city), funding construction and mainte
nance of the plant through taxation and revenues and manag
ing the system through an independent board. If municipali
zation was not practical, then, Lafaye suggested that the
council grant a short-term franchise drawn to met the coun
cil's specifications. Those specifications should include
the authority to determine rates on the basis of the cost of
service, the right of purchase at "fair value," and the
right of council members to sit as voting members of the

7 3Ibid..
7«Ibid.
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company's board of directors.78
Lafaye*s remarks and recommendations frightened the
owners of NORLC and the newspapermen of New Orleans, parti
cularly Norman Walker of the Times-Picavune and Item.'s
James Mcllhaney Thomson. Within a few days of Lafaye's pro
nouncements, James S. Pevear, a senior executive with UGEC
and a former president of NORLC, arrived in New Orleans and
held a series of lenghty discussions with Curran and the
board of directors for NORLC and ACC. Pevear and two local
bank executives, John D. O'Keefe of the Whitney Central Bank
and Trust and Rudolph

S.

Hecht of the Hibernia National

Bank, were concerned about the municipalization movement in
New Orleans. They understood that municipalization had the
qualified support of Mayor Behrman and at least two other
councilroen. They counseled Curran and his board of directors
to accept the contours of Lafaye's plan before the council
formally committed itself to municipalizing the electric
system. Norman Walker opposed municipalization because he
believed that the city could ill-afford a costly and unsuc
cessful experiment in the municipalization of public ser
vices. James Thomson of the Item, on the other hand, had be
come an advocate of municipalization, but he remained an un
reconstructed opponent of the Behrman administration. James
Thomson was not concerned that the municipalization of pub-

■^New Orleans Item, July 22, 27, 28, 30, August 20, 1915
New Orleans Times-Picayuner July 27,28, 31, 1915.
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lie services under Mayor Behrman and the Regular Democrats
would fail, but rather that it would succeed, strengthening
the political standing and credibility of "ring rule". He,
too, urged Curran and the other members of the board of
directors to accept the conditions proposed by Lafaye in
July, eliminating the possibility of a "politicized" elec
tric light and power system.7®
Despite the entreaties of the business community and
the editorial support for compliance, Daniel Curran and the
board of directors for NORLC refused to accept the condi
tions of the Lafaye report. Instead, Curran and the board
instructed the management of NORLC to conduct an "analytical
study" of the effects of Lafaye's proposals on NORLC. The
study, completed in less than a week, confirmed the initial
impressions of management that the recommended schedule of
rates was "utterly impractical" and, in fact, harmful to the
ys

company and to the city. The study "proved" that the rates
proposed by the select committee would reduce revenues by
nearly $500,000, leaving a balance, after taxes, deprecia
tion and replacement of equipment, and improvements, of only
$170,900, a rate of return of less than three percent. The
report insisted that NORLC could not survive under such
terms, and it recommended rejecting the rates offered by the
select committee.77
7®Ibid.
77New Orleans Item, August 10, 11, 13, 25, 1915; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. August 10, 12, 1915.
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The study asserted that the company could operate ef
fectively and still meet it financial obligations with
slightly lower rates, provided there was a corresponding re
duction in taxes and other financial obligations required
under the franchise. The report proposed that the city renew
its contract with the company for ten years at rates of
seven and four cents per kwh. It also suggested that domes
tic and commercial customers pay nine cents and six cents
per kwh for the next sixteen months, when NORLC would reduce
its rates to eight cents and five cents for primary and sec
ondary service. President Curran, in a letter to the commis
sion council, insisted that the rate schedule proposed by
the company study was "substantially lower than that exist
ing in most (other) cities," and that it was "an unusually
low rate for the city of New Orleans, in view of the low per
capita and customer consumption, and the great area which
the distribution system covers, by reason of New Orleans
having such large corporate limits." Curran insisted that
the company could not manage its affairs or meet its obliga
tions under lower rates, and, he predicted, he could not
foresee the time when rates could be any lower, for the fac
tors that determined the rate of service were "too numerous
and separately too uncertain" for a prudent businessmen or
a conscientious public offical to anticipate or manage .ya

78Hew Orleans Item. August 10, 11, 13, 25, 1915; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. August 10, 12, 1915.

Edward E. Lafaye, however, believed that NORLC could
manage its business affairs with lower rates and that pru
dent and competent men could plan and manage the course of
public policy. The Commissioner of Public Property dismissed
the NORLC proposal as self-serving and unacceptable. Lafaye
announced that the commission council had anticipated the
response of NORLC and had already begun preparations for
municipalizing NORLC and for securing interim sources of
electric power.
The newspapers and the business establishment pressured
Curran and the other managers of NORLC to settle with the
city. Without public support for its initial proposal, NORLC
agreed to "compromise1* with the Behrman administration. The
company agreed to submit to the administration's demands for
"unlimited and unrestricted" access to the company books,
which city officials believed was an acknowledgment of the
city's authority to regulate rates and service. NORLC also
agreed to replace the outdated public street lighting sys
tem, which the city agreed to purchase after ten years of
service at a cost of $350,000. NORLC proposed that domestic
customers pay either a flat rate or a sliding rate scale
based on the cost of service plus a "fair rate of return".
Commerical users would pay six cents and three cents for

79New Orleans Item, August 11, 1915; New Orleans TimesPicayuner August 12, 14, 1915. The council commissioned
Frederick Ballard to determine the cost of municipalization.
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primary and secondary service, but would not, like resi
dential customers, pay a twenty-five cent charge each month
for the privilege of service.**0
Commissioner Lafaye endorsed the concepts behind the
latest proposal, calling them a "radical change" from other
proposals offered by NORLC. Mayor Behrman and the council
agreed, and instructed Lafaye and his staff of utility ex
perts to review the proposals and to formulate the council's
response. Lafaye and his experts recommended that the coun
cil accept the proposals of NORLC on a tentative basis until
the administration and NORLC arrived at a permanent agree
ment. Under the tentative arrangement, NORLC would charge
domestic users seven cents for the first twenty kwh of ser
vice every month, six cents for 21 to 50 kwh, five cents for
51-200 kwh, and four cents for all service over 200 kwh.
Commissioner Lafaye recommended the same formula for large
and small commerical customers. The formulas and rates pro
posed by the municipal government would, Lafaye contended,
lower cost for every customer and relieve residential and
small commerical users of the major portion of the cost of
service. Lower rates, he promised, would enable NORLC to ex
pand and improve service, and he urged the company to accede

°°New Orleans Item, August 26-28, September 8, 13, 26,
29, 1915; New Orleans Times-Picavune. August 28, 1915. The
city would pay only three-and-one-half cents per kwh.
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to the panel's recommendations.BX
One peculiar item, though, bothered the panel of ex
perts. NORLC recommended eliminating the minimum service
charge (fifty cents per month) in favor of a service charge
of twenty-five cents a month. The panel feared that the ser
vice charge would violate state law against overcharging. It
recommended, then, that the council include both fees in the
ordinance, requiring NORLC to test the legitimacy of its re
quest in the courts. The council consented to all other rec
ommendations of the panel as well, and passed the Lafaye
lighting ordinance in December, 1915.82
The outcome of the electric rate controversy left the
city and the Behrman administration in a confident and eu
phoric mood (Behrman and his commission council were return
ed office without opposition and it was the last summer of
peace in America). Journalist Ethel Hutson, writing in the
National Municipal Review, characterized the outcome of the
electric rate issue as "a complete victory" for the city and
the Behrman administration, producing things of "lasting im
portance". The Behrman administration had cut the excessive
and regressive rates, making it possible for many more
BXNew Orleans Item. September 26, 29, 1915, October 2527, 1915. NORLC agreed to the rates, believing that the
guarantee of a service charge would offset lower rates.
82New Orleans Item. December 14, 1915; New Orleans TimesPicavune f December 15, 1915; Ethel Hutson, "New Orleans
Lighting Victory," National Municipal Review. V (January
1916), 105-07; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Boss,"
79. Act 297, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1910.
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residents to enjoy and benefit from electric ligting and
power. The administration acquired the ownership rights to
the public lighting system, giving the city a vested inter
est in the expansion of service and in the safety and wel
fare of its residents. In addition to those impressive and
permanent achievements, the Behrman administration accom
plished two other things of major significance. The commis
sion council showed that it appreciated the public needs and
that it could act without regard or reference to partisan
advantage. Its actions were at all times disciplined and
prudent, displaying the competence to govern and restoring
the public trust in government. The administration also dis
played a mastery over NORLC, compelling the company to lower
rates, expand and improve services, and submit to "regula
tion" .83
The two Lafaye ordinances were not, despite Hutson's
journalistic hyperbole, complete victories for the city and
they did not accomplish things of "lasting importance". In
comparison to the rates charged in other cities, rates in
New Orleans after the enactment of the Lafaye ordinances re
mained high. The demand for electric service increased
steadily with the expansion of the size and population of
New Orleans, but service remained insufficient. The commis

a:!,Hutson, "New Orleans Electric Lighting Victory," 10507. Though the voters returned Martin Behrman and his coun
cil to office in 1916, William Thompson did not seek reelection .
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sion council's "mastery" over NORLC extended only to the
issue of electric rates, and even there the council's abil
ity to affect rates and service depended on factors 'too nu
merous and separately too uncertain' for prudent and con
scientious public officials to anticipate or control. The
Behrman administration, as Lafaye pointed out, recognized
that the regulation of the public utilities industry could
not depend solely on the good faith of NORLC. The municipal
government needed the legal authority to regulate every as
pect of the public service industry.
The commission council also realized that, despite its
prudent behavior and undeniable success in resolving the
electric light controversy, it did not enjoy the full confi
dence of several influential segments of the public. Munici
palization of the public utilities would not generate confi
dence in the Behrman administration, but only fears and
accusations of the "politicization" of vital city services
(James Mcllhaney Thomson was more concerned that municipal
ownership would succeed, not fail). The logical and practi
cal response to these needs and fears, of course, was the
creation of a municipal public service commission. But, as
we shall see, the same interests and fears that prevented
the municipalization of NORLC emasculated municipal regula
tion. And, aided by the effects of the Great War, those same
interests and fears demoralized and nearly bankrupted muni

(
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cipal reform in New Orleans.0*

"•Hutson, "New Orleans Lighting Victory," 105-07.

Chapter Five

War and Reform

The regulation of the public utilities industry, wrote
the editor of the New Orleans Item near the end of the elec
tric rate controversy, was a simple matter of business.
After all, the newspaper wrote, no one of any civic or
political consequence was disturbed that local businessmen
and bankers had lost control of the public service companies
and that ownership and management had passed to northern in
vestment institutions and utility holding companies. Those
issues were of no lasting importance to the "intelligent"
and dispassionate citizens of New Orleans. All that the
people of the city demanded was quality service at reason
able rates and fares and the guarantee that the company re
invest a "fair" portion of its earnings back in the city in
the extension and modernization of services and the retire
ment of debt.3Ordinarily, the Item wrote, the independent and compe
titive structure of the American business system would
assure the people of efficient and effective service at
reasonable cost. But the public service corporations were
not ordinary companies. The public utility companies that
served New Orleans were, as in other American cities,
xNew Orleans Itemr December 13, 16, 1914.
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"natural monopolies," completely indispensable to the
public and private lives of the people of New Orleans,
unaffected by the restraints of the marketplace, and, for
all intents and purposes, governed by public ordinance.
There was, the Item remarked, no intrinsic danger to the
social and political integrity of New Orleans from a corpo
rate structure of interlocking directorates and giant hold
ing companies. The only true danger to the integrity of New
Orleans came from the "unnatural" and corrupt relationship
between the utility companies and the municipal government.
The only way to break that alliance was to remove the
utility industry from municipal politics. The disinterested
regulation of the public utility industry by an independent,
nonpartisan commission would eliminate the financial and
corporate abuses associated with a politicized public mono
poly like NORLC.2
The regulation of the public service industry was not,
as the New Orleans Item asserted, a simple matter of busi
ness, but a matter of an inherent political significance—
and a matter of considerable political debate. The utility
companies were to a large extent "public corporations".
Municipal and state ordinance defined the right and manner
by which these companies did business, and every aspect of

2Ibid. In its editorials, the Item blamed the Behrman
administration, not NORLC, for the corrupt utility problem
in New Orleans. For a different view, see McCormick, "The
Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics," passim.
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the industry affected the public interest. Regulation, then,
served a public, as well as a private, interest. Regulation
promised to maintain private control and management of the
utilities industry while permitting greater public direction
over the development and distribution of public services.3
"As in so many other aspects of American politics,"
writes Thomas K. McCraw, the foremost student of regulation
in America, "the fundamental controversy underlying the his
tory of regulation has been an ongoing need to work out the
inevitable tradeoffs between the good of the whole society,
on one hand, and the rights of the individual, on the
other." In political terms, McCraw writes, "regulation is
best understood as a political settlement, undertaken in an
effort to keep peace within the polity." The politics of
regulation, however, was anything but peaceful. The advo
cates of regulation were deeply divided over the best means
of regulation. Many students of regulation favored state
regulation, arguing, as did the Item, that the state govern
ment was better equipped to regulate the public service in
dustry because it had greater authority and resources, was
more disinterested, and was less political. An equal number
of "utility experts" endorsed municipal regulation, claiming

3Thomas K. McCraw, The Profits of Regulation Charles
Francis Adams. Louis D. Brandeis. James M. Landis. Alfred E.
Kahn, (Cambridge, 1984), 301-02; McCraw, "Regulation in
America: A Review Article," Business History Review. 49
(Summer 1975), 158-83; McCormick, "The Discovery that Busi
ness Corrupts Politics," 271.

[
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that municipal regulation was more direct and democratic
than state regulation.4
Proponents of state regulation acknowledged that cities
had a perfect right and obligation to regulate those utili
ties that were wholly local. Few public utilities, however,
these experts argued, were purely local. Public service was
rarely confined to the corporate limits of the cities and
generally extended into other governmental jurisdictions.
The business and corporate realities of the utilities indus
try also extended beyond the authority and ability of the
municipal government to manage effectively. Municipal regu
lation would impose a financial hardship on the city govern
ment, as well. Many cities, like New Orleans, were already
overwhelmed by debt and could not afford the money to employ
the battery of attorneys, accountants, utility experts, and
support staff necessary for a permanent, effective, and in
corruptible public service commission.9
The municipal regulation of public utilities, critics
alleged, would, as well, threaten the stability of the pub-

4McCraw, Prophets of Regulation. 302; McCormick, "The
Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics," 258-59; Delos F.
Wilcox, "Supplement to the National Municipal Review: A Cor
rect Public Policy Toward the Street Railway Problem," NMR.
9 (April 1920), 253; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts,"
221 .
9John Morton Eshleman, "State vs. Municipal Regulations
of Public Utilities," NMR. 2 (January 1913), 15-16; Wilcox,
"Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Franchises," NMR. 3
(January 1914), 13-16; J. Allen Smith, "Municipal vs. State
Control of Public Utilities," ibid., 42-43; Nord, "The Ex
perts versus the Experts," 228-29.
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lie utility companies and compromise the integrity of the
municipal reform movement. Municipal regulation, opponents
asserted, was inherently corrupt and politically dangerous.
Political considerations and public sentiments too often
controlled the policies and actions of the municipal govern
ments, making it more politically expedient to lower rates
than to protect and encourage investment. Municipal regula
tion, then, would compel investors and management to exert
every available force, including bribery and crude political
manipulation, to protect their interests and goals.*9
Beyond those rudimentary fears, proponents of state
regulation argued, the investors and management of public
utility companies saw municipal regulation as the prelude to
municipal ownership and the unjust confiscation of private
property. Regulation, these experts contended, was simply an
imperative of technology and a response to the innovations
of business and finance. It was never intended, they said,
as a means of advancing reforms aimed at redistributing the
social and political wealth and power of the community. And,
critics said, municipal regulation would actually undermine
democractic reform in the cities. It concentrated an unjus
tified expression of power in the hands of public officials
incapable of properly regulating the interests of investors.

“Smith, "Municipal vs. State Control of Public Utili
ties," 34-35; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 22123, 228-29.
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management, and citizens.*7
State regulation of the public utilities industry, on
the other hand, had none of the liabilities of municipal
regulation. State jurisdiction and authority extended beyond
the city limits, preventing the public utility companies
from escaping "meaningful" regulation because they did busi
ness in more than one county or parish. The state govern
ment, admittedly, had more financial and administrative re
sources at its disposal than the municipal governments, and
state regulation would relieve the cities of the tremendous
financial obligation of regulation. Moreover, state regula
tion would remove the public service companies from munici
pal politics. Placing regulation in the hands of an indepen
dent, nonpolitical board of experts would preserve the sta
bility and solvency of the utility companies and guarantee
the integrity of the municipal reform movement."
The advocates of municipal regulation acknowledged that
the modern public service industry was no longer a simple
enterprise controlled by local management and funded by
local bankers and businessmen for the benefit and enrichment
of the municipal community. Regional and national financial
institutions, like American Cities Company and United Gas
and Electric Corporation, now controlled and managed the
municipal service companies for their own interest and pro

*7Ibid.
"Ibid.
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fit. The influence and resources of these national utility
corporations far exceeded those of any municipal government,
making regulation more difficult, but all the more essential
for the millions of urban and suburban residents.9
Despite the realities of the new corporate power and
chronic disabilities of municipal government, the proponents
of municipal regulation were unmoved by the arguments of
state regulation. The structure and management of the public
utility corporation had changed over the past ten to fifteen
years, but, argued municipal regulation advocates, the ser
vices furnished by the utility company remained urban and
local, and the company remained dependent on local ordinance
and revenues for its existence and well-being. In the modern
city, where utilities are "absolute necessities," touching
on every facet of urban life, the people of the city must
retain the authority to determine the character and quality
of service and possess the right and authority to contract
for service. If the people of the city were to retain that
right and authority, regulatory authority should not be
shifted to a "distant authority not politically responsible
to the people of [the] city and not thoroughly acquainted,
by residence in the city, with local conditions and
needs. "xo
"Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Fran
chises," 13-16; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 224225.
x°Wilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Franchies," 16-17.

It would be a mistake, as well, to assume that the
municipal governments were incapable of sustaining effective
regulation. Many cities, like New Orleans, possessed a
powerful and highly developed city government with suffi
cient authority and resources to manage the public service
industry and to direct it along "rational and progressive
lines". In those cities with an active and progressive
government and population, it was unlikely that the public
service companies and their allies in banking and business
would dictate public utility policy. Municipal regulation
did not threaten the financial stability of the public ser
vice industry or the political integrity of the municipal
reform movement. In fact, state regulation, critics claimed,
seemed the greater threat to private interests and the pub
lic welfare. State regulation, its critics alleged, tended
to ignore the interests of minority stockholders, the de
mands of labor, and the needs of consumers. State regula
tion, especially in the form of an independent, "nonpoliti
cal" board, opponents asserted, was a move toward "unneces
sary" centralization of authority, menacing the integrity of
municipal government and the democratic process.xx
For the advocates of municipal regulation, then, the
xxWilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and Public Utility Fran
chises, 13-16; Smith, "Municipal vs. State Control of Public
Utilities," 42-43; Eshleman, "State vs. Municipal Regulation
of Public Utilities," 15-19; Lewis R. Works, "State vs. Mu
nicipal Regulation of Public Utilities," NMR. 2 (January
1913), 24-30; Nord, "The Experts versus the Experts," 221233.

regulation of public utilities was more than just a simple
matter of "private" business or the bureaucratic response
to advancements in technology and business administration.
Nor was it a simple matter of removing the public service
companies from the control of municipal governments. Rather,
the proponents of municipal regulation tended to see regula
tion in political and sociological terms. {Few serious advo
cates of state regulation considered regulation in simple
terms, devoid of social and political consequences. The
local press and other popularizers of the regulation issue
simplified, in some cases bastardized, the social and
political complexity of regulation for popular consumption.)
Local regulation, these advocates believed, was more repre
sentative of the social needs of the people, assured greater
accountability from the public and private administration of
the utilities industry, and furthered the aspirations of mu
nicipal home-rule government. It promoted the "active and
intelligent" interest of the voters and it reaffirmed the
relevancy and expediency of democratic ideals in the modern,
corporate world.x*
In New Orleans, however, politics was never academic or
simple. Though the advocates of state regulation spoke in
terms resonating the arguments of the experts, their princi
pal concern was the political consequences of municipal reg
ulation. They believed that state regulation, despite its
x*Ibid.
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apparent weaknesses and failings in other settings, was pre
ferable to municipal regulation, no matter what its virtues,
under the Behrxnan administration. They feared above all the
"politicalization" of public services and the public utility
company, which they saw as a menace to the interests of the
"active and intelligent" citizens of New Orleans and to
their idea of democratic municipal reform.
The Behrman administration, too, was concerned with the
political consequences and implications of regulation. In
its view, state regulation was wholly inadequate to the pub
lic service needs of the city and detrimental to its politi
cal independence. State regulation clearly favored the in
terests of NORLC, placing it beyond the reach of the elected
municipal officials of New Orleans and isolating it from the
concerns and needs of the ordinary citizen and customer.
State regulation, especially under an appointed, "indepen
dent" commission, would allow "private" business and social
interests— the BLCD, the Association of Commerce, the busi
ness exchanges, and, of course, NORLC— to determine the pub
lic utility policy of New Orleans, contrary to the mandate
the voters gave Martin Behrman in 1912.
The Behrman administration was also aware of the severe
limitations of its mandate. Despite years of political agi
tation against it, NORLC had managed to avoid any signifi
cant degree of regulation. The commission council still did
not possess the authority to regulate the external and in
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ternal affairs of that "public" corporation. The council
could not set fares and rates or determine the standards of
service except through a series of binding (except, it seem
ed, on NORLC) and regressive franchise ordinances. More im
portantly, the city administration did not have the confifidence of a large portion of the so-called commerical and
civic elite. Indeed, as we have seen already in a number of
public debates (the Favrot commission council charter, the
Public Belt Railroad Commission, and the Sewerage and Water
Board), the public and private elect of New Orleans, for a
myriad of social and political reasons, opposed and impeded
the municipal reform policies of the Behrman administration.
That same public and private elite opposed any utility
reform measure suggested by the Behrman administration, com
promising the utility reform effort and delaying the regula
tion of NORLC. The Behrman administration, overly sensitive
to criticism and facing another municipal election in the
fall of 1916, agreed to an ill-advised compromise measure
that divided and diluted regulatory authority and, in
effect, allowed NORLC to escape regulation.

In May, 1911, the New Orleans Item, disturbed by the
consolidation of the public utility companies under NORLC
and ACC, called for the creation of a public service commis
sion, independent of the municipal government and the Regu
lar Democtatic Organization, to regulate the public and pri

(
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vate affairs of the New Orleans Railway and Light Company
and its subsidiaries. Apparently, nothing came of the Item’s
plea, and the issue remained dormant for nearly a year.3-3
By February, 1912, however, with utility service deteriorat
ing and cost rising, the demand for greater public regula
tion of NORLC became more organized and influential. The
Item reported that many members of the city council, the
Behrman administration (the commission council charter did
not take effect until December, 1912), the legislative dele
gation, and a number of civic and neighborhood associations
favored the creation of municipal public service commission
to regulate the utilities industry in New Orleans. And, the
Item reported, most citizens approved granting the public
utilities commission plenary power over the public service
companies.x*
While the Item saw the need for a public service com
mission with near plenary powers, it could not endorse any
form of utility regulation that the Behrman administration
and the RDO favored. The newspaper again called on the busi
ness community to recommend the creation of a state public
service commission, independent of the city government and
governed by an independent, nonpartisan panel of business
men.3-9 The Progressive Union responded to the Item's, call
“ New Orleans Item, May 9, 20, 1911, February 7, 1912.
“ New Orleans Item, March 28, 1912, July 27, 1915.
“ New Orleans Item, February 7, 13, 15, 28, 1912; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 49.
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and, after a tense and protracted debate over the relative
merits of municipal ownership and public regulation, drafted
a bill that satisfied the requirements laid down by the
Item.1”
The bill created an independent state public service
commission, appointed by the governor and funded by the mu
nicipal government of New Orleans. The bill did not grant
the commission the "precise and plenary" powers over NORLC
called for by the Item. Rather, the bill more closely resem
bled the desires of the more conservative municipal affairs
committee of the Progressive Union. The public service com
mission would have no authority over consolidations, valua
tion, or rate of return. It did have the authority to "set"
rates and fares and to determine the "quality" of service.17
The draft attracted formidable opposition at the
regular session of the General Assembly in the summer of
1912. Governor Luther E. Hall, who apparently misunderstood
the content and intention of the bill, thought another "pub
lic service commission" unnecessary and costly. The state
railroad commission already possessed the authority and the
funding, Hall said, to regulate the public services of New
Orleans. The creation of a separate and independent board
would dilute the authority of the state government and drain
its meager resources. Despite the glib assurances from the
xaNew Orleans Item, February 16, April 24, May 21, 1912;
New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 15, 1912.
^Ibid.
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Item and the municipal affairs committee that the so-called
Provosty bill did not dilute state authority or sap the
state treasury, the Hall administration remained opposed to
the bill throughout the session.3-"
The Behrman administration and a majority of the city's
legislative delegation also opposed the bill, but for more
intelligent and substantive reasons than those given by
Governor Hall. Senator Henry L. Favrot, chairman of the Sen
ate Committee on City Affairs and author of a "minority" re
port on the Provosty bill, argued that the bill favored the
interests of NORLC and its principal stockholders and that,
in removing regulatory control from the civil authorities of
New Orleans, the bill was clearly unconstitutional and un
democratic. An "independent" state commission of business
men, nominated by other businessmen and serving without the
approval of the people, Favrot suggested, would be more in
clined to favor property rights over the rights of consumers
and franchise rights over franchise obligations. In effect,
state regulation would be sanctioning the interests of NORLC
and ignoring the interests of the people.3-9
The bill, contrary to the arguments of its sponsors,
Favrot contended, violated the state constitution and ig
nored the several precedents established by the courts. The
x"New Orleans Item. May 21, July 18, 29, 31, August 2,
1912; Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of
the State of Louisiana. 1912 (Baton Rouge, 1912), 580.
X9New Orleans Item. June 12, 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. June 12, 1912.

city, he argued, possessed exclusive authority over the re
gulation of its public utilities and streets and it could
not legally relinquish that authority to any private inter
est.20 (The bill also violated provisions of the constitu
tion providing for the election of all local officials who
exercised the "police powers" of the state.23-) But, more
importantly, the bill was, Favrot said, "demonstrably undem
ocratic". It demeaned the moral intelligence of the people
and their government and violated the principle of home
rule.22
Proponents of the Provosty bill lambasted the Favrot
report, labeling it as partisan and reactionary. The Behrman
administration was not interested, they asserted, in regu
lating NORLC or in promoting the public and social needs of
the city. Municipal regulation under the Regular Democrats
meant the complete politicization of public services and the
continuation of excessive costs and abysmal service. The ad
ministration's call for an elected municipal public service
commission, they charged, was not a call for democracy, but
an attempt to block reform aimed at ending the abuses of a

2°See, for example, Canal and Claiborne Street Railroad
Company v. Crescent City Railroad Company. 6 Southern Re
porter 849 (1889); New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Com
pany v. Crescent City Railroad Company. 12 Federal Reporter
308 (1881); New Orleans City and Lake Railroad Company v.
City of New Orleans. 11 Southern Reporter 77 (1892).
21Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and
Light Company. 82 Southern Reporter 281.
22New Orleans Item, June 12, 14, 1912; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. June 12, 1912.
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politicized and corrupt utilities company and its allies
in the municipal govrnment.23
With the civic and political leadership of the city
divided, the legislature postponed consideration of the socalled provosty bill, returning it to the calender and, in
effect, killing it. Undoubtedly, NORLC and its associates in
the New Orleans banking establishment pressured the legisla
ture to "kill" the Provosty bill. But they were opposed to
any form of public utility regulation, especially municipal
regulation, and no doubt would have fought against any muni
cipal regulation bill that the Behrman administration had
prepared. The Behrman administration, too, "pressured" the
legislature into postponing consideration of the Provosty
bill, but, unlike the management of NORLC and the Hibernia
and Whitney banks, the city government was not opposed to
public regulation. Mayor Behrman and many other Regular
Democrats believed what they said about the Provosty bill,
and they worked to defeat it. The bill was, to be sure,
ill-prepared and violated several conspicuous and important
provisions of the state constitution. It was, as well, a
weak and insufficient piece of legislation, denying the
public service commission the authority to regulate the

23New Orleans Item. March 28, July 18, 29, 31, August 2,
1912; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 18, 1912. The Behrman
administration prepared a municipal regulation bill, but did
not introduce it to the legislature. Apparently, the city
administration preferred concentrating on enacting the
Favrot commission charter.
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more salient aspects of the public service industry, most
notably, capitalization, valuation, and rate of return.
Finally, the bill was sectarian, more concerned with "pre
venting" the city government and the RDO from "politicizing"
NORLC than with the regulation of the public utilities. The
bill was, then, as Favrot suggested, partisan and
reactionary.
By the spring of 1914, at the height of the electric
rate controversy, public sentiment began focusing on issues
of monopoly and valuation and their relationship to the
cost, quality, and development of public service. Still, as
in 1912, the civic and social leadership of New Orleans,
though more concerned with the intrinsic questions of regu
lation, was preoccupied with preventing the "politicization"
of the public service industry. In April, the Municipal Im
provement League, (MIL) a civic reform association dedicated
to utility regulation and led by Dr. Valentine K. Irion,
authored another state regulation bill that repeated the
provisions and reasoning of the Provosty bill of 1912. The
MIL bill created a separate, independent board, appointed by
the governor and empowered to set rates and the standards of
service. The bill would, if enacted, Irion promised, reduce
the cost of service and eliminate the corrupt influence of
NORLC over city politics. State regulation, Irion said,

2*Senate Journal. 1912. 580; Schott, "John M. Parker,"
114-15, especially, footnote 46.
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would place the issues of cost and service beyond the reach
of NORLC and its allies in city government. It also would
prevent the Behrman administration from manipulating public
services and from "politicizing" the workers of NORLC.23
The New Orleans Item agreed, but contended that a pro
gressive public service commission must do more than merely
preventing the Regular Democrats from manipulating the work
ers of NORLC for partisan and political reasons. The public
service commission must have regulatory management over
capitalization, valuation, and rate of return. That sort of
control, the Item argued, would protect the legitimate
interests of investors, consumers and employees, and the
public. Capitalization that did not represent the "actual"
value of the company cheapened the value of investment,
cheating the legitimate investors of an honest return on
their investments and placing illicit profit above public

2SNew Orleans Item, January 30, April 14, May 5, 10, 21,
June 24, 1914; New Orleans Times-Picavune. May 10, 12, 1914.
According to Dr. Irion, the MIL formed sometime in 1913 be
cause of the "crying need for [the] proper regulation of
[the] public service corporations" in New Orleans. The men
who formed the MIL were "professional men" and businessmen,
who represented the "great and respectable middle classes,
neither capitalists nor laborers". The goal of the MIL was
the proper and just regulation of the utility companies. The
MIL believed that regulation was "at heart" a political
question, requiring it to become involved in local and state
politics as a nonpartisan. Proceedings had at the special
meeting of the Commission Council, City of New Orleans,
August 17, 1918, Portfolio 1, Proceedings of the National
War Labor Board, Troy H. Middleton Library, Louisiana State
University, Baton Rouge, hereafter cited as "Special Meeting," PNWLB, LSU. I would like to thank Professor Paul Paskoff for helping me secure the records of the NWLB.
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service. Bloated capitalization also meant excessive rates
and pitiful service. Utility revenues went to satisfy the
demands of fictitious investment, denying the operating com
panies of the resources necessary to improve and develop
services. Excessive capitalization, too, denied the city
government the opportunity of controlling and directing the
development of the city. As long as revenue and profit stood
as a barrier to service and development, the Item remarked,
New Orleans would remain a regressive and "politicized"
*

city.2®
The Behrman administration agreed with the assessment
of the Item, and it, too, called for the creation of public
service commission with "plenary" authority over the public
utility companies of New Orleans. The commission council,
however, favored the creation of an "independent" municipal
public service commission. The city administration proposed
creating a five member commission consisting of the Mayor
and the Commissioner of Public Utilities and three other
members chosen by the mayor upon the recommendation of the
business "exchanges". The three "laymen" would serve without
pay and, presumably, without deference to the administration
and NORLC. The bill, drafted by the City Attorney's Office,
the Commissioner of Public Utilities, and the Commissioner
of Public Property, authorized the municipal public service
commission to regulate all public utility companies in the
2®New Orleans Item, May 10, 11, 1914.
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city, in particular, the gas, electric, transit, telephone,
and telegraph companies. The bill gave the municipal public
service commission the power to regulate capitalization,
valuation, and rate of return, permitting the city govern
ment to fix rates, extend and improve service, and determine
the physical and social development of the city with due and
just regard for the interests of investment, management, and
consumers.27
Commissioner of Public Utilities William Thompson de
fended the bill and the motivation of the Behrman adminis
tration before the legislature. The bill, he explained, did
not threaten private property or "politicize" vital city
services or the employees of the utility companies of New
Orleans. Municipal regulation was, Thompson said, an intel
ligent and established policy, endorsed by utility experts,
investors, and the business community. The bill simply gave
the city the authority and the means of setting the quality,
extent, development, and cost of service by allowing it a
voice in determining the public value of service and the de
gree of profit. Valuation and rate of return were not the
exclusive concern of the management and investors of the

27New Orleans Item, April 29, June 9, 1914. Newspaper ac
counts are vague on specific provisions and powers of the
municipal commission and there is no extant copy of the
bill. It is reasonable to assume, perhaps, given the diffi
culty the city administration experienced with the PBRRC in
1913, that the Behrman government would want the "lay"
members of the commission to serve at the discretion of com
mission council.

261
utility companies, for those issues clearly affected the
public interests and determined the public welfare. Only the
municipal government, Thompson said, could fairly judge
those issues because the municipal government was the only
authority representative of the public interests and welfare
of the people of New Orleans. Immediate and direct account
ability lessened the possibility that a municipal public
service commission would "politicize" public services.2"
Despite Thompson's poised and considered assurances and
the endorsement of the Association of Commerce, the Manion
bill (Representative Martin H. Manion, a member of the RDO
from Uptown New Orleans, sponsored the bill) did not reach
the floor of the House of Representatives. Neither did the
state regulation bill. Though committed to the regulation of
the public utilities industry, the civic and political lead
ership of New Orleans was, quite obviously, divided and,
despite their common concern, unwilling to compromise. Some
time after the regular legislative session, in November,
1914, the Behrman administration asked Governor Hall and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Lee E. Thomas, to

2"New Orleans Item. June 16, 1914; New Orleans TimesPicavune. June 16, 1914. The board of directors for the
Association of Commerce reviewed and endorsed the municipal
public service commission bill, stating that it was superior
to the bill drafted by the MIL or urged by the Item.
Several notable and influential men served on the board of
directors for the Association of Commerce. They were
Edgar Stern, Samuel W. Weiss, E. L. Gladney, Frank Dameron,
Leon Simon, M. B. Kreeger, Albert Mackie, C. H. Willard, and
Gender Abbott.
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commission a joint executive-legislative commission to study
state and municipal regulation and to make its findings and
recommendations available for the regular legislative ses
sion in 1916.589
The New Orleans Item cautioned the commission against
recommending a partisan public service bill. The Item admit
ted that any commission regulating the public utility system
in New Orleans must be familiar with the city's "unique"
financial, social, and political conditions and it must be
sympathetic to those conditions. A public service commis
sion, the Item remarked, must also be representative of the
"unique" financial, social, and political interests of the
city. Those facts alone, the newspaper said, precluded any
member of the commission council or the RDO from sitting
on a municipal or state commission. The commission council
and the voters of New Orleans were not, to be sure, repre
sentative of those "unique" interests and were, conse
quently, unsuited for determining the membership of the
public service commission. Municipal regulation under the
guidance of the Behrman administration or under the guise of
democracy would, the Item concluded, upset the "delicate"
political balance between the reformers and the machine
politicians. State regulation under the guise of municipal

a9Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of
Representatives of the State of Louisiana. 1914. (Baton
Rouge, 1914), 368, 389, 769; New Orleans Item. June 19, 24,
July 2, November 24, 1914.
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regulation, the Item believed, would maintain the "balance"
of power between the Regular Democrats and the municipal
reformers.30
The Behrman administration, too, believed that a public
service commission had to be representative of the "unique"
political and social interests of New Orleans and had to
maintain the proper balance between private and public
interests. Neither the Provosty bill nor the original MIL
bill granted the public service commission the authority
sufficient to represent the interests of the city against
NORLC and NOGLC and neither one balanced the representative
political interests of the city. The Manion bill, on the
other hand, proposed establishing a representative and
balanced public service commission. The bill granted the
commission the authority and resources to regulate NORLC and
NOGLC and accorded the city administration, business (though
not labor), and the public a voice in establishing public
utility policy for the city. Opposition to the Manion bill
and to the joint executive-legislative commission convinced
the Behrman administration that compromise and balance were
pointless. And it abandoned the idea for an independent mu

3°New Orleans Item, November 24, 1914. The Item confessed
that the incumbent commission council was representative of
the "unique" social and political interests of the city. As
members of any political body associated with Martin Behrman
and the RDO, however, those "unbossed" councilmen were sus
ceptible to unwarranted political presssures. Subsequent
councils, as well, may not have the same social, profes
sional, or political integrity as the present council.
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nicipal public service commission in favor of the regulation
of public utilities by the commission council.

Early in 1916, Commissioner of Public Utilities William
Bess Thompson began a series of private discussions and cor
respondences with City Attorney Moore on municipal regula
tion under the commission council. In response to Thompson's
inquiries, Moore outlined the regulatory powers and limita
tions of the city government. In brief, Moore wrote, though
the city could compel service and fix rates, it could only
do so within the terms of its franchises with NORLC and
under the reasonable limitations of its police powers. As
the law and its practices stood at the moment, Moore said,
the council did not have the exclusive power to set rates,
fares, valuation, or capitalization. The experiences of the
past several years and the impending consolidation of the
underlying companies under NORLC, he wrote, only reempha
sized the "necessity for a municipal [public] service com
mission" invested with the authority to regulate the public
affairs of NORLC. **
After several more weeks of close study and direct con
sultation with Moore, CPU Thompson went before the full com
mission council with recommendations for creating a munici
pal public service commission. Thompson urged the council to

3XMoore to Thompson, undated (probably between February
13-19, 1916), vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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abandon the idea of an "independent" municipal public ser
vice commission. Instead, Thompson recommended creating a
municipal service commission within the Department of Public
Utilities, staffed by utility experts and administered by
the Commissioner of Public Utilities under the direct super
vision of the commission council. In essence, the city coun
cil would serve as the municipal public service commission
for New Orleans.32
Politics lay behind Thompson's recommendations— though
not the sort imagined by the New Orleans Item and the other
critics of the Behrman administration. The commission coun
cil charter of 1912, whether by design or through omission,
did not specify the authority and responsiblities of the
commission council or the Commissioner of Public Utilities
over the public utilities of New Orleans. Thompson and the
council wanted to assure that the elected officials of the
municipal government had the authority and prestige to de
termine public utility policy. A municipal public service
commission directed by the Commissioner of Public Utilities
and controlled by the council guaranteed the municipal
government the authority to determine public utility policy.
"Independent" municipal utility commissions, composed ex
clusively of businessmen (like the PBRRC), often compromised
the public authority of the commission council, subjecting

32New Orleans Item, May 3, 23, June 7, 14, 1916; New Or
leans Daily States. May 3, June 13, 1916.
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public policy to the excessive demands of pcivate business
and political interests. "Independent" boards were, as
well, indifferent and incompetent, serving on a part-time
basis and usually without any technical knowledge of regula
tion or experience in public law, administration, or
finance.
The Behrman administration, on the other hand (at
least from Thompson's point of view), was more tolerant of
the concerns of private interests and more competent and ex
perienced in governing New Orleans than anyone in the busi
ness community. The Manion municipal public service bill was
an indication of the administration's concern for balancing
the interests of the business community with the public de
mands for an authoritative and competent regulation of
public services. The bill acknowledged the role of private
interests in formulating public policy by giving the large
business associations a discernible, though modulated, voice
on the public service commission. But the business and civic
leadership of New Orleans, except the Association of Com
merce, attacked the Manion bill as partisan and questioned
the sincerity and competency of the Behrman administration.
In Thompson's eyes, then, compromise with the so-called
civic and commerical elite was impossible.
Compromise also seemed unnecessary. Despite the campaign
against municipal regulation, the Behrman administration
enjoyed the confidence of the majority of the voters of New
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Orleans and "commanded" the alligiance of most of the city's
state representatives and senators. Apparently, the adminis
tration convinced most citizens that municipal regulation
was a reasonable, authoritative, and expedient means of
regulation and that the commission council possessed the ex
perience and competence to regulate NORLC. The commission
council, then, endorsed Thompson's concept, instructing him
to draft legislation authorizing the council to regulate the
public utilities of New Orleans.33
For the next several weeks, Thompson and City Attorney
Moore pieced together

a municipalpublic service bill. The

draft gave the municipal public service commission the power
to subpoena records, compel testimony from witnesses, hear
and adjudicate cornsumer complaints, fix rates and schedules,
force extensions of services, determine a fair valuation,
assure a reasonable rate of return, and establish any policy
or practice that promoted and protected the public welfare.
The bill gave the Behrman administration "near" plenary
authority over NORLC.

The council readily approved the bill,

introducing it to the

legislature at the beginningof the

regular session in the summer, 1916. 3"*
Sponsored by State Representative John Nix, the admin
istration bill also attracted intense opposition from the
anti-Regular reformers of New Orleans. As in the past, their
33Ibid.
3,*New Orleans Daily States. May 19, 1916; New Orleans
Item. June 18-20, 1916.
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opposition to municipal regulation stemmed from a fear of
the "politicalization" of public services and the public
service industry. Their arguments against municipal regula
tion strained common sense and exposed a pernicious and ir
rational side to anti-Regular municipal reform. Percy Saint,
for example, an attorney and a member of the Louisiana State
House of Representatives from Uptown New Orleans, labeled
the Nix bill a fraud and naked power grab, permitting NORLC
to escape regulation, yet enabling Behrman and the Regulars
to extend and strengthen their grip on the "vital" public
services of the city.33
The Item agreed with Saint. It was obvious to all
"unbossed" and "intelligent" citizens, the Item asserted,
that the RDO and the Behrman administration were not serious
about regulating the utility companies. In the past twelve
years, the newspaper wrote, Mayor Behrman and the Regular
Democrats had allowed NORLC to go virtually unchecked. The
past three city administrations had permitted NORLC to con
solidate its control over the producing companies, ignore
its franchise obligations, and exact exorbitant profits from
the city. Now, prated the Item, after years of controversy
and agitation over NORLC, the Behrman Democrats suddenly
demanded the plenary authority to "regulate" the utilities
of New Orleans.3®

3SNew Orleans Item, June 15, 21, 1916.
3®New Orleans Item. June 15, 1916.
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The current commission council was competent and pro
gressive, the Item admitted, but it was uncharacteristic of
previous "ring" administrations and it was unlikely that the
RDO would renominate the same sort of commission ticket for
the fall elections. (If the Regulars renominated [without
Behrman, of course] the same sort of ticket, then, the Item
revealed, it would endorse the concept of a municipal public
service commission, replete, of course, with the proper
safeguards and restrictions.) Still, the newspaper reminded
its readers, the "machine that stands behind [the commission
council], and limits its usefulness to a large degree, is a
hungry and ambitious institution more than likely to sacri
fice reform for power and patronage." 37
Perhaps because of the abusive criticism leveled at the
Nix bill, the House Committee on City Affairs (HCCA) held
hearings on the bill a week ahead of the scheduled date. The
only witness at the hearing, at least according to the press
accounts, was CPU Thompson, the "author" of the bill. The
HCAC's action, naturally, prompted charges of "railroading"
from the critics of the bill. The HCCA ignored those allega
tions, giving the municipal service bill an unqualified fa
vorable recommendation. On the floor of the House of Repre
sentatives, however, the Nix bill encountered resistance;
3-7New Orleans Item, June 15, 1916. In a later editorial,
the Item reversed its position on supporting municipal regu
lation, arguing that municipal regulation went against the
"overwhelming preponderance of American experience in regu
lating public utilities." See Item. June 21, 1916.
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this time from another, even more determined quarter, the
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. In a letter addressed
to Speaker of the House Hewitt Bouanchaud, attorneys for
NORLC complained that the Behrman administration, for its
own partisan purposes, used its immense political influence
with the HCCA to stifle debate and to manipulate the pas
sage of the Nix bill, and hey urged the House of Representa
tives to recommit the bill for a full and more judicious
hearing before HCCA.3"
Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson disputed the
attorneys' version of events. The city administration, he
protested in a published statement, did not have to coerce
the HCCA into giving the Nix bill a favorable recommenda
tion. The bill had its own intrinsic value and had the sup
port of several important civic and political organizations.
A favorable recommendation for the Nix bill did not preempt
further debate on the bill or preclude consideration of
other public service bills. The attorneys and management of
NORLC, Thompson said, could hardly feign ignorance or sur
prise over the contents of the Nix bill, or suggest that
they were "uninvited" to public hearings, or question the
integrity or motives of the Behrman administration. City
3°New Orleans Item, June 14, 15, 1916; New Orleans Daily
States. June 13, 1916. In their letter, attorneys Bernard
McCloskey, John Patrick Sullivan, and Charles F. Buck, Jr.,
implied that the Behrman administration wanted to "capital
ize" on the recent controversy over public utilities to
gain control over the 3,700 men and women who worked for
NORLC and NOGLC.

Attorney Moore and he, Thompson explained, met with the
attorneys £or NORLC and ACC as the administration prepared
the Nix bill. At the conference, Moore and Thompson ex
plained each provision of the legislation, permitting the
attorneys the chance to express their opinions and to
raise objections. At no time during the conference or any
time before the HCCA hearing (a period of seventeen days)
did NORLC object to the content, tone, or purpose of the
bill.33
Daniel Dennis Curran, president of NORLC, disputed
Thompson's claims. Curran claimed that the attorneys for
NORLC attended the conference with Moore and Thompson only
to learn the purposes and means behind the administration's
public utility policy. The attorneys were not there to par
ticipate in drafting legislation, Curran said, and they had
no authority to bind NORLC to any bill or policy, something
the Behrman administration knew in advance of the meeting .*°
In addition, Curran went on to say, when the municipal
officials introduced the Nix bill to the HCCA, the board of
directors of NORLC informed the commission council that it
was "emphatically and unanimously'' opposed to the bill and
to the policy of municipal regulation. In their letter to
City Attorney Moore on June 9, the NORLC attorneys informed

39New Orleans Item. June 14, 16, 21, 1916; New Orleans
Daily States. June 14, 16, 21, 1916.
■*°New Orleans Item, June 16, 1916; New Orleans Daily
States. June 16, 1916.
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the commission council that the board questioned the wis
dom of municipal regulation. The financial communities in
New Orleans and New York, the attorneys said, were fearful
that municipal regulation would impair future financing and
investment. Investors and managers were extremely skeptical
about municipal regulation, particularly when the municipal
public service commission was highly politicized. Such a
piece of radical legislation would, unquestionably, disturb
the financial stability of the company and have a corres
ponding effect on the political equilibrium of the city.
Curran then reminded the Behrman administration that NORLC
was willing— and had been since 1914, he said— to accept
regulation by some state agency, preferably the State Rail
road Commission. State regulation fit the national stan
dards, he said, and was familiar and acceptable to manage
ment, investors, and consumers, and would not disturb the
order and rhythm of the utilities industry or the business
of municipal government.1,1
The Behrman administration favored municipal regulation
precisely because it would disrupt the established order of
the utilities industry and because it would, to some degree,
realign political authority in New Orleans (regulation by an
independent state board would curb some of the excesses of
the utility industry, but would not "realign" political au
thority in the cities). The management of NORLC understood
«xIbid.
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the implications of municipal regulation and did all it
could to prevent its adoption. And it endorsed state regula
tion to avoid the financial and political costs of municipal
regulation. In addition, Curran's indictment of the city ad
ministration and the HCCA was unwarranted and self-serving.
The president and management of NORLC knew of the council's
intention of drafting the Nix bill, but it made no public
comment on its objection to municipal regulation. It par
ticipated in a formal conference with municipal officials
and learned firsthand the content of the Nix bill, and
still it made no public protest. Even after its board of
directors went "on record" opposing the bill, NORLC chose
not to contest the bill until after the HCCA had endorsed
it. NORLC, then, had every reasonable opportunity to influ
ence the course of the NIX bill, but chose to remain silent
only later feigning injury.*2
The Behrman administration and the HCCA acted with un
necessary haste in considering the Nix bill before the
scheduled time, but there was no effort to deceive the pub
lic or opponents about the content of the Nix bill or to
"steamroll" the bill into law. The uninitiated public knew
the general contents of the bill weeks before the HCCA de
liberated on it and the commission council discussed the
bill in public on separate occasions. As any reasonably in

*2New Orleans Item, May 3, 23, June 7, 9, 14-16, 1916;
New Orleans Daily States, June 7, 9, 14-16, 19, 20, 1916.
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formed citizen knew, the recommendation of the HCCA did not
prevent the House or the State Senate from considering other
utility regulation bills or from amending the Nix bill. In
fact, even after the House passed the Nix bill by an over
whelming majority, the General Assembly considered two
separate bills authorizing the state regulation of the muni
cipal utilities of New Orleans and finally consented to
amending the original Nix bill.'*3
In the Louisiana State Senate, NORLC and the other cri
tics of municipal regulation lobbied against the Nix bill,
proposing instead that the legislature place NORLC under the
"supervision" of either the State Railroad Commission or an
independent state public service commission. The spokesmen
for NORLC (there were six of them who appeared against the
Nix bill) told the Senate Committee on City Affairs (SCCA)
that municipal regulation was a dangerous and radical doc
trine that frightened investors and threatened private pro
perty. The Nix bill gave the Behrman administration a re
gime already biased against business, the authority to set
arbitrary limits of capitalization, valuation, and rate of
return, force the extension of services into undeveloped and
unprofitable sections of New Orleans, and in general inter■*3New Orleans Item. May 3, June 14-16, 1916; New Orleans
Daily States. May 3, June 13, 19, 1916. Following the pas
sage of the Nix bill. Representative Percy Saint introduced
a bill creating a state-municipal public service commission
for New Orleans. In the Senate, George Williams sponsored a
bill drafted by attorneys of NORLC granting the State Rail
road Commission authority over NORLC and NOGLC.

275
fere with the policies and management of a private corpora
tion. The investors and management of NORLC, its spokesmen
said, appreciated the business and political justification
for regulation, but for obvious reasons they objected to
regulation by a politicized municipal commission. State
regulation, by contrast, was a "fixed doctrine" compatible
with the political, economic, and constitutional tenets of
the free enterprise system. The company would submit to
state regulation, preferably under the State Railroad Com
mission, but it would accept regulation by an independent
state public service commission.**
Appearing for the city administration. Mayor Behrman
and Commissioner of Public Utilities Thompson assured the
SCCA that municipal regulation was no radical doctrine and
no threat to private property or public services. Municipal
regulation under the Nix bill, they said, would allow the
citizens of New Orleans, through their elected representa
tives, to manage their own essential needs, chart their own
development, without compromising or diluting their author
ity and integrity or threatening private investment. The
bill did not contemplate governing the internal, private
affairs of NORLC (valuation, rate of return, and rates and
'•‘•New Orleans Item, June 15, 19-21, 1916; New Orleans
Daily States. June 21, 1916. The men who represented NORLC
were its principal executives and attorneys. They were Hugh
McCloskey, chairman of the board of directors, Francis C.
Homer, president of ACC, Bernard McCloskey, general counsel,
and attorneys Henry Favrot, Charles Buck, Jr., and John Pat
rick Sullivan.
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fares were, they argued, hardly private concerns), but did
intend to compel service and establish rates and fares in
line with the city's ability to pay. The bill gave the city
administration no direct or indirect control over the em
ployees of NORLC, and the administration had no intention of
using its regulatory powers to manipulate customers and
workers. The only threat posed by municipal regulation and
the Nix bill, they said, was to NORLC's "monopoly" over the
cost and development of public services in New Orleans. The
SCCA agreed with Behrman and Thompson, recommending the Nix
bill but with one dissenting vote.1-3
The administration was confident that the Senate would
approve the Nix bill, claiming that it had the votes to pass
the measure on the first ballot. Instead, the Behrman admin
istration, overly sensitive to the intemperate criticism of
its political rivals and ever susceptible to the necessities
of city politics, agreed to a series of amendments that
divided and clouded the regulatory authority of the city.**
The compromise, offered by two rural parish senators
(but surely authored by the attorneys of NORLC and arranged
by its business associates with the city banks and on the
Board of Liquidation), called for the creation of an inde
pendent state board of public utilities, consisting of the
Commissioner of Public Utilities and four other citizens of
••"New Orleans Item, June 21, 1916; New Orleans Daily
States , June 21, 1916. The vote was 12 to 1.
■•"New Orleans Item, June 25, 1916.

New Orleans chosen by the governor. The new Nix bill em
powered the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) to enact "all
just, reasonable, and adequate rules and regulation for the
supervision and regulation" of NORLC and NOGLC. The BPU
could

determine "reasonableand just rates," adjusting those

rates

and fares in relation to the net earnings and divi

dends

of the two companies. It could, as well, "encourage"

the utility companies to reinvest profits back in the com
panies in the form of debt repayment, physical improvements
and replacements, and business economies and efficiencies.
The BPU could require the utility companies to extend their
services into those areas of the city "sufficiently populous
to insure a reasonable revenue" to the companies. Finally,
for the purposes of setting the cost of service, the BPU
could determine the "fair value" of all "facilities dedi
cated to the public use". The Behrman administration con
sented to the compromise amendments and the bill became law
without much difficulty or delay.*-7
The law was far from adequate. It ended the discredited
practice of fixing rates and fares by individual contract
and ordinance, though, in effect, it allowed the utility
companies to continue fixing rates and fares. The act re
quired the BPU to establish a "sliding" scale of rates and

■*',Act 36, Acts Passed bv the General Assemhly n-F the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1916: New Orleans
Item. June 23, 1916; New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23,
1916; New Orleans Times-Picayune. June 23, 1916.
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fares based not on the "cost of service" but on the profits,
dividends, and valuation of the companies. In adjusting the
rates and fares for NORLC, the BPU also had to consider the
earning capacity of the entire company, permitting the com
pany to charge higher rates or fares for one service to off
set lower earnings in another service. The law, however, did
not give the BPU the authority to set the rate of return or
to limit the earning capacity of the companies.
In determining the valuation of the two utility compa
nies, the BPU had to follow a complex and controversal
formula. In formulating the "fair value" of NORLC and NOGLC,
the BPU had to consider the original cost of construction,
the current market value of all bonds and stocks, the
earning capacities of the underlying companies, the depre
ciation of equipment, the cost of reproduction, and "devel
opmental and going concern value". Such an equation would
add tens of millions of dollars to the valuation of the two
companies (bloating its fixed financial obligations) and
millions of dollars in revenues and profits. By contrast,
the BPU could only "encourage" innovation and modernization,
allowing obsolete equipment and debt to figure into the
determination of value and rates. The BPU could not, un
fortunately, even encourage the extension and development
of public services. Under the revised Nix act, the BPU could
not compel either NORLC or NOGLC to extend services to areas
that did not have the population to guarantee a return on
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investment. In essence, then, the compromise diluted the
regulatory power of the municipal government, allowing the
companies to determine the character and development of
public services in the city.*3
The amended Nix act further weakened the regulatory au
thority of the municipal government by dividing it between
the commission council and the independent Board of Public
Utilities. The BPU was, in theory, independent of the muni
cipal government, but the Commissioner of Public Utilities
served as the chairman of the board, the City Attorney was
its legal counsel, and the city administration alone deter
mined the budget for the board. The act clearly restated the
council's "unassailable" authority over rates, franchises,
and service. But just as clearly, the act invested the coun
cil and the BPU with the authority to "supervise and regu
late" NORLC and NOGLC. There was, as well, considerable
public speculation that the Nix act was unconstitutional,
that it violated provisions of the state constitution and
the municipal charter of New Orleans that required the
election or selection by the commission council of any
municipal official exercising the reserved powers of the

*"Act 36, 1916. The act also gave the utility companies
the "right to appeal to any Court of competent jurisdiction
to test the legality, validity, constitutionality, or rea
sonableness of any order, decree, rule, regulation, or or
dinance" of the commission council or the BPU. The companies
did not have this right under the original Nix bill.
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state or municipal governments. The Board of Public Utili
ties clearly fell into that category. *•*
Why, then, did the Behrman administration abandon one
of its major legislative and political initiatives without
apparent reason or provocation? Critics of municipal regula
tion and the original Nix bill claimed that the Behrman ad
ministration submitted to the compromise out of political
desperation. Public sentiment, they insisted, was suspicious
of municipal regulation and of the Behrman administration.
Municipal regulation concentrated too much power over pro
perty and service in the hands of the city's elected munici
pal officials. Elected municipal officials were hardly dis
interested public administrators but rank politicians, sus
ceptible to too many political pressures to effectively and
dispassionately manage the public service needs of the
city.*0
In New Orleans the political dangers of municipal regu
lation were compounded by the presence of a voracious poli
tical machine bent on controlling every feature of the pub
lic and private lives of the people. The "intelligent" and
"sober" citizens of New Orleans recognized the Nix bill as a
transparent "power grab," designed solely to further the
■•"Moore to Edward J. Glenny, Commissioner of Public Util
ities, February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8, 24, November
26, 1918, John F. C. Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol.8,
CAP, CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. December 5, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States, December 5, 6, 1918.
*°New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23, 1916; New Or
leans Item, June 23, 1916.
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political ambitions of the Regular Democratic Organization
and the Behrman administration. These citizens exposed the
corrupt features of municipal regulation under the Nix
bill, eroding its legislative support and forcing the RDO
and the administration to abandon their scheme and to submit
to a compromise bill. The new Nix bill, the product of the
best legal and business minds in the city, allowed the true
representatives of the people— the civic and commerical
leaders of New Orleans— to regulate NORLC and to check the
ambitions of the Regulars and the Behrman government.31
Later, after the failure of the BPU to regulate NORLC,
these same sober and intelligent citizens invented another
explanation for the Nix compromise. According to this
version, the Behrman administration conspired with NORLC and
its allies in the business community to prevent the regula
tion of the public utilities industry in New Orleans. Appar
ently, the original Nix bill was nothing more than an elab
orate ruse designed to prevent the passage of a more ex
acting state regulation bill. The Behrman administration had
no intention of regulating NORLC and it offered the original
Nix bill only to arouse the considerable opposition to muni
cipal regulation, gulling critics into accepting amendments
the administration knew were insufficient and unconstitu
tional .3a

31 Ibid..
3aEthel Hutson, "New Orleans' Experience," 79.

Neither of these two highly partisan and illogical ac
counts is, to say the least, an accurate explanation of the
genesis of the Nix bill or of the reasons behind the compro
mise. The Behrman administration did not agree to the Nix
compromise out of political desperation and it was not in
clined toward a cynical and impolitic alliance with the man
agement of NORLC. The Behrman administration was, as we have
seen already, a sincere and consistent proponent of munici
pal regulation. In the years prior to 1912, the administra
tion, using precedents set by previous administrations, reg
ulated the public utility industry through the customary
methods of franchise, taxation, and contract. Though the
municipal government never abandoned those practices, con
solidation and monopoly made them inadequate, placing the
utility companies beyond the control of municipal authority.
Modern regulation theory and practices promised to restore
public control over essential services without compromising
the tenets of private enterprise or incurring the large debt
and tax obligations associated with municipal ownership.
Municipal regulation, with its ties to home rule and cen
tralized authority, appealed to an administration bent on
determining both public services and municipal policy.
Political necessity, however, advised the Behrman ad
ministration to accomodate public utility policy to the
legitimate interests of the business and reform elements of
the city, sharing with those interests visible authority
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over public service policy. The Manion bill of 1914 extended
public control over the modern public service industry,
according the municipal administration and the business and
civic leaders an "equal" share of authority over public ser
vice. The civic leadership of the city, in particular the
Item and the MIL, opposed the Manion bill, insisting that
the Behrman administration merely wanted the jobs and power
that flowed from municipal regulation. In 1914, without ex
perience or success in the regulation of the public utility
companies, the commission council did not believe that it
could manage the regulation of public services without the
active support of the business and civic leadership of New
Orleans.
Over the next several years, however, the commission
council learned that it could regulate some of the actions
of the utility companies without the assistance of the or
ganized and vocal business and reform elements. Between 1914
and 1916, the city council, acting as its own municipal pub
lic service commission, addressed several public service
issues. Though the administration performed reasonably well
in those areas, its inability to influence matters of capi
talization, valuation, and rate of return stymied efforts to
compel service and establish fair rates. In 1916, faced with
growing demands for better, cheaper services and drawing on
the lessons of the past five years, the administration
drafted the Nix bill, giving the commission council exclu
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sive authority over NORLC. Dividing regulatory power as the
civic reformers suggested only compromised the force of reg
ulation and relinquished authority over public matters to
private concerns.
Those private concerns, however, were part of the
commonwealth of interests that energized the public life of
New Orleans, and in the end proved too powerful for the
Behrman administration to resist. The Behrman administra
tion, then, did not seek compromise because it lacked con
viction, but because compromise promised.,to do more than
conviction. It promised to bring private and public concerns
and interests into concert and to bring a measure of peace
to the public life of the city. The revised Nix bill prom
ised both service and regulatory reform, something not truly
possible without the cooperation of NORLC, the civic reform
ers, and the commission council. The management of NORLC
agreed to the compromise because it removed exclusive regu
latory control from "municipal" authority and because it
allowed the company to determine valuation, profit, and the
extent of service. The anti-Regular reformers were satisfied
with the revised bill because the BPU was, with one excep
tion, independent of the city administration, allaying their
fears of a powerful municipal government and, more to the
point, giving them a formal and potent voice in determining
public service policy. The Behrman administration accepted
the compromise because it guaranteed service and because it
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reformed public utility policy, expanding and strengthening
the authority of the commission council over that policy.
The compromise, however, could not fulfill its promises
and it collapsed under the weight of politics and the strain
of war. The compromise did not allow the management of NORLC
to determine the value, rate of profit, and character and
pace of the development of the public service industry in
New Orleans. The municipal population demanded additional
services at prices nearly too low to support existing ser
vices, while the financial market, operating under the de
mands of a wartime economy, demanded higher returns on its
investment. Fares and rates were already set by municipal
franchise and ordinance, and municipal officials were re
luctant to increase fares and rates without imposing more
exacting restrictions on the utility companies. The Behrman
administration, faced with the growing financial and politi
cal crisis in the utility industry, questioned the necessity
of an independent public service commission, ignoring its
recommendations and refusing to meet its financial requests.
Several high-ranking municipal officials, particularly com
missioners Lafaye and Glenny and City Attorney Moore,
questioned the expediency and wisdom of the Nix act, viewing
it as an impediment to the regulation of the utility com
panies of New Orleans. The act— and the political compromise
that stood behind it— simply could not restore the financial
and civic integrity of the utility industry in New Orleans
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or invest the municipal government with the political
authority to manage public services. But, if the act and
compromise could not resolve the long-standing financial
and political problems of municipal regulation, then,
perhaps, America's entry into the Great War might provide
the financial and political resources to end the stalemate
and to suggest a democratic solution.93

Old cities like New Orleans, wrote the editorialist for
the New Orleans Item in the spring of 1918, tended to be
politically and socially "self-centered, clanish, and, in a
sense, provincial". Old families and old ideas had for years
commanded the commerical and civic life of the city, retard
ing the financial and social development of New Orleans. In
more recent years, however, under the leadership of Mayor
Behrman and the new men of the commission council, there
were indications that the city was discarding its old paro
chialism and was embracing the spirit of progress and re
form. Prior to 1917, however, the municipal reform movement
lacked a sense of urgency and common design. The war, more
than any other event in the city's recent past, gave the
municipal reform movement a sense of moral and practical
necessity and purpose, quickening its pace and sharpening

93Moore to Glenny February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8,
November 26, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol.8,
CAP. CA, NOPL.
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its focus.**
The war that would make the world safe for democracy
would also advance democratic, progressive reform at home.
The war effort and the public good required that the munici
pal administration suppress social vice and promote social
hygiene (see below Chapter Seven), sanction and secure woman
suffrage (see below Chapter Seven), restructure relations
with business and labor, and redesign the structure of muni
cipal politics and government (see below Chapter Nine).
Those issues, of course, predated the war, but the wartime
emergency, the Item suggested, gave them a greater sense of
poignancy. But the war not only rekindled the spirit of re
form, it also tested the resiliency of the municipal reform
movement. The war tested the public and private resources of
the city, demanding of those resources more and better pub
lic services, better living and working conditions, higher
wages, recognition of the rights of labor, incentives and
subsidies for business, and a more direct and responsive in
volvement of the municipal government with the private and
public lives of the people of New Orleans. The first test
was not long in coming.**
Early in 1918, the management of NORLC announced that
the company was near bankruptcy. The financial and contract
ual conditions imposed on the company by the wartime emer-

**New Orleans Item, March 11, April 25, 1918.
**New Orleans Item. April 25, 1918.
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gency and by a misguided form of regulation prevented the
company from meeting its financial obligations or refinan
cing itself. Unless the company received the financial as
sistance of the federal government and an increase in rates
and fares from the commission council of New Orleans, then
it would either lapse into receivership, curtailing services
and laying off personnel, or cease operations altogether,
plunging New Orleans into an economic and social crisis.sa
There was no guestion that the wartime emergency con
tributed to the financial troubles of NORLC, worsening its
condition and hastening the impending crisis in the company
and in the national public utilities industry. Though de
signed to preserve private capital and to restrain infla
tion, the fiscal policies of the Wilson administration did
just the opposite. Federal policy prompted heavy borrowing
from the banking industry, exhausting the credit supply and
driving up the costs of essential materials and services to
unprecedented levels. The war was particularly hard on the
public utilities industry, which survived and prospered on a
constant flow of credit and a cheap, abundant supply of raw
materials and labor. Though its gross revenues rose in 1917
by $540,000, NORLC reported that its operating expenditures
for the same year increased by $604,000, a four per cent
rise in one year. The enormous increase in the cost of fuel,
labor, and finance nearly paralyzed the company, reducing
saNew Orleans Itemr February 20-21, 1918.
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its earning capacity and jeopardizing its standing in the
financial market.9*7
The war, however, was not solely responsible for the
financial and political problems of NORLC or the public ser
vice industry. The immense problems of the public utilities
industry— overcapitalization, absentee ownership, the fixed
term franchise, and a perverse, seemingly corrupt, involve
ment in municipal politics— predated the war. In the early
years of the twentieth century, investment bankers seized
control of the public utilities industry. These bankers,
anxious to promote and profit from the electrification and
consolidation of the companies they controlled, overcapital
ized the companies, turning stocks into bonds and dividends
into "fixed" interest. Old debt and obsolete equipment was
never retired or amortized, but simply recapitalized and
allowed to "earn" dividends. Overcapitalization, however,
did not benefit the public service industry. It actually im
paired credit, making future financing more difficult to ob
tain and more expensive to manage. It also prevented the

^ Proceedings of The Federal Electric Railways Commis
sion. (Washington, 1919), vol. 1, 538, 555, vol. 3, 2138-40,
2174-77, 2182-92, 2271; "Exhibit C, Information relative to
[the] New Orleans Railway and Light Company System, December
31, 1917, Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway and Light
Company, October 4, 1918," Portfolio 2, Proceedings of the
National War Labor Board, hereafter cited as PNWLB, Troy H.
Middleton Libray, LSU; Delos F. Wilcox, "Problem of Recon
struction With Respect to Urban Transportation," National
Municipal Review. 8 (January 1919), 33, 36; David M. Ken
nedy, Over Here: American Society and the First World War
(New York, 1980), 94, 101-03.
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operating companies from expanding and improving services,
eroding public confidence and further impairing the credit
of the companies.90
Despite the deteriorating financial and physical condi
tion of the public service companies, legal and business ob
ligations required them to pay huge dividends on their pre
ferred and common stock. The preferred and common stock of
the operating companies were held by large holding compan
ies, which, in turn, were owned by still larger companies or
by investment banks and insurance companies. The holding
companies did not own any physical property, but, by holding
the preferred and common stock, they controlled and managed
the operating companies. The holding company system made
possible the consolidation of lesser companies and the ex
pansion and improvement in services, providing the capital
and management to keep the underlying companies solvent and
operating. The holding company system, however, based its
management of the operating companies on the volume of their
securities and on the frequency of refunding and exchange.
In brief, profit came not from prudent financing, careful
management, or exemplary service, but from manipulating the
bond and stock issues. Operating companies were stripped of
all resources and incentives for improvements, no longer
responsible for their own actions and no longer responsive
" PFERC. vol. 1, 554-555, 562; vol. 2, 1203-04; vol. 3,
2136-37, 2161, 2266-67; Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction,"
HMR. 34-35.
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responsive to the needs of the community.38
Industry spokesmen, however, defended the early devel
opment of the public service industry, arguing that the
municipal and state governments shared the blame for the de
plorable condition of the public utilities industry. At the
beginning of the modern public utilities industry, spokemen
claimed, few people in either management or government had a
"proper conception" of the best means of financing, opera
ting, or regulating the public service industry. The princi
pal blame, however, lay with the character and policies of
public regulation. Early in the history of the modern public
utilities industry, public officials insisted on fixed, com
petitive franchises that compelled the utility companies to
needlessly expand and "improve" services, but required them
to operate and survive on a limited, fixed revenue. Industry
spokesmen asserted that the fixed-term, fixed-revenue fran
chise impaired the credit of the industry and, ultimately,
resulted in the neglect and deterioration of services. The
term franchise became worthless at expiration, and, without
the guarantee of renewal or reimbursement, franchise owners
were forced to extract a profit high enough to return their
initial investment and to give them a fair rate of return.
The fixed-term franchise also fixed rates and fares and pre
vented the utility company from adjusting its revenues to
38PPERC, vol.l, 537-55, vol.2, 1,203-04, 1,221, 1,271;
vol.3, 2,173, 2,269-70; Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction,"
35.
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meet the changing conditions of the economy and the demands
of municipal regulation. Consequently, service deteriorated
and the companies faced bankruptcy.00
The financial and legal limitations imposed on the in
dustry by an inapposite form of regulation, industry spokes
men argued, forced the utility companies to finds ways of
negating or avoiding the provisions of their franchises. In
effect, then, despite the fulroinations of politicians and
civic associations, the utility companies were providing the
best service possible. The industry could, with adequate
financial assistance, the appropriate legal flexibility, and
good will of the people correct the abuses apparent in the
system and restore service to prewar standards.ex
In New Orleans, as elsewhere throughout the United
States, it was the public utilities industry, not the muni
cipal authorities, that had depleted the local utility com
panies of the resources to sustain services, manipulated the
legal and political circumstances to serve their own inter0OPFERC, vol.l, 63-G5; vol. 2, 1223; vol. 3, 2137-38,
2161, 2166-67, 2268, 2270; James E. Allison, Report on the
Street Railway Service of the Citv of New Orleans Made to
the Committee on Transporation Facilities of New Orleans.
(New Orleans, 1917), 3, 6-7, Louisiana Collection, HowardTilton Memorial Library, Tulane University; Valerie Jean
Conner, The National War Labor Board Stability. Social Jus
tice. and the Voluntary State in World War I. (Chapel Hill,
1983), 68-69.
“ Bentley W. Warren, "Argument and Brief Submitted to the
Federal Electric Railways Commission on Behalf of the Com
mittee of One Hundred Acting for the American Electric
Railway Association," PFERC. vol. 3, passim. Warren was the
General Counsel for the American Electric Railway Associa
tion.
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ests, and jaundiced public sentiment against them. NORLC was
"notoriously" overcapitalized and operated virtually without
regulation. Most of its revenue went to sustain its heavy
debt, leaving virtually nothing in reserve to improve or ex
tend services. For years the company flaunted its disregard
for the strictures of its municipal franchises, and it
labored continually and successfully to prevent or dilute
municipal regulation. The character of the public utility
industry and the policies of its management— not the wartime
emergency— precipitated the crisis in the industry and ex
hausted the good will of the people of New Orleans.
The Behrman administration responded to the "latest"
crisis at NORLC by reexamining the feasibility of municipal
ownership and by asserting the direct authority of the muni
cipal government over the public services of the city. The
wartime emergency rekindled interest in municipal ownership
of public utilities. The new proponents of municipal owner
ship, like the New Orleans Item, argued that private owner
ship was inept, profligate, and corrupt. It extracted enor
mous and illicit profits from the city, denying it adequate,
quality service and preventing it from planning and deter
mining its own development. Municipal ownership, the Item
asserted, was less costly, more efficient, and more democra
tic. It would result in lower fares and rates, provide more
and better services, lower and equalize taxes, and end the
corrupt monopoly of private interests over public affairs.
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The dangers of municipal ownership still existed, but they
were minimal and insignificant when compared to the substancial dangers of private ownership. The Item urged the city
administration to make preparations for the municipalization
of the entire NORLC system, including the properties of the
New Orleans Gas Light Company. The commission council, al
ready considering the benefits of municipal ownership, com
plied with the Item’s request and instructed Edward J.
Glenny, the Commissioner of Public Utilities, to study all
aspects of municipalization.
The barriers erected to municipal ownership by the
utilities company and by the wartime emergency were many and
formidable, however. The municipalization of NORLC and NOGLC
required the Behrman administration to conduct a comprehen
sive legal and financial study that convinced the legisla
ture, the Board of Liquidation City Debt (the bankers of New
Orleans), the general business community, and the common
citizens of New Orleans of the necessity, wisdom, and expe
diency of municipal ownership. The management and ownership
of NORLC and NOGLC would, undoubtedly, contest any reduction
in the purchase price that threatened the "integrity" of
their investment, delaying and, most certainly, increasing
o:zNew Orleans Item, February 20, 21, 23, March 18, May
23, October 10, 1918; PFERC. vol.3, 2282. The state legisla
ture enacted legislation in 1918 authorizing the "municipal
ities" of the state to own and operate electric streetcar
and power companies. Act 128, Acts Passed bv the General As
sembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session.
1918.
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the cost of municipalization. The taxpayers of New Orleans
would, in all likelihood, question the wisdom and practical
ity of municipalization. Municipal ownership would require
the city government to spend millions of dollars, borrowed
at wartime interest rates, in purchasing, improving, and
operating public services. And municipalization would not
guarantee an immediate reduction in rates or a discernible
improvement in services. In brief, it would be extremely
difficult to create and maintain a political consensus in
fluential and patient enough to sustain the municipalization
of public services in New Orleans.63
The Behrman administration possessed the influence and
the patience to sustain a consensus on municipalization, but
it did not have the resources or the time to invest in
creating one. Even under the best conditions, municipaliza
tion was an expensive and protracted undertaking, requiring
the municipal government to invest immense amounts of money,
energy, and time into the process. Even in the best of
times, the condition of city finances prevented the Behrman
administration from seriously considering municipalization.
The war played havoc with city finances. The inflation
spawned by the war required the Behrman administration to
raise assessment rates, but city revenues never kept pace
with the cost of running the city, compelling the adminis-

63New Orleans Daily Statesr February 20, November 7,
1918; PFERC. vol.l, 540-49, 556, vol.3, 2148, 2160, 2215.
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tration to curtail, not expand, services. The war confounded
city finances in other ways. The war drove up interests
rates and allocated investment capital to legitimate war
time projects. Simply put, municipalization bonds were un
likely to attract investors, and, even if the administration
found a willing lender, the city could not afford to borrow
the money.
The war— and the administration of Woodrow Wilson— did
not accord the city administration the time to municipalize
public services in New Orleans. Secretary of the Treasury
William Gibbs McAdoo convinced President Wilson that the
utility industry was essential to the war effort and the
federal government must not let the war weaken the public
service industry. The industry, McAdoo wrote, was "closely
connected with and [is] an essential part of our prepara
tion and successful prosecution of the war..." Given the
local nature of the utility industry, McAdoo continued, the
federal government must insist on local responsibility and
accountability for the industry. President Wilson agreed
with McAdoo. It was essential, wrote the president, that the
public utilities be kept at "maximum efficiency," and that
the federal government should do whatever was "reasonable"
to sustain the utility companies, primarily by encouraging
the municipal governments to respond promptly and positively
to the immediate needs of the companies and the community.
The president and Secretary McAdoo suggested that the feder-
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al government would, under the right conditions, furnish
loans to the cities to keep the utilities operating. Munici
pal authorities, then, would guarantee the continuation of
service and prevent the financial collapse of the public
utilities industry— at least for the duration of the war.®'*
Encouraged by the administration's assurances, batter
ies of attorneys and lobbyists representing the public ser
vice industry descended on Washington, seeking guaranteed
loans and calling for the establishment of a federal loan
agency to subsidize the faltering utilities industry. The
management of the public service corporations believed that
an ingestion of federal money would save the companies from
defaulting on their financial obligations, eliminating the
likelihood of costly reorganizations. The companies saw,
too, that the federal government would require security for
its loans, forcing the municipalities to raise rates and
fares and preventing them from pursuing any policy that
might impair the credit and performance of the utility com
panies. Despite the objections of several prominent senators
and congressmen to the idea of bailing out the public utili
ties industry. Congress enacted legislation creating the War

®‘€William Gibbs McAdoo to Wilson, February 15, 1918,
Wilson to McAdoo, February 18, 1918, as found in "In the
matter of Arbitration Between Division No. 196, Amalgamated
Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of
America of New Orleans, Louisiana and New Orleans Railway
and Light Company," July 1918, Appendix, Exhibit A, PNWLB.
LSU; New Orleans Item. February 22, May 31, June 1, 1918;
New Orleans Daily States. February 28, June 1, 1918.
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Finance Corporation, authorizing it to extend loans to banks
and industries deemed "good risks" and "essential to the war
effort". One of its first applicants was the New Orleans
Railway and Light Company."9
In May 1918, several officials of NORLC and the Ameri
can Cities Company, including the chairman of the board of
ACC, Francis T. Homer, appeared before the applications com
mittee of the WFC. The executives of the two companies re
counted for the committee the desperate financial condition
of the New Orleans public utilities company and they asked
the WFC to grant the company a loan of 5.2 million dollars.
Despite weeks of persistent lobbying by the management of
the two utility companies, the committee rejected their re
quest, explaining that the WFC did not have the authority to
grant loans directly to companies like NORLC and ACC. The
applications committee informed the utility executives that
the WFC could, with the proper guarantees, extend a loan to
either the City of New Orleans or to a local bank on behalf
of the company. Before the WFC would consent to such a loan,
however, NORLC had to demonstrate that it was properly man
aged and in reasonable financial condition and the commis
sion council of New Orleans had to underwrite the loan by

" M c A d o o to Wilson, February 25, 1918, Arthur S. Link,
ed.. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, hereafter cited as PWW.
(Princeton, 1984), vol. 46, 442-43; William P. G. Harding to
Wilson, July 12, 1918, ibid.. vol. 48, 597-99; PFERC. vol.3,
2154; New Orleans Item, February 21, March 2, May 7, Novem
ber 19, 1918; New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 27, 1918.
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raising the rates and tares of the company."®
Company officials maintained that the railway and elec
tric divisions of the company were, despite their financial
problems, "well and honestly managed, and well maintained
and operated," and saw no need for an increase in rates and
fares for the moment. Apparently, though NORLC wanted and
sought an increase in rates and fares, the company did not
want to involve the Behrman administration in determining
the size and duration of the increases. An increase in fares
and rates would require weeks of public discussion, delaying
the loan process and accentuating the need for greater pub
lic control over rates, valuation, and expenditures. An in
vestigation by the WFC, however, found the New Orleans util
ities company a potential "bad risk," and the directors of
the WFC wanted the Behrman administration to guarantee the
loan. William P. 6. Harding, the managing director of the
WFC and a member of the Federal Reserve Board, informed the
management of NORLC and the city administration that the WFC
would not consider a loan to the utility company until the
WFC and the Behrman administration had come to a "definite

""Committee on Applications, Minutes of Meeting, May 28,
29, 1918, "Application of American Cities Company and New
Orleans Railway and Light Company," vol. 1 War Finance
Corporation. Record Group 154. National Archives (hereafter
cited as WFC, RG 1541; William P. G. Harding to Martin
Behrman, May 31, 1918, ibid.: New Orleans Daily States. May
18, June 1, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 23, 24, 31, June 1,
1918; Conner, The National War Labor Board. 83-84.
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understanding regarding increased revenues" for NORLC.67
Mayor Behrman dispatched Commissioner of Public Utili
ties Edward J. Glenny and City Attorney I. D. Moore to meet
with the WFC, assuring the federal officials of the adminis
tration's "full cooperation" and explaining to them the
legal processes and possible political impediments in in
creasing utility rates and fares. Mayor Behrman informed the
WFC that the city administration recognized the "necessity
of assisting public utility properties to render the ser
vices contemplated in their franchises," and that the com
mission council would honor any reasonable request or
recommendation that allowed NORLC to continue operating. The
mayor also assured the people of New Orleans that the admin
istration would make a thorough and deliberate assessment of
the financial condition of NORLC, confining the increase to
the requirements of service and protecting "the genuine pub
lic interest to the government's fullest extent of power."so
The request and recommendations offered by NORLC, how
ever, were hardly reasonable. The company asked the WFC to
loan it in excess of five million dollars at five percent
interest, secured by a one cent fare increase (one-half cent
"■'William P. G. Harding to Martin Behrman, May 31, 1918,
WFC. RG 154; "Exhibit C...Brief on Behalf of New Orleans
Railway and Light Company, October 4, 1918," Portfolio 2,
PNWLBr LSU; Allison, Report on the Street Railway Service
of the City of New Orleans. 3; New Orleans Daily States.
May 18, 22, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 22, 23, 24, 26,
1918.
""New Orleans Daily States, May 22, 27-28, 31, June 1,
1918; New Orleans Item. May 22, 26-27, 31, June 1, 1918.
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for repayment of the loan and one-half cent for improvements
to service), reducing services, ending the transfer system
and discount fares for school children (and free rides for
the Catholic clergy and religious), and several minor econo
my measures. It seemed unlikely that the WFC would lend such
a substantial sum of money to a minor utility corporation
that federal investigators had already characterized as a
poor risk. The WFC was not in the business of rehabilitating
or refinancing utility companies, but in preventing them
from collapsing and damaging the war effort. Even if the WFC
agreed to loan NORLC five million dollars, a one cent in
crease could hardly be deemed the proper security for such a
huge debt. In theory the six cent fare increased revenues by
only twenty percent, an increase of $800,000 a year. With
the other economies, the company could expect an increase of
1.6 million dollars, a sizeable savings but hardly enough to
satisfy the WFC. For in reality, the six cent fare would not
yield a twenty percent increase in revenues, and there was
no guarantee that the company could economize or that the
city would accept a reduction in services. Moreover, there
was considerable public opposition to any increase in the
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cost of public services.®*
From the start, the local press, long critical of the
Behrman administration, doubted the wisdom of the adminis
tration's policy and questioned the expediency of the six
cent fare. The utility policy of the Behrman administration,
the New Orleans Item remarked, was, as ever, nearsighted and
extravagant. The city administration pledged millions of
dollars in additional revenues for NORLC, permitting the
company to borrow millions more in public funds so it could
continue operations and avoid another costly refinancing and
reorganization. The NORLC did not deserve the assistance of
either the federal War Finance Corporation or the people of
New Orleans. The company was, as everyone knew, grossly
overcapitalized and shamelessly mismanaged, requiring man
agement to send millions of dollars in illicit dividends to
New York and Philadelphia banks and allowing property and
services to disintegrate. With the assistance of the Behr
man administration, the company avoided any meaningful
degree of public regulation, insolating itself against
®*PFERC, vol.l, 539, 557, 560; Wilcox, "Problem of Recon
struction," 38-39; Wilcoc, "Effect of Fare Increases Upon
Street Railway Traffic and Revenues," NMR, 9 (October 1920),
633-35; New Orleans Item, May 28, 29, 31, 1918; New Orleans
Daily States. May 27, 29, 1918. Railway experts predicted
that the six cent fare would substantially reduce the number
of riders, offsetting the superficial benefits of a one
cent increase. Any increase over one or two cents, moreover,
would be financially and politically damaging to the
utility companies. The management of NORLC claimed that the
six cent fare brought a thirty percent increase in New
Orleans, but conceded that it did not permit the company to
meet its financial obligations and improve services.

f

303
public scrutiny and accountability. Now, after years of
prodigal fianancing and behavior, the company claimed that
unless it received the immediate assistance of the federal
and municipal governments it would default on its financial
obligations and cease operations.70
There was, as ever, the Item remarked, no truth to the
dire predictions of NORLC, and there was, as well, no appar
ent benefit to rescuing the company from a disaster of its
own making. An emergency federal loan and a raise in the
costs of services would not prevent a thorough and permanent
collapse of NORLC. The federal government was unwilling and
unable to loan NORLC the sort of money that would allow the
company to meet all its finacial obligations, attract new
investment, and avoid collapse. The loan would be small and
the WFC would expect repayment with interest. The one cent
fare increase would not help the company in refinancing and
reorganizing itself, either. The six cent fare would not
generate enough money to help NORLC repay the WFC loan or
meet its crushing debt, operate the system, and attract new
investment. Ultimately, the company would default on its
debt and continue operating under a private receiver until
the stockholders agreed on a suitable refinancing plan. In
any event, the Item concluded, the city would have spent
millions of dollars on preserving public services and would
lose millions more in the rehabiliation of NORLC. It urged
7°New Orleans Item, May 23, 24, 26, 27, 1918.
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the Behrman administration, then, to avoid another public
humiliation and to "municipalize" NORLC and NOGLC.71
Mayor Behrman, however, under pressure from the Wilson
administration and from the public to keep NORLC operating,
dismissed the idea of municipalization as premature and com
mitted the administration to the six cent fare and a more
direct and vigorous regulation of NORLC. The municipal ad
ministration wanted to avoid any crippling interruptions in
service, and saw the fare increase as an effective and rea
sonable means of preserving public services. Above all else,
however, the commission council wanted to prevent NORLC from
lapsing into receivership. Unlike the Item, the Behrman ad
ministration believed that receivership threatened the pro
gress and welfare of the city. The principal obligations of
any receiver were to preserve the investment of the stock
holders and to reduce the obligations of service that per
mitted the company to continue operating until the stock
holders refinanced and reorganized the company. Both of
these duties could run counter to the interests of the city,
minimizing the regulatory authority of the municipal govern
ment and curtailing public services.72
The one cent fare increase was, unquestionably, the
"simplest solution," and it offered the Behrman administra7XNew Orleans Item. May 22-31, 1918.
72New Orleans Item. May 22, 26-27, 31, 1918; New Orleans
Daily States. May 27, 28, 31, 1918, January 5, 1919; PFERC.
vol.2, 1,263-64; Moore to Behrman, undated, (but probably
between May 22 and 31, 1918), vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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tion its only opportunity to reconstitute public utility
policy in New Orleans. The Nix bill authorized the commis
sion council to regulate fares and rates without regard for
the fixed charges provisions of the franchise ordinances
and utility contracts the city had with NORLC and NOGLC.
The council could, then, by simple ordinance, set fares
and rates and avoid the delay and expense involved in
granting a new franchise. The one cent increase was, as
well, reasonable, equitable, and politically acceptable. The
war had pushed up the cost of doing business, and a fare in
crease seemed thoroughly justified given the wartime econom
ic circumstances. If NORLC discontinued service for any
length of time, the loss of services would effect businesses
and the quality of life throughout New Orleans. The Behrman
administration could, as well, justify a modest increase in
fares because the war had pushed up wages and salaries (even
city employees received a raise during the war) and commut
ers could, with little hardship, absorb the increase in car
fare. Politically, a fare increase was acceptable because
the adminstration and public saw it as a temporary, wartime
measure that would expire with the end of the war. Of more
importance, however, the Behrman administration viewed the
fare increase as an opportunity to rectify the deficiencies
in the Nix act and to expand and enhance the council's power
over NORLC and NOGLC.73
73Ibid.
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As expected, the MFC refused the request of NORLC for
five million dollars, citing, as it did before, that the
WFC charter prohibited it from loaning money directly to
NORLC and that the loan request far exceeded the immediate
needs of the company. The WFC again informed the officers
of NORLC that it would consider a smaller loan negotiated
through New Orleans banks and underwritten by the city
government.74 Disappointed and desperate, the management of
NORLC had no other choice but to seek the assistance of the
Behrman administration. Within a matter of a few hours fol
lowing the ruling of the WFC, Daniel Dennis Curran, presi
dent of NORLC, wrote to Mayor Behrman and the commission
council, requesting their help in obtaining a federal loan
for NORLC.'73
In his letter, Curran emphasized the importance of
NORLC to the growth and prosperity of New Orleans, arguing
that the prosperity of the company was indispensable to the
further progress and wealth of the city. In the past eight
years, he wrote, NORLC furnished the city with outstanding
service and added "materially" to the welfare and develop
ment of the city. The company provided cheap, efficient gas,

^••Committee on Applications, "Minutes of Meetings, May
29, 1918;" William P. G. Harding to Behrman, May 31, 1918,
vol.l, WFC. RG 154: New Orleans Item. May 29, 31, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States. May 29, 30, 1918.
79Curran to Martin Behrman and the Commission Council,
May 31, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit A, Portfolio 1, PNWLBf LSU;
New Orleans Item, June 1, 1918; New Orleans Daily States.
June 1, 1918.
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electric, and transit service and returned millions of dol
lars to the community in services, improvements, wages and
salaries, civic and charitable contributions, and taxes. In
the past three years alone, Curran said, NORLC spent over
three million dollars in improvements to services, and, in
1917, paid almost $500,000 to the city in property taxes.
NORLC and NOGLC employed nearly 4,000 people, many of whom
deserved substantial wage and salary increases.7*1
Despite the many improvements and an overall increase
in revenues, Curran remarked, NORLC faced severe economic
problems that threatened to bankrupt the company and, possi
bly, end services. The economic dislocation brought on by
the war— not past mismanagement— was responsible for the
company's troubles. The wartime emergency drove up the costs
of essential materials and services, making it impossible
for the company to meet its "fixed" financial obligations
and requiring it to delay or forego needed replacements and
improvements. Those conditions alone, Curran insisted, com
pelled the management of the company to seek the aid of the
federal government and the Behrman administration, and he
requested that the commission council investigate his
claims, satisfying itself that the war alone was responsible
for the financial crisis at NORLC.77
The commission council convened at a special session to

7eIbid.
77Ibid.
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consider Curran's proposals and to listen to Mayor Behrman's
explanation and suggestions. The mayor testified to the im
portance and urgency of crisis at NORLC. The mayor was con
vinced that NORLC was incapable of resolving its financial
problems by itself, that it required the assistance of the
Wilson administration in Washington and the municipal gov
ernment of New Orleans. The management of the company was,
for the most part, Behrman suggested, responsible for the
financial and physical conditions of the company, but the
war worsened those conditions, inflating the cost of opera
tion, consuming private investment, and jeopardizing public
services. The company was, the mayor reported, unable to
continue operating under these conditions, but neither muni
cipalization nor receivership was an acceptable answer. The
Wilson administration designated the public utilities indus
try an essential wartime industry and made the municipal
and other local governments responsible for its continuing
operation and essential welfare. If the commission council
temporized or failed to take the appropriate action, NORLC
would probably cease operations, conveying to a candid world
"a failure in the commerce of this city of the first magni
tude". 78

■'"Martin Behrman to Commission Council of New Orleans,
June 4, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit B, In the Matter of Arbitra
tion Between Division No. 194, AASEREA, July 1918, Port
folio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. June 4, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States. June 4, 1918, January 5, 1919.
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A candid city administration, however, could not in
good conscience dismiss the past mismanagement of NORLC.
Mayor Behrman insisted that before the council consider
Curran's proposals it impose certain conditions and qualifi
cations on NORLC that would "safeguard and protect the in
terest of the people of this community”. The mayor made six
recommendations, and he insisted that NORLC submit to each
of them before the council agreed to raise carfare. Behrman
proposed that three members of the commission council, the
mayor and the commissioners of Public Utilities and Public
Property, become permanent, voting members of the board of
directors for NORLC, according the Behrman administration a
direct and influential role in formulating the broad corpo
rate policy of the company. Behrman also proposed that the
mayor select (subject to the approval of the board of direc
tors) the general manager of NORLC, giving the city adminis
tration an indirect hand in managing the physical property
of NORLC. 73
Sitting on the board of directors and appointing the
general manager of NORLC was of little intrinsic importance
unless the council could free itself of the Nix act and re
solve the issues of valuation, rate of return, and service.
The Behrman administration was aware of the numerous defi
ciencies in the Nix act and it saw the fare increase issue
73Ibid.; "Proceedings had at a special meeting of the
Commission Council of the City of New Orleans held on Satur
day August 17, 1918," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
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as an opportunity of rectifying those problems. Before the
Behrman administration consented to any fare increase, NORLC
had to submit to a "complete and full" survey of all proper
ties, determining "for all future time" the legitimate valu
ation of the company. The Nix act required the Board of Pub
lic Utilities (and the commission council) to use three
standards for determining the "fair value" of NORLC: origi
nal cost of construction, the earning capacity of the secur
ities, and the costs of reproduction.80
Clearly, those standards favored NORLC, bloating its
valuation out of proportion to its actual value. The city
administration, mindful of the injustice of those standards,
refused to abide by them, proposing instead that the commis
sion council (not the Board of Public Utilities) set valua
tion on the "actual cash value" of all properties, irrespec
tive of outstanding capital issues. In other words, Mayor
Behrman wanted the commission council to "squeeze" out all
watered stock, relieving much of the financial crisis of the
company and, ultimately, reducing the cost of service. The
mayor’s recommendations, however, went beyond reducing rates
and fares, but had two other, more significant, purposes.
Behrman believed that his recommendations would permit the
city government to reorient the public utility industry to
ward service, rather than profit, and it would allow the
city government the time to give "serious" consideration to
aoIbid.
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public ownership. The last three recommendations were
designed to accomplish those ends.®1
The mayor proposed that the commission council, after
determining the "actual cash value" of NORLC, also set a
fixed purchase price for the company. And that the council
reserve for the city the right to buy NORLC at any time
during the war or for the two years immediately after the
war. During the "option period," the commission council
would, in addition to determining rates, fares, and wages,
also set the rate of return, fixing it a six percent.
Finally, if the council failed to exercise its option to
purchase NORLC, the administration would forfeit its right
to select the general manager, determine wages, and limit
the rate of return. However, the commission council would
retain its seats on the board of directors and require NORLC
to return its "excess" profit to the city."2
At first, there were few— if any— critical responses to
Mayor Behrman's proposal. The business establishment, in
particular the banking and legal associates of NORLC, were
unusually silent. And the New Orleans Item, the severest
critic of the Behrman administration, was lavish in its
praise of the plan. It characterized the proposal as "busi-

aiIbid.
a2Ibid. Behrman's final proposal guaranteed NORLC a rate
of return no less than seven percent, but required the com
pany to give the city fifty percent of any return between
seven and eight percent and seventy-five percent of any
return above eight percent.
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like" and "substantially sound in principle," offering a
just solution for every interest, especially to the stock
holders (ACC and UGEC) of NORLC, who faced a costly recei
vership unless they cooperated with the administration in
reorganizing and rehabilitating the company. The editor and
publisher of the Item were pleased and surprised by the con
tent and tone of Behrman's recommendations, given the the
administration's previous reliance on older, less enlight
ened notions of public utility regulation. The plan, the
Item said, signaled a

shift in the administration's policy

toward NORLC and marked a fundamental change in its philoso
phy of politics and municipal government.aa
There was, to be sure, nothing truly surprising or
novel about the proposals offered by the Behrman administra
tion. And, almost needless to say, the plan hardly repre
sented a radical transformation in the policies and politi
cal philosophy of the Behrman administration. Since early in
1912, the Behrman administration had been considering many
of the proposals offered by Mayor Behrman in June, 1918. The
municipal regulation bills proposed by the Behrman adminis
tration in 1912, 1914, 1916 authorized the municipal govern
ment to adjust rates and fares, assure a reasonable and ad
justable rate of return, and determine a "fair and just"

B3New Orleans Item. June 4-6, 1918.
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valuation.84 Between 1916 and 1918, as the crisis within the
public utilities industry became more apparent and acute,
the Behrman administration became disenchanted with the Nix
act compromise, and, as the deficiencies of the act became
more apparent, the administration looked for ways of repeal
ing its provisions.88
In the early summer of 1917, the city administration,
beset with complaints about railway service and demands from
NORLC to curtail services, commissioned a critical survey of
the entire public transportation system. The study, con
ducted by James E. Allison, a railway expert, recommended
that the commission council be accorded representation on
the board of directors of NORLC and that the mayor appoint
the general manager for the company. Given the right circum
stances and with the proper guarantees, Allison insisted,
the joint management of the company would assure a higher
quality of service and greater, more efficient profit.
Allison also argued that a guaranteed, though flexible, rate
of return would convince stockholders of the safety of their
investment and induce them to expand services and return a
portion of their profit to the community. These guarantees
would, above all else, make the interests of the company
a*Moore to Thompson, undated (probably between February
13-19, 1916) vol.7, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. March
28, 1912, April 29, June 9, 16, 1914.
BBMoore to Commissioner of Public Utilities E. J. Glenny
February 28, August 3, 1917, August 8, November 26, 1918,
Waldo to Moore August 24, 1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; New
Orleans Item December 5, 1918.

314
identical with those of the community, ending years of
mutual suspicion and restoring the faith of the people in
public services and public administration.“
Predictably, the management of NORLC was critical of
the tone and content of Behrman's proposals. In a letter to
the commission council, NORLC president Daniel Curran com
plained that the municipal government ignored the damage
done to NORLC by the war and that it refused to consider the
company's needs and proposals. The war had disrupted the
normal financial and business operations of the company, and
the company now faced bankruptcy and receivership unless it
found alternative sources of investment and income. In nor
mal times, reorganization under a private receiver would be
preferable to public rehabilitation, but the war prevented
the private reorganization of the company. Moreover, recei
vership during the wartime crisis, Curran suggested, would
only result in higher fares and a reduction in services,
jeopardizing the prosperity of the community and compromis
ing the nation's war effort. In short, the company could not
continue operating unless it received federal aid and an in
crease in local revenues. And neither was available to the
company unless it submitted to the regimen forced on it by

BBAllison, Report on the Street Railway Service of the
City of New Orleans. 7-8.
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the war and the Behrman administration.87
Despite its reservations about public rehabilitation,
Curran announced, the management of NORLC would submit to
the administration's plan— with one critical exception. The
company would welcome the mayor and the commissioners to the
board of directors and it would agree to limit the rate of
return to six percent. But it would never consent to a per
manent public valuation by the Behrman administration, nor
would it agree to any valuation based solely on "actual cash
value". Such a formula, Curran charged, undermined the in
terests of the stockholders and threatened the future, pri
vate rehabilitation of the company and the development of
the community.B"
Though Curran's assessment was, to say the least, selfserving, it was not an idle criticism. As Curran asserted,
the plan offered by the Behrman administration ignored the
adverse effects the war had on the public utilities company,
and instead concentrated on issues that were, in effect, un
related to the wartime emergency. Though the Wilson adminis
tration insisted that the municipal governments take responsiblity for the industry, public management, an agreed upon
rate of return, and a public rehabilitation of the industry
were not necessary to assure the continuing operation of the
"7Curran to Behrman June 10, 1918, Appendix, Exhibit C,
In the matter of arbitration between Division No. 194 AASEREA and NORLC, July 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New
Orleans Item. June 10, 1918.
"■Ibid.

company. From the standpoint o£ the management of NORLC,
then, the administration's demands were unwarranted and in
sidious. The board of directors did not determine the finan
cial or business policies of the company (it was a court of
last resort in labor disputes, though), and, from the view
of management, the presence of the Behrman administration on
the board of directors tended only to "politicize" the
crisis Circumscribing the valuation and the rate of return
only deepened the crisis and made the private rehabilitation
of the company more costly."*
In these matters, however, the Behrman government acted
not from ignorance or self-interest, but with a sense of
purpose. As Mayor Behrman explained in defense of his pro
posals, the federal government made the municipal government
responsible for the continuing operation of NORLC. The city
was, in effect, lending its "full faith and credit" to the
company, requiring its citizens to bear the burden of higher
fares. It seemed only just and fitting that the council
"manage" the public affairs of the company, imposing the
conditions that assured the permanent rehabilitation of the
company and that established the strictest regulatory au
thority over its public affairs and obligations.90
Like many other progressive reformers and public ser
vants, the commission council of New Orleans saw the war as

B9Ibid.
9°New Orleans Daily States. June 13, 1918.
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a time and an opportunity to address those problems that,
for one reason are another, escaped resolution in the years
that preceded the war. Indeed, the Behrman administration
acted from the basic premise of the progressive politics:
"the conviction that government should actively pursue the
public interest in a society whose private sector seemed in
creasingly indifferent or hostile to that interest." The
Behrman administration was not interested simply in remedy
ing the immediate problems of NORLC, though it understood
the necessity of preventing the collapse of service. Nor was
the municipal government interested in simply managing the
business affairs of the company for the duration of the war.
The mayor and the council, instead, saw their presence on
the board of directors as an opportunity to manage the pub
lic rehabilitation of NORLC. The Behrman administration be
lieved— perhaps naively— that public rehabilitation meant a
thorough and fair reduction in the valuation of the capital
"investment" in the company, lower rates and fares, greater
efficiency and accountability from the corporate manage
ment, and more reliable service. The council also believed
that public rehabilitation gave greater authority to public
regulation and made municipal ownership possible."x
The Behrman plan was, of course, not without its flaws
"xLafaye to Behrman and the Commission Council, December
30, 1918 as quoted in the New Orleans Daily States. January
5, 1919; New Orleans Item, July 1, 3, 1918; New Orleans
Daily States. June 13, July 1, 1918; David M. Kennedy, Over
Here, 97.

and ambiguities. It was apparent from the discussions on re
habilitation that the one cent fare could not fund the refi
nancing and reorganization of the company and other in
creases would be necessary. The Behrman plan, remarked
Rudolph S. Hecht, the executive vice-president of the
Hibernia National Bank, a large holder of NORLC securities,
would not attract the intelligent investor. No prudent in
vestor, he said, "with sense enough to have money to lend,"
would invest in NORLC under the Behrman plan. It did not
provide adequate protection or incentive for investors and
would prevent the thorough "overhaul" necessary to rehabili
tate the company. Nor would management accept any valuation
formula that ignored the accrued and legitimate interests of
investors. In short, the management of NORLC would contest
the public rehabilitation of the company at almost any
cost.92
That cost did not include federal loans, however. When
the Behrman administration agreed to the one cent fare in
crease, the management of NORLC applied immediately for a
loan from the War Finance Corporation. The company asked
for and received a loan of one million dollars to pay the
interest on the securities of several underlying companies
and make improvements. NORLC pledged $1.6 million in bonds
as security and promised to repay the loan with interest and

92New Orleans Item, June 12, July 1, 3, 1918; New Orleans
Daily States. June 13, July 1, 1918.
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not to borrow except for current expenses. The WFC voted to
extend the money to the company, contingent on an increase
in revenues. Commissioner Lafaye, speaking for the Behrman
administration, proclaimed that the loan now afforded the
administration and the company the time and incentive to
reorganize and rehabilitate the company. But others were
less sanguine. Speaking for investors and management,
Rudolph Hecht cautioned that the WFC loan would not "solve
the financial difficulties of the company, but... only tide
it over the immediate emergency".93
Neither Lafaye nor Hecht was correct. The momentum and
character of the war did not accord the Behrman administra
tion and the management of NORLC the time and latitude to
rehabilitate the public utilities industry as they had
planned. Rehabilitation went beyond resolving the financial
difficulties of the electric street railway industry or cor
recting the deficiencies of public administration and regu
lation. But included the issues of a "living wage," collec
tive bargaining, the closed shop, race, and "the rights of
the community". Until the Behrman administration and NORLC
resolved those and other issues, the rehabilitation of the
public utilities industry in New Orleans would remain an

S3Committee on Applications, Minutes of Meeting, June 25,
26, 1918, vol.l, WFC. RG 154: Typescript of Indenture be
tween New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the War
Finance Corporation, July 30, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB: New
Orleans Daily States. July 11, 1918; New Orleans Item, July
11, 1918.
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elusive reform.

Chapter Six

On Neutral Ground

In December, 1917, John G. O'Kelley, the Federal Fuel
Administrator for New Orleans, wrote to Commissioner of Pub
lic Utilities Edward J. Glenny and to Nelson H. Brown, the
general manager of NORLC, asking them to recommend ways of
reducing the coal consumption of the giant utilities com
pany. Meeting with O'Kelley in early January, Glenny and
Brown informed the Fuel Administrator that the surest and
simplest method of reducing coal consumption without incon
veniencing the public or compromising the war effort was to
reduce the number of streetcars serving the city. By elimi
nating unnecessary streetcar service, they asserted, the
company would save hundreds of tons of coal each week, pre
venting interruptions in electric light and power services
and, by consolidating lines, actually enhancing streetcar
service. O'Kelley endorsed the idea, and Glenny and Brown
set out immediately to put their idea into practice.1

xNew Orleans Item, January 11, February 4, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States. January 3, 13, 17, February 1, 4, 5,
1918. The Fuel Administration began operations in August,
1917 under the direction of Harry A. Garfield, the president
of Williams College. Kennedy, Over Here, 123-24; Burl
Noggle, Into the Twenties The United States From Armistice
to Normalcy. (Urbana, Illinois, 1974), 62; Robert D. Cuff,
"Harry Garfield, The Fuel Administration, and the Search for
a Cooperative Order During World War I," American Quarterly.
30 (Spring 1978), 39-40, 46-47.
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The council and NORLC agreed to reduce a number of cars
on specific lines during "off hours" and to consider elimi
nating and consolidating lines feeding into Canal Street. At
the end of the first month of the new schedule,

company

officials claimed that rerouting saved 110 tons of coal a
week (twenty-four tons on Sundays alone). NORLC president
Daniel D. Curran claimed that despite the reduction in the
number of cars, there was "no decrease in service to the
public other than the elimination o f ...wasteful and dupli
cated services". Despite reservations about several aspects
of the rerouting plan, Commissioner Glenny believed that
the reduction in car services had saved fuel and had
improved services. Though he regretted the minor delays
and other inconveniences associated with the rerouting plan,
Fuel Administrator O'Kelley expressed his satisfaction with
the overall success of the plan and encouraged the adminis
tration and the company to continue their efforts.2
Despite the obvious advantages of the Glenny-Brown re
routing plan, there were, as well, several aspects of the
plan that troubled the Behrman administration and the other
public and private leaders of the city. Neighborhood associ
ations, merchants, and, most especially, the Carmen's
union were angered by the implications and repercussions of
the rerouting plan. Neighborhood civic associations, partic-

2New Orleans Daily States. February 5, 7 8, 10, 16,
1918; New Orleans' Item. February 7, 1918.

ularly in the Seventh, Ninth, and Twelfth Hards, complained
to the Board of Public Utilities (an action that irked the
commission council) that the company had arbitrarily re
routed lines and curtailed service long before federal offi
cials sanctioned a reduction in service. In the Garden Dis
trict (Twelfth Hard), a group of citizens, led by Paul H.
Maloney, filed a petition with the BPU calling on NORLC to
restore car service to their neighborhood and offering to
defray some the cost of restoring service. The board of di
rectors for the Dryades Building and Loan Association filed
suit against NORLC and the Commission Council (but not the
BPU), claiming that NORLC had, in violation of its 1912
franchise with the city, consolidated the Peters and Dryades
Street lines. Though the court upheld the position of the
company and the city, the Behrman administration was truly
disturbed by the response of the public. But no more so than
by the response of the Carmen's union.3
The carmen took their protest directly to Commissioner
Glenny. Since the end of 1916, they noted, NORLC, in viola
tion of its franchises with the city and in contravention of
its contract with the union, had been reducing service and

3New Orleans Daily States. January 3, 13, 17, February
5, 22, 28, March 11, 1918; New Orleans Item. January 11,
February 4, 6, 19, 23, March 11, 12, 1918; New Orleans Times
Picayune. February 23, 1918. Judge Porter Parker dismissed
the suit, remarking that the "evidence clearly shows that
this rerouting did not originate with the railways company,
but was done as a conservation measure by a public offi
cial" .
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consolidating lines. The company justified its actions as
wartime economy measures, designed to eliminate waste, con
serve energy, and to keep vital services operating at "maxi
mum efficiency". The company was not interested, the carmen
insisted, in conservation or efficiency, but in reducing its
own cost and maintaining its rate of profit and in eliminat
ing jobs and crippling the labor movement. The rerouting
plan, then, the union charged, only gave the company the
license to exploit the community further and to assault and
weaken the labor movement in New Orleans.4
Despite the apparent justice of many of the complaints
against the rerouting plan, the Behrroan administration was
unwilling to repudiate it completely. The rerouting plan and
other conservation measures (heatless Mondays, for example)
significantly reduced coal consumption in the city and
allowed the company to increase and improve electric light
and power services. There were, in addition, other long-term
benefits to the plan. In 1913, the Behrman administration,
in response to numerous complaints about deteriorating rail
way service, conducted a study of the entire street railway
system. The study, done under the supervision of Commission
er of Public Utilities William Bess Thompson, recommended
4Gus Bienvenue to W. D. Mahon, International President
of the Amagamated Association of Street and Electric Railway
Employees of America [AASEREA], November 16, 1916, W. V.
Seber to Union membership, November 21, 1916, Street Railway
Union Collection, hereafter cited as SRUC, box 1, Special
Collections Division, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane
University; New Orleans Daily States. February 14, 1918.
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the consolidation of several streetcar lines and the cre
ation of a "loop" system on Canal Street. The commission
council, under pressure from Canal Street merchants and
neighborhood civic associations, delayed consideration of
Thompsonfs recommendations, pending the investigation and
recommendations of street railway experts. The investiga
tion, begun in the summer of 1917 under the direction of
James E. Allison, a St. Louis railway expert, confirmed Com
missioner Thompson's initial findings and recommendations.
Despite expert analysis and recommendation, the Behrman ad
ministration could not overcome the concerted, politicized
opposition to consolidation and rerouting. The fuel crisis,
then, provided the administration with an opportunity to
accomplish what peacetime politics would not permit.9
The city administration was, however, fully aware of
the hardships faced by most citizens. In addition to the
interminable delays in traffic, New Orleanians, like most
other Americans, were beset by rising food and clothing

®Waldo to Moore, June 30, 1910, vol.5, Moore to Thomp
son, January 6, 1913, vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL; unsigned to
Thompson, February 19, 1915, Ninth Ward residents to Thomp
son, May 5, November 17, 1914, September 7, 1915, West End
residents to Thompson, January 8, 1916, Napoleon Avenues
residents to Thompson, February 9, 1916, Central Carrollton
Improvement Association to Thompson, March 21, 1916, William
V. Seeber to Thompson, November 21, 1916, Department of Pub
lic Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.l, CA,
NOPL; New Orleans Item, Daily States. Times-Picavune. Octo
ber through December, 1914; Allison, Report on the Street
Railway Service of the City of New Orleans. 3-7, Louisiana
Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane Univer
sity.

326
prices, higher rents, shortages in housing and fuel, and
self-imposed rationing (meatless Mondays, wheatless Wednes
days). At the end of 1916, food prices in New Orleans had
increased thirty-five percent over 1915, and the cost of
living had jumped nearly twenty-six percet. By early 1918,
the Item reported that food prices in New Orleans had in
creased 127% over 1914. And, between December, 1917 and
December, 1919, the cost of living in New Orleans had risen
another thirty-four percent.®
Real wages, however, particularly among the unskilled
and semi-skilled worker, had not kept pace with the rising
cost of living. Street railway workers, especially the con
ductors and carmen who operated the streetcars, suffered
even more than the common "day laborer". Between 1900 and
1907, under a succession of one year contracts, wages for
street railway workers of NORLC changed very little, ranging
from fifteen cents an hour in 1901 and to twenty cents in
1907. The 1910 contract, the second in a line of three year
contracts, raised wages from twenty-one and a half cents an
hour to twenty-two and three quarters cents, an increase of
one and a quarter cents an hour. Between 1910 and 1913,
NORLC increased wages by one quarter cent each year, giving
"New Orleans Item. May 19, 1913, October 4, 26, November
4, 1916, January 2, February 1, 3, 1918; Paul H. Douglas,
Real Wages in the United States 1890-1926. (Boston, 1930),
55. According to figures compiled by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, despite a sufficiency of federal law and a
battery of regulatory agencies, the cost of living rose 70%
between 1916 and 1918.
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senior employees twenty-three and one quarter cents an hour
in 1912-1913. And, in 1913, the company and the union signed
a five year contract, agreeing to pay "regular time" conduc
tors and operators twenty-four cents an hour for the first
three years of the contract, twenty-four and a quarter in
the fourth year, and twenty-four and one-half cents in the
final year of the contract. By contrast, "platform men"
(conductors and operators) in other Southern cities, like
Dallas, Atlanta, Shreveport, Louisville, and Charleston, all
made more money than the platform men in New Orleans. And,
in many cases, unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed
by NORLC made more money than most carmen.*7
John Stadler, the president of the carmen's union in
1918, denounced the increases as "meaningless" and as an
indication of the pathetic working conditions at NORLC.
Since 1913, he said, the company had been consolidating
^"Minutes of the Hearings in the Street Railway Cases,"
July 20, 1918, 1, 46-47, 49v Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Con
tracts between Local 194, AASEREA and New Orleans Railways
Company and New Orleans Railway and Light Company, 19021907, 1910, 1913, SRUC. box 13, SCD, H-TML, TU; "Before the
National War Labor Board Employees versus New Orleans Rail
way and Light Company On re-Hearing Brief On Behalf of the
New Orleans Railway and Light Company," October 4, 1918, 219, Portfolio 2, PNWLB; New Orleans Item. May 15-30, June
1-5, 1913; New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 24, 25, June 1,
5-7, 1913. The carmen wanted a one year contract, paying
them twenty-five cents an hour and requiring them to work a
nine hour shift in a ten hour day. They also wanted to elim
inate the no strike clause and to compel NORLC to discharge
any worker dismissed from the union. The men received none
of those demands, but they earned the praise of the local
press. The Item characterized the union men as mature, de
termined, conservative, and, above all, "amendable to rea
son" and simple justice.

328
lines and rerouting cars, contrary to the demands of the
public and the instructions of the Behrman administration.
The removal of cars and the consolidation of lines not only
inconvenienced commuters and evaded franchise obligations,
but also threatened jobs and compromised on the labor move
ment. In rerouting lines, the company was, in effect, reduc
ing the number of men assigned to regular hours shifts,
forcing the carmen to accept part-time pay, and, consequent
ly, lowering income and forcing men to leave work and the
union. "The men are simply unable to make ends meet,” he
said. Unless the company offered the union a "living” wage
and better conditions, many union workers would, of neces
sity, resign from the company and seek employment in some
other, more rewarding and satisfying line of work."
Stadler's criticisms and warnings could only have dis
turbed and dismayed the Behrman administration. John Stadler
was, after all, the president of one of the largest and, un
doubtedly, the most visible labor union in the city— a union
with a storied past and a deep and abiding relationship with
the Regular Democratic Organization, dating back to the
General Strike of 1892.9

Stadler had not only denounced the

BNew Orleans Daily States. Hay 13, 15, 18, 1918.
9At every important juncture of its development, the
union had the support of the Regulars, who prevented
management from using the police powers of the state or city
to break the movement. See John Fitzpatrick to Hugh
McCloskey, May 23, 24, 31, November 7, 1892, Fitzpatrick to
Joseph Lemon, November 8, 1892, Paul Capdevielle to William
Mehle, October 2, 1902, MCLMO. vols.67 and 82.
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the rerouting plan as harmful to the public good and order,
but, by implication, also accused the Behrman administra
tion, a principal architect of the rerouting plan, of being
either indifferent to the social repercussions of the
plan. And, even more menacing to the public good and the
social order, was Stadler's promise of mass resignations if
NORLC and Behrman administration (the mayor and two other
commissioners were about to assume their seats on the board
of directors of NORLC) did not meet the wage and contract
demands of the union.
Contrary to the accusations leveled at the Behrman ad
ministration, then and now, it was not unsympathetic to the
interests of organized labor. Nor did it act on the belief
that those interests were irrelevant to the public rehabili
tation or regulation of NORLC. The administration often en
couraged the interests of organized labor, but would not
permit organized labor— or management— to disrupt public
services or in any other way threanten the public order or
the social good of New Orleans. The administration consider
ed service the primary obligation of both management and
labor, and it saw the resolution of the wage and contract
dispute as indispensable to the rehabilitation of the com
pany.10

1QFor an opposite point of view, see George M. Reynolds,
Machine Politics in New Orleans. 1897-1926 (New York, 1936),
139-43; Adam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in
New Orleans," 49-51.
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In June, 1918, Martin Behrman addressed the NORLC board
of the directors for the-first time as one of its newest
members and executive officers. The mayor acknowledged the
myriad of important and pressing problems the company faced.
But, he told his new colleagues, their most important prior
ities must be establishing a fair and just wage and settling
contract differences with the street railway union. The
union wanted a substantial pay increase and several signifi
cant reforms and concessions from the company, but the com
pany had its own set of concerns and also had serious finan
cial difficulties. Any settlement, then, would require pa
tience, understanding, and an attentiveness to the common
concerns of the company, the union, and the community. The
mayor encouraged the board and the management of the com
pany to begin those discussions at once and, most important
ly, in earnest.11
The management of NORLC actually needed little prompt
ing from Martin Behrman; it was prepared to grant a modest
pay increase, but it was determined as well not to concede
to the union's list of demands. Those demands were, even by
past standards, truly remarkable. The union insisted that
the current wage scale was far below regional and industry
standards, a disparity compounded by the ever-rising cost of
living in New Orleans. Working conditions, in particular the

xlNew Orleans Item, June 12, 13, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States. June 12, 13, 1918.
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ten hour

day and the part-time schedule, were unacceptable.

Justice and necessity, then, impelled the union to seek a
substantial increase

in pay and a decrease in hours. The

union also insisted that the financial condition of the com
pany was irrelevant and that industry standards and local
economic conditions alone should determine the size of the
wage increase. The union demanded, then, that the company
pay motormen and conductors forty-five cents an hour for a
nine hour day and time and a half for work over nine
hours.12
Those were not the only demands the union made. In 1917
the local union received permission from the "international"
office to begin recruiting nonunion workers in the electric
and "gas house" divisions for membership and to include them
in all wage and contract agreements. Over the next year or
more, local union leaders persuaded the unskilled and semi
skilled workers of the electric and gas divisions, many of
them black, to join the carmen's union. The union advised
the company of its activities, and insisted that the new
wage and contract agreement include all workers in the gas
and electrical divisions, granting them the same percentage
increase as the carmen. The wage increase proposed by John

“ New Orleans Item, Hay 15, 18, June 17, 18, 19, 1918;
New Orleans Daily States. May 7, 13, 16, 18, June 17, 18,
1918.
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Stadler would exceed two million dollars.X3
Union membership, perhaps more so than money, was the
essential issue, and the union wanted provisions in the con
tract assuring it control of the work force and, in effect,
the character of the work place. The carmen insisted on a
two year contract, preventing the company from locking the
union into wages or agreements outdated by changing economic
conditions. More to the point, the union demanded that NORLC
agree to a formal and detailed grievance procedure that pro
tected the worker against the anti-union activities of man
agement. And, most important of all, the union demanded that
NORLC recognize the union shop, agreeing to dismiss any
eligible worker who refused to join the union.x"*
The management of NORLC was not surprised by the char
acter of the union's demands, and it was, as expected,
opposed to every feature of the proposals. It acknowledged
that the men deserved a pay increase, but it argued that the
union's demands were excessive and out of proportion with
prevailing regional and industry standards and conditions
and beyond the ability of the company to pay. The cost of
living in New Orleans, management asserted with no apparent
sense of irony, had been "overestimated" by the union, and
x=*William B. Fitzgerald, First Vice-President, Interna
tional AASEREA, to John Stadler, May 14, 1918; William D.
Mahon to Gus Bienvenue, June 17, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD,
HTML, TU; New Orleans Daily States. May 7, 13, 16, 31, June
10-14, 17-19, 1918; New Orleans Item. May 13, 18, June
12-14, 17-18, 1918.
x «Ibid.
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did not justify the sort of increase demanded by the carmen
The wage increase demanded by the union would only further
exhaust the meager financial resources of the company and
would absorb the WFC loan and the six cent fare, either
forcing the company to default on its loan and requiring the
Behrman government to increase fares and rates. In addition,
to include nonunion workers in the wage agreement would vio
late the charter of the Carmen's union and antagonize the
craft union workers already under contract with NORLC. And,
management insisted, the company would never relinquish con
trol over the conditions of employment and would never sub
mit to demands for a union shop.13
Company management assured the union that it would seek
a reasonable wage increase for the motormen and conductors,
but it refused to negotiate (for the moment) any of the
other issues raised by the union. Rather, the company sug
gested that the union submit its proposal to include "non
union" workers in the agreement to the International leaders
in Chicago or to the Orleans Parish Civil District Court, in
either case damaging the credibility of the local union.xa
President John Stadler, too, refused to negotiate the
issue of union membership. He accused NORLC of misrepre-

1BNew Orleans Daily Statesr June 17-19, 1918; New Orleans
Item. May 29, June 17-19, 1918; Typescript Exhibit dated
September 19, 1918, "Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway
and Light Company," October 4, 1918, Portfolio 3, PNWLB. LSU.
x"New Orleans Item. June 19-20, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States. June 19-20, 1918.
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senting the legitimate rights of the local union and of
trying to disguise its own intentions. The local union, he
said, and not NORLC, was the principal judge of the qualifi
cations of its membership. The local began recruiting gashouse and electric workers with the approval of the Interna
tional office, and it notified NORLC of the new composition
of the union long before contract discussions began. The
company had no reason, other than corrupt self-interest,
for refusing to bargain with the local union. The company's
reasons were, Stadler intimated, simple and obvious. NORLC
simply did not want to pay its employees (other than top
management) a representative wage or salary and it did not
want to relinquish its exploitive grip on labor. Until NORLC
recognized the AASEREA as the representative of the gas and
electric workers, there would be no further "discussions".17
In a manner of speaking, negotiations were never truly
suspended, but carried on in public discussions and private
correspondence. Mayor Behrman reminded the union and NORLC
of their joint commitment to public services, and he insist
ed that they reopen their discussions, submitting any major
disagreements to mediation by the federal National War Labor
Board (NWLB). The company, much to its later regret, readily
agreed to the mayor's suggestion, but the local union balked
at the idea of a mediated settlement. But, after consulting
with the International leadership, who assured the local
1-7Ibid.

1
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that the NWLB would grant workers a "substantial increase,"
the local union consented to Behrman's proposals. The local
agreed to negotiate issues of membership, employment, and
the union shop with NORLC and to submit the wage issue to
the NWLB. NORLC, too, expressed its willingness to compro
mise, confident that it could dilute proposals for the union
shop and that the NWLB would grant an inconsequential pay
increase.xa
Representatives of the company and the union met con
tinually for a week, devising two separate agreements. The
"primary" agreement, a preliminary, though binding, con
tract, concentrated on eligibility, grievance procedures,
and provisions for a union shop. In essence, the primary
agreement acknowledged the authority of the local AASEREA to
set eligibility standards for its membership and, in part,
determine the character of the labor force. Under the terms
of the primary agreement, the conditions of the contract
would extend to all eligible gashouse and powerhouse employ
ees. Those employees not presently eligible would be covered
under the contract until the AASEREA ruled on their eligi
bility. If the International chose not to embrace those non
union members of the gashouse and powerhouse divisions (an

1BBehrman to National War Labor Board, June 19, 1918,
Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Mahon to Stadler, June 15, July 11,
1918, Mahon to Bienvenu, June 18, 26, 1918, box 2, SRUC,
SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Item. June 13, 14, 17-19, 21-23,
1918; New Orleans Daily States. June 13, 14, 17-19, 22, 23,
1918.
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unlikely event given the commitment of the local AASEREA to
unionizing unskilled and black workmen), then those workers
could form separate unions. NORLC and NOGLC would then use
the 1918 contract as the basis for contracts with the new
unions .X9
The primary agreement also promised to restructure
disciplinary and grievance procedures, giving the employee
and the union a more open and formal means of contesting
company discipline and expressing discontent. The company
insisted, however, that grievances had to be resolved with
in the individual divisions of the company and always "in
favor of the maintainance of the organization and discipline
of the company". And, though the employee and the union had
the right of appeal, there was no appeal beyond the board of
directors. The company also retained the "unrestricted
right" to discharge any employee for just cause— legitimate
union activity was not just cause. Despite the intimidating
language of this provision, in effect it provided for com
pulsory arbitation of disputes, according the carmen and
other union members a right previously withheld from them.20
“ Agreement and Supplemental Agreement entered into be
tween the New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the
Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Em
ployees of America, Division No. 194 of the City of New Or
leans, State of Louisiana, July 1, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB,
LSU; box 13, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Item. June 26,
28, 1918; Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike
of 1929-30," 17-19; Pairclough, "Public Utilities," 50-51.
“ Ibid. The most common grievance concerned promotion.
The agreement ended that dispute by making senority the sole
standard for promotion.

New Orleans Railway and Light Company and the local
also agreed to a union shop. All current employees of NORLC
eligible for membership with the AASEREA would be required
to join the union after the new contract went into effect.
New employees were, as well, required to join the union
following a probationary period of sixty days, and no member
of the the AASEREA would be expected to work with any non
union worker except in emergencies.21
The "supplemental" agreement was, by comparison, brief
and direct. The union and the company simply agreed to sub
mit the dispute over wages to the NWLB and to abide by its
decision. Mediating the wage issue and reconciling the union
and NORLC to the decisions of the NWLB, on the other hand,
was more intricate and difficult than either the union, the
railway company, or the Behrman administration anticipated.
Mediation of the dispute took more than four months, invol
ving a lengthy rehearing and producing a controversal re
vision of the initial wage award. And the decisions of the
NWLB contributed to the collpase of NORLC and hampered the
Behrman administration in its efforts to bring about a pub
lic rehabilitation of NORLC.22
21Ibid. The carmen agreed to work nine hours within a
twelve hour shift. To avoid disputes over part-time pay for
full-time work, the company agreed to pay motorroen and con
ductors time and a half for any "run" of work under six
hours and regular time for "runs" between six and nine
hours. The union also promised not to strike or engage in
any work stoppage that might "materially cripple any service
rendered" by NORLC.
22Ibid
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The decisions reached by the National War Labor Board,
however, were in part the result of the diverse interests
of labor and management and the intense rivalries within
the Wilson administration. Organized labor and management,
of course, sought to use the NWLB to their own advantage,
and would not consent to government arbitration of vital,
vested interests. Organized labor opposed any effort to set
a minimum wage standard, fearing that it would become the
acknowledged maximum wage. Business, on the other hand,
feared setting standards too high, fueling inflation,
further "destablizing" the economy, and strengthening the
position of organized labor. The Wilson administration, for
its part, was badly divided and uncertain about its author
ity and ability to establish a common, fixed labor policy.
It was, as well, intent on preserving the integrity of the
peacetime executive departments and committed to the policy
of "voluntary cooperation".33
The Wilson administration, then, carefully defined and
restricted the power of the NWLB. The NWLB could not intrude
on the labor policies of the permanent, peacetime executive
departments and agencies unless a department or agency vio
lated an established principle of the NWLB. The board could
mediate most other labor-management disputes, but even in
33William B. Wilson to Wilson, Agust 5, 1918, 181, August
5, 1918, 206-07, Wilson to William B. Wilson, August 28,
1918, 367, vol. 49, Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1985); Valerie Jean Conner, The
National War Labor Board, 30-31, 50-67.
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those cases its authority was severely limited. The board
could not "arbitrate" a dispute unless management and labor
agreed to arbitration and the board arrived at an unanimous
decision. In those cases, its decision was binding, but it
had no means o£ forcing compliance with its decision. If
labor or management wanted the board to mediate a disagree
ment, the board could recommend a settlement. But, as in the
case of "arbitration," either side could refuse to accept
the recommendations of the NWLB. In effect, then, the NWLB
had no actual power, save that of "moral suasion".
The principles laid down for the NWLB reflected the
same inner tensions and conflicting interests, and signaled
only a "modest advance" in labor-management relations. Labor
and management pledged that there would be no strikes, lock
outs, or other actions that might impair the war effort, in
effect compelling them to negotiate or mediate their differ
ences. Management acknowledged the right of labor to orga
nize and to bargain collectively, and agreed that no employ
ee would be dismissed because of union membership or for any

^William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, March 8, 1918,
vol.46, 578-80, Robert W. Wooley and Matthew Hale to Wilson,
April 19, 1918, vol.47, 376-79, William B. Wilson to Wilson,
April 29, 1918, vol.47, 461-65 in Arthur S. Link, ed.. The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, 1984); "Proclamation by
the President of the United States, National War Labor
Board," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; Conner, The National War
Labor Board, 30-31; Robert D. Cuff, "Herbert Hoover, The
Ideology of Voluntarism and War Organization During the
Great War," Journal of American History. 64 (September
1977), 358-72; Cuff, "The Politics of Labor Administration
During World War I," Labor History. 21 (Fall 1980), 546-69.
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legitimate union activity. The NWLB principles preserved the
union shop where it already existed. In an existing open
shop, however, unions could not force workers to join a
union or coerce management into accepting a union shop.
Finally, the NWLB would guaranteed all laborers, regardless
of their union affiliation (or sex), a living and equitable
wage, taking into account, of course, local wage standards
and economic conditions.2®
In June, the NWLB, under the direction of co-chairmen
William Howard Taft and Frank P. Walsh, began deliberations
on the wage award issue. Industry spokesmen testified that
few, if any, railway companies could survive the sort of
wage increases contemplated by the unions and the NWLB un
less there was a corresponding increase in fares. Wartime
conditions and adverse public regulation, rather than indus
try mismanagement, were responsible for the street railway
crisis. Neither the local communities nor the federal
government would acknowledge their proper responsibility
2®"Principles and Policies to Govern Relations Between
Workers and Employess in War Industries for the duration of
the War," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; SRUC. box 14, SCD, HTML,
TU; New Orleans Item, April 15, 1918; Conner, National War
Labor Board, 29-30. Several railway companies entertained
the idea of hiring women as conductors and motormen as war
time replacements for men serving in the armed services.
Union officials, however, complained that management was not
concerned with helping women but with using women to reduce
wages and demoralize the union. Eventually, the union con
sented to the idea, insisting, however, that women work
under the same conditions and at the same pay and that they
be required to join the union. See J. B. Lawson, Chairman
General Executive Board International AASEREA, to all
locals, August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.

341
toward the industry. Local regulatory authorities refused
to increase rates and fares because local political consid
erations were too overpowering for them to resist. Federal
policy was, as well, harmful. Though the president possessed
the authority to regulate the industry and increase fares,
he relied on a flawed policy of local regulation and volun
tary cooperation. The only sensible policy, spokesmen said,
called for direct federal aid to the industry and tying the
wage increase to a corresponding increase in railway
revenues.28
The two chairmen informed President Wilson that the
NWLB would grant a substantial increase to street railway
employees, advising him that the increases, though justi
fied, would bankrupt many companies, disrupting services
and threatening the war effort. Taft and Walsh suggested
"with all the emphasis possible" that Wilson increase rail
way rates or ask Congress to give him that authority.
Wilson refused to alter his policy. He believed that direct
federal aid to the utilities industry was an unwise policy,
and he continued to place great trust and faith in local
government and voluntary coooperation. The board soon aban
doned efforts to tie wage increases to increases in rates
and fares. Late in June, the board announced its decision.

28Conner, The National War Labor Board, 68-72. Attorneys
for the railway industry argued in addition that the NWLB
could raise rates independent of the President's authority
to assume control of the industry.
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Neither the financial condition of the railway companies nor
their need for additional revenues would have any relevant
bearing on the wage awards granted to street railway
employees. The only pertinent issue was the determination of
a fair and living wage for railway workers that would sus
tain them in the midst of the increasing cost of living.2"7
Early in July, 1918, three days after the carmen and
NORLC agreed to refer their wage dispute to the NWLB for
"investigation and readjustment," representatives of the
company wrote to the board asking for an immediate hearing
and a favorable "readjustment". Consumed with the issues of
a "living wage" and direct federal aid to the railway indus
try, the NWLB delayed its hearings until later in July, but
counseled the union and the company to anticipate high wage
awards. The board began hearing agruments in the New Orleans
case on July 20.28
The Carmen's union, represented by International presi
dent William D. Mahon, general counsel James H. Vahey, and
local president John Stadler, spoke first. The railway com
pany will argue, the union representatives said, that the
27Taft and Walsh to Wilson, July 1, 1918, as cited in
Wilson to Tumulty, July 5, 1918, vol.48, 526-27, The Papers
of Woodrow Wilson: New Orleans Item, June 24, 25, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States. June 25, 1918; Conner, National War
Labor Board, 68-88.
2BCurran to Taft and Walsh, July 3, 1918, Francis T.
Homer and H. Generes Dufour to NWLB, undated, W. Jett Lauck,
Secretary, NWLB to Curran, July 8, 1918, Lauck to Behrman,
Curran, Stadler, and others, July 13, 1918, Portfolio 1,
PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item, July 14, 1918; Conner, The
National War Labor Board, 50-88.
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wage increase demanded by the union was unjustified, that
economic conditions in New Orleans were not as acute as the
union portrayed them, and that any sizeable increase in
wages would inhibit he company's ability to maintain
service, resulting in the collapse of NORLC. The wage
demands, union spokesmen said, were justified for three
principal reasons. Since 1916, the employees of the railway
department of NORLC had been subsisting on twenty-four and
a half cents an hour, a standard lower than many cities in
Louisiana and the South. The company had, as well, reduced
the number of cars in service, consolidating runs, and
forcing many men to work "overtime'* in order to make ends
meet. Many of these men had invested many years of service,
acquiring seniority with the company and the union, and they
were unwilling and, in many cases, unable to change jobs.
The majority of the better paying jobs in New Orleans
required men of specialized skills; most of the carmen and
other men represented by their union were not skilled
workers, but fell into the category of "semi-clerical"
workers.23

29"In the Matter of the Arbitration Between Division No.
194 the Amalgated Association of Street and Electric Railway
Employees of America of New Orleans, Louisiana and the New
Orleans," July, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU, hereafter
cited as "Arbitration Between AASEREA and NORLC," 1, 2, 9,
10; "Minutes of the Hearing in the Street Railway Cases,
July 20, 1918," 1, 49, ibid.; Contracts between AASEREA,
Division No. 194 and New Orleans Railways Company and New
Orleans Railway and Light Company, box 13, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU.
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The second reason, the union contended, was even more
compelling than the first. Since the beginning of the Great
War, the cost of living, even in warm-weather cities like
New Orleans, had increased over ninety percent, while "real"
income for the carmen had not increased since 1910. Simple
economic justice and the vital necessity of the railway in
dustry to the war effort and the development of New Orleans
justified the demands of the carmen for a substantial in
crease .
Finally, though the financial condition of the company
was not relevent to establishing the wage award, the union
argued, NORLC had the resources and the earning capacity to
fund the wage increase and to maintain services. Admittedly,
the war skewed the financial and investment arrangements of
the company, forcing it to seek federal aid from the War
Finance Corporation, but on the whole it remained solvent
and successful, despite warnings of its imminent collapse.
Though the WFC loan prevented NORLC from defaulting on cer
tain securities, the people of New Orleans, not the stock
holders, underwrote the loan. These additional revenues, in
the form of a six cent fare and a reduction in services,
amounted to nearly one million dollars, all coming at the
expense of the people of New Orleans and the employees of
NORLC. Though it claimed it had no money to maintain service
or to pay its workers a fair wage, NORLC continued, despite
the war, to pay huge dividends to its stockholders and tre-
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mendous salaries and fees to its management and retainers.
In short, the union suggested, the company could, without
question, pay the wage increase authorized by the NWLB.30
H. Generes Dufour, the general counsel for NORLC,
agreed with the union that the NWLB should consider the
financial condition of the company in determining the wage
award. The company, Dufour told the NWLB, was in serious
financial difficulty, mostly as a result of the rigors of
the wartime crisis, but to some degree from the failure of
government to properly assess the needs of the public ser
vice industry, particularly in the South. The war increased
the cost of operation, including labor, and absorbed the in
vestment capital normally reserved for private enterprise.
As a result, though gross earnings increased $744,000 from
1914 to 1917, operating cost rose $1,200,000 over the same
time. The added cost of operation compelled the company to
seek government assistance. The WFC loan would not resolve
the financial difficulties of the company, but only prevent
3°Charles E. Thomas to Taft, July 21, 1918; Auditor's
Report, New Orleans Railway and Light Company System, June,
1918; Exhabit A, Brief on Behalf of New Orleans Railway and
Light Company, October 4, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLBf LSU;
Comparative Payroll Statement, New Orleans Railway and Light
Company, undated, ibid. According to the data furnished to
the NWLB by NORLC, the company paid nearly $2,000,000 in
interest and dividends for 1917, but that figure may be in
accurate and misleading. Many of the company's "fixed"
charges— rentals and leases— were, in fact, dividends paid
to itself. See Simon Boro and Company, et. alia, v. New
Orleans City Railroad Company, et alia.. 244 Federal Report
er 617. Curran earned $23,500, railway manager Nelson Brown
$5,000, NOGLC president Lee Benoist $6,000, and attorneys
retainers totaled $22,700 a year.
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it from defaulting on certain outstanding bonds. Though the
loan was contingent on the six cent fare, the stockholders,
along with the people of New Orleans, would guarantee the
WFC loan.31
The six cent fare would, as well, guarantee the carmen
a fair and reasonable wage. The company, Dufour informed the
NWLB, would devote only a portion of the six cent fare to
redeeming the WFC loan. The other portion it would dedicate
toward a wage increase for the carmen. After consulting with
city officials (the Behrman administration had just given
city employees a fifteen to twenty percent wage and salary
increase) and studying the wage scales in other cities, man
agement offered the union a twenty-five percent increase,
raising wages for carmen to thirty-one cents an hour and
giving other "union" employees between a ten and fifteen
percent raise. But the union insisted on a eighty-three per
cent increase for the platform workers and a portional in
crease for all other employees, totaling in excess of two
million dollars. A wage award of that calibre would leave
NORLC with a deficit it could not erase with any reasonable
increase in revenues or economies and promised the thorough

31"Arbitration Between AASEREA and NORLC," ibid., 1-3.
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collapse of the public utilities industry in New Orleans.33
If, on the other hand, the union relented in its wage
and contract demands and accepted the proposal of the com
pany, Dufour asserted, the carmen would make more money than
motormen and conductors in most other major southern cities.
In the process, the carmen would be preserving the jobs of
hundreds of their fellow workers and assuring the integrity
of industry and labor in the South. The "natural advantages"
of the southern climate and the "radical difference in the
economic and industrial [racial] fabric in the South,"
Dufour informed the board, justified a lower wage scale for
the southern labor. "Upon this fundamental economic fact,"
he said, "rests Southern industry and commerce." The lower,
Southern wage enabled the utility industry to compete suc
cessfully for investment and to provide public services at
reasonable and profitable prices. "It would prove destruc
tive of the South's economic situation if any artifical con32Ibid.. 4-6. Commissioner of Public Property Edward E.
Lafaye testified that municipal employees were "generally
satisfied with the wage increase granted to them by the
Behrman administration, regarding it as a "living wage" suf
ficient to meet the rising cost of living in New Orleans.
Though Lafaye acknowledged that carmen made less than most
municipal workers, he considered NORLC's offer "fair".
Dufour capitalized on Lafaye's remarks, reminding the NWLB
that "It is a well-known fact that employees of municipal
ities throughout this country are, so far as wages paid them
be concerned, regarded as favored employees and are never,
as a rule, underpaid." "Statement of Edward E. Lafaye, Com
missioner of Public Property of the City of New Orleans in
connection with the Arbitration Before the United States War
Labor Board of the Wage Scale to be Paid Employees of New
Orleans Railway and Light Company, July, 1918," Portfolio 1,
PNWLB. LSU.
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dition were brought about by mere fiat of establishing uni
formity in the wage scale throughout the country." In other
words, imposing a higher, uniform wage scale on southern
labor would hinder the development of the South's "natural
advantages," retarding industrial and economic progress, and
threatening racial accomodations and peace in the South.33
A week after the close of the hearings, the NWLB
rendered its decision. Before publizing its findings and
specifying the wage awards, however, the NWLB admonished the
union, the industry, and the municipal authorities against
exploiting the wartime emergency for their own advantage.
The war, the chairmen declared, "is not a normal period of
industrial expansion from which employers should expect un
usual profits or employees abnormal wages;...it is an inter
regnum in which industry is pursued [by industry, labor, and
government] only for common cause and common ends." The pur
suit of those common ends, nonetheless, necessitated a sub
stantial increase in the wages paid to the carmen and allied
union workers. By the same token, the war threatened the
electric railway industry with insolvency, and, though the
industry was guilty of past mismanagement and questionable
financial practices, it surely merited the assistance of the
federal and local governments. The NWLB recommended, then,
that Congress and the president consider legislation remedi
ating its financial problems and creating a federal agency
33I b i d . .
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to assist in its reform.3'*
Consideration of any sort of "remedial" legislation, of
course, would take months and the would require the approval
of a wary Congress and a president intent on maintaining the
integrity of local authorities. For the present, then, local
communities and authorities were solely responsible for
remedying the problems of the electric street railway busi
ness. The NWLB called on the Behrman administration to in
crease railway fares to meet the requirements of the wage
award. In considering the fare increase, the board advised,
the administration should disregard the past sins of NORLC.
"Over capitalization, corrupt methods, exorbitant dividends
in the past," the chairmen wrote, "are not relevant to the
question of policy in the present exigency. In justice, the
public should pay an adequate war compensation for a service
which can not be rendered except at war prices." Those war
time fares, however, should not be governed by the demands
of stockholders or management, but by "the immediate
pressure...to keep street railways running so that they may
meet the local and national demands for their services."33
The NWLB divided the wage award into three, graduated
3'•"Resolution Adopted by the National War Labor Board,"
July 31, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; Docket No. 98,
"Findings of Joint Chairmen as Arbitrators in re Employees
versus New Orleans Railway and Light Company, July 1918,
ibid., hereafter cited as "Findings of Joint Chairmen," box
14, SRUC. SCD, HTML,TU; Committee on Public Information,
The Official Bulletinr August 3, 1918, Portfolio 3, ibid.;
New Orleans Item. August 1, 2G, 1918.
33Docket No. 98, "Findings of the Joint Chairmen," ibid.
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classifications. The award was retroactive to July 1 and was
effective over the duration of the war. The board granted
experienced platform workers in large metropolitan areas,
where the cost of living was considered at its highest,
a wage of between forty-eight and fifty cents an hour. Those
carmen working in smaller, presumably less expensive cities
would earn up to forty-five cents an hour, and in cities
with a recognized lower cost of living, the board awarded
motormen and conductors forty-two cents an hour. Carmen
working for NORLC fell into this third category. They would
receive thirty-eight cents an hour for the first three
months of the award, forty cents over the next nine months,
and forty-two cents thereafter. The board considered other
railway workers and the employees of the gashouse division
covered under the "primary agreement" in a separate deci
sion. Those workers, many of whom were unskilled and black,
received increases between seventy-one and 180 percent,
elevating their wages above those of the many skilled, white
workers.36
In general union leaders were satisfied with the award,
though they were disappointed that the board placed New
Orleans in the third classification. The board's reasoning,
at least according to the Official Bulletin, the journalis
tic organ of the United States Committee on Public Informa
36Ibid.? Conner, The National War Labor Board, 77-81; New
Orleans Item. August 1, 10, 12, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States, August 10, 1918.
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tion (the Creel Committee), was climatic and economic. "In
New Orleans the wage was fixed lower than in other larger
cities," the Bulletin wrote, "the reason being the climatic
conditions, which made possible the ommission of the items
of fuel and heavy clothing from the cost of living budgets."
Apparently, the board did not give consideration to the
oppressive heat and humidity that characterized and distin
guished New Orleans weather. The NWLB acknowledged, though,
the distinctive character of the Southern economy. The wage
award granted to the New Orleans Carmen's union recognized
and justified the lower wages paid to southern workers— with
one noteable exception. The board, for some unaccountable
reason, granted unskilled black workers an increase that
paid them wages equal to those of white men. Apparently, the
board, at least for the moment, did not fathom the social
and economic implications of its ruling. But NORLC did. And
with its assistance, the board moved to correct the "unin
tended" consequences of its decision.3-7
The management of NORLC was, to say the least, dismayed
and alarmed by the board's decision, and it asked for an
immediate reconsideration and readjustment. In a series of

3-7Docket No. 98, "Findings of Joint Chairmen", Portfolio
1, PNWLB. LSU; Curran to Taft and Walsh, August 10, 1918,
ibid.; Official Bulletin. August 3, 1918, Portfolio 3,
ibid: New Orleans Item. August 10, 1918. For the initial
response of the union see, Gus J. Bienvenue to W. Jett
Lauck, August 16, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB and William D.
Mahon to Stadler, August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU.
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letters to the board, NORLC president Daniel Curran reiter
ated the company's initial arguments for a "reasonable" wage
award and explained the damaging economic and social conse
quences of the board's decision. That decision, he wrote,
was "unjust and unfair" and completely "out of proportion
with the necessities of the case". The wage award authorized
by the board exceeded the company's ability to pay, threat
ening its financial stability and jeopardizing its loan with
the WFC. If the board did not reajust its initial decision,
NORLC would be required to pay an additional two million
dollars for labor, which current revenues could not meet.
The company would then be forced to cut services and demand
fares and rates that neither politics nor business could
justify.30
The award also compensated unskilled, "common" workers
beyond their value and contribution to the company, Curran
said. This later aspect of the award would only serve to
"demoralize" the carmen and the other skilled workers with
NORLC. It would, as well, disrupt labor throughout the city
and the region. This "common" class of laborer, Curran in
formed the board, was of the "same class as Southern farm
labor, [and was] composed almost exclusively of negroes.—

3BCurran to Taft and Walsh, August 8, 10, 1918, Portfolio
1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. 1, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 29,
1918; New Orleans Daily States, August 1, 2, 10, 14, 1918.
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It is patent," Curran warned, "that a disturbance o£ the
labor conditions in this city and in the agricultural dis
tricts o£ this state will result from the above condi
tions. "3®
It was evident, as well, that Curran's warning disturb
ed the NWLB. The board, anxious to avoid any labor unrest
and eager to "harmonize" all interests, dispatched two field
investigators under the supervision of W. Jett Lauck, the
executive secretary of the NWLB, to New Orleans to examine
Curran's claims. The field investigators remained in New
Orleans for about two weeks, conducting "interviews" with
company management, union officials, and civic leaders
(there is no evidence that the two investigators spoke with
the mayor or members of the commission council). From these
"interviews" they concluded that there was some merit to
Curran's assessment. There was no immediate possibility that
NORLC would collapse under the wage award. But with the
commission council bending to political pressure not to in
crease carfares, there was the danger that the railway com
pany would suspend some operations and "lay off" workers.
3*Ibid. For the most obvious and compelling reasons, most
black workers for NORLC displayed no public dissatisfaction
with Curran's remarks. A few black workers, however, ignored
convention, complaining in writing to President Wilson and
the NWLB about the naked racial prejudice woven into the
appeal of NORLC. Their protest, however, was muted with
resignation. The southern white man, they said, would submit
to paying any "colored laborer" a wage equal to the white
man. See Nemis Paper to Wilson, September 6, 1918, W. Celles
to Taft and Walsh, September 11, 1918, Portfolio 1 PNWLBr
LSU.
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And, with many common "colored" laborers earning wages under
the award in excess of their merit or due, there existed the
chance for a "great deal of strife and industrial unrest" in
New Orleans. The report suggested that the board review its
decision, modifying it with the intention of "harmonizing"
the financial, social, and political interests of New
Orleans.
The report convinced the NWLB to review and reconsider
its initial decision in the New Orleans case. The board then
temporarily suspended the award for all workers except
motormen and conductors, and it scheduled a rehearing for
early October. Union representatives vigorously protested
the suspension, arguing that NORLC would use the suspension
to negate its contract agreements with the union. The union
also pointed out, with some justification, that NORLC had
not yet produced any tangible evidence that the wage award
was damaging to the company or demoralizing to the workers
and the community. The suspension of the award was, there-

'•°Lauck to Curran, August 12, 1918, Report Arthur Sturgis
and M. Joseph Chiesa to W. Jett Lauck, August 31, 1918,
Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU. In many respects, the report re
flected the interests of NORLC, repeating its arguments for
reducing the size and scope of the wage award and suggest
ing that NORLC already paid black workers an adequate wage.
The report also accused the Behrman administration of suc
cumbing to organized labor and oppositing to the six cent
fare. The report ignored the opposition of the Board of
Public Utilities and other so-called middle-class reformers
to the fare increase. It also ignored NORLC's demands for
an immediate increase as a means of avoiding public rehabil
itation. For different view, see Conner, The National War
Labor Board. 81-82.
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fore, unjust, and would, the union leaders insisted, damage
the men's morale and could disturb the public order.*1
The board, already predisposed toward revising the
wage award, refused to lift the suspension and, after some
delay, proceeded with the rehearing.** The Mew Orleans Rail
way and Light Company filed a lenghty and detalied brief
with the NWLB, seeking, as the brief explained, only "simple
justice" and arguing that the wage award was "unworkable and
excessive". NORLC contended, as it had throughout the entire
proceedings, that the wage award was beyond the company's
ability to pay. Working with current revenues, the award
would produce a deficit estimated at $2,526,000, $1,700,000
coming from the railway division alone. Even with the most
generous and feasible fare increase and the most reasonable
reduction in services, under the present wage award the com
pany faced huge deficits. And, the company insisted (with no
justification), political conditions in New Orleans made it
nearly impossible for it to secure any substantial fare in
crease. The regulation of public utilities in New Orleans

*xWalsh to unknown, August 30, 1918, Lauck to Curran,
August 30, 1918, Lauck to Stadler, August 30, 1918, Stadler
to Lauck, August 30, 1918, Lauck to E. M. Nolan, undated,
Lauck to Curran, September 19, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB.
LSU; Mahon to Stadler August 21, 1918, box 2, SRUC. SCD,
HTML, TU; Stadler to Lafaye, September 19, 1918, Lafaye
to Stadler, September 19, 1918, box 14, ibid.; New Orleans
Item. September 20, 1918; New Orleans Daily Statesr Sep
tember 20, 25, 1918.
*3!Walsh to unknown, August 30, 1918, Lauck to Curran,
August 30, 1918, Lauck to Stadler, August 30, 1918, Port
folio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
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was wholly inadequate and thoroughly politicized. The Nix
act, which was to govern the regulation of public utilities
in New Orleans was, in fact, a dead letter. The Behrman ad
ministration dismissed the Board of Public Utilities as
unnecessary and subjected the provisions of the act to poli
tical expediency. Simply put, the municipal government was
unwilling to increase carfares because it feared a backlash
from consumers and organized labor.*3
A sizeable reduction in the wage award, however, would
permit the company to maintain services, meet its financial
and contractual obligations to investors and employees,
without demoralizing either of them, and allow the Behrman
government the political latitude to increase fares. For the
reduction to satisfy and harmonize all interests, it had to
extend to all classifications and divisions of workers,
skilled and unskilled, gas, power, and railway. Skilled
workers for NORLC, the company suggested, were immune to the
seasonal and occupational reverses that tormented skilled
labor in other fields of work. The union wage scale, design*3Before the National War Labor Board, Employees vs. New
Orleans Railway and Light Company On Re Hearing, "Brief on
Behalf of the New Orleans Railway and Light Company, October
4, 1918," 2, 19, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU, hereafter cited as
"Brief On Behalf of NORLC,". The brief estimated that the
six cent fare would result in a deficit of $636,000, the
seven cent fare $170,000, and the eight cent fare $110,000.
Management suggested that it could "operate" under the award
if it abandoned many services and elimimated whole depart
ments of the company. For example, the company could dismiss
the entire maintenance crew (600 men) and 150 carmen. Obvi
ously, management said, considerations of that sort were im
possible.
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ed to protect the skilled laborer from those seasonal and
occupational reverses, did not apply to the skilled employ
ees of NORLC, and their award, the brief argued, should be
reduced to a figure below the prevailing union scale.■“■“
The wage award accorded to the unskilled, common black
laborer, NORLC argued, was unjustified and potentially
damaging to the economic and social fabric of the community.
The award given to the common black laborer placed him on a
par with motormen, conductors, and railway supervisors, all
of whom were white and more skilled. "In dealing with [the]
problem of Southern industry," the company reminded the
NWLB, "this Board cannot ignore the fact that there is a
different scale of living between the negro [sic] and the
white man generally and that the character of this [black]
labor is such that an increased wage will not improve the
standard of living but will merely result in idleness and
dissipation." A high wage for black workers encouraged
absenteeism and resulted in a decline in productivity,
forcing the company to hire more men, draining the rural
parishes of productive farm laborers, swelling the city with
uninitiated citizens, and placing a greater strain on
housing, santitation, and other vital city services .*s
Though not nearly as damaging and dangerous to the
city’s economy and social order, the wage awarded to the

■“■•"Brief on Behalf of NORLC," 4-11.
«Ibid., 8-9.
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motormen and conductors, too, threatened vital public ser
vices and the industrial peace of the city. Even with a re
duction in the awards to skilled and common workers, with
present revenues or with a six cent fare, the current wage
scale for the carmen exceeded the company's ability to pay.
Nor did the platform men merit the sort of wage authorized
by the NWLB. The carmen did not perform specialized, skilled
work, as they insisted. Rather, it was, at best "semiclerical" work, requiring only average intelligence, judg
ment, and coordination. Yet, under the present wage scale,
motormen and conductors were making more money than experi
enced railway supervisors and skilled mechanics, fostering
discontent among labor and draining the company of precious
resources and skilled workmen.48
The company recommended that the board rescind its ini
tial award, replacing it with the wage scheme used by the
Railroad Administration. Under such a system, carmen would
receive a maximum of thirty-four and a half cents an hour,
commom workers twenty-six cents, and skilled labor an in
crease of between thirty and forty percent. The Railroad Ad
ministration system, the brief contended, guaranteed company
employees a just settlement and allowed the company to main
tain services and to meet its financial obligations. Without
an immediate and favorable revision, NORLC would collapse

48Ibid.. 7-13, 16.
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into bankruptcy and probably cease operations.*7
The response of the NWLB was neither immediate nor
completely favorable. The board, anxious to protect the WFC
loan and to tie the wage and fare increases together, de
layed announcing its decision for nearly three weeks, only
further complicating and aggravating an already tense and
bitter debate over the necessity and character of a fare in
crease. Only after the Behrman administration "resolved” the
rate and fare controversy, did the NWLB announce its deci
sion. The original award for motormen and conductors would
remain unchanged. The NWLB acknowledged, however, that
the awards for unskilled and skilled workers were made in
"error". Unskilled, black workers would earn a minimum of
thirty-eight cents an hour, almost doubling their current
wages. The revised award granted skilled (presumably white)
workers a ten cent increase, provided the increase did not
surpass the prevailing union wage scale. * a

*7Ibid..
*aWinthrop More Daniels to Wilson, October 1, 1918, The
Papers of Woodrow Wilsonr vol. 51, 242-48; Behrman to Lauck,
October 23, 1918, Lauck to Behrman, October 23, 1918, Lauck
to Bienvenue, October 24, 1918, "Revision of Award of the
Joint Chairmen as Arbitrators in re Employees versus New
Orleans Railway and Light Company, October 24, 1918," Arthur
Sturgis and M. Joseph Chiesa, Examiners National War Labor
Board to New Orleans Railway and Light Company and to Local
194, AASEREA,” November 20, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU;
SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; New Orleans Daily States. October 21,
23-26, December 18, 1918; New Orleans Item. October 21, 2325, November 15, December 18, 1918; Conner, The National War
Labor Board. 82-83.
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The revision pleased no one and did not, as one scholar
recently suggested, "harmonize" the competing economic and
political interests of New Orleans. The management of NORLC,
for the moment, refused to accept the revised award, pro
testing that it, too, would bankrupt the company. Union
representatives also complained, calling the new award "a
grave and serious injustice" that would force the skilled
workmen to accept wages designed to compensate and satisfy
unskilled, common laborers. The board rejected the appeals
of the company and the union, insisting that the new awards
were generous and fair and that the new fare and rate ordin
ance enacted by the Behrman administration provided NORLC
with sufficient income to maintain services and fund the
wage increases.
The wage awards granted to the carmen and to the other
workers were, at least by the standards of New Orleans, fair
and generous. And the fare and rate increases enacted by the
municipal administration at the insistence of federal au■•"Francis T. Homer to Philp H. Gadsden, Representative of
the American Electric Railway Association, War Board, Octo
ber 26, 1918, Gadsden to Lauck, October 28, 1918, Stadler to
Lauck, November 1, 1918, Stadler to Charlton Ogburn, Ex
aminer, National War Labor Board, November 6, 1918, Stadler
to Taft and Walsh, December 2, 1918, Homer to Dufour and the
National War Labor Board, December 6, 1918, "Appeal to the
National War Labor Board for Revision of the Award, October
27 [24], 1918, an Interpretation given by Messrs. Chiesa and
Sturgis," November 21, 1918; "Opinion on Appeal," December
14, 1918, National War Labor Board, "Response to Employees'
Appeal, Employees v. New Orleans Railway and Light Order in
re Appeal from Examiners Interpretation of Revision Award,"
December 17, 1918, Portfolio 2, PNWLB. LSU; Conner, The
National War Labor Board. 83.
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thorities, too, seemed sufficient to fund the wage increases
and to refund the WFC loan. Federal policy was, however,
generous to a fault, "ordering" wage and rate increases that
neither the company nor the city administration seemed will
ing to absorb. The awards prompted NORLC into curtailing
services, dismissing workers, and contemplating receivership
as a means of avoiding the consequences of the wage settle
ment and public rehabilitation. The union and the city ad
ministration, understandably, objected to the dismissals and
elimination of services. The union threatened to delay the
efforts of the Behrman administration to increase rates and
fares (a threat the administration took seriously), unless
the council tied the rate increases to a thorough, public
rehabilitation of NORLC. Fearing the collapse of the city's
economy, the Behrman government cabled the Wilson adminis
tration, requesting him to take over the operation of NORLC,
freeing the city to pursue, in a logical and expedient
fashion, the public rehabilitation of the company. The
federal government refused the city's request. The local and
regional character of the utility industry and the peculiar
ities and dissimilarities of public utility law, Wilson in
formed the mayor, prevented the formulation of a common
policy, allowing the federal government to operate the rail
way industry. However, Wilson wrote, "It is imperatively
necessary that local and state authorities should take [the]
action necessary for [the] immediate relief" of the public
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utilities industry.*0
Despite its assertions respecting and encouraging the
independence and authority of local governments, the public
utility policy of the Wilson administration, denied them the
authority to pursue the public rehabilitation of the utili
ties industry and, as a consequence, discouraged immediate
relief. Federal policy was, in the first place, inconsistent
and confusing, the result of a protracted debate within the
Wilson administration.91 The Behrman administration, antici
pating either federal management or municipal ownership,
delayed relief to NORLC, worsening the company's financial
crisis. The wage awards granted by the NWLB, given without
9°Behrman to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, Behrman to Wilson,
August 12, 1918, Wilson to Tumulty, August 13, 1918, The
Papers of Woodrow Wilson,, vol. 49, 240-41; New Orleans Item.
August 13, 14, 1918. For an indication of how the Behrman
administration preceived the threat of the organized labor—
and other interests— to public rehabilitation, see "State
ment of Edward E. Lafaye, Commissioner of the Department of
Public Property of the City of New Orleans in connection
with the arbitration Before the United States War Labor
Board," July, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU.
9:1The debate revolved around the issues of direct federal
aid and "management" of the public utilities industry. Those
who favored such a policy, like NWLB co-chairman William
Howard Taft, Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo,
Secretary of Commerce William Cox Redfield, and WFC chairman
William Procter Harding, urged President Wilson to create a
railway administration empowered to manage the electric
street railway industry. Others, like ICC chairman Winthrop
More Daniels, believed that federal management was a "dan
gerous policy," further burdening the federal treasury and
undermining the authority of the local governments. See, as
examples of the debate, Harding to Wilson, July 12, 1918,
The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 48, 597-99; Daniels to
Wilson, August 5, 1918, ibid.. vol. 49, 183-84, Wilson to
Daniels, August 7, 1918, ibid., 204, Wilson to Redfield,
August 7, 1918, 207, Daniels to Wilson, September 2, 1918,
420-22.
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regard for the financial condition of the company or the
city, made public rehabilitation under the six cent fare im
possible, forcing the Behrman administration to accomodate
higher rates and sustaining to those who opposed the public
rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway and Light.32

In the beginning of August, 1918, after months of ex
haustive and inconclusive debate, Daniel D. Curran called on
Mayor Behrman and the commission council to suspend their
investigation into the financial condition of the company
and to extend immediate and unqualified relief to it. The
wage award granted by the NWLB, he said, coupled with the
increasing cost of business, would, if left without remedy,
create a deficit of nearly three million dollars. Unless the
council granted the company substantial increases in railway
fares and gas and electric rates, the company could not meet
its financial obligations, including the WFC loan and the
NWLB award, causing it to cease operations.39
Over the next several days, representatives of NORLC
met with the officers and membership of several important
business associations, including the New Orleans Clearing
house, a consortium of bankers, and the Association of

" N e w Orleans Daily States. August 13-15, 18-19, 1918;
New Orleans Item. August 13-15, 18-19, 1918.
"C u r r e n to Behrman and Council, August 14, 1918, Portfo
lio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item. August 14, 1918; New
Orleans Daily States. August 14, 1918.
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Commerce, the conservative successor to the more progressive
Progressive Union. H. Generes Dufour, appearing before rep
resentatives of the Clearinghouse and several exchanges,
maintained that with sufficient funding and proper regula
tion the company could erase its huge deficit, provide ade
quate service, and avoid the dangers and embarrassment of
bankruptcy. For the increases to be effective, he argued,
they had to be sufficient and equitable; large enough to
sustain operating expenses and shared by the entire communi
ty. He recommended, then, a two cent increase in carfare, a
twenty-five percent hike in gas and electric rates, and a
five percent reduction in railway services. The business
associations required little coaxing. Convinced that it was
the obligation of the commission council to meet the crisis
"squarely, courageously, patriotically, and without delay,"
the businessmen called on the council to discontinue its
investigation and to grant NORLC the increases it requested
without qualification.*■*
The Association of Commerce, unlike the commodity ex
changes and the New Orleans Clearinghouse, was not content
with petitioning the commission council. The Association of
Commerce, with financial and personal ties to NORLC, offered
a specific plan that gave NORLC the sort of increases it de
manded, removed regulatory control from the commission coun-

a-#New Orleans Item. August 15-16, 1918; New Orleans Daily
States. August 15, 1918.
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cil, and provided for the private rehabilitation of the com
pany. The plan, authored by former Commissioner of Public
Safety Harold W. Newman, provided for a seven cent fare and
a thiry percent increase in gas and electric rates. The
proposed increases offered by the Behrman and Wilson admin
istrations were designed to meet specific wartime demands
and obligations and were, by and large, unconcerned with the
financial condition of NORLC. But the increases recommended
by the Newman committee and the Association of Commerce, on
the other hand, were permanent rates, adjusted to meet the
financial condition and obligations of the company and
designed to assist in the private rehabilitation of NORLC.3S
Moreover, the Newman plan provided for the appointment
by the commission council of a permanent, independent and
"nonpartisan" board to regulate the rates and fares of the
public utilities company. The new board would replace the
ineffective and discredited Board of Public Utilities and
would, presumably, better preserve the interests of the
business community and NORLC. With rates and fares finally
secured, private investors, with the "encouragement" of the
Behrman administration, would reorganize and refinance NORLC
in a proper and businesslike fashion, providing for adequate
s3"Typescript of Resolutions of [the] Commerical Ex
changes and Home Labor Organization to Commission Council,"
August 16, 1918, Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans Item,
August 16-18, 1918; New Orleans Daily States. August 16-18,
1918. Newman left the Behrman administration in late in
1917, protesting the mayor's stand on the closing of Storyville. See below pages
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public service and guaranteeing sufficient protection for
investment.*B
The commission council met in extraordinary session on
Saturday, August 17, to listen to the request of NORLC for
an immediate, unconditional increase in rates and fares. The
council also welcomed suggestions and commentary from sup
porters and critics of the proposed increases, particularly
from those who either endorsed or opposed the Newman plan.
Attorney H. Generes Dufour, as he had so often, presented
the case for the company. Dufour recounted for the council
essential character and obvious needs of the company. Public
utilities were "absolutely essential to modern life," and
without them the city's economy would collapse. These utili
ties were also vital to the overall war effort; without them
essential wartime industries and projects, like the proposed
Industrial and Navigation Canal, would collapse as well.*7
The war also disrupted the normal course of business,
Dufour continued, driving up prices, exhausting traditional
sources of credit, and compelling the company to seek alter
nate sources of revenue. The federal government, one of the

*BIbid. Among those guarantees was a provision calling
for an investigation by the Association and the new board
of the NWLB wage award. The intent of the provision was, of
course, to reduce the size of the award and diminish the
authority of the union over the company and its workers.
S7"Proceedings had at a special meeting of the Commission
council of the City of New Orleans held on Saturday, August
17, 1918," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU (hereafter cited as
"Special Meeting"); New Orleans Daily States. August 17,
1918; New Orleans Item. August 17, 1918.
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two possible sources of credit and revenue available to the
company, not only failed to respond to the critical needs of
NORLC, it also contributed to the company's worsening finan
cial condition. The Wilson administration refused to grant
NORLC the funds necessary to maintain services and meet its
financial oblgations. And the National War Labor Board,
without regard for the financial condition of the company,
granted a wage increase to workers that even in the best of
times could only bankrupt the company.9"
The only other source of revenue left open to NORLC,
Dufour assured the commission council, was the people of
New Orleans. In seeking the increase, the company had pro
vided the Behrman administration with sufficient evidence,
legitimating its claims and enabling the administration to
make a fair and complete assessment of those claims. Despite
the public pressures, the municipal government, in good con
science and with the best interest of the city in mind,
cannot delay or qualify the increase in revenues. There were
no legitimate reasons for delay or qualification. Without an
immediate increase the company would collapse, defaulting on
all its financial and contractual agreements, ruining many
of its smaller creditors ("widows, orphan asylums, and
trust funds"), and damaging the economy of the city for
years to come. Further qualification was, as well, unneces
sary. NORLC had already agreed to the mayor's regulation and
3"Ibid.
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rehabilitation plan, assuring the council adequate authority
over the public services companies. Should the council re
quire additional assurances, however, Dufour suggested
placing the rate and fare increases on a trail basis, re
pealing them should they prove no longer necessary.39
Few critics of the Newman proposal actually questioned
the need and justice of some sort of fare and rate increase.
It was obvious that the company needed additional revenues
to fund the NWLB wage award and to repay the WFC loan, and
it was equally apparent that consumers should share in meet
ing the cost of operations. The principal opponents of the
Newman plan— the carmen's union, the Board of Public Utili
ties, and the newspapers— objected to the financial condi
tions and the political consequences of the proposal. These
critics maintained that there was no compelling reason for
the commission council to suspend its investigation and to
grant NORLC an immediate and unqualified increase in rates
and fares. A thorough investigation, they assured the coun
cil, would reveal that the rates and conditions proposed by
the Newman plan were excessive and harmful, compelling the
public to pay for the entire cost of operations, with no
corresponding guarantee of improved services, and allowing
the company to avoid the consequences of public rehabilita
tion and regulation.50

39Ibid.
soIbid.
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Under the Newman plan, critics charged, the rate and
fare increases assessed by NORLC would fall heaviest on the
working man and woman, requiring them to pay a dispropor
tionate share of their income to transportation and the
other vital public services. Such increases would transform
public utilities into private conveyances and conveniences
for those who could afford to pay for them. It was apparent,
as well, that the proposed increases would extend beyond the
wartime crisis, becoming more or less permanent rates and
allowing management to employ public funds to refinance the
company without rehabilitating it.®1
After hours of nearly endless discussion and debate,
the commission council tabled the Newman proposal. As Mayor
Behrman explained, the council understood the concerns of
NORLC and the business community, but it did not share their
sense of urgency. The Ballard investigation, commissioned by
the council in June, was nearly complete. Undoubtedly, its
findings would enable the council to formulate a permanent
and just solution to the utilities crisis in New Orleans.
There was, then, the mayor announced, no need for a "quick
fix".62 Unfortunately, for Mayor Behrman and the commission
council, the Ballard investigation dragged on for several
more months, never permitting the Behrman administration to
enact a "permanent" solution to the utilities crisis and

eiIbid.
®2Ibid.
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contributing to the demands for a "quick fix".
Late in September, 1918, William Proctor Harding, the
Managing Director of the War Finance Corporation, wrote to
Martin Behrman demanding that "quick fix". Direct and un
compromising, Harding reminded the mayor and the council of
their promise to raise revenues for NORLC. Without a size
able increase in rates and fares, NORLC faced bankrutcy,
jeopardizing the security of the WFC loan and exposing the
council's "bad faith". Meeting in emergency session, the
mayor and the council entertained proposals from the WFC
calling for an immediate increase in fares and rates. As
agents for the WFC explained, a six cent fare and a thirty
percent increase in gas and electric rates would enable
NORLC to meet its loan obligations, the NWLB award (soon
to be reduced), and, ultimately, provide the company with a
modest surplus.®3
Though it had no other reasonable choice but to consent
to the WFC demands, the council attached several conditions
to the ordinance increasing fares and rates. Drafted by the
City Attorney's Office and introduced by Commissioner of
Public Utilities Edward J. Glenny, the ordinance recounted
in some detail the origins of the fare and rate increases,
®3W.P.G. Harding to Behrman, September 30, 1918, "Minutes
of Meeting," October 1, 2, 1918, WFC. RG 154: New Orleans
item. October 1, 2, 1918; New Orleans Daily States. October
1, 2, 1918. Economists for the WFC estimated that the fare
and rate increases would generate an additional $2,400,000
for 1918-1919, while expenses for the same time would
increase another $2,200,000.
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emphasizing their wartime character and suggesting that the
Wilson administration was responsible for its adoption. The
ordinance allowed NORLC and NOGLC to collect the new fares
and rates only over the term of the WFC loan. And required
the companies to dedicate the increases solely to retiring
the loan and subsidizing the NWLB award (the wage award
expired with the end of the 1918 contract). In addition, the
new ordinance authorized the commission council to "regu
late" fares and rates on the basis of the valuation set by
the Ballard investigation, nullifying the valuation provi
sions of the Nix act and reiterating the full authority of
the commission council over the regulation of public ser
vices in New Orleans. One week later, despite the objections
of the union and the Board of Public Utilities, the commis
sion council formally enacted the Glenny ordinance. It went
into effect immediately . e *
Opposition to the Glenny ordinance was immediate and,
for the most part, ineffective. Wilbert Black, a union rep
resentative, filed suit in Civil District Court against
NORLC, attempting to prevent the company from collecting the
fare increase (the union planned separate suits against the
increase in electric and gas rates). The suit contended that
the Glenny ordinance was illegal, arguing that the municipal
government had no legal authority under its charter or the
"■•Ordinance No. 5257, CCS. CA, NOPL; Behrman to Harding,
October 9, 1918, vol.2, "Minutes of Meeting," WFC. RG 154:
New Orleans Item, October 2-4, 8-9, 1918.
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laws of the state to regulate fares, and that the increase
in fares represented an unjust and unconstitutional tax on
the people of New Orleans. Civil District Court Judge Hugh
C. Cage ruled against the union, arguing that the commission
council possessed the "full authority" to regulate the qual
ity and cost of public services. In effect, then. Cage's
ruling questioned the legitimacy of the Nix act and the au
thority, to say nothing of the existence, of the Board of
Public Utilities.®3
The Board of Public Utilities recognized the implica
tions of the Black decision, and it acted quickly to assure
its existence and to "preserve" its authority. The board ac
knowledged that the authority of the commission council was
unquestioned in matters of contracts, franchises, routes,
and schedules. But, under the provisions of the Nix act,
and contrary to the opinions of the City Attorney and the
decision in the Black case, the council had no authority
over the regulation of rates and fares. That authority,
board members asserted, lay clearly and exclusively with the
board. And they called on the Behrman administration to re
scind the rate and fare provisions of the Glenny ordinance
and to underwrite the board in a suit defining the authority

®"Black v. New Orleans Railway and Light Company 82
Southern Reporter 81; New Orleans Daily States. October 3,
9, 10, 16, 22, 31, November 25-27, 1918; New Orleans Item,
October 9-10, 16, 31, November 25-27, 1918.
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of the council and the board under the Nix act.*®
The city administration, convinced of its own authority
and anxious to pursue an independent course, encouraged the
Board of Public Utilities to test its authority under the
Nix act. The administration insisted that it could not par
ticipate in a suit against itself, and it suggested that the
BPU initiate its own suit, asking the state government to
represent it in court. The BPU, constrained by the opinions
of the city attorney and without independent resources, com
plied with the council's recommendations. Early in December,
the BPU issued an "ordinance," canceling the rate and fare
increases enacted under the Glenny ordinance, and ordering
NORLC to surrender all "appropriate" documents concerning
the fare and rates increases. Officals for the company,
citing the opinions of the city attorney, refused to obey
the order, contending that the board had no regulatory
authority that the company was bound to respect.67

BBMoore to Martin Behrman and the Commission Council,
November 26, December 9, 1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; "Spe
cial Meeting," Portfolio 1, PNWLB, LSU; Black v. New Orleans
Railway and Light Company.
; Board of Public
Utilities in and for the Citv of New Orleans v. New Orleans
Railway and Light Company. 82 Southern Reporter 280; New Or
leans Daily States. December 5, 6, 16, 18, 1918, February
13, April 1, 2, June 7, 10, 1919; New Orleans Itemf December
5-6, 1918, April 1, 2, May 6, 1919.
67,Board of Public Utilties v. New Orleans Railway and
Light Company. 81 SR, 281; Moore to Glenny, February 28,
1917, August 3, 1917, August 8, 1918, November 28, 1918,
December 9, 1918, John F. C. Waldo to Moore, August 24,
1918, vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Item. December 5,
10, 1918; New Orleans Daily States, December 5, 10, 1918.
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Acting on orders from Governor Ruffin G. Pleasant, the
state Attorney General filed suit on behalf of the board,
seeking to repeal the Glenny ordinance and to establish the
full and complete authority of the board over public ser
vices in New Orleans. At a preliminary hearing, NORLC ques
tioned the constitutionality of the Nix act, arguing that
the act violated provisions of the state constitution re
quiring the election of all municipal officials "exercising
the police [inherent] powers or administering the affairs"
of the city. The Civil District Court ruled against the BPU,
reaffirming the authority of the commission council to regu
late the cost of service and declaring the Nix act unconsti
tutional. In nullifying the act, the court agreed with the
contention of NORLC that the Board of Public Utilities was a
municipal board invested with the inherent powers of the
city. The Louisiana constitution required that the people of
New Orleans select all municipal officials and boards exer
cising the police power of the city, and prevented the leg
islature from abating or abridging those powers.""
On appeal, the state Attorney General argued that the
City of New Orleans, as a "creature" of the state, enjoyed
its inherent powers at the sufferance of the state legisla
ture and that the legislature could, as it desired, con

""Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and
Light Company. 82 SR 281-283; New Orleans Item. January 6,
7, 10, 11, 1919; New Orleans Daily States, January 3, 6, 10,
11, 1919.

tract, expand, or withdraw those powers. In this instance,
the legislature delegated the inherent powers of the state
to the state Board of Public Utilities, clothing it with the
"auxiliary municipal powers" to regulate the public utili
ties of the city. The Louisiana Supreme Court acknowledged
the authority of the legislature to delegate its reserve
powers as it desired, but, the court ruled, when the legis
lature chooses to delegate those powers, it must respect the
bounds placed on it by the Louisiana constitution. In all
matters concerning New Orleans, the constitution required
the election of all officials invested with the inherent
powers of the city. There were no exceptions. Whether the
BPU was a state board holding "auxiliary" municipal powers
or a municipal board, the state government had no authority
over its selection. And, since the neither the legislature
nor the governor had the power to "breathe existence" into
the board, the act had no vitality and the remainder of its
provisions were without authority.69
The decision of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the "lull
authority" of the municipal government over the public ser
vice utilities of the city, reuniting public regulation
under a single authority and freeing the administration from
the ruinous valuation and rate of return provisions of the

S9Board of Public Utilities v. New Orleans Railway and
Light Company 82 SR. 281-83; New Orleans Daily States. Janu
ary 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, April 1, May 6, 1919; New Orleans Item.
January 6, 7, 10, April 1, 2, May 5, 1919.
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Nix act. Freeing the city of the excessive valuation and
rate demands of NORLC, however, proved more difficult than
restoring full regulatory authority to the muincipal govern
ment. During the summer of 1918, as part of its plan for the
public rehabilitation of NORLC, the Behrman administration
hired Frederick W. Ballard, a utility expert from Cleveland,
to conduct a valuation survey of the physical and financial
properties of NORLC. The council instructed Ballard to de
termine the cost of rehabilitating NORLC under "normal" eco
nomic conditions. Ballard's poor health and the tedious
quality of the survey delayed completion of the survey until
November. The city administration delayed releasing the sur
vey until late in December, giving itself time to digest the
report and to suggest corrections.70
Ballard established the valuation of NORLC and NOGLC at
$32,739,193, more than $20,000,000 less than what management
claimed as "fair and adequate" valuation. The teport, as
critics of NORLC and the Behrman administration concluded,
revealed the personal and corporate bankruptcy of private
ownership of public services and the dangers of "quasi regu
lation". The Ballard report, the newspapers suggested, con
firmed what every one already knew: the financial problems
of NORLC did not stem from the economic dislocation of the
war or from the profligate wage awarded to employees.
7°"Special Meeting," Portfolio 1, PNWLB. LSU; New Orleans
Item. June 22, July 2, August 17, October 24, December 6,
14-16, 21, 25, 1918.
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Rather, those problems were the result of decades of corpo
rate mismanagement, finacial exploitation, and politicized
public regulation. The solution to those problems obviously
lay in a thorough and uncompromising reorganization and re
habilitation of the company and the depoliticization of
public service regulation. In exposing the problems of the
public service industry and suggesting a solution to the
crisis, the Ballard report, the Item wrote, was an important
move toward a "more satisfactory control of the public ser
vice question".‘7:L
The Behrman administration, on the other hand, was
completely dissatisfied with Ballard report. The Ballard
valuation differed dramatically with other, recent assess
ments conducted by the State Board of Affairs (the equaliza
tion board) and by two "utility experts" employed by NORLC.
The discrepancies between the Ballard report and the other
valuations were too glaring to ignore, suggesting that Bal
lard had either misunderstood or ignored the council*s in
structions concerning the sort of valuation it desired. In
any event, the administration recognized that a low valua-

’7XF. W. Ballard and Company, "Valuation of the Property
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company, Property in All
Parishes, Final Summary All Departments," November 30, 1918
(hereafter cited as Ballard, "Valuation of NORLC"); New
Orleans Item, December 31, 1918, January 1, 5, 7, 1919, May
7, June 3, 12, 30, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. December
31, 1918, January 2, 1919. An unidentified valuation for the
NWLB estimated the valuation of NORLC at between $37 and $38
million. See "Actual Valuation, New Orleans Railway and
Light Company," undated, Portfolio 3, PNWLB. LSU.
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tion would force NORLC into receivership, compromising the
public reorganization and rehabilitation of the utilities
industry in New Orleans.72
In an effort to stave off receivership, the Behrman ad
ministration sought a second opinion. Commissioner Edward E.
Lafaye commissioned General G. W. Goethals, the chief engi
neer of the Panama Canal and the principal architect of the
New Orleans Industrial and Navigation Canal, to conduct
another, more acceptable valuation. Though more inclusive
than the Ballard survey, the Geothals valuation was hardly
more acceptable to the city administration. In making his
assessment, Goethals simply split the difference between the
Ballard and NORLC valuations. As the general explained in
his report, Ballard disregarded many business intangibles,
fixing the valuation for rate making purposes only. Though
the administration could use the Ballard figures for rate
making, it could not use them to reorganize and rehabilitate
the company. The method of valuation employed by the experts
for NORLC was too generous to the company, setting its valu
ation on the cost of reproduction at wartime prices. Though
the administration could rehabilitate NORLC at the price set
by company experts, the cost to the consumer was completely

72New Orleans Daily States. January 3, 5, 1919; New
Orleans Item. January 3, April 6, 13, 1919. The Board of
Affairs placed the market value of NORLC and NOGLC at $47
million in 1918, while the firms of Ford, Bacon and Davis
and J. H. Perkins placed its valuation at between $55 and
$57 million.
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prohibitive. In an ef£ort to find some neutral ground, then,
Goethals recommended a figure of $44.8 million for rate mak
ing and a generous rate of return for both "old" and "new**
money."73
Several days later, Commissioner Lafaye reported his
own findings to the council, suggesting a blueprint for the
public rehabilitation of the company. It was obvious, Lafaye
told the council in his last public act as Commissioner of
Public Property (he would resign several days later), that
the valuation offered by NORLC was excessive and unrealis
tic, and he recommended that the council reject it out of
hand. He also recommended that the council disregard the
valuation set by Frederick Ballard as incomplete. The city
administration, Lafaye reminded the council, had never been
interested in establishing the valuation of NORLC for rate
making purposes only. Rather, from the start, the council
considered valuation as part of a process that would reor
ganize and reorient the public utilities industry, assuring
service based on the public needs, rewarding sound, effi
cient management, protecting legitimate investment, and
attracting the additional investment required to fund the
rehabilitation of the industry.'7'*
Though an advocate of municipal ownership, Lafaye con
sidered it inexpedient, and he counseled the administration
'73New Orleans Item, January 3, 5, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States. January 5, 1919.
'7*New Orleans Item, January 5, 8, April 6, 13, 1919.
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to reject municipalization. Instead, Lafaye recommended that
the commission council take a "direct" and "supervisory"
role in the rehabilitation, management, and regulation of
NORLC and NOGLC. Lafaye proposed, then, that the council
grant NORLC an "indeterminate" franchise to operate transit,
electricity, and gas, guaranteeing the companies an assured
rate of return on a "fixed" valuation, and adjusting rates
and fares within the limits set by the rate of return. As
the first step toward assuring the rehabilitation of NORLC,
Lafaye proposed establishing the valuation of NORLC at $38.3
million and setting the rate of return at five percent for
1919. ‘5's
The Lafaye plan, though, was not the first step toward
the rehabiliatation of the company, nor did it succeed in
preventing NORLC from declaring bankruptcy and seeking the
protection of the federal courts. On January 8, Daniel D.
Curran informed the commission council that the American
Cities Company had filed a petition in federal district
court, asking Judge Rufus E. Poster to place NORLC in re
ceivership for failing to meet its financial obligations to
the stockholders of ACC. Judge Foster consented to the peti
^"Ibid. The proposal also allowed the council to adjust
the valuation over the years, permitting the company to is
sue additional stock with the approval of the council. The
plan increased the rate of profit to six percent in 1920 and
seven percent in 1921. Lafaye urged the administration to
sever its relationship with NORLC by resigning from the
company's board of directors. In April, Mayor Behrman and
the other councilmen resigned from the board. New Orleans
Item, April 14, 1919.
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tion, appointing John D. O ’Keefe, the executive vice-presi
dent of the Whitney-Central Bank, as receiver for the com
pany, instructing him to "preserve, manage, and operate"
the three utility divisions as an unified corporation.7"
The public response to receivership was, of course,
mixed. The Daily States asserted that though the Behrman ad
ministration worked "patiently, intelligently, and earnest
ly," to resolve the utility crisis, receivership meant that
the city administration lost the opportunity to direct the
reorganization and rehabilitation of the company. A more asstute assessment came from the New Orleans Item. Receiver
ship would not prevent some form of public rehabilitation of
NORLC. Undoubtedly, the newspaper suggested, receivership
would further complicate and delay the reorientation of the
industry, but it also enhanced the opportunity to reorganize
the company along the progressive principles of scientific
management and public regulation. The complications the Item
foresaw, however, delayed the public rehabilitation of the
company for another three years, disrupting the "good order"
of the city and contributing to the defeat of the Behrman
administration in 1920.77
7"New Orleans Item, January 9, 10, February 5, 1919; New
Orleans Daily States, January 8-10, 1919. Press accounts
described O'Keefe as a man of "unusual ability," realistic,
resolute, and, above all, independent of NORLC. In fact,
O'Keefe was a member of the board of directors for NORLC,
and the Whitney-Central was one of the largest creditors of
NORLC.
77New Orleans Daily States. January 10, 1919; New Orleans
Item. January 9, 10, 1919.
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Chapter Seven

Readjustment and Reform

The period of economic and political readjustment that
followed the Armistice of 1918 had a profound, though
enigmatic, effect on the public regulation and rehabilita
tion of New Orleans Railway and Light Company. The policy of
readjustment initiated by the Wilson administration saw the
disassembling of the federal wartime administrations and
boards and, as one reliable student suggested, the eroding
of the concessions won by organized labor during the war.3During the period of readjustment, the management of NORLC,
under the direction of Receiver John D. O'Keefe and the pro
tection of the federal court, assailed the rights and con
cessions won by the union in 1918. Their actions triggered a
lengthy and divisive strike, eventually compelling the union
to accede to the demands of management. The strike damaged
the reputation and credibility of the Behrman administra
tion, though, in fact, the administration did much to bring
about a peaceful and reasonable solution. Still it was not
enough to satisfy the partisan reform press of New Orleans,
which blamed the strike on the failed public utilities
policy of the Behrman administration.
xAdam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in New
Orleans: A Study in Capital, Labor, and Government, 18941929," Louisiana History. XXII (Winter 1981), 45-65.
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The war and readjustment, the city newspapers and other
critics charged, exposed the failure of partisan municipal
regulation and the incompetence of the Behrman administra
tion. During the war and readjustment, the Behrman commis
sion council ignored the provisions of the Nix act, politi
cizing municipal regulation and allowing federal agencies
and the interest of NORLC to determine public policy.
Operating with the protection of the city council and the
approval of the federal government, NORLC curtailed street
car service, permitting the company to avoid its franchise
obligations and antagonizing commuters and employees. The
wartime economy and the financial mismanagement of the com
pany (ignored, if not condoned, by the Behrman administra
tion) nearly bankrupted the company, compelling the city
administration to raise rates and fares to underwrite a
federal loan and to meet an increase in wages ordered by
the federal National War Labor Board.
The Armistice did

not

see a restoration

of servicesor

reduction in cost, but

the

bankruptcy of the

company andan

increase in fares. Nor

did

it see the reestablishment of

public authority over NORLC, but its further deterioration.
Exhausted by the war and motivated by partisan advantage,
the Behrman administration refused to participate in the re
habilitation of NORLC, allowing the company to set the con
ditions for its reconstruction and regulation.
There was a measure of truth in the complaints of the
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city press, but it misread the intentions of the Behrman
administration. Though exhausted by the ordeal of war and
"reconstruction," the commission council offered a series of
temperate and workable proposals for the rehabilitation of
NORLC aimed at restoring and strengthening municipal author
ity. But the Behrman administration did not possess plenary
authority over the rehabilitation process, nor did it enjoy
the respect of Receiver O'Keefe or the confidence of the
city newspapers. And the politics of readjustment, like
municipal politics in general, served both private and pub
lic concerns, giving them a hand in shaping public policy
and tempering public authority in the name of private rights
and restraining private interests on behalf of the public
good.
The policy initiated by the Behrman administration in
1918, despite the criticisms of a partisan press, ended the
streetcar strike of 1920 and brought about the public reha
bilitation of NORLC and the "restoration" of municipal regu
latory authority over the public utilities industry in New
Orleans. Though carried out by the "reform" administration
of Andrew McShane (see Chapter Eight), the Behrman policy
scaled down the valuation of NORLC, aligned rates and fares
with the cost of service, limited the rate of profit, per
mitted the municipalization of public utilities, and recog
nized the municipal government as the exclusive "regulatory"
authority of public services in New Orleans.

Near the end of 1919, on the eve of the first anniver
sary of the November Armistice, William D. Mahon, the presi
dent of the AASEREA, wrote to union leaders and members,
cautioning them against antagonizing management during the
period of "readjustment". Management, he said, obviously
considered readjustment an opportunity to reassert its con
trol over labor, regaining the rights and concessions it
lost before and during the war. Union workers should respond
to every complaint and demand of management, then, with cir
cumspection and vigilance, never permitting the companies
to blame the decline in services and the rise in prices on
the union and never relinquishing fundamental rights. John
Stadler, the outgoing president of the New Orleans AAESREA,
reiterated Mahon's message to the local membership. He urged
the carmen to perserve in their work, reminding them of
their service and contract obligations and of the anti-union
sentiment of Receiver John D. O'Keefe.2
The concerns of the union leadership were legitimate.
During the period of receivership and readjustment, the
quality of service deteriorated further and working condi
tions remained intolerable. Receiver O'Keefe mananged the
company for the benefit of the stockholders, curtailing ser
vice wherever possible and maintaining revenues at any ex
pense. The brunt of his economies, predictably, fell on the

2Mahon to Locals, November 10, 1919, Stadler to Members
of Local Division 194, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.
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customers and employees o£ NORLC. O'Keefe was, as well, a
devoted company man. He was a member of the board of direc
tors of NORLC, an executive officer of one of its principal
creditors, the Whitney-Central Bank, and he was openly crit
ical of the policies of the Wilson and Behrman administra
tions and bitterly resentful of the concessions granted to
the union. Prom his perspective, it was the misappropriation
of authority and power by the government and the union
during the war, and not the financial mismanagement of the
company, that led to the collapse of NORLC. It was his task
as receiver, then, to readjust and reapportion that author
ity and power to suit the interests of the company. His
first major opportunity came in the spring of 1920.3
Early in June, after several months of preliminary dis
cussions (conducted in the newspapers), the carmen's union
and Receiver O'Keefe began negotiations for the 1920 con
tract. The union, citing increases in the cost of living and
poor working conditions, demanded a "substantial" increase
in wages and a similar reduction in hours. The union wanted
an increase of thirty-five cents an hour, raising wages from
the forty-two cents granted by the National War Labor Board
in 1918 to seventy-seven cents an hour. The men also demand
ed an eight-hour day, a six-day week, and time and a half
for Sundays and all holidays. The total wage award for all
3New Orleans Item. January 9, 1919; Stadler to Member
ship, June 4, 1919, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU; Fairclough,
"Public Utilities," 53.
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union workers, including common day labors and gashouse
workers, was $3 million.4
Receiver O'Keefe acknowledged that the carmen deserved
a wage increase, but, he argued, the union demands were un
realistic and unjustified, demanding much, conceding little.
He told the carmen, however, that he would agree to a "sub
stantial" increase in wages and a modest change in hours,
provided the union submitted to certain conditions. First,
the union had to reduce and revise its wage demands. The
wage demanded by the union exceeded industry and regional
standards, and, more importantly, exceeded the ability of
the company to pay, threatening it with complete collapse.
The company could, though, offer a sliding scale that
increased wages from forty-two cents to fifty cents an hour,
provided the men agreed to a nine hour work day and agreed
not to oppose the increase in fares the company needed to
fund the pay raise.®
The pay increase and the readjustment of power, though,
required other, more demanding conditions. O'Keefe would not
agree to any pay raise or reduction in hours unless the
union agreed to exclude common day laborers— a majority of
whom were black— and gashouse employees from the contract.
The common worker, O'Keefe insisted, did not share any of
“■New Orleans Item. March 1, 8, 10, May 17, 31, June 6,
7, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. May 17, 23, June 6, 7,
1920.
®New Orleans Item, June 7, 10, 22, 29, 1920; New Orleans
Daily States, June 7, 15, 23, 1920.
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the concerns or meet any of the standards of carmen's union.
The employees of New Orleans Gas Light Company, many of them
skilled and experienced workers, were thoroughly dissatis
fied with their standing within the carmen's union and demaned separate contracts. The union's demand to continue
representing these workers was unreasonable and detrimental
to the reorganization of the company, elevating the union to
the status of management and preventing the stockholders
from employing the economies necessary to rehabilitate the
company. O'Keefe would not continue discussions until the
union consented to his demands and would not agree to a pay
increase until the commission council assented to an in
crease in carfares.8
Neither the council nor the union acceded to O'Keefe's
demands. The commission council was, understandably, sus
picious of any petition from NORLC asking for additional
revenues. Though the Behrman administration entertained the
receiver's request for a fare increase, the council delayed
consideration of the proposal until a more "appropriate"
time. Mayor Behrman informed the council that a seven cent
fare would serve no more "useful purpose" than the six cent
fare. At the time of the six cent ordinance, the mayor said,
the company assured the council that the increases in fares
and rates would prevent receivership and further the rehaaNew Orleans Pailv States. June 10, 14-15, 23, 27, 1920;
New Orleans Item, June 15, 22, 29, 1920; Fairclough, "Public
Utilties," 53-54.
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bilitation of the company. The increases did neither.
Receiver O'Keefe, the mayor said, insisted that the seven
cent fare would do what the six cent fare could not do. But,
Behrman continued, there was no guarantee that an increase
in fares would allow the receiver to meet expenses and re
habilitate the company. Without those and other assurances
from the receiver, the council should not agree to any
increase in fares and rates. Without dissent, the council
postponed consideration until a later date.7
The union, however, refused to suspend discusssions or
to postpone consideration of O'Keefe's demands. James Rod
gers, who replaced John Stadler as president of the local
union, characterized O'Keefe's remarks as false and mislead
ing, intending to deceive the people and demoralize the
union movement. The receiver maintained that wages had to
match regional and industry standards, the increase in the
cost of living, and the demands of employment. But the wage
scale suggested by the receiver, Rodgers argued, did not
meet with the standards he had announced. The carmen's job
reguired skill and concentration, as well as dedication to
the safety and comfort of the passengers, something, James
Rodgers insisted, the receiver consistently ignored. More to
the point, however, the receiver sought to use the wage
issue as an ultimatum against the union, forcing it to re
linquish control of its membership and denying representa7Ibid.
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tion to those who needed it most. The union would not,
Rodgers insisted, abandon its members at any price. To
eliminate those men from the contract would violate their
trust, diluting the strength of the union and ending, no
doubt, in the destruction of the union movement.*1
Over the next several days, discussions degenerated
badly. Though each side offered revisions in the wage scale,
neither side would compromise on the fundamental issue of
union representation. And, despite the intercessions of city
and federal authorities, the union membership voted over
whelmingly to strike on July 1." In the interim, the Behrman
administration and federal officials arranged for a series
of conferences between Receiver O'Keefe and the union lead
ership. Receiver O'Keefe spoke briefly, reiterating the
difficulties facing the company. He could not operate— much
less rehabilitate— the company under the wage and contract
provisions demanded by the company. The union had to reduce
its wage demands and relinquish its control over personnel
and management decisions. Agreeing to those concession, he
said, would permit him to manage the company more
"New Orleans Daily States. June 15, 17-20, 22, 1920; New
Orleans Item. June 18, 20, 29, 1920. Rodgers admitted that
some skilled workmen withdrew from the AASEREA. But, as he
pointed out, the 1918 contract allowed those skilled workers
to join unions that represented their craft.
"New Orleans Daily States. June 23-27, 29, 1920; New Or
leans Item, June 24, 26, 30, July 1, 1920. The union revised
their wage demands to sixty-five cents an hour. The receiver
countered with a sliding scale of forty-six, forty-eight,
and fifty-one cents an hour. The strike vote was 2,414 to
twenty-five, with twelve abstensions.
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efficiently, furthering its recovery and rehabilitation.
Without those concessions, O'Keefe argued, the company would
collapse.xo
The union representatives disputed O'Keefe's remarks.
The union, they said, only wanted what the NWLB and the
management of NORLC agreed to in 1918. The NWLB refused to
consider the financial condition of NORLC in setting the
wage awarded to the carmen. Instead, the board based
wages on the cost of living and the prevailing regional and
industry standards. There was no compelling evidence to sug
gest, the union contended, that conditions and circumstances
had changed at all to warrant a change in policy. Regarding
union eligibility, the union asked only to continue repre
senting the same classification of workers under the same
terms and provisions agreed to in 1918. The union did not
seek then or now to supplant management, but only to pre
serve the contractual and personal rights of the men it
represented.xx
With discussions at standstill and the strike rapidly
approaching, Mayor Behrman appointed a special, nonpartisan
committee of business, labor, and civic leaders, chaired
by former commissioner Harold W. Newman, to investigate the
xoIbid.
xxNew Orleans Daily States. June 28-30, 1920, July 1, 15,
1920; New Orleans Item. June 28, 30, July 7, 1920. The dis
cussions did not advance much beyond the restating of wellknown positions, except to establish that a wage of sixtyfive cents would pay the carmen $150.00 a month and would
require a ten cent carfare.
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issues and demands raised by the union and the receiver and
to suggest ways of mediating a settlement. Initially, the
committee did little more than "reexamine" the evidence and
lecture the union about its obligations to "public service"
and the "public order". Newman appealed to the union to de
lay the strike until after the Fourth of July holiday, per
mitting the commmittee to study the issues and recommend a
settlement. A strike, Newman scolded the union, would not
serve the public interests, and he warned the union that the
city government would be within its rights to enjoin the
union from striking. "There can be no strike," Newman said,
mimicking Calvin Coolidge, "against the public wishes."“
Mayor Behrman and union representatives were in a more
conciliatory mood. The mayor, too, counseled the union to
delay the strike, suggesting that delay would allow the ad
ministration and the special committee the time to decipher
the conflicting testimony and to propose a workable solu
tion. Union representatives insisted that the membership
would not submit to veiled threats or vague promises, but
probably would consent to a delay if the special committee
would guarantee a monthly wage of $150.00, a nine hour day,
and a six-day week. Union eligibility and representation,
however, were not negotiable. Nonetheless, the Newman com
mittee ignored the mayor and the union, calling on the union

“ New Orleans Daily States, June 30, 1920; New Orleans
Item, July 1, 2, 1920.

393
to postpone its strike in the interest of the public good
and the public safety. Without the guarantees it sought and
in response to the obtuse policy and rhetoric of the Newman
committee, the union rejected the demand that it delay the
strike.13
The strike began at daybreak with the completion of the
last "nightrun". Later that morning, O'Keefe secured a court
order from Judge Foster, enjoining the union from any "vio
lent" action taken against the company, its officials, work
ers, or property. As a precaution against labor violence,
Judge Foster ordered federal marshals to ride the street
cars of New Orleans, "augmenting" the New Orleans Police
Department and further assuring the safety of passengers and
the protection of property. He would not use federal troops,
he said, unless there was "actual" violence.14
The injunction and its companion order augmenting the
New Orleans police with federal marshals were unnecessary,
more an indication of O'Keefe's intentions than of the
union's "tendenacy" to violence. The injunction was not, as
it asserted, aimed at preventing violence, but rather at
blaming the union for the distruption of service and the
inconvenience to passengers. The union recognized the damage
violence would do to its cause and standing with the commu
nity, and it worked diligently and, for the most part, suc13New Orleans Daily States, July 1, 2, 1920; New Orleans
Item. July 1, 2, 1920.
14Ibid.
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cessfully to prevent the violent disruption of service. The
court order, too, was disingeneous. The carmen's strike
against the receiver for NORLC, operating under the protecttion of federal bankruptcy laws, was not a strike against
the United States government. There was, then, no legal
justification for employing federal marshals as "private"
security. And, federal marshals did not "augment" the New
Orleans Police Department for the simple reason that the
Behrman administration did not use the police force to keep
the streetcars operating.1*
The union seemed unmoved by the tone and content of the
court's injunction and order. The union paraded and picketed
against NORLC, but, at the same time, it sought to reopen
negotiations with Receiver O'Keefe, first through the Newman
committee, then through Judge Poster. The Newman committee
refused to discuss any issues or arrange for discussions
with John O'Keefe until the men returned to work. The union,
of course, declined the offer, and instead sought an inter
view with Judge Foster. Foster arranged for O'Keefe to meet
with union representatives, but O'Keefe's remarks angered
union leaders, further complicating a serious problem and
revealing O'Keefe's true intentions.1®
In an emotional and caustic speech, Receiver O'Keefe
called on Judge Foster to declare NORLC an open shop, inlsIbid.
1BNew Orleans Daily States. July 2, 9, 13, 1920; New
Orleans Item, July 3, 10, 1920.
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sisting that the local carmen's union and its national spon
sor should forfeit their standing as the bargaining agents
for the employees of the traction, electric, and gas divi
sions of NORLC. These unions and their officers, O'Keefe
claimed, were a "bar to progress and service," conspiring to
take over the management of the company, preventing its pro
per financial reorganization and rehabilitation, and threat
ening the stockholders with financial ruin. The origins of
this conspiracy were recent and clearly visible. With the
nation preoccupied with war and the company near financial
exhaustion as a result of that war, O'Keefe said, the unions
and their allies in local and national governments, exacted
huge wage awards from the company and wrested control of the
company from management. The wages granted by the National
War Labor Board exceeded every rational industry and social
standard and damaged irreparably the financial condition of
the company, forcing the company into receivership.3-7
The provisions and conditions of the 1918 contract, ex
tracted from the company under duress, O'Keefe asserted,
were even more ruinous. The union, contrary to its bylaws,
incorporated workers into its ranks who were ineligible for
membership, compelling the company to include them in the
wage award and according them the privileges of union repre
sentation. In addition, the contract of 1918 wrested control

X7New Orleans Daily States, July 2, 9, 13, 1920; New Or
leans item. July 3, 10, 1920.
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of the company from its managers and gave it to the union.
Under the terms of that contract, labor imposed a closed
shop on the company, forcing management to relinquish con
trol over personnel, discipline, promotions, and grievance
procedures. Despite these immense privileges and powers, the
local, at the insistance of the national union, now sought
to expand its power over management by imposing another exhorbitant wage demand on the company and its customers and
absorbing the clerical staff into the union. The company,
O'Keefe predicted, could not survive, let alone reorganize,
under such conditions. And, though O'Keefe promised to re
cognize the men's right to organize and bargain collectively
through a representative of their own choosing, he refused
to deal with the AASEREA or its local affiliate and asserted
his right to contract with whom ever he chose.1®
The union, of course, denounced O'Keefe, labeling him
as anti-union and censuring his remarks as contemptable lies
calculated to prejudice the public against the union. The
wages awarded to the union in 1918, its representatives
said, did not exceed either industry or Southern standards
and did not surpass the company's ability to pay. In fact,
the wage awarded to the carmen and other union workers fell
below industry and regional standards and barely matched
the cost of living in New Orleans. And, company executives
convinced the NWLB to revise a portion of the wage award,
18Ibid.
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reducing the scales paid to unskilled, common labor. Company
executives also managed to fanagle reductions in services
and increases in revenues from the city, providing them with
ample savings and resources to fund the wage award. In
brief, then, there was no truth to O'Keefe's assertions that
the union dictated the wage award and, as a consequence,
contributed to the collapse of NORLC.3-9
Nor was there any truth to the allegations that the
union dictated the 1918 contract, supplanting management to
the detriment of the union, the company, and the city. The
management of NORLC freely participated in the contract dis
cussions and, though it had had reservations about several
aspects of the union's proposals, management eventually
agreed to every provision of the "primary" agreement. The
receiver, union representatives charged, willfully miscon
strued the intent and effect of the 1918 contract. The union
did not reconstitute its membership to supplant management
or to establish a closed shop. Rather, the union merely ex
tended representation and organization to those workers who
were, prior to 1917, unorganized and without representation.
The contract of 1918 did not impose a closed shop on NORLC
(the NWLB guidelines prevented the union from doing that),
but a union shop, requiring eligible workers to join the
union and preventing the company from dismissing workers for

X9New Orleans Daily States, July 2, 3, 12-15, 22, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 3, 1920.
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legitimate union activity. The other personnel provisions
did not threaten the authority and integrity of management,
but simply and clearly accorded the employees of NORLC
greater, more formal protection against the unfair labor
practices of management. It was this regressive and profli
gate management— and O'Keefe's administration perpetuated
it— that formed the greatest obstacle to the social progress
and industrial peace of New Orleans.2"
Management was also uncompromising and determined to
break the strike and the union. O'Keefe rejected the union's
offer to return to work under the 1918 contract while a
special arbitration board and the Behrman administration
determined the size of the wage and fare increases. O'Keefe
also convinced Judge Foster (who did not require much con
vincing) to issue a special order, declaring that the men
had "quit" their jobs in the wage and contract dispute and
directing O'Keefe to "restaff" the railway division and to
restore normal operations with "all convenient speed". In
effect, the order locked out the union and set aside the
1918 contract. The order recognized the right of employees
to organize and to bargain collectively through a represen
tative of their own selection, but it also asserted the
right of the receiver to contract with whom he pleased. In
hiring his new staff, the receiver was to give preference to
"former" employees, permitting them to return to work under
2°Ibid.
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the NWLB wage scale and "restoring" their seniority. The
order tied any wage increase to the financial condition of
the company and to an increase in the fares. The receiver
and the court, then, would alone decide the size of the wage
increase. Seniority, as well, was no longer the sole stan
dard for promotion and advancement within the company. Pro
motions would be determined on the basis of tenure of ser
vice and ability, and would be granted at the discretion of
the receiver. Foster also rescinded the grievance provi
sions of the 1918 contract, leaving all personnel matters to
the discretion of management.33*
Judge Foster tried to assure the striking carmen that
his order was a temporary contract, permitting the receiver
to continue operating the streetcar system and affording the
carmen every reasonable protection. Once back to work, the
carmen, through their own bargaining agent, and the receiver
could negotiate a new contract and could work toward a rea
sonable wage increase. O'Keefe did not seek to destroy the
union or to deny its members a living wage, Foster said, but
sought only to rehabilitate the company in the most judi
cious and economical manner. O'Keefe could not rehabilitate
the company in a reasonable fashion unless the union "read
justed" its demands for a wage increase and relinquished its
3*New Orleans Daily States. July 3-4, 8, 11-13, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 3-4, 8, 12, 1920. O'Keffe set July 12
as the deadline for "rehiring" striking carmen. After that
date, he would show no preference for former employees. Only
one former employee, H. J. Bellocq, applied for his old job.
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complete control of the labor force to management.22
The union saw no reason to agree to FosterTs so-called
contract. The order offered scant protection to workers,
allowing the receiver to use wages, hours, and promotions to
discipline workers and to emasculate the union. Though it
"recognized" the right of employees to organize and to bar
gain collectively, the order did not compel management to
bargain with their chosen representative. In fact, the order
did not obligate the receiver to contract with any union
representative. Without the protection of a union contract,
with specific obligations for management and provisions for
a "living wage," the union saw no reason to return to work.
In short, "no contract, no work".23
The union's response and vote outraged Foster, and he
reacted in anger. The issue, he told reporters, was no long
er a matter of wages, hours, and conditions (these concerns
were important, though secondary to the issues of membership
and representation), but a question of the fundamental right
of contract. "The real question now at issue is," he said,
"are the courts of the United States to be governed by the
Constitution and laws of the United States in their deci
sions or be subjected to the dictation from any organized
group of men." The resolution of this question, Foster an
22New Orleans Daily States. July 3-6, 15; Hew Orleans
Item. July 3-7, 1920.
23New Orleans Daily States, July 4, 6, 9, 1920; Hew Or
leans Item. July 6, 7, 9, 1920. The union voted 1,500 to one
to reject Judge Foster's order.
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nounced, was "paramount and superior to any temporary incon
venience the public may suffer".**
The settlement of the strike did not depend, as Judge
Foster believed, on resolving the fundamental right to con
tract. But, rather, on adjusting and accomodating the pri
vate interests of the carmen and the company (the dictation
of organized groups of men) with the interests of the public
(themselves an association, a commonwealth of private inter
ests). The strike would end, not in the courtroom, but in
the boardroom of NORLC, the lunchrooms of union halls, the
editorial rooms of the New Orleans newspapers, the meeting
rooms of neigborhood civic and political associations, and,
perhaps most important of all, the public rooms of City
Hall.2®
The car strike of 1920 was a costly affair, both finan
cially and politically. Each day of the strike (it lasted
nearly a month) cost the motormen and conductors over $5,600
in wages and benefits, far exceeding the "strike benefits"
they obtained from the AASEREA and other sympathetic unions.
The local union spent money of its own in support of its

“ New Orleans Item. July 8, 13, 1920.
“ Despite the ex cathedra pronouncements of jurists like
Foster, most students of American law did not recognize the
freedom of contract as a catholic and infalliable doctrine.
The courts had long recognized the authority of the states
to alter or nullify contracts. For a most able analysis on
this subject, see Melvin I. Urofsky, "State Courts and Pro
tective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevalution," The Journal of American History. 72 (June 1985),
63-91.
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members and in an attempt to win public and political
support for its cause.28 Por NORLC, the strike was even more
expensive. The interruption of streetcar service, of course,
saw a dramatic and threatening loss in operating revenue.
The New Orleans newspapers claimed that the strike cost
NORLC between $20,000 and $30,000 a day in lost revenue and
nearly $20,000 in wages for "replacement" workers.3*7
The strike cost NORLC and the union more than money.
The strike cost NORLC whatever public confidence it may have
possessed, discrediting, if only temporarily, its anti-union
policies and practices and compelling it to accept mediation
and compromise. And though the union enjoyed the support of
the public, the Regular Democrats, and the press, the strike
forced the union to accept a compromise mediated by a spe
cial board and approved by Judge Poster that negated several
concessions won by the union during the war. The Behrman ad3"The union received nearly $13,600 from the AASEREA and
other contributors and it spent $12,700 in managing the
strike. See "Expenses of Strike of 1920," and William D.
Mahon to J. B. Lawson, August 7, 1920, box 2, SRUC. SCD,
HTML, TU; New Orleans Item, July 1, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. July 12, 13, 1920.
3,/New Orleans Item, July 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 1920; New
Orleans Daily States, July 1, 6, 11-13, 17, 1920. Receiver
O'Keefe claimed that some 1,300 men applied for the jobs
vacted by the striking carmen. O'Keefe's claims were exag
gerated for political effect. O'Keefe wanted to give the
impression that the company enjoyed the complete confidence
of the public, which, as we shall see, it did not. The State
of Louisiana also spent a good deal of money on the strike—
and for political effect only. Governor John M. Parker, the
intractable opponent of the Behrman administration, in an
attempt to embarrass the mayor and the commission council,
sent state troops to New Orleans to aid the city government
in keeping the peace.
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ministration also paid dearly for the strike. The strike
came at the beginning of a very bitter municipal election
campaign and contributed to the impression that the Behrman
administration was incapable of resolving the public utili
ties crisis or of governing the city.
At the beginning of the strike, John O'Keefe promised
the customers and stockholders of NORLC that there would be
no interruption in normal operations. It was a promise he
could not keep. On July 1, the first day of the strike,
there was no commercial streetcar service (the union kept
its pledge, however, to deliver newspapers and other forms
of mail), requiring commuters to find other ways of getting
to work or to the store. The public seemed prepared for the
first day of the strike (at least that was the impression
the press wanted to give a concerned and weary public), but
soon after grew tired of the abbreviated schedules, the in
numerable delays, and the hazardous nature of public trans
portation. On the second day of the strike, the Daily States
reported that management had restored service on only four
lines, three above (west) and one below (east) Canal Street,
virtually paralyzing traffic and resulting in missed ap
pointments, unmade sales and purchases, and leaving the pub
lic overheated and overwrought. Streetcar service, the Daily
States reported, was not only inadequate and inconvenient,
but also dangerous. The management of NORLC replaced the
striking carmen with inexperienced workers, given virtually
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no training and no supervision. In a single day, more than
two weeks into the strike and with fewer than 100 cars "on
line," these "trainees" were involved in more than thirty
accidents, resulting in more intractable delays and a few
"minor" injuries.2*
Two weeks into the strike, it was apparent, at least to
the New Orleans press, that O'Keefe was "losing" the strike.
Public sentiment, the newspapers reported, favored the car
men and blamed O'Keefe, Foster, and the stockholders of
NORLC for the strike. The public was convinced that O'Keefe
and the ownership of NORLC orchestrated the streetcar strike
for its own selfish interests. It was apparent that O'Keefe
and the management of NORLC intentionally maneuvered the
union into striking for better wages and working conditions,
hoping that the strike and the courts would break the union
movement. It was equally apparent, the press reported, that
NORLC hoped to use the wage dispute to exact higher fares
and rates from the public, rehabilitating the company with
public funds yet avoiding the consequences of public re
habilitation.2*
O'Keefe and the management of NORLC did not really
"lose" the strike. The union simply won over public senti
ment to its side. The union avoided "radical" demands and

2<*New Orleans Daily States. July 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15, 21,
1920; New Orleans Item. June 26, 30, July 2, 3, 7, 1920.
2*New Orleans Daily States. July 12-15, 1920; New Orleans
Item. July 10-13, 1920.

threatening rhetoric, eschewed violence, and sought conser
vative associates and counsel. Throughout the strike, the
union and its triends spoke only o£ conserving their inter
ests and of maintaining their rights. These tactics impress
ed critics and won supporters for the union. Charles I.
Rosen, an inveterate opponent of the Behrman administration
and its pro-union "tendenacies," complemented the union and
exonerated it from blame. Clearly, he told reporters, the
carmen were not "bolsheviki" or members of the outlawed IWW.
The carmen were not bent on socializing the public utilities
industry in New Orleans. They sought only a living wage and
the right to organize— rights recognized by conservative and
patriotic Americans like William Howard Taft and Rufus E.
Foster.30
Though O'Keefe had not really lost the strike, by the
end of the second week he had clearly surrendered the initi
ative. Not to the union, but to the Behrman administration

3°New Orleans Daily States. July 13, 1920. The union even
won the support of several members of the Orleans Democratic
Association, the municipal political organization of such
conservatives as John M. Parker, John Patrick Sullivan (an
attorney and lobbyist fox NORLC), and Andrew McShane, the
ODA candidate for mayor in 1920. The most prominent ODA
member to support the carmen was James Comiskey of the Third
Ward. Comiskey's endorsement of the union may have been
prompted by Third Ward politics. Before Comiskey gave his
endorsement, Arthur and Michael Mitchell, RDO precinct
leaders from the Third Ward and longtime opponents of Sulli
van, Parker, and Comiskey, called on the people of the ward
to endorse the union shop and to refuse to ride on "scab"
car lines.
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and the civic and business leadership of the city."1 At the
end of the second week, the Behrman administration filed a

.

petition with Judge Foster, asking him to rescind his order.
In its petition, the council argued that the position of the
receiver concerning the union was untenable. The union and
the company had a longstanding relationship, dating back to
at least 1908 and continuing to this day. The union sought
merely to retain the rights and concessions it had acquired
over the years; rights and concessions agreed to by the man
agement of NORLC. The lockout of striking union workers, the
council suggested, was unjustified as well. It provoked con
frontation and, in effect, prevented the union from offering
or accepting any reasonable compromise. Rescinding the order
would end the strike, restoring the relationship between the
union and the company, encouraging the men to return to work
under the existing contract, and providing the opportunity
for compromise."2
Judge Foster agreed to consider the petition and to
hold "public" hearings on it. Clearly, the petition favored
the union and no doubt O'Keefe and Foster would have re
jected it. But they did not have to reject it. Several days
after the council filed its petition, the Newman committee
3XOn July 15, O'Keefe offered a "new" proposal that mere
ly reiterated earlier pronouncements and demands. The union
and most responsible public and private leaders rejected the
offer as meaningless. New Orleans Daily States. July 14-20,
1920; New Orleans Item, July 14-20, 1920.
""New Orleans Daily States. July 16-17, 20, 1920; New
Orleans Item, July 20-21, 1920.
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offered another plan, one that clearly favored the receiver.
The Newman committee proposed that the men return to work
under Foster*s order, ending the strike and requiring the
men and the receiver to submit their differences to arbitra
tion. The Newman plan called for Judge Foster to appoint a
three member committee of "Special Masters," authorized to
determine, subject to Foster's approval, wages, terms and
conditions of the contract, union recognition and eligibil
ity, the necessity and extend of fare and rate increases,
and the conditions for the rehabilitation of NORLC. The de
cisions of the Special Masters were not binding and could be
appealed to the federal courts.33
O'Keefe accepted the terms of the Newman plan (except
the proposal dealing with the rehabilitation of NORLC), but
the union rejected the idea of returning to work under
Foster's order and relying on a special committee composed
exclusively of Foster's appointees. Over the next several
days, then, a special "conference committee"3'* worked to
find a plan acceptable to the union and the receiver. The
committee suggested that the men return to their jobs with
out a contract, working, however, under the same conditions,
wages, and protections of the 1918 contract and NWLB award.

33New Orleans Daily States. July 21, 23, 1920; New Or
leans Item. July 21, 22, 1920.
3*Martin Behrman, O'Keefe, Newman, James B. Edmonds,
publisher of the Times-Picayune. J. B. Lawson and William
Byrnes of the union, and Reginald H. Carter of the United
States Labor Conference made up the conference committee.
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The conference committee also recommended that the union and
the company each select one member of the Special Masters,
allowing Mayor Behrman to choose the third (and presumably
impartial) member of the arbitration board. The Special Mas
ters would be authorized to consider and decide questions of
union recognition and eligibility, wages and hours, contract
conditions, and fare increases. And, over the objections of
the receiver and despite the opposition of the Behrman ad
ministration, the conference committee instructed the
masters to devise a plan for the rehabilitation of the com
pany. The decisions of Special Masters were not binding,
allowing the union and the receiver to challenge and reject
any unwelcomed recommendation.3*9
The union leadership and Receiver O'Keefe agreed to the
recommendations of the conference committee, permitting the
striking carmen to return to work and restoring full service
within a matter of days. As the men returned to work, the
special selection committee of the mayor. Receiver O'Keefe,
and union attorney William Byrnes met to select the Special
Masters. After deliberating three hours a day for three
days, the selection committee chose Charles J. Theard, the
president of the Citizens Bank and Trust Company, president
pro tempore of the Sewerage and Water Board, and a close
friend of Mayor Behrman, George H. Terriberry, an admiralty

33New Orleans Daily States. July 23, 27, 1920; Hew Or
leans Item. July 23, 1920.
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lawyer, an executive with the Association of Commerce, and a
member of the Newman Committee, and John P. O'Leary, presi
dent of the Jefferson Construction Company and a RDO co
leader of the Fourteenth Ward (O'Leary replaced George
Glover, a contractor, who declined to serve). Judge Foster
approved the selections, and the Special Masters began their
deliberations a week later.9B
At the opening session, the Special Masters established
the principles that would guide their deliberations. First,
the masters announced that they would not give considera
tion to "unsubstantiated" statements. The receiver and the
union, then, would be required to submit written, factual
evidence and testimony "substantiating" their contentions
and allegations. Second, regarding wage and fare increases,
the masters would rely principally on the policies of the
National War Labor Board. The financial condition of NORLC
was irrelevent to the issue of a pay increase. Questions of
its ability to fund a wage increase would have no bearing on
the recommendations of the masters. If the cost of living
justified an increase, the masters said, they were prepared
to award one to the carmen and to all other eligible
workers. The Special Masters would, as well, structure any
wage award to meet industry, regional, and local standards,
and would apply the same formula for skilled and unskilled

38New Orleans Daily Statesr July 27-29, August 3, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 27, August 3, 1920.
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workers used by the NWLB in its revised award o£ October,
1918. And, though the wage awarded to the carmen and other
workers would not depend on the company's ability to pay,
the masters would consider tying the wage increase to a cor
responding increase in rates and Cares.37
The Special Masters heard testimony and accumulated
"documented" evidence for nearly three weeks. The union pre
sented statistical evidence and "expert" testimony showing
that the wages paid to the carmen under the 1918 wage award
had not kept pace with the cost of living during the period
of readjustment. The union also contended that the wage in
crease offered by the receiver failed to meet the standards
set by the NWLB in 1918, disregarded the recommendations of
the Federal Electric Railway Commission for a "living wage,"
shortened hours, and humane working conditions for all elec
tric street railway employees, and ignored the wishes of
Judge Foster that the men earn at least $150.00 a month.3"
John O'Keefe acknowledged that the carmen deserved an
increase in pay and that, with the proper guarantees and
"adjustments," the company was prepared to offer a just and
living wage. However, the wage demands of the union were, as

37New Orleans Daily States, August 3, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 3, 1920.
3®New Orleans Daily Statesr August 3-4, 6, 11, 19, 1920;
New Orleans Item. August 3-4, 11, 18, 20, 1920. President
Wilson, at the insistence of several members of his cabinet,
commissioned the Federal Electric Railway Commission in
1919. The hearings and recommendations of the FERC cover
several thousand pages and three volumes.
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in 1918, excessive and harmful, exceeding the cost of living
in New Orleans, industry and regional wage standards, and
the company's and public's ability to pay. With a corre
sponding fare increase, however, the company could offer the
carmen a respectable pay increase that met every reasonable
standard.39
The proper guarantees and adjustments that O'Keefe
alluded to concerned union representation and eligibilty and
the elimination of the so-called closed shop provisions
found in the 1918 contract. William Byrnes and the other
union representatives argued that the union alone possessed
the authority to set eligibility requirements and that with
out that authority the union movement would collapse. Union
spokesmen also pointed out that the change in the "composi
tion" of the union had no effect on the relationship between
the union and the company. The union represented the same
sort of workers that it had in 1908 when it began its rela
tionship with NORLC. Despite the contentions of the receiver
and the new General Manager of NORLC, Arthur Kempster, the
1918 contract did not alter the relationship between NORLC
and its workers. And the contract did not create a closed
shop, as the new management contended, and it did not pre

*"New Orleans Daily States. August 3-4, 6, 11, 19, 1920;
New Orleans Item, August 3-4, 11, 18, 20, 1920. O'Keefe pro
posed that the council grant the company an eight cent fare,
but only a portion of the two cent increase would be used to
"fund" the wage increase. The company would dedicate the
other portion to improving services.
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empt the prerogatives of management.40
The new management of NORLC, nonetheless, argued that
the changes in the character of the union and the terms of
the 1918 contract altered the traditional relationship be
tween management and labor and contributed to the financial
collapse of the company and now threatened its plans for
reorganization and rehabilitation. In his testimony before
the Special Masters, General Manager Arthur Kempster insist
ed that the recent changes in the union and the closed shop
provisions of the 1918 contract "alienated" the employees
from the company, causing them to be dishonest in their re
lationship with the company, impairing service and endanger
ing the community. The closed shop, he told the masters, was
"obnoxious, unfair, and un-American," and its elimination
alone would restore control of the union movement to the
local carmen and control of the company to local management.
With the restoration of these traditional and normal rela
tionships, management could assure the workers just wages
and fair working conditions, the stockholders a fair return
on their investments, and the city excellent service at a
reasonable cost.41
4“New Orleans Daily States. August 16, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 8, 16, 21, 25, 1920.
41New Orleans Pally Statesf August 20-24, 1920; New
Orleans Item. August 20-25, 29, September 2, 1920. According
to the union leadership, O'Keefe hired Kempster after he had
helped break a streetcar strike in Seattle. The union also
accused Kempster of hiring special strikebreakers from
St.Louis, Chicago, and Mexico. Kempster and O'Keefe denied
the charges.
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Two weeks after concluding the investigation, the Spe
cial Masters filed their report with the federal district
court,

releasing their recommendations to the public the

sameday. The report began by emphasizing

the public nature

and social obligations of the public utilities industry. The
masters reminded the company and the union that they were
engaged in a business
impressed with a public service, and that
without regard to the rights and obliga
tions that exist between them as parties
to this contract, they owe to the public
the duty and obligation to provide and
render safe, adequate, continuous, and
efficient public service, and to that end
they have entered into these mutual cove
nants with full recognition of the paramount
rights and interests of the public and of the
obligation to fully and sincerely co-operate
to meet the public's requirements.
Meeting the public's requirements, however, also meant sat
isfying the private needs and interests of the carmen and
the company. The carmen and the other employees of NORLC
were entitled to a "fair and just" wage and to the right to
organize and bargain collectively through a representative
of their own choice. Similarly, the company was entitled to
an adequate and reasonable return on all legitimate invest
ment and to the reasonable and legitimate protection of its
property. "The attainment of those ends," the masters wrote,
"constituted the moving and controlling consideration for
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this agreement."*5*
The masters recommended, then, a graduated wage scale,
paying the carmen forty-nine cents an hour for the first six
months of the contract, fifty-two for the second half year,
and fifty-five cents for the last full year of the contract.
Skilled and unskilled workers covered under the NWLB award
and 1918 contract would receive proportional increases,
raising some wages by as much as ten cents an hour. Under
the terms set by the conference committee, the wage award
was retroactive to July 1, and could be, like all other
recommendations of the Special Masters, appealed to the
federal district court. In addition, though the Special
Masters refused to tie the wage award to a fare increase
(and they had no authority to bind the Behrman administra
tion to any ex parte agreement), they nonetheless recom
mended that the commission council "fund" the award by
granting NORLC an eight cent fare .**
The public character of the street railway industry,
the Special Masters continued, required the receiver and the
company to recognize the legitimacy and the limits of each
^"District Court of the United States For the Eastern
District of Louisiana No. 15,960 In Equity In the Matter of
Receivership of New Orleans Railway and Light Company Report
of the Special Masters," box 14, SRUCP SCD, HTML, TU, here
after cited as "Report of the Special Masters"; New Orleans
Daily States. September 21, 1920; New Orleans Item. Septem
ber 21, 1920.
*3"Report of the Special Masters," ibid.; Byrnes to
Rodgers, September 21, 1920, box 2, ibid.: New Orleans Daily
Statesr September 21, 1920; New Orleans Item, August 26,
September 21, 1920; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 54.
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other's private rights. The union must acknowledge the right
of management to the full and complete control of the corpo
ration and that thats necessitated the enforcement of em
ployee discipline "under such reasonable and proper rules
[it] may from time to time establish". Management, on the
other hand, was obliged to recognize and accept the rights
of labor to organize and to bargain as a union. With those
principles in mind, then, the masters recommended that
Receiver O'Keefe sign a contract with the local division of
the AASEREA and that the contract include all classes of
workers covered under the 1918 contract. The masters recom
mended, as well, that the receiver and the union use the
1918 contract as the basis for a new agreement, with two
important changes. The masters proposed eliminating the 1918
grievance procedures, replacing them with a system of ap
peals through management.

In addition, the masters recom

mended that management alone determine promotions, making
ability and merit the measure of advancement within the
company with seniority only a minor consideration . **
The receiver and the union filed exceptions to the
recommendations of the Special Masters with Judge Foster.
O'Keefe told the judge that the wage settlement proposed by
the masters went beyond the company's and city's ability and
willingness to pay. The wage schedule recommended by the
Special Masters exceeded the offer made by the company by an
««Ibid.

additional $250,000 a year and would require a ten cent
fare, which neither the company nor the city could tolerate.
The receiver remained adamant in his opposition to the local
and national AASEREA and to the inclusion of "ineligible"
workers in the carmen's contract. O'Keefe would remove his
objections to the AASEREA (but not to the "ineligible"
workers), however, if Judge Foster removed all "closed
shop" provisions from the 1920 contract and not just those
recommended by the Special Masters.*®
The union also had three principal objections to the
recommendations of the Special Masters. The carmen believed
that the wage award offered to them was fair, and they
agreed to accept it. They objected, however, to the propor
tional wage recommendations for all other union workers,
claiming that those recommendations actually decreased the
wages of skilled and unskilled workers in the electric and
gas divisions and, in effect, deprived them of union eligi
bility and representation. The Special Masters, the union
told Judge Foster, tied the wage award to the fare increase,
making the wage award dependent on the company's "ability"
to pay and making the municipal government and the patrons
of the street railway responsible for pay increases. That
proposal, the union argued, was contrary to the principles
estabished by the NWLB in 1918 and reiterated by the Special

*®New Orleans Daily States. September 22, 26, 29, 1920;
New Orleans Item. September 22, 25, 29, October 1, 1920.
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Masters in 1920, and was, as well, detrimental to the union
and to the city. Finally, the union would not accept the
recommendations permitting management to dismiss employees
for arbitrary reasons and to promote "company” men over
senior union men.*"
At the end of September, Judge Foster issued an opinion
on the exceptions filed by the receiver and the union and on
the recommendations of the Special Masters. In general, the
judge considered the wage recommendations of the masters to
be fair and eguitable, conforming, for the most part, with
industry and regional standards and local conditions. The
only exceptions Foster cited concerned the wage awards for
certain classifications of skilled and unskilled workers.
The judge refused to decrease the wages paid to unskilled
workers, and he ordered Receiver O'Keefe to ignore the
recommendations concerning those workers. However, Foster
considered the proportional wage increase awarded to other
classes of workers too high, and he reduced their increase
from ten cents to five cents an hour. Foster ordered O'Keefe
to begin paying the new wage schedule, retroactive to July
1, but contingent upon a corresponding increase in street
railway fares. To meet the new wage award, Foster instructed
the receiver to petition the commission council for an eight

""Ibid.
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cent fare.*'1'
Poster also ordered O'Keefe to comply with the contract
recommendations of the Special Masters. The judge noted the
principal objections of the receiver and the union, but
found their objections without merit. The receiver argued
that he did not want to contract with the AASEREA because it
had Illegally unionized workers, wrested personnel and dis
cipline authority from management, and sought to supplant
management by imposing a closed shop on the company. Foster
saw no evidence that the international or local AASEREA
recruited "ineligible" workers and saw no reason to exclude
those workers from the 1920 contract. Foster ordered O'Keefe
to contract with the AASEREA, but left the matter of union
eligibility for the union and the receiver to settle during
the contract discussions to follow. Judge Foster also saw no
evidence, as weel, that the 1918 or 1920 contract as pro
posed by the union supplanted the prerogatives of management
or imposed a closed shop on the company. Under the terms of
those agreements, the receiver was free to hire any one he
chose. And, though all workers were required to join the
47"Opinion of the Court on the Report of the Special Mas
ters Filed September 30, 1920." United States District Court
Eastern District of Louisiana, Empire Trust Company versus
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Number 15,960. box
14, SRUC, SCD, HTML, TU, hereafter cited as "Opinion of the
Court"; "In the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Louisiana at New Orleans, Number 15,960
in Equity," Empire Trust Company, as Trustee. Complainant
against New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Defendant.
Consolidated Cause, ibid. hereafter cited as "Court Order";
New Orleans Daily States, September 30, October 1, 1920.
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union, the union could not deny them membership. The agree
ments, the judge said, did not abridge the rights of manage
ment or the union, but recognized principles and rights al
ready well-established in labor-management relations.'40
Foster dismissed the exceptions of the union, too. The
union wanted promotion based solely on seniority and object
ed to granting management pleanary authority over promotion.
Management, Foster wrote, must have authority over the ad
vancement of workers to assure the safe, economical, and
efficient operation and management of the company. Promotion
solely on the basis of seniority served only the interests
of labor, and did not serve to promote and protect those of
investors and management. Judge Foster also denied the
union's petition for reinstating the arbitration provisions
of the 1918 contract. The recommendations of masters would
not compromise the rights of workers or subject them to ar
bitrary discipline or dismissal. Under the terms of the new
provisions, the men retained the right to appeal to the
principal management and to the board of directors of the
company. "It is not to be supposed," wrote Foster, "that the
heads of an extensive organization (like NORLC] will arbi
trarily discharge a man who is competent and doing his

^"Ibid.; New Orleans Item, October 1, 1920.
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duty."*»
At first, the union leadership was convinced that it
had exacted a near "complete victory," preventing the recei
ver and management from dismembering the union and eroding
the authority and morale of the union movement in New Or
leans. In a "special notice" issued to the membership on the
day of the deciding vote on Foster's ruling, union leaders
catalogued the essential points "won" by the union. The
Special Masters and the courts, the leaders argued, acknow
ledged and confirmed the right of unionization and collec
tive bargaining and forced the receiver to accept the essen
tial provisions of the 1918 contract, including those
guaranteeing the union shop. There was but one major "set
back". The masters eliminated the 1918 grievance provisions,
substituting an appeal process through the upper management
of the company. Though the appeals process was unsatisfac
tory, the union had the assurances of the court that the new
arrangement would not compromise the rights of any man or
the union movement. Despite its dissatisfaction with the
wage award and with Foster's ruling, the union, following
the suggestions of its leadership, voted overwhelmingly to
accept the wage and contract provisions recommended by the

'■"Foster to William Byrnes, January 7, 1921, box 2, J. P.
O'Leary to Mayor Arthur J. O'Keefe, August 12, 1926, SRUC.
SCD, HTML, TU; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 51, 61-65;
Carpenter, "The New Orleans Street Railway Strike," 1-3,
18-20, 23-25.
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Special Masters and approved by Judge Foster.00
The carmen's vote "ended" the 1920 strike, but the
agreements o£ 1920 did not settle the dispute between labor
and management. The 1920 agreement allowed the receiver to
retain strikebreakers, incorporating them among the union
work force and directing them to promote dissent and dissat
isfaction within the carmen's union. The "first" sign of
that dissatisfaction came in the summer of 1921. In August
union president Edwin Peyroux introduced a resolution at a
membership meeting calling for a separate charter for black
union members, effectively segregating and abandoning them.
Black union members protested, but the international AASEREA
agreed with the white membership, calling for an equal but
separate "sub-division" for black union members. When the
black unionists refused a separate charter, the white major
ity read them out of the union, refusing to include them in
union contracts and, in effect, yielding to the company's
complaints about union eligibility.01
For the next ten years, the principal issues remained
unchanged. The company, reorganized and operating under
"new" management, systematically schemed to end the union

"""Special Notice to Membership, Division 194 from Con
ference Committee," October 6, 1920, box 2, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 54.
01Mahon to Gus Bienvenu, August 13, 1921, George Mosley
to Mahon, August 15, 1921, William B. Fitzgerald and J. B.
Lawson to local membership, March 12, 1922, box 2; Mahon to
Bienvenu, January 7, 1924, Edward A. VeilIon to Mahon, June
8, 1926, box 3, SRUC. SCD, HTML, TU.
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shop and to break the union. The union, now divided and com
promised from within by company men, sought in vain to re
store the mandatory arbitration of individual and union
grievances. In 1926 company officials demanded the end of
the closed shop, no longer requiring management to dismiss
workers who were no longer in good standing with the union.
The union demanded a new contract preventing the company
from firing employees without submitting the decision to
arbitration. The board of directors for the company rejected
the union's demands, insisting that such a provision would
cripple the company's prerogative to "discipline our em
ployees and to control the affairs of our company," and the
board announced that it "cannot and will not consent to any
proposals which impair or encumber...

proper control and

direction" of the company. After an abortive strike attempt,
the union and the company submitted to an agreement that
favored the company. By 1929, with the declining importance
of the street railway system to the company (electric and
gas service had replaced transit as the principal source
of revenue for NORLC-NOPSI), a sizable company union
already in place, and the help of the federal courts, the
company eventually broke the union, obtaining all that John

f

423
O'Keefe demanded in 1920.*a

In August, 1920, Albert S. Richey, a professor of
electrical engineering at Worchester (Massachusets) Techno
logical Institute and a public utility consultant employed
by Receiver O'Keefe, appeared before the Special Masters,
explaining to them the nature of the street railway crisis
and suggesting a potential solution. Federal and local war
time utility policies, Richey told the masters, were, in
part, responsible for the current financial and political
problems of the electric street railway industry. Those
policies dramatically increased the cost of operation,
particularly in the area of labor, and, at the same time,
denied the companies the additional revenues needed to main
tain and to expand public services. As damaging as those
policies may have been, Richey said, they only hastened and
worsened existing problems. Public utility legislation and
*aWilliam B. Fitzgerald to Bienvenu, May 21, 1921, box 2,
VeilIon to Mahon, October 30, December 28, 1925, January 1,
June 26, July 17, 1926, Veillon to Fitzgerald, October 30,
1925, Fitzgerald to Veillon, November 3, 1925, Mahon to
Veillon January 2, June 26, 1926, John P. O'Leary to Mayor
Arthur J. O'Keffe, August 12, 1926, box 3, SRUC. SCD, HTML,
TU; New Orleans Daily States. May 3-17, 1921, July 3, 1925,
July 30-31, August 11, 1926; Fairclough, "Public Utilities,"
62-65; Carpenter, "New Orleans Street Railway Strike," 1924. Wages and hours, of course, were important, though it
seems, secondary issues. In May, 1921, O'Keefe secured a
fifteen to twenty percent reduction in salaries, which man
agement formalized in the 1922 and 1924 contracts. And,
though the legislature passed a nine hour law, Governor John
M. Parker vetoed the bill. See New Orleans Daily States.
May 3-17, 1921, June 7, 22, July 1-19, 1922; New Orleans
Item. May 5-9, 1921, May 16, June 22, July 1-3, 1922.
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regulation

were, for the most part, to blame for the

problems of the public utilities industry. The requirements
of the conventional public utility franchise and the demands
of municipal regulation encouraged inefficiency and profi
teering, inhibited the growth and development of service,
and "politicized" the public service industry. The obvious
solution to the utilities crisis, Richey concluded, lay in a
thorough overhaul of existing franchise laws and a detailed
revision of municipal regulatory policy."3
Richey recommended that the commission council repeal
all street railway franchises, replacing them with a single,
"indeterminate" franchise that would allow MORLC (or its
successor) to operate the streetcar system on a "service at
cost" basis. Under the "service at cost" (SAC) plan, rates
and fares would automatically be adjusted to meet the total
cost of service. That cost would include wages, the cost of
production, maintenance, depreciation of the physical pro
perties, taxation, and rate of return. The rate of return,
based on a "fair valuation" of all properties, Richey said.
"3New Orleans Daily Statesr August 12, 1920. Richey was
not alone in his condemnation of municipal and federal util
ity policies. Several utility experts, even those who favor
ed either more rigorous municipal regulation or municipal
ownership, were critical of established regulatory policies.
See, for example, the testimony of Jacob Newman in the
PFERCr vol.l, 557-74; Delos F. Wilcox in the PFERC. vol.3,
2135-40; Allison, Report on the Street Railway Service of
New Orleans. 3-8; John Bauer, "Deadlock in Public Utility
Regulation II Nothing Ever Settled," National Municipal Re
view, 10 (October 1921), 498; Wilcox, "Problem of Recon
struction With Respect to Urban Transportation," ibid . r 8
(January 1919), 33-48.
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should be generous enough to safeguard original investment
and to attract the additional money necessary to rehabili
tate the company. With a fair valuation and a generous rate
of return, the company could maintain and expand services,
contributing immeasurably to the growth and development of
the city.***
The service at cost plan, Richey told the masters,
would, in addition to protecting legitimate investment, pro
viding adequate operating revenues, and assuring profits and
service, strengthen and expand municipal regulatory author
ity, while eliminating politics from the public service
issue. Under the SAC plan, the city administration would de
termine (in cooperation with management and ownership) a
fair valuation, an acceptable and sufficient rate of return,
and reasonable and adequate rates and fares. After estab
lishing the initial valuation, rate of return, and rates and
fares (clearly a political act, requiring open, public de
liberations and approval), adjustments in cost and in ser
vice would be automatic, determined by expert analysis and
arrived at with precision and equity. To assure fairness and
equity, Richey suggested that the city administration create
a special board of supervisors, serving under the direction
of the Commissioner of Public Utilties and funded by NORLC.
The new public utilities board would be authorized to recom
mend adjustments in rates, fares, and profits and have
***New Orleans Daily States. August 12, 1920.
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direct and uncontested access to the company's books. It
would have no authority, however, over stock issues, the
development of services, or the other perogatives of manage
ment .
The service at cost or assured service plan, as it was
later termed, had the unqualified approval of the executive
management of the street railway industry (including John D.
O'Keefe), and won the endorsement of the Federal Electric
Railway Commission. But the plan had its detractors, too,
particularly among the more "liberal" utility experts, like
Delos F. Wilcox, the New Orleans press, and the Behrman
administration. Though not a novel concept or invention and
coming after years of slow and often imperceptible reform
of the public utilities industry, the service at cost plan
attracted considerable debate and aroused intense feelings
and interests on both sides of the issue.
At the center of the service at cost plan was the pub
lic recognition of a permanent monopoly, granted and perpet
uated through a single, comprehensive, "indeterminate" fran
chise. Proponents of the assured service plan contended that
the conventional and outdated term franchise was a "worth
less scrap of paper." The limited term of the franchise
undermined the value of the investment, denying the investor
the proper financial security, encouraging speculative and
questionable financing, and resulting in deplorable and
BBIbid.

427
costly service. Under the terms of the limited term fran
chise, investors were forced to seek a "profit as will not
only give them a fair return upon their investment but will
also return them their capital," discouraging them from re
investing their money in renewals and replacements and
resulting in delapidated equipment and deplorable service.
By contrast, supporters of the service at cost plan argued
that an indeterminate franchise, granted without a specific,
limited term, competitive bidding, and unnecessary franchise
obligations, would properly secure investment, encouraging
further investment and assuring quality service.
Franchise reform alone, of course, would not resolve
the street railway crisis, for it could not attract the new
investment needed to restore and rehabilitate the industry.
Investors in public utilities sought additional assurance in
the form of a guaranteed rate of return or profit. Manage
ment agreed that a fixed and generous rate of return would
protect old investment and attract new investment, speeding
the rehabilitation of the industry and furthering the devel
opment of new and better services. But for these events to
take place, the rate of return had be "certain" and "rea
sonable," and had to include old as well as new investments,
requiring government and consumers to agree to higher, more
flexible rates and fares and to accept a more generous
®"PFERC, vols.1-3, passim; Allison, Report on the Street
Railway Service. 3-8; Wilcox, "Service at Cost In Local
Transportation," NMR. 9, (December 1920), 765-72.
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valuation of property.***
The valuation of property went to the heart of the pub
lic utilities crisis. Management, government, and consumers
agreed that setting a fair and reasonable valuation was in
dispensable to the resolution of the street railway crisis
and to the rehabilitation of the public service industry.
Yet, there was intense, often bitter, disagreement over the
proper means and ends of setting a fair and reasonable
valuation. The public utilities industry maintained that a
"fair" valuation would restore and preserve the credit of
the industry, respecting the worth of previous investments
and prompting new investors to assist in the rehabilitation
of the street railway industry. From the standpoint of the
industry, there were two principal means of establishing the
valuation of property. The first (and the less preferable)
was the historical approach. This method allowed the company
to include all properties and services (stock and bond pro
motions, discounts, rentals) in valuating property, irre
spective of their current condition or contribution to the
operation of the system. However, the historical method
valued property and services at their original costs, ignor
ing the increased value of property as part of a "going con
cern". The second (and more appealing) was the reproduction
3-yPFERC. vol.l, 540, 546, 557-58, 568-69, vol.3, 2266,
2271, 2282-83; Allison, Report on the Street Railway
Service. 7; Bauer, "Deadlock in Public Utility Regulation
I: Collapse of Credit," NMR, 10 (September 1920), 474; New
Orleans Item, October 4, 1920.
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method. This method established the value of property on the
basis of the cost of reproducing or replacing the entire
system at current prices. The reproduction formula allowed
companies to include properties and services in valuating
property that no longer contributed to the operation and
maintenance of services, permitting the companies to "earn"
profit from useless property. The war and the "confused
state" of valuation law in the United States played finan
cial havoc with the reproduction method. Prices during the
war and the period of readjustment, flucuated greatly,
skewing costs and values and making it nearly impossible,
not to mention politically inexpedient, to determine a
"fair" valuation under the reproduction method.""
The public, too, saw the value of establishing a fair
and reasonable valuation of utility properties. An estab
lished valuation would "end" disputes about excessive, spec
ulative capitalization, restore public confidence in the
public utilties industry (and in public regulation), and
would hasten the rehabilitation of services. Utilities ex
perts, however, were well-aware of the industry's "passion"

""PFERC, vol.2, 1264, vol.3, 2142-43; Bauer, "Deadlock in
Public Utility Regulation II: Nothing Ever Settled," NMR.
10, (October 1920), 499-500; Bauer, "The Supreme Court and
Reproduction Value in Rate Making," NMR 12 (September 1923),
529-32; Bauer, "Reproduction Cost Has Not Been Adopted by
the Supreme Court," NMR 12 (November 1923), 644-48; Wilcox,
"Service at Cost," NMR. 9 (December 1920), 765-72. The
United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the issue
of valuation on several occassions, but was unable to define
"fair valuation" with precision.
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for overcapitalization. And feared that the industry would
exaggerate the historical or reproduction cost. For the most
part,

these experts favored the so-called actual cash value

method. It set the value of properties on the basis of cash
"actually and prudently" invested in existing and useful
property, giving no allowances for certain classes of intan
gibles, like promoters fees or stock and bond discounts."
Critics of the cost of service plan admitted that the
plan would restore and preserve the credit of the public
utilities industry, in theory eliminating speculation in
utility securities, assuring both profit and service, and
restoring public confidence in private management and in
the regulatory authority of government. In theory, rates and
fares were tied to service and profits. The utility company
could increase its dividends only by a corresponding reduc
tion in rates and fares, making efficiency and service the
only proper and true concern of management and government.00
These critics pointed out, however, that in this case
theory did not match reality. In reality, rates and fares
would increase automatically to meet the demands for a "rea
sonable" and generous rate of return, eliminating any need
for efficient and economical management. And, as testimony
before the FERC revealed, utility experts could not deter
mine what sort of fares and rates would produce a fair rate
" Ibid.
" M e l v i n I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis and the Progres
sive Tradition (Boston 1981), 28.
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of return. "There are not enough brains in the street rail
road business...," Jacob Newman told the FERC, "to answer
that question." Nor could experts agree on what constituted
a "fair" rate of return. They were, as well, unable to de
termine if the rate of return should be fixed permanently or
should be adjusted from time to time to meet changing market
conditions, or if old money should receive the same rate of
return as new investment capital. In short, critics pointed
out, the cost of service plan was untested and uncertain and
unlikely to resolve the public utilities crisis.**
Despite the uncertainty of the cost of service plan.
Receiver John O'Keefe endorsed the concept in his testimony
before the Special Masters. The company could no longer
oprate under present conditions and obligations, he said.
The rates and fares awarded to the company in 1918 were
wholly inadequate and could not bring about the restoration
of public credit or the rehabilitation of the company. The
cost of service plan, on the other hand, he assured the
masters, would solve the company's problems, permitting it
to meet its financial and service obligations, bringing
about the restoration of its credit and reputation, and
"•'•PFBRC. vol.l, 540, 546, 557, 568-69, vol.2, 1234-1257,
vol.3, 2135-36, 2143-48; Hilcox, "Municipal Home Rule and
Public Utility Franchies," NMR 3 (January 1914), 22-26;
Wilcox, "Problem of Reconstruction With Respect to Urban
Transportation, NMR 8 (January 1919), 37; Wilcox, "Service
at Cost," NMR. 9 (December 1920), 766; Bauer "Deadlock in
Public Utility Regulation II Nothing Ever Settled," NMR 10
(October 1920) 498-501; New Orleans Item, September 21, 27,
October 4, 1920.
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assuring the rehabilitation of the utilities industry in Mew
Orleans.82
The following month the Special Masters recommended to
the court and the commission council the adoption of the
cost of service plan. The masters noted that the plan had
the endorsement of the FERC and several "leading" utility
experts. The plan, as recommended by the FERC, would pose
the fewest legal, managerial, and financial obstacles for a
proper rehabilitation of the industry, and could, if adapted
to local conditions, provide quality service. In addition,
the assured service plan would allow the receiver and the
principal stockholders to rehabilitate the company on terms
acceptable to the municipal authorities and, even more im
portantly, would permit for a more precise, less politicized
regulation of the public utilities company.83
The masters were not content with simply recommending
82New Orleans Item. February 25, 28, August 18, September
14, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. February 26, August 18,
1920. O'Keefe maintained that after meeting all operating
expenses, the company earned only $1,000,000, hardly a sum
sufficient to rehabilitate the company. Also appearing
before the Special Masters was Rudolph S. Hecht, president
of the Hibernia National Bank and the chairman of the Bond
holders Protection Committee, a consortium of investors
holding NORLC bonds. Hecht proposed that the city municipal
ize NOGLC, placing it under a special utility board orga
nized like the Sewerage and Water Board. He also recommended
that the city grant NORLC a service at cost franchise, set
ting its valuation at $50 million and providing for a twotiered rate of return for old and new investment.
83"Report of the Special Masters," ibid.: Fairclough,
"Public Utilities," 54; New Orleans Item. September 21,
1920. The masters defined the cost of service as the
"actual" cost of operation: wages, power, fuel, regulation
cost, taxation, replacement cost, and fair rate of return.

the adoption of the assured service plan. The success of the
plan and the relevancy of the masters' study depended on
establishing an acceptable valuation, rate of return, and
schedule of rates and fares. The masters "confessed" that
they had great difficulty determining these questions,
primarily because of the "wide differences of opinion among
experts on these questions". Despite these difficulties and
differences, the masters arrived at what they considered
reasonable and acceptable terms. They set the valuation of
NORLC (for rate making purposes) at $41.5 million, the
average of the four previous valuations conducted since
1918.

e*

The masters also fixed the rate of return at seven

percent, suggesting, however, that with rehabilitation the
company could operate profitably at rate of return between
six and seven percent. The masters recommended, as well, an
increase in streetcar fares from six cents to eight cents,
with discounts for advanced ticket buyers and school chil
dren. In their report, the masters contended that the eight
cent fare would permit the company to meet its financial
obligations, including the new wage awarded to the carmen,
and, at the same time, fund the rehabilitation of the
company.as
««Ibid.

Ballard: $32.4 million
Lafaye:
$38.3 million
Goethals:$44.8 million
NORLC:
$52.1 million
average

•“Ibid.

$42.0 million
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O'Keefe bristled at the masters' report, petitioning
Judge Foster to dismiss the recommendations as insufficient
and inappropriate in light of the evidence and testimony of
expert witnesses. The valuation suggested by the masters,
O'Keefe told Judge Foster, ignored established principles
and procedures for determining the valuation of public util
ity properties and summarily dismissed the evidence present
ed to them by independent, expert witnesses. Recent court
decisions, O'Keefe argued, established the reproduction
method as the only equitable means of determining the legi
timate valuation of public service properties. The masters,
O'Keefe suggested, may have been ignorant of the precedents
set by these cases, but they simply chose to ignore the
testimony of the company's witnesses."■
During the hearings, the company presented evidence
from two "independent engineers and appraisal experts,"
J. H. Perkins (a former employee of NORLC) and J. Frank
Coleman, discrediting previous valuations and describing
their valuation as equitable and legitimate. Perkins and
Coleman estimated that the cost of reproducing NORLC and
NOGLC at current prices was nearly seventy-four million
dollars, a staggering price by any standard and completely
unacceptable for rate-making purposes. But, basing the cost
of reproduction on the average of prices from 1915 to 1919

""New Orleans Daily States, September 29, 1920; Reclas
sification of the Electric Plant. 52-54.
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and accounting for a reasonable depreciation in property,
Perkins and Coleman set the valuation of NORLC and N06LC at
$55.6 million, seventeen million dollars more than the
Lafaye valuation and nearly eleven million dollars higher
than General Goethals's assessment. O'Keefe believed that
the Perkins-Coleman valuation was too low, but agreed to
accept it if the city administration set the rate of return
for this and other investments between eight and eight and a
half percent. Anything less than a $55 million dollar valua
tion, an eight percent rate of return, and an eight cent
fare, O'Keefe told the judge, and the company would
collapse.■7
Foster would not permit the company to "collapse". He
set aside the masters' recommendations concerning valuation
and rate of return, categorizing them as unrealistic and un
necessary. Obviously, the judge concluded, the masters did
not do a thorough analysis of the valuation and rehabilita
tion issues. They set the valuation and rate of return "too
low" to aid in the rehabilitation of the company, and their
recommendations may have exceeded their authority. The valu
ation and rehabilitation of the company, Foster suggested,
were too important to leave to an ad hoc, ex parte committee
of private citizens. Rather, those issues were the proper
concern of the receiver (and, by implication, the court) and
"^Reclassification of the Electric Plant. 54-55; New
Orleans Daily States. August 13, 16, September 29, 1920;
New Orleans Item. October 1, 1920.
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the municipal government.®B
Foster also dismissed the masters' fare schedule as
"impractical" and "inadequate". Discounted fares for school
children and ticket buyers only complicated the receiver's
task, adding unncessary expense to the cost of operations.
And they did not adequately compensate the receiver for the
cost of service. An eight cent fare, on the other hand, un
complicated by discounts and tickets, would enable the com
pany to retire the receiver's certificates, pay the wage in
crease awarded to the carmen, and allow the company to keep
operating. Though the eight cent fare alone could not reha
bilitate the company, it was, in the opinion of the court
and the receiver, sufficient to restore credit and attract
new investment that would aid in the refinancing and reor
ganization of NORLC. Foster then "ordered" O'Keefe to peti
tion the commission council for an eight cent fare, suggest
ing to the administration the necessity for quick action by
tying the wage increase to the enactment of an eight cent
fare ordinance.®9
Speaking for the commission council, Mayor Behrman ac
knowledged the need for quick and resolute action, and he
promised to give any proposal or petition serious considera"""Opinion of the Court," box 14m SRUC. SCD, H-TML, TU;
"Court Order," ibid.; New Orleans Daily States. October 1,
1920; New Orleans Item. October 1, 1920.
"""Opinion of the Court," ibid . : "Court Order, ibid.:
New Orleans Daily States. August 18, October 1, 1920; New
Orleans Item. August 18, October 1, 2, 1920, February 16,
1921.

437
fcion. But, he said, the council, like the court, questioned
the authority of the Special Masters to determine valuation
and rate of return, arguing that the city administration
alone possessed the authority to regulate utility rates and
fares and to determine the conditions for the public reha
bilitation of NORLC. For this reason, Behrman said, the com
mission council refused to take part in the deliberations or
to be bound by the recommendations of the Special Masters.
Nor, Behrman said, would the council accept the authority of
the federal district court to interdict the authority of the
city administration to regulate the public utility companies
in New Orleans. The council also had serious reservations
about the necessity and expediency of the eight cent fare,
contending that the eight cent fare may exceed the cost of
service and arguing that any increase must contribute to the
public rehabilitation of the company and not simply fund the
wage award or retire the receiverfs certificates.-70
The city newspapers conceded that the recommendations
of the Special Masters were without authority or effect, and
that the administration was right to ignore them altogether.
(Foster's opinion and order, though not his words, affirmed
the opinions of the press.) Nonetheless, the newspapers
assailed the commission council for refusing to participate
in an attempt to circumscribe its regulatory authority. The
7°New Orleans Itemr August 15, 16, 20, 26, 29, September
21, October 2, 4 11, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. August
23, 28, 29, September 21, October 1-4, 1920.
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press described the policy of the administration as vapid,
mysterious, and politically motivated, designed to protect
the interests of an alien corporation intent on profit and
anxious to escape meaningful regulation. The Behrman admin
istration, the press reported, failed to prevent the pyra
miding of stocks and bonds and the usurpation of local own
ership by giant holding companies that underminded the value
of the constituent companies and drained millions of dollars
from the city. That same administration, the reform newspa
pers continued, stymied direct, democratic regulation, per
mitting NORLC to avoid public control and, in effect, to
bring on its own financial bankruptcy. Now, the Behrman
administration, already discredited at the polls, sought to
bankrupt the city by refusing to protect its interest and
threatening it with a second, more destructive strike.71
Despite the illogical and partisan accusations of the
city newspapers, the policy of the Behrman administration
did not promise the political bankruptcy of the city or
threaten it with another disruptive strike. Indeed, the
policy of the administration was to preserve the political
integrity of the city and to prevent the receiver and the
71New Orleans Item, August 15, 16, 20, 26, October 1, 2,
1920; New Orleans Daily States September 22, 1920. Though
Judge Foster rejected the recommendations of the masters
concerning the rehabilitation of NORLC, he criticized the
Behrman administration for failing to accept his decision
"as sufficient evidence, prima facie,...upon which immedi
ately to authorize the receiver to put into effect an eight
cent car fare".
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court from dictating a settlement and stripping the city of
its authority over the public utilities company. Agreeing to
the eight cent fare proposal, especially in light of Judge
Foster's opinion allowing NORLC to set the cost of service,
would have meant surrendering authority to the court and the
receiver, allowing NORLC to impose the terms of its own re
organization and rehabilitation. Nor did the council's re
fusal to tie the fare increase to the wage award threaten
the good order of the city. The administration recognized,
perhaps more clearly than the business community, that the
strike had exhausted the union and that it was in no posi
tion to walk out once again. And the policy of the Behrman
administration on the wage award and the fare increase was
the same as the union. The city administration insisted, as
had the union and to some extent the Special Masters, that
NORLC could, for the time being, fund the wage award with
present revenues, determining later if the rehabilitation
of the company warranted an increase in rates and fares. It
was O'Keefe and Foster who ignored the recommendations of
the Special Masters on wages and fares, challenging the
political authority of the city administration and threaten
ing the good order of New Orleans.
So, too, did the State of Louisiana. Early in October,
before Receiver O'Keefe submitted his petition to the com
mission council, the Attorney General filed suit in Orleans
Parish Civil District Court, seeking to prevent the council

from considering O'Keefe's request for a fare increase. In
the petition before the court, the Attorney General claimed
that the state legislature, not the municipal administra
tion, possessed the exclusive authority to regulate the pub
lic utilities industry in New Orleans. The city and its
government, argued assistant Attorney General (and former
Governor) Luther E. Hall, were creatures of the state legis
lature, which retained exclusive and pleanary authority over
city streets and all other avenues of commerce in New
Orleans. The state legislature merely authorized the munici
pal government to grant franchises in its name and has the
authority to rescind or alter that grant of power at its
pleasure. "The streets of New Orleans," Hall asserted to the
court, "are state property and not city property and the
rights-of-way under franchises granted to the railways com
pany are subject to the control of the legislature." The
city administration, then, was without authority to grant
fare increases or in any way alter the terms and conditions
of the street railway franchises. Similarly, since NORLC
did not own street railway franchises, but simply leased
them, the original owners were not released from their fran
chise obligations to the state, principally, the five cent
fare. Any fare or rate increase authorized by the commission
council, then, would violate the will of the state legisla
ture, the terms of the franchises, and would constitute an
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unjust and illegal tax on the people of New Orleans.7*
City Attorney Moore told the court that the city admin
istration considered that state suit without foundation in
law and precedent. The state constitution and the 1912 city
charter granted the municipal government exclusive authority
over the city streets, including the authority to grant and
regulate franchises governing their use. The courts recog
nized that authority on several occasions, and, in the Black
decision, affirmed the authority of the municipal government
to regulate street railway fares. The court, however, found
merit in the state's argument, and issued a temporary in
junction preventing the commission council from deliberating
on the request for a fare increase.73
The court order against the commission council did not
enjoin public discussion, however. The executive leadership
of the Association of Commerce proposed that the Behrman ad
ministration grant the company an eight cent fare for four
months, enabling the receiver to pay the new wage award.

72New Orleans Item. August 16, October 1, 5, 7, 1920;
New Orleans Daily States. October 5, 1920.
73New Orleans Daily States, October 6-11, 1920; New Or
leans Item. October 6, 8-10, 1920. The union and the recei
ver were, to say the least, displeased with the state
suit. Union leaders called it a frivolous suit, benefitting
no one and hurting everyone in the city. The carmen insisted
that Receiver O'Keefe begin paying the new wage schedule at
once, asserting that the wage award should not depend on the
increase in carfares. O'Keefe, of course, declined, citing
Judge Foster's order and the injunction as his reasons for
denying the union's request. Despite the possibility of an
other strike, the union resisted that temptation and remain
ed on the job.
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satisfying the company's desparate need for additional
money, and permitting the new municipal administration the
time to determine valuation, rate of return, and the neces
sity for a permanent increase in streetcar fares. With these
guarantees, the receiver and the business community could
persuade the state to withdraw its suit against the city.7*
Initially, the Behrman administration dismissed the
notion of a temporary, unconditional fare increase, remind
ing the businessmen's association that the six cent fare or
dinance, enacted in October, 1918, remained in effect and
contributed nothing toward the public rehabilitation of the
utilties industry in New Orleans. Instead, Mayor Behrman
suggested that NORLC dispense with its dividend payments for
the next four months, appropriating those resources for the
new wage schedule, and affording the incumbent administra
tion the opportunity to set a responsible and comprehensive
public utilties policy. Behrman*s proposal received few en
dorsements, even one-time supporters like the New Orleans
Daily States considered the proposal unrealistic. The States
urged the council to adopt the proposal of the Association
of Commerce, arguing, in effect, that the new McShane admin
istration should determine the public utilities policy of
New Orleans.7*

7*New Orleans Item, October 8-10, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. October 10-11, 1920.
7*New Orleans Daily States. October 9, 1920.

The next day Mayor Behrman announced that the council
would, with the proper guarantees, consent to a temporary,
unconditional fare increase. The mayor hurriedly organized a
conference with Receiver O'Keefe, assistant Attorney General
Hall, and the executive leadership of the Association of
Commerce to discuss the specific features of the eight cent
fare ordinance and to arrange for the proper guarantees. The
conference nearly ended before it began. The first of the
proposals, offered by the Association of Commerce, angered
the city administration and NORLC general counsel H. Generes
Dufour, resulting in several heated shouting matches and
threats to discontinue the proceedings. Under the terms of
the so-called Carroll plan (Leigh Carroll, the chairman of
the public utilities committee of the Association of Com
merce, introduced the plan), the commission council would
consent to an eight cent fare effective for only six months
and subject to certain restrictions. During those six
months, the municipal administration and the State Attorney
General would restudy the public utilities industry in New
Orleans, developing a comprehensive utilities policy
(assistant Attorney General Hall proposed granting NORLC a
state franchise and regulating service and cost through a
state regulatory board or commission) and offering the re
ceiver a realistic plan for the rehabilitation of the
company. The Attorney General would agree to withdraw the
state suit if the receiver pledged to use the two cent in-
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crease to fund the wage award and meet legitimate increases
in the cost of service."7*
City Attorney Moore considered the proposal a fraud and
an insult to the city and the Behrman administration. The
proposal granted NORLC a thirty-three percent increase in
fares without determining its necessity or expediency. In
addition, plan placed few, if any, significant restrictions
on the use of the eight cent fare, allowing the receiver to
dedicate the increase to facets of the company incidental to
its rehabilitation. Furthermore, the city attorney com
plained, the association plan sought to exclude the city
government from the regulation of essential municipal ser
vices, denying to the people of New Orleans the right and
authority to determine municipal public policy. Moore then
turned his criticism toward 'Governor' Hall, exchanging
"harsh" words with the assistant Attorney General over the
content of the state suit and Hall's recommendations to the
conference. Apparently, Hall's suit and suggestions irked
the city attorney, and he threatened to resign if Mayor
Behrman and the council consented to the Carroll plan.77
Moore's threat to resign was, perhaps, irrelevant (he
was, like Behrman and the entire commission council, a lame
duck) to the discussion, but his criticism of the Carroll
7*Behrman to O'Keefe, October 12, 1920, box 14, SRUC.
SCD, H-TML, TU; New Orleans Daily States, October 11, 12,
23, 1920; New Orleans Item, October 10, 12-14, 22-23, 1920.
77New Orleans Daily States. October 11, 12, 23, 1920;
New Orleans Item. October 10, 12-14, 22-23, 1920.
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plan was succinct and correct. State regulation of municipal
public services was not only unconstitutional but also un
warranted. As we will see, when the voters of New Orleans
elected the McShane administration in 1920, they did not
reject municipal regulation (the McShane commission council
pursued the policy initiated by the Behrman administration).
Rather, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the Behr
man administration and its inability, not unwillingness, to
construct a comprehensive, workable public service policy.
Despite their loss at the polls, however. Mayor Behrman and
the commission council refused to accept any provision, no
matter how appealing or temporary, that compromised the fun
damental authority of the municipal government.70
The receiver and management of NORLC, too, objected to
a temporary fare increase. H. Generes Dufour, the attorney
for the receiver and the general counsel for NORLC, claimed
that a provisional fare increase would not meet the immedi
ate needs of the company, compelling the receiver to suspend
certain services and requiring Judge Foster to rescind the
wage award. Dufour also questioned the legality and expedi-

7"I have based this assesment of the utility policy of
the Behrman administration on the numerous correspondence of
the Mayor's Office, the City Attorney's Office, and the
Petitions and Correspondence of the Commissioner of Public
Utilities. For example, see Moore to Thompson, undated,
vol.7 (probably between February 13 and 19, 1918), Moore to
Glenny, August 8, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918,
vol.8, CAP. CA, NOPL. The newspapers, as well, dispite their
partisan opposition to the Behrman council, faithfully
reported the policy statements and actions of the council.
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ency of the provision allowing the commission council or the
State of Louisiana to determine the use of company revenues.
Under the conditions of the receivership, Receiver O'Keefe
could not appropriate revenues to suit the interests of any
one but the principal creditors of the company. In brief,
the receiver had to meet the cost of operation, including
wages and the payment of debts. He could not assign revenues
for the rehabilitation of the company. Granting the munici
pal or state government pleanary authority over the alloca
tion of revenues and other resources, Dufour predicted,
would paralyze the rehabilitation of the company and end in
the permanent collapse of the public service industry in Hew
Or leans. '7"
In the end, however, confrontation gave way to compro
mise. According to the "informal" agreement, the Behrman ad
ministration would enact a temporary two cent fare increase,
effective for six months and dedicated to funding the wage
award and other legitimate cost of operation. The enactment
of the ordinance, the agreement read, in no way obligated
the Behrman administration or the McShane commission council
to enact a permanent eight cent fare ordinance or to acknow
ledge the need or expediency of a permanent fare increase.
In brief, then, as City Attorney Moore insisted, these pro
visions acknowledged that the municipal government alone had

'79New Orleans Daily States, October 11-12, 23, 1920; Mew
Orleans Item. October 11-14, 22-23, 1920.
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the power to regulate the cost of service and, in part, to
determine the use of specific revenues."0
In addition, the Attorney General agreed to withdraw
his suit against the city council if the receiver agreed in
writing to use the fare increase exclusively for the wage
award and other specific cost of operation. Though the
agreement required the receiver to appropriate the fare in
crease for specific cost, it did not require him to dedicate
any portion of the two cent increase to rehabilitating the
company. Apparently, this aspect satisfied O'Keefe and
Dufour, and they agreed in writing to use the increase for
wages, taxes, and fuel.ax
Finally, the conference left to the McShane administra
tion the difficult job of constructing and implementing a
comprehensive public utilities policy that preserved the
political integrity of the city and resolved the public ser
vice crisis to the satisfaction of the courts, the receiver,
the principal owners of NORLC, and the people of New Or
leans. It was a task that took nearly two years and taxed
the abilities of the new administration and the endurance of
people of New Orleans. Eventually, it contributed to the
near collapse of the McShane administration and to the

“ Ibid.
axIbid.
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return of Martin Behrman.02

82Behrman to O'Keefe, October 12, 1920, box 14, SRUC.
SCD, H-TML, TU; Ordinance 5892, CCS. CA, NOPL; New Orleans
Item, October 10, 12-14, 20-21, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. October 11-13, 20-22, 1920. Opposition to the eight
cent fare was meager and ineffective. Working through the
courts, the receiver and the Behrman administration stymied
attempts to block the eight cent fare. In addition, critics
of the ordinance fell short in their attempt to initiate an
ordinance repealing the eight cent law. See New Orleans
Item. October 20-31, November 15, 1920, January 5, 1921 and
New Orleans Daily States. October 23-31, November 2, 4, 8,
22, December 14, 1920.

Chapter Eight

"A Bad Year For Kings"

Late in the spring of 1919, Donelson Caffery, a friend
and supporter of John M. Parker and violent critic of the
Behrman administration, announced the formation of the Demo
cratic Liberty League (DLL), a "new and permanent" faction
within the state Democratic party. Its single purpose, he
said, was the creation and maintenance of "good government"
in Louisiana and, in particular, New Orleans. Its principal
goal was the end of ring rule and the other forms of "polit
ical Kaiserism" in Louisiana, and its chief campaign issue
was the removal of Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic
Organization from power. The League, Caffery told reporters,
would be a potent force in the approaching state and munici
pal elections, and its chief interest for the next several
months would be the thorough political organization of the
state and city and the selection of anti-ring candidates for
the major state offices. With the election of an anti-Regular governor, the DLL would then challenge Behrman and the
Regulars for control of New Orleans.x
Despite Caffery's pronouncement, the anti-ring issue

xNew Orleans Item. May 5, 11, 18, 20, 25, 31, June 9,
1919; New Orleans Daily States. May 11, 18, 19, 20, 1919.
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was of secondary importance to many League members and
found only marginal support among the leading "independent"
candidates for governor. Only Phanor Breazeale (who had
the qualified endorsement of former governor Jared Y.
Sanders) considered ring rule a serious issue, pledging that
once elected he would remove Martin Behrman and the RDO from
power in New Orleans and influence in the state. State Sena
tor B. M. Stafford, who opposed the utilities policy of the
Behrman administration, acknowledeged that the RDO had a
"disproportional" amount of power and influence in New
Orleans and the state, but dismissed the idea of ring rule
as divisive and misleading, creating an anti-New Orleans
feeling among the voters and distracting them from the
essential problems of the state. The New Orleans "machine,"
he said, was not the source of the discontent and stagnation
in the state. Rather, the problems of Louisiana stemmed from
its colonial economy, an inadequate and inequitable tax
structure, and the failure to provide essential services
like good roads, schools, and public utilities. Percy Saint,
an ardent opponent of Mayor Behrman and the RDO (and a
future Attorney General of Louisiana), reiterated Senator
Stafford's remarks, adding that the state needed to adopt a
new state constitution, establishing a modern, effective
state government.2

2New Orleans Item, May 11, July 4, 5, September 1,
10,1919; New Orleans Daily States. July 4, 5, 1919.
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Hone of these men inspired the imagination or ignited
the hopes of the DLL and its leaders. Breazeale's anti-ring
rhetoric seemed convenient and insincere, and his failure
to address other, equally salient issues troubled Caffery
and the other leaders of the DLL. Though the sentiments and
platforms of Stafford and Saint appealed to many rural
parish League members, neither man was truly anti-RDO, and
did not appeal to the New Orleans reformers, the core of the
League's support. And, perhaps most important of all, none
of them could attract the "independent" progressive voter,
who, the DLL believed, would determine the outcome of the
state election. These circumstances convinced many League
members, especially the anti-Regulars, to seek another, more
acceptable candidate, one who embodied the anti-ring senti
ment of the DLL and who could appeal to the independent pro
gressive voter— John M. Parker.3
For the moment, however, John Parker chose not to run,
refusing to campaign for the endorsement of the DLL or to
commit to its platform.“ Parker's refusal to accept the en
dorsement of the League worried several of his supporters.

3New Orleans Daily States, June 9, August 10-12, 15-18,
1919; New Orleans Item. July 29, August 12, 13, 15-18, 1919.
Those League members advocating Parker were Governor Ruffin
G. Pleasant, Donelson Caffery, Hewitt Bounchaud, Albin O.
Provosty, and John Patrick Sullivan.
“Parker to Leland Moss, August 21, 1919, Parker Papers,
UNC; New Orleans Item. August 15-19, 21, 1919; New Orleans
Daily States. August 16-18, 21, 1919.
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and his apparent interest in running for governor again9
troubled other League members. Leland Moss, perhaps Parker's
most ardent supporter, pleaded with him to declare his can
didacy, complaining that Parker's refusal to accept the DLL
endorsement would divide the independent vote and give the
election to Martin Behrman and the RDO.* But other League
members were leery of Parker's intentions, and saw no merit
in either endorsing him or encouraging his candidacy. If
the DLL endorsed Parker, he and his supporters would absorb
the organization, reducing its appeal and turning it into a
personal political vehicle. If Parker ran independently of
the League, he could split the independent vote, giving the
election to the Regulars and their country supporters.7
At the League convention in August, the unaligned
majority of the DLL realized its worst fears. Parker's
friends, principally from the New Orleans, attempted to
postpone the nomination or, barring that event, to make it
contingent upon "subsequent developments". But opponents of
the Parker nomination, among them New Orleans reformer Dr.
9Parker campaigned for governor in 1916 as a member of
the Progressive party. Parker lost convincingly to Ruffin G.
Pleasant.
"Moss to Parker, August 22, 23, 1919, Parker to Moss,
August 21, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item.
August 19, 21, 1919; New Orleans Daily States. August 21,
1919. Professor Matthew Schott attributed Parker's indeci
sion to "personal reasons," but a better explanation seems
to lie in Parker's willful personality and demand for
politiical independence. Schott, "John M. Parker," 336.
7Charles J. Turck to Parker, August 28, 1919, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Daily States. August 17-19, 1919;
New Orleans Item. August 17-18, 1919.

Valentine K. Irion, blocked those efforts, eventually en
dorsing Phanor Breazeale for governor. Following the nomi
nation of Breazeale, several prominent members11 of the DLL
"bolted" the convention, announcing their intention of en
dorsing and campaigning for John M. Parker. Harry Gamble,
one of the "bolters" and Parker's future campaign manager,
critized the nomination and the DLL. The times were not nor
mal, he said. The people were uncertain about the fate of
the state and demanded men who could command their confi
dence. John Parker, more so than Phanor Breazeale, commanded
the respect and trust of the "unbossed," Democratic voter.
And Parker, not Breazeale, could defeat the New Orleans
machine and lead the state "at this critical time of recon
struction and rearrangement...". A week later John Parker
declared his candidacy, taking with him a majority of the
anti-Regular League members. Without the core of his sup
port, Phanor Breazeale withdrew from the race, leaving the
remnant of the DLL to John Parker and the anti-Regular
reformers."
But John Parker was hardly the ideal candidate, partic
ularly to those voters who considered the Democratic party
the party of reform and who saw ring rule as an idle and
"Among them were Esmond Phelps, publisher of the New
Orleans Times-Picayune, assistant Attorney General Harry
Gamble, State Representative James J. A. Fortier of New
Orleans, Dr. Walter S. Oser, and Oliver S. Livaudais.
"New Orleans Daily States, August 17-21, 28, 31, Septem
ber 4, 21, 23, 24, 1919; New Orleans Item. August 17-20, 31,
September 3, 5, 23, 24, 1919.
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disruptive issue. And there were many Democrats who doubted
Parker's ability to defeat the Regulars, especially cam
paigning on the issue of ring rule at the exclusion of all
other issues. For John Parker to win the elec ;Ior., then, he
had to reestablish his credibility as a Democrat, embracing
the "populistic1* elements and reforms of the party and cam
paigning on a platform that transcended the narrow partisan
ship of his past anti-Regular campaigns.xo
Among John Parker's apparent public disabilities, none
was more troubling to his supporters (or comforting to his
critics) than his checkered loyalty to the Democratic
party. As we have seen, first in 1912 and then in 1916, John
Parker distained "traditional" Southern party politics,
leaving the Democratic party for Theodore Roosevelt's Pro
gressive party crusade and completing his apostasy as that
party's candidate for governor four years later. Galvanized
by Woodrow Wilson's candidacy in 1916 and swept up by the
wartime patriotism that surrounded it and uncertain about
the tone and direction of the third party movement, John
Parker began a slow, considered move back to the Democratic
party. With the nation at war, Parker sought and accepted a
position in Wilson's wartime administration, serving as

x°Moss to Parker, August 19, 20, 22, 1919, D. D. Moore to
Gamble, October 15, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; Schott, "John
M. Parker," 335-37. For a superb account of the Democratic
party in the Progressive Era, see David Sarasohn, The Party
of Reform Democrats in the Progressive Era (University of
Mississippi Press, 1989), passim.
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the Federal Food Administrator for Louisiana and endearing
himself (at least according to his biographer) to the
state's farmers and consumers. In March, 1918, amidst pub
licity exceeding the significance of the event, John Parker
reregistered as a Democrat.xx
But Parker's return to the Democratic party did not
make him a Democrat. Nor did his former standing in the
anti-ring movement secure his position as the principal
leader and ideologue of the "reform" Democrats. To gain the
acceptance of the Democratic party and to establish himself
as a credible "reform" candidate, Parker had to do more
than change parties. Parker aligned himself with several
noteworthy and influential professional politicians, men
closely identified with the state's governing establishment,
men Parker considered at one time ill-fit to govern Louisi
ana. Those men included the incumbent governor, Ruffin 6.
Pleasant, State Speaker Lee E. Thomas, former governor
Jared Y. Sanders, and attorney and lobbyist John Patrick
Sullivan. “

xxSchott, "John M. Parker," 310-18, 325-337.
“ The majority of those men supporting Parker, of course,
came from the "reform" establishment, men like Charles I.
Rosen, Ivy G. Kittredge, Thomas I. O'Connor, and Leland
Moss. Other less noteable (for the moment) politicians also
endorsed John Parker, including Percy Saint, John H. Over
ton, and, of course, Huey Pierce Long. Moss to Parker,
August 19, 20, 22, 27, 1919, L. E. Thomas to Parker, Septem
ber 13, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New Orleans Item. Septem
ber 1, 19, October 6, 26, 1919; New Orleans Daily States.
September 1, 19, November 19, 1919; Schott, "John M.
Parker," 335-37.

Parker also identified himself with past Democratic
reform movements and administrations,X3 emphasizing his com
mitment to the "true" principles of the Democratic party,
and justifying his departure in terms of his opposition to
the RDO. For John Parker and his anti-Regular supporters,
ring rule was a real issue, and its destruction was a sin
cere and critical need. They portrayed Martin Behrman and
the Regulars as "perpetual office holders," destructive of
good government and devoid of party principle. And they
equated the destruction of the Regular Democrats with pro
gressive reform. This campaign, Parker wrote to a friend,
will be "possibly one of the most bitter fights we have ever
had in Louisiana, and the only way we will win it is going
to be by thorough organization and by keeping before the
people all the time the great principle for which we stand."
That principle was, he said in a speech, "the destruction of
the New Orleans ring and all other rings". From that great
principle stemmed "the reconstruction of our State...".x<*
But Parker could not expect to win the gubernatorial
campaign by simply aligning himself with the Democratic
X3In November, 1919, Parker wrote to Chief Justice Edward
Douglass White, asking him to substantiate Parker's support
of Francis T. Nicholls in 1888 and his opposition to the
Louisiana Lottery Company in 1892. White confirmed Parker's
claims. See Parker to White, November 17, 1919, White to
Parker, November 20, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC.
Xi*Moss to Parker, August 20, 22, 27, 1919, L. E. Thomas
to Parker, September 3, 1919, Parker to S. B. Hicks, October
7, 30, 1919, D. D. Moore to Gamble, October 15, 1919, Tran
script of Speech, October 2, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New
Orleans Item, November 1, 1919.
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party elite, or by identifying with past Democratic reforms,
or by equating progressive reform with the destruction of
the Regular Democrats. In a more important sense, however,
for Parker to win the governorship he had to come to terms
with the character and direction of the modern Democratic
party. By the late 1890s, if not sooner, Louisiana's Demo
cratic party had moved beyond Bourbonism, embracing the
principles of William Jennings Bryan, Louis Brandeis, and
Thomas Woodrow Wilson.XB
Despite Parker's attraction to the New Nationalism of
the Progressive party, his reformism hardly moved beyond the
issues of ballot reform, preference primaries, charter re
visions, and demands for "business-like" and efficient gov
ernment. The voters of Louisiana, both rural and urban,
immigrant and native, Catholic and Protestant, conservative
and liberal (for want of better words) rejected this elitist
version of progressive reform in 1912 and 1916. They sought
good roads, schools, hospitals, modern civic administrations
and services, and economic opportunity, not civics lessons
or a government responsive to the interests of a conspicuous

X9Dethloff, "Populism and Reform in Louisiana," passim;
Ashby, William Jennings Brvan. passim; Cooper, The Warrior
and the Priest, passim; Sarasohn, The Party of Reform,
passim.
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and self-satisfied urban elite.xs
Aware of his political liabilities and anxious not to
repeat the mistakes of the past eight years, Parker's sup
porters urged him to broaden his appeal, reconciling him
self to the issues and character of the new Democratic
party.3-7 Parker took their advice. And though the anti-ring
issue formed the core of his message, Parker emphasized his
commitment to reform and progressivism. In his first speech
of the campaign, Parker sought to reconcile himself with the
Democratic Liberty League, telling League members that
he was a conscientious Democrat and a modern progressive
reformer. He praised the DLL for its role in the struggle
xaSchott, "John M. Parker," 249-76; Schott, "Huey Long:
Progressive Backlash?," Louisiana History, XXVII (Spring
1986), 138-39. In his dissertation on John Parker, Professor
Schott argued that the limited success Parker enjoyed in
1916 stemmed from the "fairly well consolidated popular re
sentment on the [sugar] protection issue." He concluded that
the 1916 general election "reflected to a large degree a
rational orientation of class and sectional interests, with
planters, farmers, and working men, without a stake in sugar
protection, providing a basis for the Democratic victory."
By the "standards of many reformers in 1916 the Louisiana
Progressive party...stood foursquare on the principles of
antireform and antiprogressivism." So too did John Parker.
17Moss to Parker, August 20, 22, 27, October 15, 1919,
Thomas to Parker, September 3, 1919 and undated, Gilbert L.
Dupre to Parker, September 30, 1919, Moore to Gamble, Octo
ber 15, 1919, John M. Rodgers to Parker, November 11, 1919,
Parker Papers, UNC. Early in the campaign, Parker concen
trated his focus on canvassing south Louisiana and New
Orleans. But several of his managers pressed him to abandon
that tactic, telling him he could not win without the
assistance of north Louisiana politicians and voters. And
they urged him to curb his feelings toward the "populistic"
politics of north Louisiana. "These good people," Lee Thomas
wrote, "supported what they believed to be for the best in
terest of the country and many of their principles were sub
sequently adopted by the Democratic party."
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against ring rule and its e££ort to reform and revitalize
the Democratic party. He was, he assured the DLL, a true
Democrat and reformer, committed to the principles and poli
cies of the party. Though he considered ring rule the fore
most question of the day, he was not a "faction" man con
cerned with partisan advantage. As a progressive Democrat,
he endorsed civil service reform and cheap natural gas for
New Orleans, a "square deal" for capital and labor, an agri
cultural and mechanical college, woman suffrage, better
roads, an unlimited constituional convention, and equalized
assessment and taxation.3-"
John Parker, of course, was not the only Democratic
candidate. And he was not the only Democrat promising pro
gressive reform for the state and the city. Frank P. Stubbs
of Monroe, a retired army colonel and a veteran of the First
World War, opposed Parker in the Democratic primary. Though
Stubbs had no real practical political experience, he had
the support of several leading politicians and civic leaders
and the endorsement of Mayor Behrman and the Regular Demo
cratic Organization. Despite his inexperience, then. Colonel
Stubbs was a serious candidate with money, organization, and

x"Typescripts of speeches, September 18, October 23,
November 14, December 29, 1919, Parker Papers, UNC; New
Orleans Daily States. September 19, October 8-10, 1919;
New Orleans Item. August 16, September 19, October 5, 7, 8,
11, 23, 26, November 15, December 30-31, 1919.
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political experience behind him.3-9
For the most part, though, the Stubbs supporters mis
used their political ability, ignoring the virtues of their
own progressive platform, failing to exploit weaknesses in
Parker's record and platform, and attacking him on issues
that no longer concerned the voters.*0 It was a mistake. On
election day, Parker won an impressive victory, carrying all
but fourteen parishes and improving his vote of 1916 by
nearly thirty thousand. He also improved his vote in every
section of the state, particularly in New Orleans and in
north and northcentral Louisiana, the citadels of the
Democratic party in Louisiana.*3According to Matthew J. Schott, there were several
factors that explained Parker's victory. First, Parker's

“ Though the RDO formed the core of Stubbs's support, the
Regulars were not his only source of support. Men like
former governor Luther E. Hall, Fred A. Earhart, George H.
Terriberry, William Guste, and Loys Charbonnet supported
Stubbs, but were independent of the Regulars. And, as we
have seen, not all Regular Democrats were "machine" politi
cians. Thomas Semmes Walmsley and John Nix, for example,
were rising figures in the RDO, but could hardly be con
sidered ringsters. Moss to Parker, August 20, 1919, Parker
Papers, UNC; New Orleans Daily States, August 18, September
7-11, November 14, 16, 1919. Schott, "John M. Parker," 337.
*°New Orleans Daily States. November 4, 22, 23, 26, 30,
December 2, 1919, January 4, 7, 11, 17, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 13, 14, September 1, 20, November 28, 1919,
January 8, 1920; Schott, "John M. Parker," 336-49. The
Stubbs platform contained planks not found in the Parker
platform. For example, Stubbs and the Regulars called for
the end of child labor, mandatory education through high
school, state recognition of labor's right to organize and
bargin collectively, and civil service for all state boards
and commissions.
23-Schott, "John M. Parker," 347-49.
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return to the Democratic party nullified the issues of race
and party that contributed to his defeat in 1916. Second,
the Regular Democrats in New Orleans were badly divided,
forcing some of them to seek refuge with Parker and giving
him professional, organized support in the city. Finally,
with the collapse of the Progressive party movement and a
favorable readjustment of the sugar tariff, Parker returned
to a more familiar and conservative variety of progressivism, allowing him to attract a majority of the "unbossed"
Democratic voters of Louisiana.2*
Apart from Parker's nominal return to the Democratic
party (and Stubbs's inept campaigning), it is difficult to
determine the factors that contributed to the election of
John Parker. The RDO suffered a number of desertions during
the state campaign. But desertions were common occurrences
in New Orleans politics, and there is no conclusive evidence
that Parker benefitted from them. True, Parker received
20,603 votes in New Orleans, winning six wards (the Ninth,
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth)
and increasing his 1916 vote by nearly 6,300. And the major
ity of those votes, nearly 5,000, came from traditional
"machine" wards and precincts, apparently verifying
Professor Schott's claim. But these statistics are incom
plete and misleading. Colonel Stubbs polled 25,044 votes,
22Schott, "John M. Parker," 326-49; Schott, "Progressives
Against Democracy," 256-67; New Orleans Item. January 11,
1920.
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only 783 votes fewer than Ruffin Pleasant in 1916. Stubbs
lost but two wards won by Pleasant in 1916, and defeated
Parker by nearly eight hundred votes in the Third Ward, the
residence of John Patrick Sullivan.23 The increase in the
Parker vote, then, did not come from any riffs in the RDO,
but from a different source. In the 1920 Democratic party
primary, 5,480 "new" voters went to the polls, roughly a
twelve percent increase. And, when added to the 783 voters
who deserted the RDO, these men gave John Parker nearly
6,300 additional votes.2-*
Though the New Orleans vote was always significant (no
candidate could win a major state office without a strong
showing in the city, as Huey Long learned in 1924), Parker
won the election outside the city. The majority of Parker's
vote in 1920 came from the rural parishes in the north, the
central, and the western portions of the state, with the
23Professor Schott argued that Sullivan's desertion from
the RDO was "indicative of the lessening cohesion in Choctaw
ranks". Schott attributed this "development" to the effects
of the commission council system and to the "inability of
each ward boss to obtain political favor except by the grace
of the increasingly quarrelsome and demanding Mayor
Behrman." In truth, Behrman and the RDO forced Sullivan from
their ranks in 1913. Schott's other assertions are also
without merit. The commission council system enacted in 1912
gave the mayor enormous powers, but, as we have seen, the
commission system tended to diffuse power, and Mayor Behrman
encouraged independence and initiative, allowing the other
commissioners to effect public policy. Schott, "John M.
Parker," 342.
2*The Secretary of State did not promulgate returns
except on a parish basis. I have compiled these figures from
the city newspapers. There are a few discrepancies in the
returns, but, by and large, the newspaper accounts appear to
be accurate.
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principal increase coining from those sections that rejected
Parker in 1916. In those rural parishes, John Parker re
ceived an additional 24,731, eighty percent of his total in
crease and fifty percent of his entire vote. These heavily
Democratic and predominately "populistic" parishes elected
John Parker in 1920. Parker did not win their confidence and
their vote by returning to a more conservative variety of
progressivism or by thundering against ring rule. Rather, he
received their votes by promising to fulfill his platform,
a platform not completely of his making or to his liking.29

Immediately after his election in January, 1920, John
Parker returned to New Orleans to begin his campaign against
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democratic Organization. In a
speech delivered to the Young Men's Busines Association (a
civic and business association formed in November, 1919),
the governor-elect urged the city's young reformers to begin
in earnest the business of "redeeming" their city from the
carpetbaggery of ring rule. Anti-Regular reformers of all
ages, of course, shared Parker's sentiments. James Thomson,
the publisher of the New Orleans Item and an inveterate
opponent of Martin Behrman and ring rule since early in the
decade, also prompted New Orleans reformers (and disaffected
Regulars) to redouble their efforts to remove Martin
Behrman from office. The election of John Parker, the Item
2"Schott, John M. Parker," 270-73, 347-49.
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wrote, ensured that the state would remain free of the cor
rupt and reactionary influence of the RDO. With his assis
tance, the anti-ring Democrats of New Orleans could "redeem"
the city, restoring the people to power and ushering in a
new era of good government.a"
For most New Orleans reformers, though, the Parker vic
tory itself did not signal the approaching defeat of Mayor
Behrman or promise the end of ring rule in New Orleans.
Parker's showing in New Orleans undoubtedly sustained their
faith in anti-ring reformism and promised a distinct hope
for victory in the municipal elections in September. Yet,
experience cautioned against expecting an easy and complete
defeat of Martin Behrman and the RDO. From time to time,
the RDO had suffered losses at the polls and survived. It
was, after all, a resilient organization, favored by power
ful allies and sustained by an army of witless voters and
self-interested workers anxious to prevent municipal reform
and to retain their influence and position in political and

2®John Parker to New Orleans Times-Picayune and New
Orleans Item. January 21, 1920, Parker Papers, UNC; New
Orleans Item, January 22, 1920. According to Crawford
Ellis, an insurance executive and member of the city's socalled commerical-civic elite, ring rule extended beyond
politics into the chambers of commerce. Writing to Governorelect Parker, Ellis pleaded with him to remove William Bess
Thompson, the former Commissioner of Public Utilities (19121916), from the Board of Commissioners for the Port of New
Orleans, the Dock Board. See Ellis to Parker, January 23,
1920, John M. Parker Papers, Southwestern Archives and Manu
script Collection, The University of Southwestern Louisiana,
hereafter cited as Parker Papers, USL.
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municipal affairs in New Orleans.27
Experience also counseled a pragmatic response to the
impending municipal elections. Before the mayoral campaign
began, full-time, anti-ring reformers like James Thomson,
John Parker, and Andrew McShane urged the formation of a
professional, reform-minded political organization, modeled
on the RDO and designed not so much to destroy it as to re
place it.20 Late in December, 1919, when it was apparent
that John Parker would win the election, his campaign man»

agers in New Orleans initiated a series of discussions with
several "disaffected" Regulars, seeking a temporary alliance
for the municipal campaign. Anxious to disassociate them
selves from Martin Behrman and his administration, these
Regulars agreed to "fuse" with the reformers. Soon after
Parker's election, the alliance assumed a more or less per
manent character, with reformers and "new" Regulars forming
the Orleans Democratic Association (ODA).2*

27New Orleans Item, February 27, March 14, August 11,
1920. In a series of editorials, the Item accused the RDO of
aligning itself with any interest that could be "purchased,
influenced, controlled, or fooled". Those interests included
the city's principal banks, NORLC, and elements of vice. In
that sense, the Item wrote, the RDO resembled the Radical
Republicans of the 1860s and 1870s. By implication, John
Parker and the reformers of New Orleans were like the
Redeemers of the late 1870s and 1880s.
2"Parker to S. B. Hicks, October 7, 1919, Parker Papers,
UNC; New Orleans Item, September 14, 1918, December 29,
1919, February 10, March 13, 1920.
2*New Orleans Item, December 11, 21, 1919, January 26,
1920; New Orleans Daily States, January 10, 1920.
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The new association, the Item announced, was different
from previous reform organizations. The old reform groups
were comprised of carnival kings and cotillion leaders, dis
tainful of politics, resentful of those it served, and un
mindful of the need for a permanent reform organization. The
new organization, however, had none of the liabilities of
its predecessors. The leaders of the ODA were "new men,"
dedicated to the social principles and benefits of demo
cracy, disciplined by the regimen of war, and convinced of
the need for a permanent reform organization. These men
were, above all, realists, and they understood the need to
democratize municipal reform, opening their organization to
professional politicians of principle and experience. Their
alliance with the anti-Behrman Regulars did not adulterate
reform, but purified politics.30
The sort of realistic reformers the Item described may
have joined the ODA, but they did not lead it, define its
character, or set its goals. The reform leaders of the ODA
were old men, known to any voter and familiar to any student
of New Orleans politics in the progressive era. Though never
a member of the organization, John Parker was clearly one of
3°New Orleans Item. February 20, July 31, August 11,
September 4, 8, 1920. According to the Item, the reformers
were so anxious to defeat Behrman and the RDO that they
would tolerate any permanent organization, no matter how
disreputable, as long as it won the mayoral election for
the reformers. This "devil's bargain" apparently did not
trouble the reformers, since, as the Item reported, they
believed that the individual citizen, not the organization,
would always control public policy.
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its guiding forces, defining its goals and sustaining it
with political patronage. Parkerites dominated the reform
wing of the ODA, sitting on its campaign and "patronage"
committees, screening potential candidates, and handing out
jobs to valued political friends. The professional politi
cians who joined the ODA may have been men of principle, but
they, like the reformers, were also driven by personal and
partisan self-interests. They, too, wanted to remove Martin
Behrman and his Regulars from office. But it seems unlikely,
given their previous political beliefs and alliances, that
they shared John Parker's vision of municipal reform and
good government. Instead, it seems more likely that they
shared the beliefs and values of the president of the ODA,
John Patrick Sullivan.31
John Sullivan was the epitome of the professional,
"machine" politician. At well over six feet and weighing
more than two hundred pounds, Sullivan was an imposing,
almost menacing figure, undisciplined and quick tempered,
with ego and ambition to match his size. Politics ran in the

31Among those Parkerites who joined and served the ODA
were: H. Dickson Bruns, founder of the Ballots Reform Lea
gue in 1894 and a charter member of the Citizens League in
1896, Robert H. Marr, a former District Attorney for Orleans
Parish, Charles I. Rosen, Harold Moise, Bernard McCloskey,
Harry Gamble, Andrew McShane, and James Thomson. See New
Orleans Daily States, April 3, 1920; New Orleans Item, July
18, 28, 1920. Among the new Regulars were: Edward A. Hag
gerty, Clerk of the Criminal District Court, Bernard Daly,
an assistant District Attorney, and Henrico "Co" Desmare,
the City Comptroller. See New Orleans Daily States. July 10,
11, 25, 28, 1920.
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family. Sullivan's father was a native of Ireland, arriving
in Hew Orleans in the decade before the Civil War. Appar
ently, the elder Sullivan was a successful grocer, amassing
a "considerable fortune" from wholesaling and sending his
son to the College of the Immaculate Conception (the Jesuit
preparatory school) and Tulane University. The father was
also active in politics, working in the New Orleans Custom
House during the initial stages of Reconstruction and be
longing to a small, though conspicuous, group of conserva
tive Irish unionists.35*
John Patrick Sullivan built on the family tradition. He
was a successful attorney and lobbyist, representing several
large corporations and business associations. Sullivan was,
as well, a conservative Democrat and a consummate spoilsman.
Early in his career, "Colonel" Sullivan (he was a colonel in
the Louisiana militia) held several offices of public trust,
serving as assistant Attorney General, attorney for the
State Fire Marshall, and attorney for the State Insurance
Rating Board. Later, Sullivan served as the chief counsel
or principal lobbyist for several "local" corporations, in
cluding the New Orleans Railway and Light Company, the New
Orleans Brewers and Distillers Association, and the Hibernia
32For a description of Sullivan see Williams, Huev Long,
166-67. For an account of the political activities of
Sullivan and his familiy see. New Orleans Item. July 2,
1911, March 31, 1916 and, for the unionist activities of the
elder Sullivan see, Ted Tunnell, Crucible of Reconstruction
War. Radicalism and Race in Louisiana 1862-1877 (Baton
Rouge, 1984), 227.
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Homestead Association. These companies paid Sullivan immense
fees to represent their financial and political interests in
Baton Rouge, allowing him to acquire a considerable fortune
of his own and to pursue his passion for politics.33
In another sense, however, Sullivan's association with
the interests of these and other companies stymied his pur
suit of political influence and power. Corporations like
NORLC and the Brewers and Distillers Association opposed the
expansion of municipal authority, particularly in the areas
of regulation and taxation, requiring Sullivan to defend
their private concerns against the administration's percep
tion of the public good. As the spokesmen for New Orleans
Railway and Light Company, John Sullivan worked to defeat
the Manion public utility bill in 1914 and was instrumental
in blocking the original Nix bill in 1916, forcing the
Behrman administration into accepting an unwarranted and un
constitutional compromise. Sullivan was, as well, an unre
constructed critic of the 1912 charter and the Behrman ad
ministration, arguing that the commission council system was
unrepresentative and undemocratic, concentrating power in
too few hands and promoting the special interest of the

3:*New Orleans Item, September 19, 1912, February 3, 1920.
August 3, 6, 20, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. January 4,
1919, January 4, 10, April 3, August 6, 1920; Edward F.
Haas, Political Leadership in a Southern Citv New Orleans in
the Progressive Era. 1896-1902, (Ruston, La. 1988), 85, 88,
90; Brian Gary Ettinger, "John Fitzpatrick and the Limits of
Working-Class Politics in New Orleans, 1892-1896," Louisiana
History XXVI (Fall 1985), 341-67.
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Behrman administration. Sullivan's partners, practices, and
beliefs angered Mayor Behrman and the RDO caucus, and they
read him out of the organization in 1913. The election of
John Parker, then, afforded Sullivan an opportunity to re
store his political reputation and to redeem the city from
the control of Martin Behrman and his "Old" Regulars. And
John Sullivan was an opportunist.34

Early in May, 1920, Governor Parker announced his sup
port for the ODA and its municipal candidates (the ODA had
not yet named them), and he urged his friends in New Orleans
to join the ODA in removing Mayor Behrman and giving the
city a "business administration". Ordinarily, the governors
of Louisiana were more circumspect about interfering in New
Orleans elections. John Parker, however, was no ordinary
governor when it came to New Orleans politics. For John
Parker, the redemption of the city from ring rule was the
focal point for all other progressive reforms. And it was
his intention to use the powers of the state government and
the influence of public opinion to legislate the Behrman
administration out of office.39
At the beginning of the regular session of the state
34New Orleans Item, February 3, August 3, 6, 20, 1920;
New Orleans Daily States. February 17, March 17, 1920, Octo
ber 24, 30, 1923, February 23, March 27, November 1-3, 1924.
39New Orleans Item. May 2, July 29-30, 1920; New Orleans
Daily Statesr October 3, 19, December 4, 1919, January 8,
May 2, July 29, 1920.
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General Assembly in the spring of 1920, Parker supporters
initiated legislation revising the qualifications for voter
registration and enhancing the authority of the governor
over registration in Orleans Parish. The Parkerites claimed
that the registration bill would promote citizenship, elimi
nate duplication at the Registrar of Voters office, and
deter fraud at the polls. In fact, however, the Parker
administration designed the bill to discourage voting and to
give the governor and the ODA plenary authority over the
voting rolls of New Orleans. The new registration law,
passed by the legislature in July, required that all quali
fied voters be bona fide residents of Louisiana for two
years, Orleans Parish for one year, and the precinct six
months prior to voting in any election. The registration law
authorized the Registrar of Voters for Orleans Parish to
conduct a "new and complete** registration of the all quali
fied voters every four years, and permitted him to purge the
voting rolls at any time and for whatever reason. Finally,
the act allowed private citizens to force the removal of
any voter **illegally or fraudulently" registered, placing
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the burden of proof on the unsuspecting voter.
The new registration law promised much for the future,
but was of no real value to the ODA in the approaching muni
cipal elections (it did not go into effect until August,
only a month before the municipal elections, and the current
Registrar was W. W. Heard, a friend and supporter of Mayor
Behrman). For the ODA to win the municipal elections, the
reformers believed that they had to reduce, if not elimi
nate, the legislative and patronage power of the Behrman
administration. Soon after the session opened, Governor
Parker announced his desire to reduce the size and alter the
composition of several important legislative committees cont

trolled by the Behrman administration. The governor proposed
eliminating nine committee members from the House Committee
on City Affairs, giving the city delegation twelve positions
and the rural parishes three. In the Senate, the proportion
was roughly the same. Parker's motivation was quite simple.
By reducing the number of committeemen and changing the

3aAct 166, Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the
State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920: New Orleans
Item, January 30, March 7, June 10, 18, July 23, August
9, 17, 29, September 10, 1920; New Orleans Daily States,
January 3, 30, June 10, 16, 1920. Between January and Sep
tember, 1920, the number of registered voters in Orleans
Parish increased by 146. But, within the individual wards,
particularly in the so-called ODA wards, there were signifi
cant changes. In the wards won by Andrew McShane (Third,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Four
teenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, the number of registered
voters increased by 2,800. And in the wards won by Martin
Behrman, registered voters decrease by nearly six hundred.
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character of the committees, he hoped to eliminate the power
of the ring politicians over state and municipal affairs.
With fewer delegates from New Orleans and so few rural rep
resentatives on these committees, the Regulars would not be
able to compromise the interests of the city or bargain away
those of the country parishes.3-7
The proposal discriminated more against New Orleans and
and the rural parishes than against the RDO. It demeaned the
legislative process, suggesting that the legislature was in
ept and without virtue. It reduced the city*s representation
on two vital committees, diminishing its influence and
standing in the legislature and eroding the principle of
local self-government. The proposal aggravated the regional
and cultural divisions in the state, portraying New Orleans
as an immoral and ungovernable place. Soon after Governor
Parker forced through his proposals, the General Assembly
provided funds for a legislative investigation into the
administrative and political affairs of the New Orleans
municipal government, subjecting the city to further, un
necessary criticism, eroding the confidence and reducing
the effectiveness of the reform administration of Andrew
McShane.3"

37New Orleans Item, Hay 11, 20-25, 1920; New Orleans
Daily States. Hay 21, 25, 1920.
3aIbid. As a gesture of peace, the House and Senate
assigned each faction an equal number of committeemen.
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Eliminating a small number oC illicit ring voters and
curbing the "disproportionate" power of the RDO in the state
legislature did not necessarily guarantee the defeat of
Martin Behrman or promise the end of ring rule. Most anti
ring reformers assumed, almost without question, that the
RDO and the Behrman administration existed almost exclu
sively on political patronage, allowing them to buy voters
and to manipulate the political process to their advantage.
With this assumption guiding them, the anti-ring reformers
became the uncompromising opponents of the spoils system and
the champions of civil service reform. Despite their public
disaffection with the political patronage system, few
reformers questioned its importance in combating ring rule.
And John Parker, John Sullivan, and Governor Ruffin Pleasant
had no doubt that political patronage would defeat the old
ring, replacing it with a political faction under their con
trol and serving their interests.3*
At the start of the state campaign, more than a year
before the municipal elections, Governor Pleasant, with the
knowledge and approval of John Parker and the assistance of
John Patrick Sullivan, began removing Behrman Regulars from

39The reformers overestimated the role and importance of
patronage in New Orleans politics. Though patronage obvious
ly influenced public policy, it was not necessarily the only
or even the most important factor in determining public
policy. Martin Behrman and the RDO recognized that fact, and
never relied on patronage exclusively to retain their places
in municipal government. John Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of
New Orleans Memoirs of a City Boss. 299.
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state and parochial jobs. At first, Pleasant and Sullivan
concentrated on dismissing executive officials, believing
that they could not remove or absorb the RDO's workers until
they controlled the principal administrative and executive
jobs. From the start of the municipal election campaign, the
Behrman Regulars accused Parker and Sullivan of creating a
political machine, dedicated to promoting their own narrow
"reform" and partisan interests. The Parker-Sullivan
machine, they claimed, practiced the spoils system with a
vengence, throwing out experienced workers and replacing
them with political hacks unmindful of the true needs of
the city. Sullivan and Parker, of course, denied the forma
tion of a "second ring". Instead, they argued that the ODA
employed the tactics of the spoils system only to remove a
corrupt and ineffective administration from office.40
In the summer, 1919, Governor Ruffin Pleasant demanded
the resignations of every member of the Board of Commission
ers for the Port of New Orleans, the Dock Board. The gover
nor insisted that partisan politics had nothing to do with
his decision to dismiss the entire board. Rather, he said,
financial and political circumstances warranted the dismis
sal of the board. The incumbent Dock Board, he said, under
the direction of president William Bess Thompson, the former
Commissioner of Public Utilities, was wasteful, incompetent.

4°New Orleans Item. January 28, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States, March 29, April 1, 3, 1920.
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and thoroughly " B e h r m a n i z e d 41
In a series of open letters. Pleasant catalogued the
abuses and corruption of the Thompson board. The Thompson
board, Pleasant wrote, mismanaged the construction and the
financial obligations of the Industrial and Navigational
Canal, building a canal too large for the port to use pro
perly and jeopardizing the financial credit of the state.
Initially, the board envisioned a smaller, more manageable
canal, costing a meager four million dollars. With the state
underwriting the cost of constructing and financing the
canal, the board expanded the original concept, delaying
completion and increasing cost five hundred percent.42
Those factors alone, Pleasant said, warranted the dis
missal of the Thompson board, but there were other more
serious considerations that influenced his decision. The
Thompson board favored the political and financial support
ers of the Behrman administration. This "Behrmanized" Dock
Board, Pleasant said, financed the construction of an elec-

4Established in 1896, the Board of Commissioners of the
Port of New Orleans, the "Dock Board," reestablished public
control over the wharves and port of the city. Originally,
the governor appointed the board members to staggered terms,
preventing another administration from controlling the
majority of the board. In 1910, the legislature amended the
law, allowing the governor to replace the entire board. Act
70, Acts Passed by the General Asspmhlv of the State of
Louisiana, Regular Session. 1896. Act 30, Acts Passed bv the
General Assgmhlv of the State of Louisiana. ReaularSession.
1910.; New Orleans Daily States, January 8, 1920.
42New Orleans Item. September 25, 29, 30, October 1, 10,
14, 1919; New Orleans Daily States. September 25, 26, 29,
October 1, 4, 10, 1919.
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trie powerline to the canal, violating state law and grant
ing special favor to NORLC, a company allied with the
Behrman administration and near financial collapse. In
addition, the present board had become a warehouse of
political patronage. Since 1916, the Dock Board had fallen
under the complete domination of the Behrman administration
and the RDO, relinquishing its independence and jeopardizing
the economic and political integrity of the port. According
to "independent" sources, the RDO controlled 2,700 Dock
Board jobs, most of them secured or awarded for partisan
reasons. This excessive partisanship troubled the governor,
and he believed it "sufficient grounds" for removing the
Thompson board. But, in this case, he said, partisanship ex
ceeded its normal, more appropriate bounds and jeopardized
public policy. In brief he fired the Thompson board because
it no longer had his confidence. "It is a recognized rule of
every advanced country or commonwealth in the world,"
Pleasant wrote, "that when the policies, or even the poli
tics, of the appointees is at variance with the appointing
power, the proper thing for the appointee to do is to hand
in his resignation. It is one of those delicate customs of
public life that men of refinement never fail to recognize,
but which men immersed in the turbid current of machine
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politics can never see."*3
John Parker denied that he pressured Governor Pleasant
to remove the Thompson board, but he was, nonetheless,
elated by the news, asserting that the Dock Board would now
serve the interests of reform and progress.44 William Bess
Thompson, of course, denounced Pleasant (Sullivan and
Parker, too), defending the board and the Behrman adminis
tration against what he labeled as the "reckless" accusa
tions and lies of soured politicians and false reformers
anxious to extend their influence over state and local
governments. Thompson answered Pleasant with his own public
letters, justifying the policies and actions of the board

43Ibid. Pleasant's "independent" source was State Senator
E. M. Stafford. But Stafford's figures were inaccurate and
bloated by partisanship. According to the independent Bureau
of Municipal Research, there were but 1,921 Dock Board jobs.
The Bureau conducted its survey in 1921, but, as we will
see, Sullivan and the ODA expanded the number of workers
after the municipal campaign. In addition, in 1915 the state
legislature created a modest civil service law for Dock
Board, placing all warehousemen under a board of examiners.
Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of the
Government of the Citv of Hew Orleans r 44; Act 15, Acts
Passed bv the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana.
Regular Session. 1915.
44Long an advocate of civil service, the New Orleans
Item agreed with Parker. Civil service should wait until
after the elections. In January, 1925, at the height of
another mayoral campaign, former Dock Board President W.
0. Hudson admitted that during his term Sullivan, Pleasant,
and Parker removed RDO supporters from their jobs with the
board, replacing them with men loyal to the ODA. Hudson also
testified that even after McShane's victory, these men
kept payrolls high. New Orleans Item, September 27-28, Octo
ber 2, 4, November 4, 1919, January 24, 28, 1925; New
Orleans Daily States, September 29, November 15, 1919,
January 8, 13, 14, 26, 1925; Reynolds, Machine Politics. 44;
Williams, Huev Long. 133.
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and exposing the raw partisanship of Pleasant*s words and
actions.1*'*
In his letters, Thompson reminded the governor of the
accomplishments of the board he appointed in 1916. The incumbent board took over from a board beset by financial pro
blems and bankrupt of ideas. Within the first year of taking
office, the Thompson board increased revenues and modernized
the port— all during a period of deep local and national
crisis. Despite pressure from local bankers, the press, and
former board president Hugh McCloskey, the Dock Board and
the Behrman administration resisted efforts to rush into an
ill-conceived, ill-designed, and expensive project. The city
administration and the board secured the expertise and ser
vices of General George Goethals in planning and building
the Industrial Canal. From the start of the project, the ad
ministration maintained that the canal must be large enough
to sustain modern shipbuilding and repair facilities and
that the cost would be larger than that projected by the
business and civic "leadership** of the city. In short, the
■*"Mayor Behrman did not need Thompson to defend him and
the city administration, but the mayor made only one
comment. "It wouldn't be becoming," he said, "for the mayor
of New Orleans to call the governor of the state a liar, but
if I were not mayor and he were not governor, that is what I
would call him." New Orleans Daily States. September 24-25,
29, October 1, 4, 1919; New Orleans Item. September 24-25,
29, October 1, 4, 1919. James Wilkinson, the attorney for
the Dock Board, claimed that in firing the Thompson board
Governor Pleasant violated state the corrupt practices acts
of 1912 and 1916. Act 213, 1912, Acts Passed bv the General
Assembly of the State of Louisiana. Regular Session. 1912.
Act 33, ibid. 1916.
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estimations and policies of the board and the city adminis
tration were more beneficial and less costly than those pro
posed by the so-called business leadership of the city.**
Thompson also accused Pleasant of misrepresenting the
state's financial commitment to the canal project and of
distorting the board's relationship with NORLC. The state
did agree to underwrite the bonds for the Industrial Canal,
but the state would pay only if the canal failed to make
money and the Dock Board, Levee Board, Public Belt Railroad
Commission, and the City of New Orleans defaulted on the
bonds. For that to happen, Thompson said, the Mississippi
River had to change course (which, of course, it was trying
to do) or the board and the city had failed to provide the
services and incentives necessary to attract business to the
canal. The board and the city hoped to ensure the success of
the Industrial Canal by subsidizing the construction of
services necessary to its construction, operation, and pro
fit. The board agreed to fund the construction of an elec
tric power line because it was critical to the completion
and operation of the canal, and it chose to assume the total
cost of construction because of the extraordinary financial
conditions of NORLC, knowing it could recoup its investment
in reduced electric rates. Subsidizing this and other pro
jects guaranteed the Industrial Canal, the state, and the

■•“New Orleans Item. October 15, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States. October 5, November 4, 1919.
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municipal government, millions of dollars in revenues.*"*
Finally, Thompson refuted Pleasant's allegations that
the Dock Board was thoroughly "Behrmanized". As Thompson
pointed out, the men appointed by the governor in 1916 were
not professional politicians anxious to distribute patronage
and win voters. They were, rather, professional businessmen,
experts in finance, management, commerce, and law, concerned
with the development and expansion of the port and its con
tribution to the prosperity of the city. They were, as well,
men of unblemished personal reputation, with distinguished
records in public service. Though most board members were
supporters of the Behrman administration (Thompson and board
member Edward E. Lafaye served on the commission council
elected in 1912), all were independent public servants, com
mitted to upholding the laws governing the Dock Board. And,
Thompson wrote, at no time in the past four years had Martin
Behrman or any one associated with his administration tried
to force the board to hire anyone, no matter how qualified
or deserving.*8
‘•-,Hew Orleans, Daily States. December 11-12, 14, 1919.
‘•"New Orleans Daily Statesf September 24-26, 29, October
1, 5, 1919; New Orleans Item, September 20, 24-25, October
5, 1919. The other board members were Bernard Hans, the
Treasurer of the Liberty Manufacturing Company and Dr.
Edward S. Kelly. Lafaye was the vice-president of the CanalCommerce Bank and Trust Company. The ODA offered little or
no evidence substantiating Pleasant's claims. ODA spokesmen
Hayden W. Wren, a wharf supervisor under the Thompson board
and its successor, released a letter from Martin Behrman to
him in 1916 instructing Wren to hire several friends of
former Mayor Fitzpatrick. See New Orleans Item. December 1,
2, 1919. The letter bore a date of December 4, 1916.

Though Thompson probably exaggerated the independence
of the Dock board from the Behrman administration and the
RDO (after all, the political ideas and policies of Thompson
and Lafaye more closely resembled that of Martin Behrman
than those of Pleasant, Sullivan, and Parker), there can be
no question that the new board, led by businessman W. 0.
Hudson, served the personal and partisan interests of John
Parker, John Sullivan, and, eventually, Andrew McShane. The
new board assumed responsibilities on October 1, and quickly
began reviewing and revising the personnel policies of the
Thompson board. At issue was the interpretation of a 1915
state law that apparently placed most Dock Board jobs under
civil service. Acting on the advice of its general counsel,
the Thompson board extended civil service protection to
nearly all jobs, including certain classifications of un
skilled laborers. The new Hudson board, however, rescinded
the old guidelines, placing an additional three hundred jobs
under its direct and partisan control .*9
With the announcement of the new guidelines, John
Sullivan, the board's "efficiency expert," began purging
workers loyal to the Behrman administration. Sullivan in
formed those workers uncertain of their political loyalities
to either join the ODA or lose their jobs. Those men who re

“•"New Orleans Item, October 1, 1919; New Orleans Daily
States, October 1, 1919. Pleasant appointed W. 0. Hudson,
Albert Mackie, W. A. Kernaghan, Rene F. Clerc, and Thomas H.
Roberts, all businessmen, to the new board.
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fused to leave the RDO were dismissed without explanation or
recourse.90 The Hudson board also tried to influence the
hiring practices on the Industrial Canal project. George M.
Wells, the project manager for the Goethals Company, angrily
objected to the board's attempt to "politicize" the per
sonnel policies of his company. Wells claimed that reversing
the "hands off" policy of the Thompson board jeopardized the
entire endeavor, and, if the Hudson board continued hiring
on a "political basis," the Goethals Company would sever its
contract with the Dock Board.91
President Hudson denied Wells's assertions, but those
denials failed to satisfy Orleans Parish District Attorney
Chandler C. Luzenberg, a Behrman Regular. Luzenberg conduct
ed a public investigation into allegations of criminal mis
conduct by the Hudson Board. The accounts given by witnesses
revealed that the Hudson Board dismissed only those workers
loyal to the Behrman administration, replacing them only
with men loyal to John Sullivan and pledged to vote for
John Parker. Board members Hudson, Rene Clerc, and Thomas
Roberts substantiated the testimony of the other witnesses.

" N e w Orleans Daily States, November 1-4, 1919; New
Orleans Item. November 2, 4, 1919. General Counsel James
Wilkinson, whose ruling on the 1915 civil service law gave
Sullivan the pretext to dismiss or "convert" RDO workers,
believed the courts should review the law, and he considered
the dismissal of workers under these circumstances illegal
and unethical.
9XNew Orleans Daily States. November 17-18, 20-21, Decem
ber 3-4, 1919; New Orleans Item. November 20-21, December 4,
1919.
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Hudson testified that the board deferred to Sullivan and
Henry Sarpy (supporter of John Parker) in all personnel
matters, allowing them to discharge "Behrmanized" workers
and to replace them with workers pledged to reform. This
"evidence" went to the Orleans Parish Grand Jury, but appar
ently the Grand Jury took no action. But the Dock Board did.
The board gave its employees a holiday (with pay) on elec
tion day, presumably to vote and campaign for John Parker.*2
Ultimately, however, political patronage would not de
termine the course of the municipal elections. Urban poli
tics in the progressive era and in New Orleans was too com
plex and sophisticated in concept and practice to sustain so
simplistic a notion. Clearly, the outcome of the municipal
elections depended on how the voters, particularly the new
voters, judged the character and performance of the Behrman
administration. And, perhaps more importantly, whether these
voters saw the ODA and its policies and programs as a legi
timate alternative to Martin Behrman and the Regular Demo
cratic Organization. It should come as no surprise, then,
that over the course of the municipal campaign the ODA

*2Luzenberg to Parker, November 17, 1919, Parker Papers,
UNC; New Orleans Daily States. November 17-18, 20-21, Decem
ber 3-4, 1919; New Orleans Item, November 20-21, December 4,
1919. The 1921 state constitution staggered the terms of
Dock Board members and required the governor to demonstrate
just cause for removing any board member. Sullivan, Parker,
and the leadership of the ODA also purged other parochial
boards and commissions of "Behrmanized" workers. The workers
dismissed from the Levee Board and the Public Belt Railroad,
for example, were few, but were considered vital to the RDO.
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concentrated on exposing what it considered to be the
shallow, corrupt, and partisan character of the Behrman
administration, emphasizing its moral deficiencies and
political failures and attributing its accomplishments to
the inspiration and hard work of a better class of citizens.
The ODA promised to restore moral, political, and financial
integrity to city affairs, ending the sordid relationship
between the municipal government and NORLC, protecting pub
lic servants from a vicious spoils system, and reducing the
size and cost of government. The ODA campaign promised to do
those things and more, all without diminishing the quality
of essential city services.
The Behrman campaign, on the other hand, stressed the
vivid and tangible accomplishments of past administrations
and the RDO's commitment to the future. The Regulars also
questioned the ability and desire of the ODA to continue
political and governmental reform in New Orleans, warning
that the election of the ODA municipal candidates meant the
end of municipal reform and the return of divisive partisan
politics in New Orleans. But the Behrman campaign, like the
Behrman administration, was constantly on the defensive and
seemed incapable of any sustained effort. The emotional and
political dislocation of war and readjustment and the often
abusive partisanship of municipal politics exhausted the
Behrman administration, preventing it from resolving the
city's most pressing problems. The inability of Martin
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Behrman to govern the city to the expectations of reformers
and Regulars, then, only gave credence to the issue of ring
rule.

Few conscientious ODA supporters denied that Martin
Behrman was in many ways and for many years the most active
and constructive public official in New Orleans. "His grasp
of and interest in public affairs and his indomitable ener
gy," wrote the Daily States, "have been contributing factors
in the progress of the city...." From 1904 to 1912, the
Daily States suggested, the Behrman administration, operat
ing under the democratic restraints of the councilmanic sys
tem, was the model of conservative and progressive municipal
government in the South. During those years, the Behrman
administration completed, then expanded, the drainage and
sewerage system, lifting New Orleans out of the mud, freeing
it from disease, and stimulating its growth and development.
Also in those years, the Behrman administration constructed
the Public Belt Railroad, and, despite powerful private in
terest (John Parker and Hunter Leake of the Illinois Central
Railroad), made it the model for other municipal public ser
vices. And, finally, despite the opposition of the Board of
Liquidation City Debt and the private banking interest that
controlled it, the Behrman administration exerted greater
public control over municipal finances, allowing the munici
pal authority to determine, at least in part, the'’'course of
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public policy.**
In the years since 1912, however, with the advent of
the commission council system, all that changed. The Favrot
charter concentrated political and executive authority in
the mayor, allowing him to ignore the demands of popular
politics and the restraints of limited, democratic govern
ment. Without these safeguards to temper his judgments,
Martin Behrman became a willful and arrogant dictator.*4
But even for the most resentful personal opponents,
Martin Behrman himself was never really the issue. For the
most part, the anti-Behrman reformers and Regulars saw the
mayor as a symbol and victim of a ruthless, cynical, and
essentially undemocratic political system that sapped men of
all personal and political integrity (in the case of some
ODA supporters, opportunity). The real issue, wrote the
Daily States, was not one of rival personalities or organi
zations, but of two conflicting ideologies of politics and
government. The Behrman Regulars stood for "one man rule,”
special favor, and monopoly. Their concepts of politics and
government were essentially "undemocratic" and ultimately
"un-American". By contrast, the Item argued, the ODA and its
platform promised the restoration of political self-deter*3New Orleans Daily States. July 20, August 8, September
10, 1920; New Orleans Item. September 3, 1920; Williams,
"Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political Boss,” passim.
®4New Orleans Daily States. February 17, July 20-21, 28,
August 3, 8, 15, 17, 25, 27-28; New Orleans Item. February
22, April 6, August 5, 12, 26, 28, 1920, October 6, 1922.
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mination and the return of self-government."
Except for its depiction of Mayor Behrman as a disci
plined politician and a conscientious municipal reformer and
administrator, the arguments of the ODA were self-serving
and specious. The anti-Behrman Regulars, like John Patrick
Sullivan and Robert Ewing, publisher of the Daily States,
opposed the commission council system because it denied
them a specific and favored place in city government. In
short, they did not have the organization or the votes to
win a seat on the commission council or directly influence
municipal policy. The anti-Regular reformers attacked the
system because they did not control it. Once the reformers
assumed authority over the municipal government, they became
devoted advocates of the Favrot charter.
Though the Favrot charter concentrated executive and
legislative authority in the council and the mayor and ex
panded and strengthened the power of the city administra
tion, it did not destroy municipal self-government or sup
press popular politics. To the contrary, the Favrot charter,
more so than the charter reforms proposed by the Parker Good
Government League, preserved republican government and demo
cratic politics in New Orleans. It did not give the council
or the mayor plenary authority over every facet of munici
pal government. And it preserved the political integrity of
" N e w Orleans Daily States. July 20, 24, 28, 1920; New
Orleans Item. January 5, 14-15, 21, February 25, March 11,
April 2, 3, August 11, September 1, 5, 10-11, 1920.
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the independent boards and commissions that served New Or
leans. Nor did it establish or promote "one man rule".
Though the 1912 charter broadened the authority o£ the mayor
(he served on every municipal board and commission), it did
not invest the office with any extraordinary executive or
legislative authority. In brief, the mayor was but one of
the five executives on the commission council. Though clear
ly a powerful and influential member of the commission, as
we have seen from our discussions on the electric rate con
troversy and the interurban issue. Mayor Behrman did not
dictate solutions, but encouraged consensus and concerted
action. In that sense, then, he preserved the political in
dependence of the council and the individual commissioners.
Neither the Favrot charter nor the Behrman administra
tion inhibited public debate or prevented a democratic solu
tion to public issues. Again, as we have seen in the charter
reform debate, the municipal regulation issue, and the dis
pute over the public rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway
and Light Company, the Behrman administration responded to
the concerns of private and public interests in determining
public policy. If anything, the Behrman commission council
suffered from an arrant devotion to political democracy.
The ODA campaign, of course, concentrated on more than
just the ideological differences between reformers and Behr
man Regulars. ODA spokesmen claimed that in the years since
1900 (the year the RDO won control of the city government)
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city services and the quality of those services had deteri
orated badly and were now nearly intolerable. Schools were
poorly funded, understaffed, and overcrowded. The majority
of city streets were unpaved, poorly lighted, and in disre
pair. Open canals and gutters posed serious health and safe
ty hazards to residents. Police and fire protection were in
adequate, jeopardizing lives and property and increasing the
cost of insurance. Taxes were exorbitant and revenues mis
appropriated. Assessment policies were unfair and politi
cized, designed to protect the interests of the rich and in
fluential and to extort votes from property owners. Finally,
the city administration was cumbersome and inept, and held
captive by a select group of favored interests, in particu
lar the New Orleans Railway and Light Company.98
The ODA claims were biased and partisan, but they were
not without some merit.9,7 In the years since 1916, the
Behrman administration appeared incapable of governing New

" N e w Orleans Item. January 14, March 27, April 1, August
6, 12, 15, September 7, 12, 1920; New Orleans Daily States.
August 7, September 1, 1920.
"Though the ODA blamed the Behrman administration for
every problem in New Orleans, it refused to credit Mayor
Behrman with any progress made under his administrations.
The Item, Governor Parker, and Charles Rosen took special
pains to point out that the Behrman administration and the
RDO had little or nothing to do with the creation or devel
opment of the Dock Board, the Public Belt Railroad, the
Sewerage and Water Board, and the Industrial Canal. Their
arguments were, of course, untrue, as Robert Webb Williams
showed in his fine masters thesis. See, for example, New
Orleans Item. January 12, April 7, 17, August 3, September
8, 1920; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political
Boss," passim.
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Orleans. And there were visible signs of the Behrman admin
istration's apparent failures. The 1914 comprehensive paving
plan, for instance, designed to pave or resurface every city
street by 1925, failed to work, leaving dozens of city
streets unpaved or unimproved. The sewerage and drainage
system, perhaps the most essential of all city services,
operated at a deficit and could not meet the demands for
service. In addition, the Sewerage and Water Board required
tens of millions of dollars for expansion, replacement and
repair, an investment the city could neither afford nor
afford to do without. To meet the rising demand and cost of
city services, the Behrman administration increased taxes
and raised the rate of assessment, yet most city services,
like the Orleans Parish school system and police and fire
protection, remained underfunded and understaffed. City
finances remained tangled and uncertain, despite an exten
sive (and expensive) refunding plan enacted in 1916. Though
the city government had the necessary legal and political
authority to rehabilitate NORLC, the Behrman administration
apparently did not have the will. And, finally, the Behrman
commission council seemed uninterested in "current" issues
like housing, zoning, city planning, and natural gas.9"
But appearances can be deceiving, particularly in poli
tics and especially in New Orleans. The Behrman administra
9"New Orleans Item, August 3, 5-6, 8, September 1, 8,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. April 1, August 3-5, 8,
1920.
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tion was, of course, ultimately responsible for the condi
tion of municipal affairs in New Orleans, but there were, as
well, circumstances beyond its immediate control or influ
ence that mitigated its responsibility. The comprehensive
paving plan, for example, was never popular with property
owners, requiring them to absorb most of the cost of paving
and, consequently, relieving the municipal government (and
those citizens who owned no taxable property) of a major
expense. The city administration paved nearly thirty streets
between 1914 and 1916, and seemed poised to complete its
comprehensive plan. After 1916, however, paving virtually
stopped. The war disrupted normal patterns of commerce and
finance; raw materials for subsurface drainage and paving
were scarce and expensive and the cost of financing paving
bonds was nearly prohibitive. Circumstances did not improve
after the Armistice. Throughout 1919 interest rates and the
cost of material and labor continued to rise, allowing the
city administration to pave only a few miles of streets."®
The same sort of argument could be made for the other
failures of the Behrman administration. The commission coun
cil raised assessment rates to sixty-seven percent in 1916,
seven-five percent in 1918, and ninety percent in 1920,

""Moore to Behrman, March 28, 1913, Waldo to Moore, April
26, 1913 vol.6, CAP. CA, NOPL, Moore to Lafaye, September
11, 1914, vol.7, ibid; Administrative Survey of the Govern
ment of the Citv of New Orleans. 210; New Orleans Item.
January 13, June 13, August 5, September 3, 1920.
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raising taxes to the highest level in the city's history and
increasing revenues by several million dollars. Despite
those increases, the city curtailed services, increased its
bonded indebtedness, and operated under a deficit. Every
level of government, though, increased taxes during the
First World War, reordered its priorities, and spent more
than it took in. But the war only contributed to the finan
cial problems of the city. Their cause lay elsewhere. The
city's method of determining and collecting taxes was cum
bersome and wasteful, reflecting the interests of the
bankers who controlled the Board of Liquidation. Municipal
policy directed the city administration to collect taxes
once a year, compelling it to borrow money from the local
banks to meet the cost of governing the city. The banks
demanded five percent interest on money loaned to the muni
cipal government, but the Board of Liquidation, which set
many of the policies and conditions for city financing,
placed city revenues in accounts bearing only three per
cent, creating a sizeable deficit every year and increasing
the profits of the banks favored by the board.00

“°New Orleans Daily States. January 7, 8, 11, 13, August
6, 18, 25, September 4, 5, 19, 1920; Mew Orleans Item.
December 20, 1919, January 13, 14, August 26, September 4-5,
19-20, 1920; Williams, "Martin Behrman: Mayor and Political
Boss," 50. The Behrman administration was responsible for
three percent interest rate. Prior to 1907, the Board of
Liquidation placed city revenues in accounts bearing no
interest.
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What was true for the condition of city services and
municipal finances was equally true for the municipal regu
lation and rehabilitation of NORLC, the introduction of
natural gas, and the installation of a comprehensive zoning
and city planning ordinance. As we have seen, the issues of
regulation and rehabilitation were, in part, controlled by
private corporate interests and conservative, partisan
politics. Eventually, however, despite the power and appeal
of those interests and politics, the municipal government
established its regulatory authority over NORLC and NOPSI.
From 1910 to 1928, every city administration, including
those of Martin Behrman, attempted to pipe natural gas to
New Orleans, but without success. Again, those same inter
ests and politics that retarded the rehabilitation of NORLC
kept natural gas from New Orleans until 1928. Finally, the
Behrman administration began considering a comprehensive
zoning policy in 1915, but the courts and the interests of
small property owners prevented a thorough revision of
zoning laws until the early 1920s. Enacted by the McShane
administration, the comprehensive zoning ordinance reserved
to the city council the ultimate authority to plan the eco
nomic and social development of the city— the cardinal tenet
of the Behrman administration and the Regular Democratic
Organization.81

81See Chapter Nine.
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The objective of the ODA, of course, was not to debate
Hartin Behrman and the Regular Democrats, but to replace
them. In May, four months before the municipal elections,
the ODA executive committee02 conducted a series of inter
views with potential mayoral and municipal candidates. By
the end of July, the committee had made its decisions. The
committee "recommended" Andrew McShane for mayor.
At fifty-five years old, McShane was a long-time
anti-ring reformer, and a John Parker partisan. McShane re
sembled General John J. Pershing, and the press described
him as a seasoned and assertive leader, experienced in muni
cipal reform and popular with the average New Orleans citi
zen. But McShane had an undistinguished political "career".
He sought election to the commission council in 1912 as a
member of the Good Government League, but finished nearly
six thousand votes behind the Regular candidates. Though
active and visible in reform circles, McShane was silent
(critics said uninformed) on the important issues in New
Orleans politics and was, for the most part, unknown to the
"average" voter. And McShane was not the unanimous or even
popular choice of the ODA. The ODA executive committee

" A s h t o n Phelps, publisher of the Times-Picavune. Charles
I. Rosen, James Mcl. Thomson, publisher of the Item. State
Senator Thomas V. Craven, Bernard John Daly, Robert H. Marr,
Ivy G. Kittredge, Z. Marshall Ballard, editor of the Item.
John Patrick Sullivan, and James Edmonds formed the ODA
executive committee. Though not a member of the ODA, John
Parker influenced its decisions. New Orleans Item. July 1718, 1920.
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considered McShane early in its deliberations, but rejected
him as unsuitable. Its initial offers went to New Orleans
businessmen Edgar Stern and Leon C. Simon, but both declined
to run. Only after considerable debate and over the objec
tion of John Sullivan did the ODA executive committee rec
ommend McShane to the ward leaders.®3
McShane also had an abrasive personality and was sus
picious of the intentions of others. He was, as well, a
shallow thinker. In his acceptance speech, he parodied the
beliefs of anti-ring reformism, likening the citizens of New
Orleans to stockholders and the municipal government to cor
porate management and promising to manage the municipal gov
ernment on "sound business principles". By applying the pro
per business principles, he said, the ODA could reverse the
decline in public services, reduce the cost of government,
and end ring rule. McShane's argument, as trite as it was,
had an obvious appeal to the businessmen in the ODA. The
executive committee selected four businessmen and a former
union leader for the commission council ticket. Stanley Ray
was at one time the managing editor of the Times-Picayune
and now was the personal secretary to Governor John Parker.
Richard Murphy was a sugar broker and John P. Norman owned
the Aurora Planation in Algiers and considered himself a
planter. Wilbert Black was a former steamship worker, a

®3New Orleans Item. July 17, 18, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. July 24, 28, 1920.
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leader in the Steam Engineers Union, and the president of
the Central Trade and Labor Council. None of these men, with
the exception of Hilbert Black, had any acknowledged experi
ence in municipal politics or government. And Black's ex
perience was limited. He and the Central Trade and Labor
Council opposed the six cent fare ordinance in 1918.04
The Regular Democrats ridiculed the selection of Andrew
McShane and "his" ticket. The Behrman supporters contended
that the ODA ticket did not represent the interests of the
people of New Orleans, but was more in keeping with the
political agenda of John Parker and the partisan interest
of John Patrick Sullivan. Clearly, these two politicians
were instrumental in the formation of the ODA and in the
selection of its candidates. But they, like their counter
parts in the RDO, were not manipulators of public sentiment
or public men. The selection process used by the ODA re
flected the interests of Parker and Sullivan only because so
many other men held the same interests. And, the ODA candi
dates were as representative of the people of New Orleans as
were Martin Behrman and his commission council ticket.09
““•New Orleans Item, July 20, 21-24, August 13, 28, Sep
tember 2, 1920; New Orleans Daily States, July 20-21, 23-24,
August 28, 1920. The other ODA candidates were more "tradi
tional". The executive committee chose Robert H. Marr, a
former District Attorney, for that position, George E.
Williams, a former state senator and protege of John Fitz
patrick, for Criminal Sheriff, Edward C. Haggerty for Clerk
of Criminal District Court, and John J. O'Neill for Clerk of
Civil District Court.
" N e w Orleans Daily States. July 24, 1920; New Orleans
Item. July 31, August 2, 3, 1920.

Early in July, after several days of gentle persuasion
by his most ardent supporters, Martin Behrman announced his
candidacy for a fifth term as mayor of New Orleans. The RDO
caucus extended its endorsement to the mayor the next day,
ending speculation by the reform press that the RDO would
not support the incumbent mayor. Apparently, there were
several Regulars who wanted to replace the mayor with a
younger, less controversial candidate. But the mayor had the
support of the majority of the caucus, principally from oldline supporters like Arthur J. O'Keefe, the leader of the
Tenth Ward, Arthur and Michael Mitchell, rivals of John
Sullivan for supremacy of the Third Ward, and new Regulars
Charles F. Buck, Jr., Thomas Semmes Walmsley, and Paul H.
Maloney. Though the last four years had clearly diminished
Behrman's standing in the community and called into question
his ability to govern as effectively as in the past, Martin
Behrman was still an extremely popular mayor and a success
ful politician. And no one else in the Regular Democratic
Organization could rival his accomplishments or match his
record of political success.*®
Several days later, the RDO announced the completion of
its municipal ticket. In many ways the 1920 ticket resembled
those of 1912 and 1916. Apart from Martin Behrman, only Paul
Maloney had any practical experience in municipal politics.

BBNew Orleans Daily States. July 10, 15, 16, 18, 1920;
New Orleans Item. July 18, 1920.
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And though Maloney was active in city politics for years,
(Governor Pleasant appointed him to the Orleans Parish Levee
Board in 1919, but removed him in favor of ODA leader Ivy G.
Kittredge), he had never before sought an elective office
and his principal advocation was business. The other candi
dates, Charles S . Barnes, Maurice DePass, and Thomas
Harrison, were either business or professional men. And the
mayor's campaign managers, Charles Buck and Semmes Walmsley,
were from the so-called civic-commerical elite of New Or
leans. The RDO's municipal ticket did not represent, as some
critics charged, the desire of the RDO to stave off certain
defeat. Rather, the 1920 ticket reflected an established
rule of municipal elections in New Orleans in the progres
sive era. Political organizations, whether reform or
Regular, tended to nominate men of established professional
and social standing for major executive positions, assigning
the minor, though equally important, positions to men of
lesser ability and experience. The 1920 ticket was no excep
tion. •*'
The election campaign was intense, bitter, and short,
lasting less than two months. Mayor Behrman focused his pub
lic campaign on three issues: his own record of extensive
public service and achievements, McShane*s glaring inexperi
ence in municipal politics and public affairs, and the
"■'New Orleans Daily States, July 10, 15, 16, 21-23, 25,
27, 1920; Williams, Huev Long. 223-24; Teaford, Unheralded
Triumph. 42-54.
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inability of Andrew McShane, or any other member of the ODA,
to govern New Orleans independently o£ the interests of John
Parker and John Patrick Sullivan.
Over the course of the municipal campaign, the mayor
stressed his years of public service, never failing to men
tion that McShane, Sullivan, and Parker devoted the majority
of their lives to personal advancement and service to pri
vate corporate interests. While those men pursued private
gain (in the cases of Parker and Sullivan, often at the ex
pense of the public good), he and the RDO exhausted them
selves in improving the economic and social conditions of
New Orleans. Those improvements benefitted every segment of
the New Orleans community, completing the sewerage and
drainage system, ending the threat of yellow fever, building
the Public Belt Railroad over the opposition of men like
John Parker, paving hundreds of miles of streets, establish
ing a modern, democratic municipal government, and extending
the authority of the municipal government over city finances
and the public regulation of essential city services .99
The mayor admitted that his administration was not
always successful in resolving the problems of the city.
The city needed to expand and repair the sewerage and water
system, develop the resources of the port, allocate greater
revenues and energy to the public school system, develop

aaNew Orleans Item, July 25, 26, August 6, September 10,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. August 3, 1920.

501
comprehensive paving and zoning plans, bring a just end to
the streetcar strike, and ensure the equitable rehabilita
tion of New Orleans Railway and Light Company. With the
removal of wartime regulations and economic sanctions, the
city government could complete those projects interrupted by
the war and move toward the expansion and modernization of
all city services.**
Though Behrman emphasized his record in every campaign
speech and publication, he did not believe his record was
the exclusive issue. For Martin Behrman, a more important
issue was the "relative merits and abilities" of Andrew
McShane and his approach to governing the city. The mayor
contended that McShane, like many so-called reformers, was
distainful of politics and unfamiliar with public affairs.
Prior to the ODA nomination, McShane's interest and experi
ence in municipal politics was limited to voting every four
years and seeking elective office once. He was uninformed
and, apparently, unconcerned about the principal issues
facing the city. In addition, McShane's concept about the
role of government in the conduct of municipal affairs was
banal and detrimental to the immediate and future needs of
the city. McShane wanted to reduce the authority of the
municipal government over the private and public affairs of
the people, pledging to be a "hands-off mayor," and commit
ting his administration to a retrenchment in services and
"•Ibid.
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the reduction of the size and cost of the municipal govern
ment. Though Mayor Behrman pledged himself to economy and
efficiency in government, he promised an active, energetic
administration, dedicated to the further expansion of
services and proper regulation of municipal affairs.*70
The foremost issue, Behrman reminded the voters, was
not McShane's inexperience or his effete notions of politics
and government, but whether he and his administration would
govern New Orleans or pursue public policies for the parti
san benefit of John Parker and John Sullivan. The nomination
of McShane was an indication of the intentions of Sullivan
and Parker. Andrew McShane was not the best candidate or
the only candidate available to the ODA. But he was the only
candidate who best met the interestsof Sullivan and Parker.
The entire tenor of the campaign suggested that Sullivan,
Parker, and a few other anti-Regular reformers would con
trol the McShane administration. And the men behind Andrew
McShane, the mayor asserted, were narrow-minded partisans
bent on governing the city to suit the interests of a select
class of citizens. The Parkerites wanted to restrict politi
cal participation,

curtail services, and reduce the author

ity of the municipal government over the affairs of business
and corporate interests. The disgruntled Regulars hid be
hind the banalities of anti-Regular reformism, hoping to

7°New Orleans Daily Statesr August 6-7, 1920; New Orleans
Item. August 6, 13, 26, 1920.
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replace the Berhman regulars and, eventually, remove the
reformers, too.71
The mayor's criticisms disturbed the confidence of the
ODA campaign. After the mayor's remarks, the city press
(Behrman had no newspaper support; even the Daily States
deserted him) portrayed McShane as a conspicuous leader of
the anti-ring reform movement, reciting a litany of reform
organizations McShane supported.73 The newspapers also de
picted McShane as an experienced and resolute businessman,
capable of constructing an assertive and independent admin
istration. Finally, the press described McShane as a self
less public servant, committed to political democracy and
economic and social progress. A McShane administration, the
Item and the Daily States wrote, promised more than the end
of ring rule and economy in municipal government. It would
provide better schools and teachers' pay, better fire and
police protection, and a clearer, healthier New Orleans. The
commission council under Andrew McShane would bring about a
reasonable and just settlement of the public utility issue,
enact a comprehensive zoning and planning ordinance, promote
71New Orleans Daily Statesf August 6, 13, 19, 21, 24,
1920; New Orleans Item. August 19, September 8, 1920.
7ZMcShane claimed he was active in the Young Men's Demo
cratic Association (1888), the Antilottery League (1892),
the Citizens League (1896), the Jeffersonian Democrats
(1900), the Home Rule Democrats (1904), the Good Government
League (1912), and with John Parker in 1916 and 1920. New
Orleans Item. August 6, 13, 26, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States, August 6-7, 1920. The list only proved the point
Mayor Behrman tried to make. McShane, like other reformers,
became involved in municipal affairs only every four years.
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the construction of affordable, middle-class housing devel
opments, improve and expand the sewerage and drainage
system, pipe natural gas into the city, and provide an
active and meaningful role for women in the politics and
municipal government of New Orleans.n *
The anti-Regular press, however, promised more than the
McShane administration and the ODA could deliver, making a
prophet of Martin Behrman. Andrew McShane's disposition and
political inexperience nearly ruined his administration and
contributed to the collapse of the ODA in 1922. Though
Parker and Sullivan did not manipulate the McShane adminis
tration, their partisan concerns compromised the indepen
dence of the new commission council. And though Parker and
Sullivan did not run the McShane administration, as Mayor
Behrman predicted, neither did Andrew McShane. His illtempered behavior and his critical disapproval of nearly
every policy proposed by the commission council (and his
numerous absences from work for chronic, though minor, ill
nesses) isloated him from his own government, allowing the
other councilmen to direct the municipal policy of the
McShane administration.
Those problems were, however, in the future, and were
not, as Mayor Behrman thought, the issues that concerned
the voters of New Orleans. Rather, most voters considered
73New Orleans Item. July 18, 20, August 4-5, 24, 26,
1920; New Orleans Daily States. July 20, September 2, 5,
1920.
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Behrman's record and the need for change as the most impor
tant issues of the municipal campaign. On election day, rain
threatened to dampen the turnout and the predictions made by
both factions. The Regulars predicted a record turnout,
eclipsing previous records and giving Martin Behrman a com
fortable majority. The McShane supporters were just as opti
mistic, forecasting a "snug majority" for "Mayor" McShane
and a complete and unqualified victory for the ODA.*7*
None of the predictions came true (though the rains
held off), though the ODA spokesmen came closer to the
actual outcome. McShane received 22,906 votes (fifty-one and
a half percent), winning ten of the seventeen wards, includ
ing five ring wards (the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh) and increasing the anti-Regular vote by more than
2,300. Mayor Behrman, on the other hand, garnered only
21,541 (forty-eight and a half percent), receiving 3,400
votes fewer than Frank Stubbs. McShane's majority was indeed
"snug," only 1,365, but it was, nevertheless, a complete
victory over Martin Behrman. McShane gained votes in every
ward but the Second, where both he and Behrman lost votes,
the Ninth, which he carried by 286 votes, the Fifteenth,
Behrman's home ward, and the "rural" Seventeenth. In the ten
wards carried by McShane, the ODA increased the anti-Regular
■'‘•New Orleans Item, September 4-7, 9, 11-13; New Orleans
Daily States. September 5, 12-13, 1920. The Behrman Regulars
predicted a six thousand vote victory for Behrman and the
RDO and the ODA leadership saw McShane sweeping every ward
and receiving a nine thousand vote majority.
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vote by 1,300 votes, the majority o£ those votes coming from
the five "ring" wards McShane carried.79
McShane received 16,000 votes from the ten wards he
carried, approximately seventy percent of his total vote. In
the five ring wards, McShane polled 9,000 votes or nearly
forty percent of his vote. Yet, in those wards, McShane re
ceived only 1,100 more than Martin Behrman. The five "Up
town" wards, the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth,
and Sevententh, gave McShane only 7,000 votes, thirty per
cent of his vote. But in those wards, McShane received his
largest majorities, garnering 2,300 more votes than Mayor
Behrman. In short, though McShane made tremendous inroads
against the Regulars in the traditional ring wards (he also
received 7,000 votes in the seven wards Martin Behrman

79New Orleans Itenj, September 15-18, 1920; New Orleans
Daily States. September 15-17, 1920. McShane carried the
Third (Sullivan), Sixth ("Co" Desmare), Seventh (Daly),
Ninth (John Nunnemacher), Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Wards. Parker lost
the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Wards in January.
The Ninth was a traditional ring ward.
Ward
3
6
7
9
11
12
13
14
16
17

Inc
424
403
36
-238
323
70
136
128
47
-27
1,302
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carried), he "won" the election in the Uptown wards.***
Martin Behrman, on the other hand, lost the election
in the traditional Regular wards. Behrman lost votes in
every ward but the Ninth and the Fifteenth. In the seven
wards he carried, Behrman polled only 9,100 votes, losing
1,100 votes from the state primary in January. And, in the
ten wards won by Andrew McShane, Behrman lost 2,200 votes,
seventy percent coming from the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Wards. Clearly, then, the "traditional" Regular
voter, including 2,800 new voters, deserted Behrman and the
RDO, giving their votes, however reluctantly, to Andrew

'7aNew Orleans Item. September 15-18, 1920. The official
returns were not published on a precinct basis, and the re
turns that I have compiled only approximate the official
final count.
Ward*/Vote
3
6
7
9
11

2,531
1,166
1,672
2,010
1,589

Gain over Parker
424
403
36
238
323

8,968
948
* traditional "machine" wards
Ward*/Vote
12
13
14
16
17

1,851
1,596
1,957
701
844

Gain over Parker
70
136
128
47
-27

6,949
354
* traditional "reform" wards

Majority
303
376
30
286
150
1,145
Majority
564
400
1,005
180
216
2,365
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McShane and the ODA.77
The elections for the four remaining positions on the
commission council were even more closely contested. Only
1,270 votes separated first from second place, 514 second
from third, eighty-six third from fourth, and fifty-one
fourth from fifth. Three ODA candidates, Wilbert Black (who
out polled Mayor Behrman), Richard Murphy, and Stanley Ray,
won seats on the council. Paul H. Maloney, who finished
third, was the only Regular to win a place in the municipal
government. The voting returns in the commission council
races (and the parochial races, too) followed the pattern
set in the mayoral election. The RDO candidates performed
well in the wards and precincts carried by Mayor Behrman,
while the ODA candidates carried the McShane wards and pre
cincts. And, as in the mayor's election, the commission
council (and parochial) elections turned on a sizeable

77New Orleans Itemr September 15-18, 1920.
Ward/Vote
1
2
4
5
8
10
15

960
991
1,106
1,716
1,351
1,699
1,284
9,107

Lost vote
+10
255
353
222
235
125
+60
1,120

Majority
77
258
507
601
190
299
613
2,545

In Wards 3, 6, 7, 9, and 11 Mayor Behrman received
7,823 votes, 1,572 fewer than Frank Stubbs, and in Wards
12, 13, 14, 16, and 17, Behrman polled 4,624 votes, 663
fewer than Stubbs.
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increase in anti-Regular votes in the traditional RDO wards
and precincts and a precipitous decline in Regular votes
throughout the city."7"
Though the election did not portend the imminent
collapse of the RDO (Paul Maloney had, after all, won a seat
on the commission council and erstwhile Regulars controlled
the most important parochical offices), it was, nonetheless,
as close to a complete victory as the ODA could have ex
pected. Contemporaries and later students of the 1920 elec
tion have offered several important, though incomplete, ex
planations for the defeat of Martin Behrman and the Regular
Democratic Organization. First, they argue, the campaign of
John Parker for governor and his startling showing in New
Orleans legitimized the issue of ring rule and showed that
Mayor Behrman and the Regulars were vulnerable on that
issue. Second, the election of Parker encouraged the New
7BNew Orleans Daily States. September 17-23, 1923.
Commission council: Wilbert Black
22,204
Richard Murphy 20,924
Paul H. Maloney 20,420
Stanley Ray
20,334
Maurice DePass 20,283
Thomas Harrison 20,272
John R. Norman 20,269
C. S. Barnes
19,560
Parochial offices:
District Attorney
Robert H Marr(ODA)
22,255
A.D. Henrigues(RDO) 21,281
Criminal Sheriff
George Wiliams(ODA) 23,206
Richard Meredith(RDO) 20,340
Clerk, Civil Court
John J. O'Neill(ODA) 21,705
Thomas Connell(RDO) 21,573
Clerk, Criminal Court Edward A. Haggerty(ODA) 22,356
James Byrnes(RDO)
20,303
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Orleans reformers and the disaffected Regulars to create a
second political organization, dedicated to the removal of
Martin Behrman and to permanent, practical reform for Hew
Orleans. The presence of so many important Regulars in the
ranks of the ODA gave credence to the issue of one-man rule
and was further evidence that Martin Behrman could be beatened. These ersatz reformers testified to the venality and
incompetence of ring rule and the Behrman administration.
The ODA, then, was able to speak with authority about waste
and incompetence in public services, the inequity of the
municipal assessment and taxation policy, and the political
favoritism shown to NORLC.79
As important as those factors were, contemporaries and
later scholars alike agreed that the "critical factor" in
the defeat of Behrman and the RDO was John Parker's whole
sale dismissal of Regular Democrats from state offices and
jobs and the redistribution of those positions and jobs to
ODA supporters."0 There is, of course, no sure or precise
way of determining the number of voters who became part of
the "critical factor". The New Orleans newspapers were, of
course, thoroughly partisan, and routinely exaggerated the

79New Orleans Item. September 13, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. September 9, December 5, 1920; Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans. 1896-1926, 77-78, 208-213;
Schott, "John M. Parker," 104; Williams, "Martin Behrman
Mayor and Political Boss," 118-24, 130.
*°New Orleans Daily States. September 9, 1920; Reynolds,
Machine Politics. 77-78, 208-13; Williams, "Martin Behrman
Mayor and Political Boss," 118-34, 130.
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number of votes won by the redistribution of patronage. And
when the press reported specific figures, the press accounts
usually referred to the number of RDO men dismissed from
their jobs. The number of men replaced, however, was re
markably small, particularly in proportion to the number of
state and parochial positions available to John Parker and
John Patrick Sullivan.BX
Since so few men were dismissed, most students assumed
that the remaining workers, somewhere between 1,700 and
2,000 men, became "galvanized" supporters of McShane and the
ODA. It is conceivable that all 2,300 state workers voted
for McShane, giving him the increase he enjoyed over John
Parker and providing the margin of defeat for Martin
Behrman. But clearly they did not. In the seven wards Martin
Behrman won, 1,036 men who voted in January abstained from
voting in the mayoral election. And in the five "machine"
wards carried by Andrew McShane (undoubtedly, the recipients
of Parker and Sullivan's cache of political patronage),
the ODA gained only 948 votes, while 1,020 voters stayed at
home on election day, unwilling to vote against Martin
Behrman— or for McShane. The point is simple, though
surely profound. In modern New Orleans politics, patronage
axAccording to the New York Bureau of Municipal Research
(directed by historian Charles Austin Beard), there were
2,333 parochial jobs in Orleans Parish. Of those jobs,
sixty-two belonged to the Orleans Parish Levee Board, 350
to various state and parish departments, and 1,921 to the
Dock Board. Administrative Survey of the Government of the
City of New Orleansr 43-45.

512
did not necessarily translate into votes.
But competent, effective government and sufficient pub
lic services did. Apparently, from the perspective of the
majority of New Orleans voters (albeit a narrow one), Martin
Behrman and the Regular Democrats mismanaged the municipal
government, allowing municipal services to deteriorate,
raising taxes, and permitting corporations like New Orleans
Railway and Light Company to threaten the public order and
extort higher rates and fares for inadequate services. With
good reason, then, the voters and politicians of New Orleans
questioned the ability of Martin Behrman to govern the city.
Despite Mayor Behrman's numerous disadvantages and dis
abilities, the municipal elections were, nevertheless, ex
tremely close, suggesting that a great many citizens were
uncomfortable with the prospect of Andrew McShane, John
Sullivan, and John Parker governing New Orleans. For the
most part, the ODA conducted a spiteful, negative campaign,
promising to curb both the benefits and excesses of municifl2New Orleans Item, September 15-18, 1920.
Ward/Lost vote (Behrman)
1
+132
2
532
4
299
5
59
8
76
10
12
15
58
1036

Ward/Lost vote (McShane)
3
250
6
122
7
284
9
146
218
11
8
12
13
72
120
14
16
+50
17
97
1257
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pal government under Martin Behrman and the RDO. The tenor
and volume of the campaign was so bitter and shrill that
many critics in the press were concerned that the rancor of
the campaign might carry over to the next administration.
And the candidacy of Andrew McShane troubled nearly fifty
percent of the voters of New Orleans. He was, to be sure, an
acerbic campaigner, given to excessive promises and brusque
language. He was, as well, a second-rate reformer, never
leading, but always on the edge of the reform movement.
Given these apparent shortcomings and the presence of
other, more vigorous men in the ODA (and on the future
commission council), voters and politicians no doubt
questioned his ability to govern the political coalition
and the city that elected him.
They were right. Early in the legislative session of
1920, Governor Parker insisted that the legislature grant
him the authority (and the money, $25,000) to investigate
financial and political conditions in New Orleans. The in
vestigation was nearly without precedent (a similar "probe"
in 1912 failed to discover any political corruption in New
Orleans) and was, without question, partisan. The governor
and the legislature intended the investigation to embarrass
the Behrman administration and to contribute to its defeat.
Though the commission council blocked the "probe," it accom
plished what Parker and the ODA intended. But, as critics
feared, the investigation continued on into the next admin
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istration, proving more of an embarrassment to the McShane
administration than to Martin Behrman, for the McShane
council refused to implement any of the recommendations made
by its own municipal survey commission. Mayor McShane also
seemed ill-fit to govern New Orleans, and, by his own admis
sion, was incapable of compromise. He was often ill and
always (or so it seemed) unpleasant and uncooperative. He
was, as well, unable to control, much less direct, the or
ganization that elected him. Within two years of his inaugu
ration, the New Orleans Item publicly regretted his
election.
Martin Behrman took his defeat with grace and confi
dence. As his retirement approached, the mayor seemed calm,
almost resigned to his new life as a "private" citizen.
Though he said he had no more personal political ambitions,
he believed that time would show how well the Regular Demo
cratic Organization governed New Orleans, and he predicted
that its "defeat" would be short-lived. The New Orleans Item
and Daily States agreed with the mayor, but for slightly
different reasons. The Daily States wrote that the political
and administrative record of Martin Behrman and the RDO
spoke of the "excellence [of] their stewardship". Under the
Behrman administration, the States continued, New Orleans
progressed more in the past twenty years than in the last
two hundred. And, the newspaper suggested, the new commis
sion council would do well to study the policies of past
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Behrman administrations, perhaps learning more from their
successes than from their failures. The Item, perhaps
sensing the volatile character of the ODA coalition, argued
that it was neither desirable nor possible to destroy the
political organization that had shaped the public policy of
New Orleans for more than twenty years. The McShane admin
istration and the ODA would benefit from the existence and
active participation of a "secondn political organization
like the RDO, restraining the ODA and the administration
from the excesses of one-party rule and one-man government.
The McShane administration and the ODA were the new
"Regulars" now. But, as the Daily States and the Item
feared, the new administration could not learn from the past
and the ODA could not forget it.83

aaNew Orleans Item. September 15, 18, December 5, 1920;
New Orleans Daily States. November 21, December 4-6, 1920.

Chapter Nine

The Irish Interregnum

The McShane administration entered office with great
anticipation and even greater expectations. The last reform
administration to govern New Orleans, that of Walter C.
Flower, left office more than twenty years before, accom
plishing a great many things for the city, but incapable of
sustaining itself in office. Since that time, no reform
movement remotely challenged the electoral supremacy of the
Regular Democratic Organization and its four-time mayor,
Martin Behrman. But Andrew McShane and the ODA had humbled
Martin Behrman and the Regular Democrats, sweeping them
from office (with one exception) and inaugurating a munici
pal government dedicated to anti-ring progressive reform.
The new administration was clearly inexperienced in munici
pal and political affairs, but it was, at least according to
the reform press, sincere, intelligent, and completely free
and independent of the quarrelsome, factional politics of
the past. And, though the margin of victory for the new
municipal government was extremely narrow, its mandate,
at least as McShane and the ODA interpreted it, was unmistakeable. It was clear, wrote the Daily States, that the
mandate of the new administration called for "rigid
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economy" in public finances, a reduction of tax and assess
ment rates to prewar levels, "depoliticization" of public
administration and the introduction of municipal civil ser
vice, expansion of essential city services, including water,
drainage, sewerage, and paving, a "fair and reasonable" re
habilitation and regulation of New Orleans Railway and Light
Company, a fundamental, democratic restructuring of the
municipal government, and the enactment of a comprehensive
city planning and zoning law.1
Andrew McShane expected nothing less from himself and
his administration.2 In his inaugural address, McShane vowed
to eradicate machine politics from the municipal government,
erecting in its place an open, independent, democratic gov
ernment, dedicated to the economical, efficient, and unbias
ed administration of the "public business". Accomplishing
these changes required intelligent planning, fortitude, and,
above all, patience on the part of the city administration

1New Orleans Daily States. September 15, December 2, 4,
6, 1920, January 2, 1921; New Orleans Item. January 5,
February 12, 26, May 23, 1921; Raymond O. Nussbaum, "Pro
gressive Politics in New Orleans," passim.
2When the new commission council convened in December,
it assigned each councilman to a separate executive depart
ment (as mayor McShane served as Commissioner of Public
Affairs). Richard Murphy became Commissioner of Public
Finance, Wilbert Black the Commissioner of Public Property,
Stanley Ray the Commissioner of Public Safety, and Paul H.
Maloney the Commissioner of Public Utilities. McShane ap
pointed Ivy G. Kittredge as City Attorney, John Klorer as
City Engineer, Harry Fitzpatrick, his cousin, as Fire Com
missioner, and John H. Bruns, McShane's son-in-law, as
Police Commissioner. New Orleans Daily Statesr December 4-9,
1920.
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and the public. The foundation was being laid, and the new
commission council was anxious to begin work.3
Achieving those changes, of course, was easier said
than done, and required more than practicing the "cardinal
virtues" of prudence, patience, and foritude. It required
experience, leadership, and, above all, ability. Though the
new commission council had some ability and could acquire
experience, it lacked leadership and direction. Or, better
said, it had too many leaders and went in too many direc
tions, dividing the McShane administration against itself,
eroding its foundation, and leading to its collapse. The
collapse of the McShane administration began before it took
office, and responsibility for its failure lay with the vol
atile character of the ODA coalition, the willful and explo
sive personality of Andrew McShane, the sterility of munici
pal reform as practiced by McShane, Sullivan, and Parker,
and the almost intractable problems of governing a large
and expanding city like Mew Orleans.

Early in the legislative session of 1920, the Parker
floor leaders in the House of Representatives introduced the
administration's so-called "probe" bill. Prepared by Parker
and his principal aides, the bill authorized the governor to
appoint a special, independent commission, empowered to "in
vestigate" every aspect of the municipal and parochial gov
3New Orleans Daily States, December 6, 1920.
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ernments of New Orleans. Over the past eight to ten years,
the governor explained, Martin Behrman and the Regular Demo
crats had acquired near pleanary power over the municipal
and parochial governments of New Orleans, imposing an unre
sponsive, unrepresentative municipal government on the city,
monopolizing the debate on public policy, and endangering
democratic government and reform in New Orleans and the
state. It was his firm hope, he said, that an investigation
into the financial, political, and administrative activities
of the Behrman Regulars might prompt the appropriate politi
cal and structural reforms to return municipal rule to the
better citizens of New Orleans and restore the proper polit
ical balance between New Orleans and the state.4
In the House and Senate, Regular Democrats accused the
governor of abusing his executive authority and of using the
legislature to sanction and fund a political "witchhunt". In

4New Orleans Daily States. June 8, July 10-11, 1920; New
Orleans Item. May 15, June 18, 24, 30, August 3, September
4, 1920. Prom the start, one of the principal objectives of
the municipal investigation was replacing the existing com
mission council system with another form of government that
promoted the interest of the ODA and its supporters. But the
ODA could not agree on what form of municipal government
best suited its interests. John Sullivan favored a return to
the councilmanic system, while McShane favored retaining the
existing system, with a few modifications, and other ODA
members wanted wholesale revisions in the municipal govern
ment. The preamble to the bill declared that its purpose was
to help the people of New Orleans "obtain [a] form of go
vernment which will best lend itself to service and effi
ciency, and that will not serve as a cloak or agency for the
construction and maintenace of a political ring or
rings...". Act 37, Acts Passed bv the General Assembly of
the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920.
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the lower house, Representative John Dymond, a Regular from
New Orleans, offered an amendment to the bill, delaying its
work until after the municipal and parochial elections. But
the House refused to amend the bill, and sent it to the Sen
ate. In the Senate, the bill met greater opposition. Despite
the pleas (and threats) from Governor Parker and the ODA,
the Senate Finance Committee amended the bill, preventing
the investigation until after September 14, the day of the
municipal and parochial elections. But in the full Senate,
the Governor and his ODA supporters eliminated the amend
ment and passed the bill, authorizing Parker to appoint a
five man commission and appropriating $25,000 for the inves
tigation. *
In August, one month before the municipal elections,
Governor Parker selected the New Orleans "municipal survey
commission,” appointing Frank Dameron, Allison Owen,
Terrance Smith, Albert English, and Thomas H. Roberts, all
well-known businessmen and "agressive" anti-Regular reform
ers, as members of the commission (Harold Moise was general
counsel). But before these men could begin their work, the
commission council and the mayor filed separate suits
“Act 37, ibid.; New Orleans Item, June 18, 24, 26, 2930, July 1, 1920; New Orleans Daily States. July 1, 1920.
Senator Delos R. Johnson from rural north Louisiana expres
sed best the sentiment of the country parishes. Whether the
General Assembly was right or wrong about investigating New
Orleans was "irrelevant," he said. The "hill people" of
north Louisiana want to see New Orleans get its "just
desserts," and the probe was the first course. The Parker
administration was, in part, responsible for this sentiment.
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against the state, attempting to block the investigation. In
their suits, the council and the mayor acknowledged the au
thority of the state legislature to investigate the adminis
tration of the municipal government, but the Claiborne act
(Representative Ferdinand Claiborne sponsored the bill) was
a deceitful misuse of the authority of the legislature and a
gross waste of tax money, designed to further the partisan
interest of Governor Parker and his supporters in New
Orleans. The purpose of the Claiborne act and the intent of
the Dameron commission, Behrman and the council asserted,
was to discredit the municipal government of New Orleans,
reward ODA partisans, buy votes for the ODA candidates, and
allow John Parker to determine, if not dictate, the election
of the mayor, commission council, and the other municipal
officers of New Orleans.8
Eventually, the Civil District Court ruled in favor of
Martin Behrman (the McShane administration withdrew the city
suit, leaving Behrman as the only petitioner), nullifying
the Claiborne act and preventing the Dameron commission from
investigating the municipal government of New Orleans. It
was, however, a Pyrrhic victory. The opposition of the
8New Orleans Item. August 6-13, 1920; New Orleans Daily
States. August 7-13, 1920. After the municipal elections,
members of the Association of Commerce accused Frank Dameron
and Allison Owen and several other "prominent" civic leaders
of being excessively anti-Regular. The executive committee
of the Association, chaired by Arthur Parker, the brother of
John Parker, exonerated Dameron, Owen, and the others of all
allegations. See New Orleans Daily States. January 28, March
1, 1921.
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B£hrman administration to an administrative survey of the
municipal government convinced many "unaligned" reformers
and some "disaffected" Regulars of the necessity of such a
survey- And, more importantly, these interests, for an as
sortment of reasons, pressured the McShane administration
into employing the municipal survey as the prinicipal means
of ending ring rule and establishing a permanent reform gov
ernment in Mew Orleans.7
Late in December, 1920, barely a week after the McShane
assumed municipal power, the Tax Payers Association of New
Orleans (TPA) called on the commission council to "recon
vene" the municipal survey commission, empowering it to "re
mediate" the problems affecting the municipal government of
New Orleans. At first the council (and the ODA patronage
committee) ignored the requests of the TPA to eliminate
"useless" jobs through the municipal government, scaling
down the cost of government and, in the process, reducing
taxes and the assessment rate. By the middle of February,
with problems of the Behrman administration still readily
apparent, the council could no longer ignore the demands of
the TPA and the newspapers for an administrative survey.®
In February, J. Blanc Monroe, an executive official of
7New Orleans Item. August 8-18, November 10, 13, 29, 30,
December 3, 28, 1920, January 7, 10, 20, 1921; New Orleans
Daily States,. August 7-22, October 2, November 10, December
2, 8, 1920, January 20, October 4, 1921.
®New Orleans Item, December 4, 1920, February 19, March
2, April 24, 1921; New Orleans Daily States. December 16,
1920, March 2, 1921.
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the TPA and the general counsel of the Orleans Parish School
Board called on the city administration to "endorse" the
concept of a municipal survey commission. According to
Monroe, the city and the McShane administration would both
benefit from an exhaustive and authoritative review and
reform of the municipal government. The municipal govern
ment of New Orleans, he told reporters, needed a complete
restructuring and reordering of its priorities. The present
system of government was inequitable and wasteful, penaliz
ing businessmen, investors, and property holders with high
taxes and insufficient services and supporting an army of
needless workers and officials. Since the new administration
was so inexperienced, he said, a systematic review of the
municipal government could guide the commission council in
its efforts to rid the city of Behrmanism and could, at the
same time, recommend ways of restructuring the municipal
government and making it economical and equitable.9
From the start, the McShane council was skeptical of
the motivation of the TPA (the commission council and the
TPA feuded constantly over assessment practices, paving ex
penses, and the cost of government) and uncertain of the
value of an unrestained administrative survey of the city
government. But the TPA and its supporters in the press,
principally the Item, assured the council that the sort of
municipal survey they envisioned would not be politically
9I b i d .
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motivated, but designed to promote effective, efficient man
agement of municipal affairs. The "fundamental" concerns of
any city, the Item advanced, were not politics and patron
age, but public health, safety, commerce, education and the
arts, and a whole assortment of other essential services.
Modern municipal government, then, at least according to the
TPA and the New Orleans Item, required the skilled manage
ment of those services, and a municipal survey would vir
tually assure the city of the sort of government and
policies necessary to manage those concerns and services.3-0
Apparently, the constant pressure of the TPA and the
Item convinced the commission council to pursue the idea of
a municipal survey, but the council was unwilling to grant a
municipal survey commission the sort of pleanary authority
demanded by the TPA and the Item. Early in August, the coun
cil took up the idea of a municipal survey. Commissioner of
Public Finance Richard M. Murphy suggested limiting the sur
vey commission to matters of taxation, assessment, and econ
omy, leaving to the commission council concerns of a more
"political" nature. Though economy was the watchword of the
McShane administration, a majority of the council found no
appreciable value in so limited a survey, preferring instead
to expand the survey to all municipal departments, including
the commission council and the independent boards and com
missions serving the city and parish. But the commissioners,
3-°Ibid.
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fearful of losing control over their own government, refused
to give the survey commission the authority to impose its
recommendations on the commission council or the other
"branches" of the municipal government. And the principal
boards and commissions, the Sewerage and Water Board, the
Public Belt Railroad Commission, the Orleans Parish School
Board, and the Board of Liquidation City Debt, either de
clined to participate in the survey or refused to abide by
the recommendations of the municipal survey commission.xx
Despite its reservations and caveats, the commission
council agreed to sponsor a "full and complete" survey of
the municipal government by an independent, nonpartisan com
mission of businessmen, assisted by recognized experts in
the field of municipal administration. Eager to avoid any
suspicion of bias or partisanship the city council, incred
ibly, invited the moribund Dameron commission to serve as
the municipal survey commission. After some initial hesita
tion, the Dameron commission agreed to the conditions set by
the commission council. The municipal survey commission im
mediately hired a "professional" staff, led by "Colonel"
James E. Edmonds, the former managing editor of the TimesxxNew Orleans Item. August 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 16, 19, 20,
September 15, 1921; New Orleans Daily Statesr August 9-10,
September 7, 10, 15, 17, 1921. City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge advised the commission council that it could not
delegate the reserve powers of the city to the municipal
survey commission, and, consequently, the recommendations of
the commission were not binding on the council or any muni
cipal department. Kittredge to McShane, August 31, 1921,
vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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Picayune, to conduct the survey. Though the staft was ener
getic, possessing "high principles and ideals" and broad ex
perience in "practical politics," from the start it was evi
dent that it lacked the competence to conduct a thorough and
systematic analysis of the New Orleans municipal government.
Late in September, then, James Edmonds recommended that the
municipal survey commission and the commission council hire
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR) to conduct
the survey. Within a matter of days, the McShane administra
tion contracted the BMR, appropriating $25,000 for the com
pletion of the municipal survey.1-2
The Bureau of Municipal Research began its initial in
quiries in September, completing the investigation in late
November. Over the next month, the BMR collated the information it had gathered, issuing a detailed report and lenghty
analysis to the Municipal Survey Commission at the every end
of December. For the next several weeks, the MSC studied the
report and recommendations of the BMR, releasing an explana
tion of the BMR report and offering its own analysis of the

X2New Orleans Item. August 3-5, September 2, 25-27, 30,
October 1-2, December 5, 14, 1921; New Orleans Daily States.
August 5, October 1-2, December 5, 14, 1921; Municipal Sur
vey Commission, Administrative Survey of the Government of
the Citv of New Orleans. 8. Begun in 1906 by municipal re
formers William H. Allen, Frederick Cleveland, and Henry
Bruere, the BMR advocated a scientific approach to
municipal administration, though, according to historian
Otis Pease,
the BMR tempered its scientific reformism with
"a saving sense of realism". Otis A. Pease, "Urban Reformers
in the
Progressive Era: A Reappraisal," Pacific Northwest
Quarter- lv. 62 (April 1971), 54.

527
conditions and problems of the municipal government and
proposing several recommendations for the administrative and
political reform of the City of New Orleans.13
The report of Bureau of Municipal Research was more and
less than the Municipal Survey Commission expected and de
sired. The BMR report, covering more than two hundred pages
and countless organization charts and diagrams, was a sys
tematic and detailed assessment of the structure, policies,
and practices governing the municipal and parochial adminis
trations of New Orleans. It was, as well, far too comprehen
sive, overly technical, and, at times, virtually unreadable,
making it difficult to digest, much less implement, all its
recommendations. And, despite its much acclaimed political
"realism," the BMR virtually ignored the political diffi
culties and consequences of the reforms it proposed, com
pelling the Municipal Survey Commission to reject many of
the more significant proposals of the BMR as impractical and
inappropriate for New Orleans.1*
In its investigation and report, the Bureau of Munici
pal Research concentrated on three principal issues: the re
structuring of the municipal government, reforming and

“ Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of
the Government of the Citv of New Orleans. 6-9, 54-278; New
Orleans Item, October 1, November 13, 23, December 21, 29,
1921, January 15, 18, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. Decem
ber 16, 1921, January 18, 1922.
“ Municipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of
the Government of the Citv of New Orleans, 6-9.
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reorienting the financial and taxing policies of the city
government, and the efficient redistribution of city ser
vices. "The essentials of good government are easily
stated," the report announced. "They are axiomatic; no one
will debate them."
The first requisite is democracy. No political
structure is sound that is not so constructed
as to respond quickly and precisely to popular
control. The second requisite is economy. Govern
ment must not only respond to popular demands,
but [also] must be carried on at the lowest cost
consistent with the proper discharge of public
functions and fair conditions of employment for
those who serve the city. The third requisite is
efficiency. This means that the work undertaken
by the city government should be well done in
accordance with the best standards of good work
to be found in other cities and in private enter
prises.
According to the Bureau of Municipal Research, the
municipal government of New Orleans met none of the
essential requisites for democratic, economical, and
efficient government. The city government was unresponsive,
profligate, and inefficient, and in need of thorough, com
prehensive reorganization. "The type of city organization
that is most desirable," the report intoned, "is the one
that makes for simple, direct, responsible government." In
contrast, the municipal government of New Orleans was overly
complex, oblique, and irresponsible. "In fact, a more intri
cate and unintelligible arrangement could hardly be de
vised." There were, for example, sixty governmental offices,

XBIbid.. 58.
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departments, boards, commissions, and other agencies consti
tuting the municipal government of New Orleans. The citizens
of New Orleans elected forty-five officials, the governor
appointed twenty-five more, and nearly thirty officials
served as members of self-perpetuating boards. "In fact,"
the BMR concluded, "New Orleans has no semblance of a sys
tematic and well-co-ordinated administrative organiza
tion.1,18
The source of the city's discontent was, the BMR
wrote, the politicized structure of the municipal govern
ment. The Pavrot charter did not restructure or reorient
the municipal government of New Orleans. Though the 1912
charter enhanced the authority of the mayor and executive
departments it created, it did not (as critics of the
Behrman administrations alledged) concentrate complete
municipal authority in the mayor and the council. Rather,
like other commission council governments, the Pavrot char
ter tended to diffuse power and obscure responsibility. The
commission form adopted by New Orleans merely superimposed
the commission form of government on the existing, "disor
ganized collection" of special, independent boards and com
missions, continuing the same "wasteful," politicized
policies and practices of past administrations and per-

xaIbid.. 57-58.
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petuating machine politics.3-7
The rehabilitation of the municipal government of New
Orleans, as seen by the BMR, demanded the centralization of
municipal and parochial power in a single authority, elimi
nating the independent boards and commissions and assigning
their duties and responsibilities to expert administrators.
Though the BMR considered the centralization of municipal
authority essential to good government and to the develop
ment of New Orleans as a progressive city, it also recog
nized, but discounted, the entrenched, opposition to the
concentration of political authority in the United States.
With that realization in mind, the BMR recommended two
approaches to reorganizing the municipal government in New
Orleans.xa
Though sure to arouse controversy and opposition, the
first proposal allowed the commission council to retain and

X7Ibid. According to the BMR, the board system of muni
cipal government was "a clever means of escaping account
ability and consequently criticism and blame" for public
policy. The board system, the BMR report said, was devoid of
initiative, rewarded mediocrity, retarded public improve
ments and development, and, above all, arrested the author
ity of the commission council, preventing it from determin
ing and controlling public policy. In essence, the BMR was
correct, for boards and commissions like the Public Belt
Railroad Commission and the Board of Liquidation City Debt,
served the vested interests of the commerical and banking
elite of the city. These boards, as we have seen, resisted
the efforts of the Behrman administration to influence
their conduct or eliminate their hold on public policy. For
an historical account of the development of the independent
commission system, see Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph.
66-80.
XBIbid.. 60.
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expand its authority over the municipal government. The plan
called for the commission council to abolish most of the in
dependent commissions, turning over their duties to "compe
tent" administrators directly responsible to the commission
council. The BMR claimed that the plan promised a simple,
direct, and immediate remedy for New Orleans's administra
tive "paralysis". The plan, as portrayed by the BMR, may
have simplified the "lines" of municipal authority, but in
augurating such a plan would not be simple or, for that
matter, likely. The plan proposed eliminating the elective
Board of Assessors (something no governor, legislature, or
constitutional convention had been willing or able to accom
plish), replacing the assessors with a "bureau of assess
ment," accountable only to the Commissioner of Public Fi
nance and the commission council. In addition, the BMR's
recommendation called for the Commissioner of Public Finance
to take control of all future bond issues and the liquida
tion of bonded indebtedness, relegating the Board of Liqui
dation City Debt to retiring old debt and gradually ending
the control of the Board— and the bankers who sat on it—
over the financial and political development of the city.1"
These aspects condemned the proposal from the start,
uniting Regulars and reformers, laborers, merchants, and
x"Ibid., 60-61. The plan also eliminated the boards of
police and fire commissioners, and placed the Public Belt
Railroad Commission and Sewerage and Water Board directly
under the mayor. These boards would be abolished under the
second plan.
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bankers against a plan that degraded popular participation
in public affairs and proposed a fundamental realignment of
power in New Orleans. It was unlikely that the civic and
commercial elite of New Orleans, given its past opposition
to the modest centralization of municipal power under the
Behrman administration, would endorse so radical a change.
Nevertheless, the BMR considered its first proposal a
feasible, though wholly inadequate, response to the adminis
trative needs of the city. "If the people of New Orleans
desire a government that is simple in structure, that fixes
definite responsibility for action, and that is capable of
operating effectively and economically," the BMR report con
tinued, "then sweeping changes must be made in the present
organization"— changes that involved a complete revision of
municipal government and politics.20
Efforts to return to a councilroanic system of govern
ment (a plan endorsed by John Patrick Sullivan and the Daily
States), the Bureau informed the Municipal Survey Commis
sion, were regressive, and should be ignored. Instead, the
BMR advocated the adoption of the Commission-Manager plan.
"This form of city government has much to commend it. It is
not only simple in structure and definitely locates adminis
trative responsibility, but it has the added advantage over
other forms of municipal government in that it enables the
city to secure an experienced and trained chief administra
2°Ibid.. 61.
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tor and to retain his services so long as he directs satis
factorily the city's work."2X
The Commission-Manager plan concentrated most all muni
cipal authority in a single, reputably nonpartisan, chief
administrator, chosen by the commission council and serving
no fixed term of office. The city manager was solely respon
sible for the composition and performance of his administra
tion, and, as the BMR report explained, "in the active man
agement of the [city] he stands in the same relation to the
commission council that a corporation head does to his
board of directors". The success or failure of the commission-manager plan, then, depended on the "good faith and
vision" of the commission council in selecting the "best
trained man available for the position and...giv{ing) him
absolute freedom in administrative matters.82
But even for the so-called business progressives who
constituted the Municipal Survey Commission or sat on the
Hew Orleans commission council, the commission-manager pro
posal required a naive act of faith and an almost prophetic
vision. The BMR proposal called on the elective commission
council to "relinquish all administrative powers and duties
and become simply a legislative or policy determining body."
The council would remain an elective body and would continue
to determine the broad features of public policy, retaining

2XIbid.. 61-62.
22Ibid.
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direct control over civil service, the juvenile and city
courts, and the Public Belt Railroad. But, apart from
selecting the city manager, the council would have no other
administrative or political authority.23
By contrast, under the second BMR proposal, the city
manager would have the authority to "co-ordinate the activ
ities of the city administration in any way he [saw] fit” .
The city manager would have the freedom to consolidate ad
ministrative departments, recruit experienced, competent
subordinates, and determine the ultimate cost of essential
city services. To guard against the establishment of an
unelected political machine, the BMR proposed that the MSC
and the commission council introduce a municipal civil ser
vice system and that the city manager plan follow, as close
ly as possible, the Bureau's specific recommendations.2•
The BMR recommended the creation of eight municipal de
partments,29 consolidating the duties and services of the
municipal, parochial, and state governments serving New
Orleans. As with the first proposal, the BMR recommended the
elimination of most of the independent commissions, includ
ing the Board of Assessors, the Board of Liquidation, and
the fire and police boards. Under the second set of recom

23Ibid., 62-63.
2'•Ibid.. 63. The BMR report recommended that all public
workers, with the exception of the city manager and the
department heads, should be placed on civil service.
2SPublic Finance, Works, Safety, Welfare, Utilities, Law,
Drainage and Water Supply, and Parks and Recreation. Ibid.
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mendations, the BMR urged the abolition of the Sewerage
and Water Board, the Recorder of Mortgages, the Registrar of
Conveyances, and several other minor boards, and it sug
gested that the city manager and the commission council con
sider eliminating the Public Belt Railroad Commission and,
if studies warranted, the Orleans Parish School Board.*®
The commission-manager proposal had few defenders, and
the Municipal Survey Commission rejected the proposal as im
practical and unwise. In a city as large as New Orleans,
with diverse economic and political interests and concerns,
a commission-manager plan was indeed an impractical and illconsidered proposal. It placed political and administrative
authority in the hands of "outsiders" hired to determine and
carry out public policy. It muffled, if not silenced, popu
lar participation in the public affairs, relegating citizens
to the level of consumers of public services and voters to
the role of "stockholders". Above all, it placed government
and politics beyond the control and influence of even the
most active and interested citizens, allowing "experts" to
determine the most fundamental public issues.*"7
*®Ibid . r 63-67. Though the BMR made no "positive" recom
mendations concerning the School Board, it did argue that
"so long as the schools remain(ed) under a separate govern
ing body...there (could) never be (a) carefully co-ordinated
budget plan covering all activities of the city government."
*'yIbid.. 12. The only defender the commission-manager
plan had was the New Orleans Item. The Item reported that
the commission-manager plan was not a "solid recommenda
tion," but a simple summary of the latest developments in
the "science" of municipal management.

Nevertheless, the Municipal Survey Commission consider
ed the BMR study and report invaluable contributions to
the rehabilitation o£ New Orleans politics and government,
revealing several important facts about the character and
business of the municipal government. When the McShane ad
ministration assumed power in December, 1920, the MSC wrote
in its report, municipal affairs were in "a state of practi
cal paralysis and administrative collapse; without proper
care for the present and without adequate plan for the fu
ture". The causes for this administrative "collapse" were
apparent to even the most casual observer, though remedying
the collapse would be difficult, requiring a modification
in the form of the municipal government and fundamental
change in the content of city politics. The paralysis in
government and politics stemmed from the politicalization of
the "public service personnel" and the "confused and tangled
governmental organization, which concealed responsibility,
added to costs, limited economies, and impeded action while
aiding politicalization of public service". The origin of
these problems could be traced to the Pavrot commission
council charter of 1912, which "superimposed...the old
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structure o£ the former politicalized ward-and-councilmanic
form [of municipal government], without destruction of the
gross evils existing in that form and without the Commission
Council as such being given the necessary opportunity to
function."a"
Finally, the BMR study revealed that the McShane admin
istration, despite its considerable accomplishments (there
were four the MSC report mentioned), remained a victim of
the old politicized form of municipal government. In an
effort to defeat the old regime, the ODA and its supporters
employed the same sordid tactics and appealed to the same
baser instincts that won elections for the Regular Demo
crats. And, as a consequence, "the working personnel [of
the municipal government], in considerable measure, [was]
still too deeply concerned with factional and partisan
politics".
These facts, "drawn naturally from the mass of data"
assembled by the Bureau of Municipal Research, led the MSC
to several general conclusions. First, in making its recom
mendations, the MSC would ignore any consideration of fac
tional advantage, local custom, or political convention. It
would, as well, suggest only those reforms that were feasi
ble and that the commission council could enact "in good
2<*Ibid.. 6-7.
2gIbid.r 7. The four noteable achievements of the McShane
administration were placing city finances on a cash basis,
repairing streets, establishing a system of maintaining city
property, and making "necessary plans for the future".

538
faith and without jeopardy to other public interests".
Second, though it refused to endorse either of the "politi
cal" recommendations made by the BMR, the Dameron commission
recognized the need for the restructuring of municipal gov
ernment and politics. The MSC proposed, then, the creation
of two special advisory committees and the abolition of the
civil service commission, replacing it with a Bureau of Em
ployment and Personnel Supervision. The City Plan Commis
sion, representing the commerical elite of New Orleans,
would, with the help of experts and the approval of the city
administration, develop a comprehensive city plan, designed
to chart the city's civic and commerical future. The City
Advisory Committee, consisting of one representative from
the commission council and the principal independent boards
and commissions, would bring order, continuity, and harmony
to the administration of municipal affairs. As a division of
city government directly responsible to the commission coun
cil, the Bureau of Employment and Personnel Supervison would
establish a civil service system for the city, separating
policy making from administration and determining the em
ployment policies and standards of performance for every
municipal department. The MSC also proposed that all "rankand-file" employees of the city and parochial governments be
"barred from partisan and factional activities and the
places these public servants fill be removed from the bar
gain counter of political campaigns". With these reforms
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in place, the municipal government of New Orleans could
begin implementing the fiscal and administrative reforms
recommended by the Bureau of Municipal Research.30
Though the McShane administration was anxious to reduce
the cost of government, it was not prepared, or willing, for
that matter, to restructure municipal government or relin
quish political authority to a bureaucracy of experts or to
a series of citizens advisory boards. Like previous adminis
trations, the McShane commission council jealously guarded
its prerogatives and powers, and was anxious to expand its
authority into other areas of municipal administration. The
McShane administration was content with the present system
of municipal government, believing it served the specialized
interests of the commerical and civic elite of New Orleans.
The McShane commission council also wanted to control the
municipal reform movement, structuring its policies to meet
its own definitions and expectations of good government and
assuring the continuation of business reform in New Orleans.
The reforms proposed by the BMR and advocated by the
MSC promised, however, to strip the commission council— and
a majority of the people of New Orleans— of effective poli
tical and administrative authority, turning it over to
experts and the privileged few. In one sense, then, the
McShane administration, like the Behrman administration, re
sisted (though not completely) the antidemocratic excesses
3°Ibid.r 7-12.
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advocated by the BMR, the MSC, and John M. Parker. In an
other sense, however, the McShane commission council,
through its political alliances, policies, and accomplish
ments, yielded to those excesses, paralyzing the municipal
government and leading to its own administrative collapse.

In many ways, the Orleans Democratic Association was an
organization of excesses, uniting the extremes of the antiBehrman, anti-Regular movement in an unstable political
coalition. At times, all that united these disparate politi
cal factions was their commitment (indeed their obession)
to removing the Behrman administration from power, replacing
it with their own variety of municipal reform. But once the
ODA defeated Behrman and the "Old" Regulars, the coarse
fabric of the reform organization began to ravel, tearing
apart the reform coalition. The first and most revealing
snag developed over the issues of political patronage and
civil service reform.
During the municipal campaign, the Parker administra
tion lavished state patronage on the "disaffected" Regulars,
hoping to attract their support for Andrew McShane and the
other ODA candidates. The reformers consented to this "cor
rupt bargain," believing it a necessary, though evil, expe
dient. The patronage system was, after all, the epitome of
ring rule, sustaining an unqualified, regressive administra-
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tion in office, adding unnecessarily to the cost of govern
ment, and denying men of talent and intelligence the oppor
tunity for public service. But there was, as well, virtue in
necessity. Political patronage had helped defeat the "Old"
Regulars (or at least the ODA believed it had) and could be
used to sustain the ODA in office and further its conception
of good government and progressive municipal reform. The
continuation of the patronage system, if only on a temporary
basis, also had an immediate benefit. It provided the
McShane administration with experienced workers, allowing it
to continue services without interruption and to pursue its
political reforms, including civil service, without distrac
tion. 3X
Accomplishing all this was, however, easier said than
done. In several municipal and parochial departments, ODA
officials "purged" dozens of experienced (RDO) workers, re
placing them with men of unknown ability and little experi
ence. And, to compound the issue, ODA leaders in the tradi
tional Regular wards and precincts, themselves recent con
verts to anti-Regular reform, awarded jobs almost exclusive
ly to former Regular Democrats, bypassing the reform wing
of the ODA coalition. The dispute over jobs was so intense
and personal that it rent the ODA patronage committee in
two and disrupted the efforts of the McShane administration
3XNew Orleans Item, November 25, December 10, 28, 29,
1920, September 3, November 1, 8, 1922; New Orleans Daily
States, November 28, December 5, 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 1920.
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and the reformers within the ODA to enact a comprehensive
municipal civil service law.32
At the state constitutional convention in the spring of
1921, barely four months after the inauguration of the
McShane administration, Charles I. Rosen, a charter member
of the ODA and an inveterate opponent of ring rule, asked
the convention to incorporate a series of detailed civil
service provisions in the state constitution. The Rosen
proposals applied only to New Orleans, superseding other
municipal civil service laws and the civil service provi
sions of the commission council charter. Rosen called for
the creation of an independent, municipal civil service com
mission, appointed by the governor (though funded by the
municipal government) and authorized to write and implement
the policies and regulations governing civil service employ
ment for New Orleans. Under the Rosen proposals, all munici
pal personnel, except elected officials, major appointive
positions (City Attorney, City Treasurer, Clerk of Council),
teachers, unskilled labor, and the personnel of the various
independent boards and commissions, would be subject to the
rules and regulation devised by the new civil service com
mission. 33

32Ibid.
33New Orleans Daily States, March 15-18, 23, 1921.
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Though the civil service provisions won the support of
the Committee on Parochial and Municipal Affairs, they did
not have the support of Colonel Sullivan, Mayor McShane, or
other ODA delegates. Nor did they have the support of former
Mayor Behrman (Behrman was a delegate to the consitutional
convention). Sullivan and the ODA patronage committee
opposed the Rosen provisions because, as they argued, the
proposals were too specific and did not belong in a modern
state constituion. Sullivan favored broader, less detailed
civil service provisions, granting the legislature the au
thority to enact civil service legislation for New Orleans.
And, as a way of placating Rosen and the ODA reformers, he
and Governor Parker promised to enact the Rosen provisions
at the next session of the legislature .*+
But Sullivan's reason was disingenuous and his prom
ise false. Despite their limitations and partisanship, the
Rosen proposals threatened Sullivan and his organization. In
effect, the Rosen provisions set a limit on the number and
sort of "nonexempt" positions and jobs, preventing Sullivan
and the ODA from expanding their influence. In addition, the
Rosen proposals placed municipal civil service under a state
agency, mandated by the constitution, serving at the discre
tion of the governor, authorized to adopt civil service
policies and regulations free of "political" pressures, and

3'*New Orleans Item. April 27, 1921, September 13, Novem
ber 8, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 27, 1921.
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£unded by the municipal government. Hardly the ideal circum
stances for an unreconstructed spoilsman like John Patrick
Sullivan or a partisan reformer like John Milliken Parker.
Sullivan and Parker convinced Rosen to retract his propo
sals, promising to enact them or something like them in next
session of the legislature. After "mature reflection," Rosen
withdrew the provisions, but a municipal civil service bill
was never introduced during John Parker's term, and civil
service reform remained an elusive, though intensely de
bated, reform for the next several years.33
The Municipal Survey Commission, too, blamed the
"spoils system" for the administrative paralysis of the New
Orleans municipal government. "From 1900 to 1920," the MSC
wrote, "New Orleans was controlled, literally, by a soviet
of municipal employees. Under this condition,...the public
service in New Orleans had reached a point...of practically
complete administrative collapse. Standards of public ser
vice had become so lowered as to be nearly non-existent. It
will be a generation before New Orleans ceases to pay,
heavily, because street paving, repair, and maintenance, the
33Ibid.; Schott, "John M. Parker," 386; Kemp, ed., Martin
Behrman of New Orleans. 320. Rosen acknowledged that the
purpose of his proposals was to prevent the growth of a
second political machine, one more powerful and corrput than
the RDO. Mayor Behrman opposed the Rosen provisions because
he opposed civil service, not because it threatened the
political hegemony of the RDO, but because it hindered the
formulation of public policy and lessened administrative
control over workers. Behrman also opposed the provision
giving a state agency control over municipal civil service.
See Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New Orleans. 295-301.
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construction and repair of public buildings, were not pro
perly supervised or planned, because data essential to pro
per planning and administration were not kept...[and]
because the public, as a whole, was inert, and permitted
it."3a
The MSC placed much of the blame for the "administra
tive collapse" on the Behrman administration for establish
ing and perpetuating the "soviet of municipal employees" The
1900 civil service law and the 1912 commission council char
ter provided "no effective system for the selection of fit
employees," and the ambiguities and specific exemptions of
those laws allowed for dismissals based on "political
grounds". Though the MSC did not blame the ODA or the
McShane administration for using the spoils system to remove
the Regulars from power, the MSC cautioned the new organiza
tion and administration against continuing the old system
and contributing to the administrative paralysis of the
municipal government. "The continuation of the [present
civil service] operation and method, however, will consti
tute a grave reflection upon the present administration. No
new law is necessary for the present Commission council to
install a proper system of government...New law may be
necessary to protect a proper system against destruction in
the future, but is not necessary for installation. Lack of

3BMunicipal Survey Commission, Administrative Survey of
the Government of the City of New Orleans. 48.
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the law is no excuse for inaction. However, to forbid parti
san or factional activity by employees [and abuse of the
employment practices by the municipal government], a consti
tutional amendment is necessary."37
The MSC, however, rejected the Rosen proposals as un
justified and impractical intrusions on the administrative
and political authority of the city, eroding the powers of
the commission council without effecting real civil service
reform. The Roen proposals denied the municipal government
the authority to decide fundamental issues of public policy
and to manage public programs. "The [public] policy [of the
city], the plan adoption, the program-making, must be in the
hands of elective public servants, answerable to the elec
torate, aided and advised by a limited number of appointed
deputies charged with the duty of seeing the agreed policy
carried out." "For this reason, we are opposed to any legis
lation which shall place in the hands of the State author
37Ibid.. 48-49. The 1896 municipal charter created a
civil service commission for New Orleans, placing many
municipal employees (the number is uncertain) under civil
service regulations. The civil service commission was, at
least according to the reformers who enacted the law, in
dependent of politics and the spoils system. Over the next
several years, however, the Regular Democrats managed to
alter the civil service regulations, eventually reorganizing
the civil service commission and rewriting the civil service
regulations. Nussbaum, "Progressive Politics in New
Orleans," 76, 87-88, 92-96; Reynolds, Machine Politics in
New Orleans. 58-61; Kemp, ed., Martin Behrman of New
Orleans. 295-96, fn. 5. The BMR reported that there were
8,000 government workers in New Orleans; 2,600 under the
commission council and the rest divided among the state and
parochial departments. Of those 8,000, 2,600 were under
state and municipal civil service.
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ities as such or any Commission or agency of the State, as
such, any division of authority over the employees of gov
ernmental agencies properly subordinate to the municipal
government of New Orleans." It was the duty and obligation
of the commission council, then, to determine the fundamen
tal civil service policies of New Orleans, depoliticizing
municipal employment practices, recruiting and retaining
competent employees, and protecting them and the administra
tion of public affairs against political and personal fac
tionalism. 30
The MSC urged the commission council to create a Bureau
of Employment and Personnel Supervision, a reconstituted
Civil Service Commission, answerable only to the commission
council, and empowered to establish civil service regula
tions and procedures that supplemented the employment and
public policies of the commission council. The policies and
procedures established by the council and implemented by the
Bureau of Employment and Personnel Supervision should, the
MSC recommended, apply to all divisions and departments
under the political and administrative authority of the city
and parish. The only exceptions would be the chief deputies
and confidential clerks of all elective officials.33

3BIbid., 50 (first quotation), 15 (second quotation).
3"Ibid.. 51-53.

The McShane administration and the ODA leadership
ignored the civil service recommendations of the Municipal
Survey Commission, refusing to relinquish their political
"advantage” . Rather, the McShane council sought greater
economy and accountability in municipal government by revis
ing the financial, taxation, and assessment policies of the
municipal government. The administration failed to reform
the fiscal and assessment policies of the city, exacerbating
the city’s financial condition and jeopardizing several es
sential city services, like fire and police protection,
water and drainage, paving, and education. That failure
stemmed from a combination of personal and political intran
sigence to change, inexperience and incompetence in the
municipal government, and, perhaps most important, a height
ened rural bias against New Orleans, in part the fault of
John Parker and the anti-Regular reformers of New Orleans.
In its lenghty and exhaustive report on the financial
condition and procedures of New Orleans, the Bureau of Muni
cipal Research found the city’s financial condition deplor
able and its financial administration cumbersome and ineffi
cient, impeded by constitutional restrictions and uncoordin
ated effort. The city operated under a rigid set of tax re
strictions and limitations. The original purpose of those
limitations and restrictions was to preserve the financial
credit of the city. "That purpose," the BMR wrote, "was com
mendable, but the means adopted was cumbersome and round-
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about" and impractical. Those limitations, the BMR pointed
out, denied the people of New Orleans "the right, either by
popular vote or through the acts of their duly elected rep
resentatives, to pass on the amounts of their expenditures,
and to some extent even on the purpose of their expenditure,
without first obtaining the consent of the citizens of the
entire state". And it was, as the BMR concluded, "an expedi
ent of doubtful value". Still, the BMR recommended nothing
more than a "revision of the involved provisions governing
tax rates in such a manner as to give to cities a greater
measure of home rule in their purely local affairs, without
removing the safeguards now thrown about the security of in
vestments in municipal bonds".*0
The local financial arrangement, itself imbedded in the
state constitution, allowed political interest to determine
the financial policies of the city. The determination and
management of the city's debt, tax, and assessment policies
were divided among three independent, and at times rival,
public authorities, the Board of Liquidation City Debt
(BLCD), the Board of Assessors, and the commission council.
That sort of financial arrangement resulted in a duplication
of effort, added immeasureably to the cost of government,
and, understandably, contributed to the city's miserable
financial condition. The city spent a disporportional amount
of its taxing power and revenue on debt management, permit*°Ibid. . 144-45, 147.
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ted electoral politics to influence assessment policies and
practices, and saddled the financial administration of the
city with ineffective collection and record procedures. The
BMR recommended, then, the elimination of the BLCD, the
Board of Assessors, and the creation of a uniform system of
debt and revenue management under a single municipal admin
istrator .**■
The Municipal Survey Commission recommended the adop
tion of several of the more technical and administrative
reforms proposed by the BMR, but the MSC refused to endorse
any of the principal political reforms. Though the BMR
praised several of the policies of the BLCD, the Bureau
called for the gradual elimination of the board, turning its
duties over to the commission council. The MSC was "greatly
impressed" by the BMR recommendations on debt management,
and, though it could not "presume to pass judgment upon the
details of...the various suggestions," it recommended that
the commission council, BLCD, S&WB, and PBRRC study them
with care. But nowhere in its report, however, did the MSC
contemplate eliminating the Board of Liquidation or turning
its duties over to the commission council.
The Municipal Survey Commission acknowledged, however,
the "grave need" for a thorough revision of the assessment
and revenue policies of the municipal government. The MSC

•*xIbid.r 7 2 - 7 4 ,
•*aIbid.. 20.

92-122.
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recommended the "standardization and equalization" of all
real property within Orleans Parish, requiring the Board of
Assessors to assess real property and improvements to real
property separately and assigning a standard and uniform
value to all property. The MSC did not recommend the aboli
tion of the Board of Assessors, but urged the McShane admin
istration to work with the present Board "in an earnest and
sincere effort to accomplish the needed reforms.... If such
co-operation fails, then the question of...abolishing the
present system of seven separately elected assessors must
necessarily become a vital issue.
The McShane administration disregarded all but of a few
of the proposals of the Municipal Survey Commission, and its
fiscal reform policy consisted of reducing the assessment
rate from its wartime high of ninety percent to eighty-five
percent of assessed value, imposing a new method of

'"3Ibid.. 17-21, 122-38. The BMR reported that the munici
pal government of New Orleans taxed personal property at a
higher rate of assessment than real property. "The low per
capita assessed value of real estate in New Orleans, in com
parison with those of other cities in its population group
and of other cities in the same section of the country,
would indicate...one of two things— either that New Orleans
is a very poor city or that its real estate is very much un
derassessed. The unusually high per capita assessment of
personal property, on the other hand, eliminates the theory
that it is a poor city." In 1921, the BMR reported, fortyfour percent of New Orleans's revenues came from real estate
taxes. The national average was fifty-two percent. New
Orleans received thirty-one percent of its tax revenues from
personal property tax, while the national average was only
thirteen percent. But New Orleans was, and in many ways
remains, a very poor city, purposely placing the tax burden
on corporation wealth and commerical activities.
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budgeting and accounting (recommended by the BMR and MSC) on
most municipal departments, and attempting to revise the
assessment policies of the city along the lines recommended
by the BMR and the MSC. Only the new budgetary provisions
achieved any success. The reduction in the assessment rate
jeopardized vital public services, compelling the McShane
commission council to shift appropriations, curtail ser
vices, and delay new projects. The commission council agreed
that the city had to develop a comprehensive paving policy
and enact a comprehensive zoning and planning ordinance.
There was no agreement on the details of the plans or their
financial and political costs. The administration also
agreed that New Orleans needed to modernize and standardize
its assessment policies (though the commission council was
unwilling to place more of the tax burden on property hold
ers), and it began working with the Board of Assessors on a
plan to initiate the reforms urged by the BMR and the Muni
cipal Survey Commission. These were assignments that would
have taxed the capabilities and fortitude on any municipal
government. They bankrupted the McShane administration .**

'•'•New Orleans Daily States, February 16, 1919, March 2223, April 2, August 5, December 19, 1921; New Orleans Item.
August 3, December 19, 1921, September 3, 1922. Though the
assessment rate declined, the millage rate rose, giving the
McShane administration an increase in revenues. Still, it
was constantly struggling to fund services. One reason was
the distribution of the revenues. Thirty six cents of every
dollar went to the Board of Liquidation; only twenty-three
cents went to the city alimony.
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Early in November, 1921, as the BMR completed its study
into the administrative and financial condition of New
Orleans, Commissioner of Public Finance Richard Murphy
issued a preliminary report (probably gleaned from the BMR
investigation) urging the commission council to install a
new system of determining the assessed value of real proper
ty in New Orleans. As Murphy explained, the "block and lot"
method of assessment would equalize assessments, reduce
taxes, generate needed additional revenues, and "depoliticalize" and democratize the tax structure of New Orleans.
The BMR survey would confirm, he told the council, what
every citizen already knew. The present system of assessment
and taxation was regressive, inequitable, and politically
motivated. It protected the interests of "favored" property
owners (home owners), allowing them to evade taxation and
shifting the tax burden to the commerical and professional
classes. Adopting the plan would, as well, fulfill the ODA
campaign promises, depoliticizing public affairs and estab
lishing a permanent, progressive municipal government for
New Orleans.*3
The Murphy plan was, however, inadequate. Despite the

*3New Orleans Item. November 19, 1921, March 15, 1922;
Administrative Survey of the Government of the Citv of New
Orleans, 73-74, 125-28, 137. Murphy argued that the "block
and lot" method (critics labled it "block and tackle") would
add between $100,000,000 and $150,000,000 to the assessment
rolls, mostly from tax dodgers and the politically wellconnected, augmenting the city treasury by nearly one mil
lion dollars.
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justice of some of its provisions, the proposal did not
favor the equalization of assessments, the depoliticization
of assessment practices, or the establishment of permanent
reform. The McShane commission council had no intention (and
could not muster the political courage} of attempting to re
vise the state constitution, deposing the elective Board of
Assessors and replacing it with an appointed bureau of
accountants, clerks, and assorted "experts'' in assessment
procedures. The progressive reform ideology of the BMR may
have urged a more efficient and an equitable rearrangement
of the lines of public authority, but public sentiment de
manded a democratic and, ironically, inequitable assessment
of private property.
The problem of equalization of assessment, though, went
beyond the question of removing the Orleans Parish Board of
Assessors.""7 Nor was it simply a matter of convincing the
citizens of New Orleans to equalize assessments or to shift

'""The commission council did not have the authority to
assess real or personal property, though the council could
review the decisions of the Board of Assessors. Even that
review was severely restricted by state law and was "merely
advisory" since only the board of Assessors and the Board of
State Affairs (Equalization Board) could reduce assessments.
Act 231 Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana at the Regular Session. 1920: Ivy G. Kittredge to
Richard M. Murphy, July 27, 1922, Assistant City Attorney
Rene A. Viosca to George Thoele, Secretary to the Board of
Equalization for Orleans Parish, September 10, 1923, vol.10,
CAP. CA, NOPL.
'"‘'Orleans Parish had seven elected assessors, one each
for the seven municipal districts of New Orleans. Each of
the other sixty-three parishes had one elected assessor for
the entire parish.
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the burden of taxation to other classifications of property
and wealth. And, as the MSC survey revealed, it was not a
partisan issue, with "machine" politicians aligned against
change and the "progressive reformers" dedicated to economy,
efficiency, and democracy.
As early as 1915, the Behrman administration, seeking
financial and political independence from the state legis
lature and the rural parishes that dominated it, demanded
the equalization of assessment within Orleans Parish and
throughout the state. In March of that year, the commission
council arranged for the Bureau of Municipal Research to
study the financial circumstances of the city, instructing
the BMR to recommend ways for the city to equalize assess
ments within the parish, increase municipal revenues, and
establish a measure of financial independence from the state
government.
In many ways, the 1915-1916 BMR report anticipated the
municipal survey of 1921-1922. The BMR recommended replac
*aAs Jon C. Teaford has pointed out, it would be a mis
take to assume that the so-called machine politicians were
incompetent, corrupt, and profligate with public revenues.
It would be a mistake, as well, to believe that the business
reformers were competent, incorruptable, and conservative in
the financial affairs of the city. "Tight money and high in
terest rates," Teaford wrote, "may have been more decisive
in determining whether sewers were built and waterworks
expanded." See Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. 283-84,
"Finis for Tweed and Steffens: Rewriting the History of Ur
ban Rule," Reviews in American History. 10 (December 1982),
143, "New Life For An Old Subject: Investigating the Struc
ture of Urban Rule," American Quarterly. 37 (Winter 1985),
349, 351-52.
■•"New Orleans Item, March 5, 19, 1915.
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ing the Board of Assessors with a special assessment board
appointed by the mayor and charged with the equalization of
assessment throughout the parish. Under the new arrangement,
the commission council would set assessment policies, stan
dardizing the assessment rate, repealing exemptions on "pri
vate" (Catholic parochial) schools, assessing real estate at
rates comparable to personal property rates, and centraliz
ing financial authority in the office of the Commissioner of
Public Finance. The principal recommendation, however, con
cerned the state assessment and taxing policies. The BMR
recommended the abolition of the direct state tax on real
and personal property, apportioning the tax revenues among
the parishes in proportion to all revenues raised for local
purposes.®0
The Behrman administration was thoroughly disappointed
in the BMR recommendations. The administration had no inten
tion of replacing the Board of Assessors (though Behrman
would have gladly eliminated the Board of Liquidation) or
repealing the exemptions for church property. And though it
welcomed recommendations designed to enhance revenues and to
alleviate the heavy state tax burden on the city, the BMR

®°New Orleans Item, March 5, 19, June 8, September 8,
November 24, 1915, January 1, 11, April 30, 1916; New
Orleans Daily States. January 6, 1916; New Orleans TimesPicavune. March 6, 1915, January 6, 1916; Ethel Hutson, "New
Orleans Survey," National Municipal Review, 5 (July 1916),
522-23; "Miss Hutson's Rejoinder," NMR. 5 (October 1916),
705-06; Herbert R. Sands, "New Orleans Survey— A Reply,"
NMR. 5 (October 1916), 703-05.

557
proposals would have placed a greater burden on real estate
and would have increased the amount of taxes the city paid
to the state, while decreasing taxes in rival parishes like
Jefferson and St.Bernard. To increase personal property
taxes while decreasing the taxes paid by New Orleans Railway
and Light Company or the Cumberland Telephone Company was
unacceptable to the Regular Democrats and to the voters of
New Orleans. And, as Mayor Behrman and the commission coun
cil recognized, equalization of assessment had to apply to
all parishes. The BMR proposal for "equalized" assessment
would penalize New Orleans, forcing Orleans property owners
to pay more taxes, receiving fewer state services in re
turn. The administration and the financial leaders of the
city would never increase local taxes or equalize assessment
policies until all parishes followed suit.*x
Despite these obstacles. Commissioner Murphy pressed

sxHutson, "New Orleans Survey," 523; "Miss Hutson's Re
joinder," 705. Equalization of assessment remained an in
tense issue throughout the Progressive Era in Louisiana. The
Pleasant administration tried to resolve the issue, but was
unsuccessful. The constituitonal convention of 1920 provided
for uniformity of property tax assessment, but the Louisiana
Tax Commission, the body charged with that task, failed to
perform its duty. "Failure of the commission to supervise
the assessors and to insure uniformity of property taxation,
as required by law," writes the premier student of Louisiana
constitutional history, "led to the rapid emergence of
seventy autonomous sheikdoms in which each assessor was
essentially free to value and assess property as he
pleased." The emergence may have come sooner than this stu
dent realized, but the causes he attributed to the failure
are undeniably true. Carleton, "Elitism Sustained: The Loui
siana Constitution of 1974," Tulane Law Review. 54 (April
1980), 579-80.
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for the adoption of his plan. In haste and without any pub
lic debate on the issue, Henry Umbach, the president of the
Board of Assessors, Robert W. Riordan, chairman of the Loui
siana Tax Commission, and the Board of Liquidation gave the
plan their tenative approval. Acting on their advice (but
without the approval of the City Attorney; Murphy referred
the plan to the City Attorney as an afterthought), the com
mission council agreed to accept Murphy's proposals as the
basis for assessment reform and instructed the Commissioner
of Public Finance to prepare the "appropriate" legislation
for the adoption of the plan.32
At the legislative session in June, Murphy described
for the General Assembly tbc disabilities and political
evils of the current assessment policies, arguing that the
city could no longer afford a regressive, politically biased
tax and assessment system. In contrast, the "block and lot"
system would reduce rates, increase revenues, and promote
"greater democracy" in Hew Orleans. Though the plan was com
plete and required no revision by the legislature, it needed
the financial assistance of the state government. Commis
sioner Murphy estimated the cost of installing the block and
lot plan at $150,000, and he asked the legislature to con
tribute $60,000 to help the city defray the cost. And though
the House of Representatives passed the Murphy bill, the
state Senate, obviously concerned with the excessive costs,
s2New Orleans Item. November 19, 1921, March 15, 1922.
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rejected the bill, effectively killing the plan.93
Despite the action of the state legislature and its own
financial difficulties, the commission council ordered the
adoption of the Murphy plan, commissioning Stoner, Gallagher
and Gross, a Houston engineering firm, to implement the
block and lot system. From the start, unexpected delays,
petty bickerings, and growing doubts about the efficacy and
equality of the block and lot system, impeded installation.
Stoner, Gallagher and Gross took eight months to complete
its survey, requiring the Board of Assessors to delay the
assessment of property for several months and finally for
cing the board to revert to the old method of establishing
assessed value. The delays jeopardized city services and
threatened the city's credit rating, irritating the citizens
and creditors of New Orleans and rupturing the "tentative"
consensus on the Murphy plan.9*
After the legislature rejected the Murphy plan, the
Board of Assessors grew apprehensive about the block and lot
system. In a formal statement, the Board of Assessors warned
that "extreme care should be exercised in the adoption or
installation of any [assessment] system in conflict with ex
isting statutory provisions...”. Without the specific sanc
tion and protection of state law, the city administration
" N e w Orleans Item, June 14, July 3, 19, September 13,
October 4, 17, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 23,
June 21, 1923.
" N e w Orleans Item, January 10, May 13, 31, 1923; New
Orleans Daily States. January 10, 11, May 15, 28, 1923.
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risked countless lawsuits and endless delays, threatening
the repeal of assessment reform and the city with financial
bankruptcy. Martin Behrman cautioned, as he had in the past,
that the adoption of an equalized rate of assessment, unless
applied uniformly within each parish and throughout the
state, would jeopardize the interests of New Orleans, re
quiring the city to pay a disproportional share of the state
property tax and, in effect, subsidizing the other parishes
and the state with its tax revenues. And, despite its
claims, the Murphy plan did not equalize assessments or
democratize the tax structure of New Orleans. The block and
lot system placed a greater share of the assessment and tax
burden on the small property owners, compelling them to pay
an excessive share of the property tax of the city.**
Distrubed by the implications of the block and lot plan
and disenchanted with the McShane administration, the Board
of Assessors (every one a Regular Democrat) rejected the
assessment figures calculated by Stone, Gallagher and Gross,
referring to them as an "alien and incompetent assessment"
based on an unproven and suspect system. The board ordered a
reassessment of property values under the old method, in
effect leaving the McShane administration with a deficit
and compelling it to reallocate resources and to curtail

**New Orleans Item. September 3, 1922, February 18, May
13, 31, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. May 15, 28, 1923.
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city services.**

In December, 1920, at the inauguration of the McShane
administration, the Association of Commerce sent a survey to
one hundred business and professional executives, asking
them to rank the city's essential "civic improvement" needs.
Predictably, the civic and business leaders of New Orleans
neglected the issues of public education, decent, affordable
housing, "full employment” and a "living wage," public
health, and child welfare. Rather, their chief interests and
priorities concerned the commerical and physical improvement
and development of the city. And, unquestionably, their
principal concern was the adoption of a comprehensive paving
and commerical transportation system, designed to enhance
commerical and residental property values and to accelerate
the pace and profit of commerical traffic in New Orleans.
Regretably, adopting a comprehensive paving plan meant
diverting precious financial and social resources from vital
city services like fire and police protection (driving up
the cost of business and residential insurance) and water,
drainage, and sanitation. Nevertheless, the Association of
Commerce and the reform press considered paving and a city
plan among the primary concerns of the new administration.
And, despite reservations about depriving other essential
""New Orleans Item. May 13, 31, June 3, August 5, October
28, 30, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. May 15, June 7, Sep
tember 21, 25, October 29, 1923.
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city services of money already appropriated to them, the
McShane administration diverted money and energy to paving
and zoning.
During the mayoral campaign, the ODA and the city press
blamed the Behrman administration for the inexcusable condi
tion of city streets, complaining that the street assessment
policy of the administration penalized property owners,
bloated cost, and prevented the development of a comprehen
sive paving plan. According to the New Orleans Item, only
twenty-seven percent of the streets in New Orleans were
paved or surfaced, making New Orleans the "worst paved city
in the country". Since 1915, the Item reported, when the
commission council adopted a new paving and street assess
ment ordinance, the city administration paved only thirtynine miles of streets, leaving 470 miles of unimproved dirt
roads in Orleans Parish. Nature was, to be sure, the princi
pal enemy of New Orleans streets. The city was, after all,
reclaimed from an immense and imposing cypress swamp that
threatened the foundation of every home, building, and
street in New Orleans. Much of the city remained undeveloped

S7New Orleans Daily States. June 17, September 29, Octo
ber 4, 6, 29, December 4, 1920. The businessmen also in
cluded the introduction of natural gas and the construction
of more hotels as their principal concerns. Assessment
reform and a comprehensive city plan were not among their
priorities. For an informative account of the city planning
movement in the urban South, see Blaine A. Brownell, "The
Commerical-Civic Eilte and City Planning in Atlanta, Mem
phis, and New Orleans in the 1920s," The Journal of Southern
History. XLI (August 1975), 339-68.
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and did not require the immediate attention of the commis
sion council. The war, too, contributed to the deplorable
condition of city streets, making it difficult to obtain the
financial, material, and human resources to maintain and ex
pand the streets. But, the Item contended, these circum
stances were not responsible for the condition of the city
streets, and they did not excuse the Behrman administration
from blame. Rather, responsibility for the streets lay with
the present street paving and assessment ordinance and the
failure of the city administration to anticipate and provide
for the development of the city.*8
The Bureau of Municipal Research reiterated the same
observations and criticisms in its report to the Municipal
Survey Commission. The BMR, too, recommended revising the
paving and street assessment laws and ordinances and estab
lishing a "consistent" and comprehensive policy of paving
and resurfacing streets. The BMR proposals, however, re
quired property owners to pay an even greater share of the
cost of paving and resurfacing and limited (in essence,
denied) their choice of paving material. Despite these inno
vations and additional resources, the BMR argued that "it
would be impractical for the city to undertake a repaving
program commensurate with (its] real needs". In essence,
""New Orleans Item, January 5, February 17, March 27,
1919, January 7, 10, 13, 25, 26, 30, 1921, October 14, 1922,
New Orleans Daily States, June 3, 22, July 26, August 6,
1919, September 29, October 4, 6, 29, December 4, 1920, June
14, 1922, February 2, 1923.
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under the existing paving laws and ordinances, the city
could not afford to rebuild the city streets."
The BMR warned, however, that "the public should be
under no illusion as to the reality of the need for paving.
It may be said without question that the economic loss ex
perienced each year by the citizens of New Orleans in the
form of cost of hauling and operating passenger automobiles
over the streets as reflected in wear and tear on equipment,
delays due to traffic congestions, breakdowns, etc. (sic),
which result from the present deplorable conditions of these
thoroughfares,

is many times greater than the amount of

money required to provide (a) suitable pavement surface."
"It is imperative," the BMR concluded, "that some definite
policy be enunciated in the matter and a repaving program
adopted." The municipal government, the BMR advised, should
initiate a more comprehensive approach to paving, incorpo
rating plans for resurfacing streets in preparation for
eventual repaving and new paving construction that included
paved and unimproved streets.®0
The Bureau proposed that the city resurface twenty
miles of streets each year over the next ten years at a cost
of $8.5 million dollars, roughly dividing the cost between
the city and property holders. If the municipal government
failed to initiate a resurfacing program, the BMR predicted,
g"Administrative Survey of the Government of City of New
Orleans. 209, 211.
"Ibid., 211.

565
eventually the deteriorating condition of the streets would
compel the government to reconstruct those streets, squan
dering precious resources and jeopardizing new construction
projects. In addition, the BMR recommended that the commis
sion council adopt a systematic and comprehensive paving
program, permitting the city to pave 170 miles of new
streets over the next fifteen years at a cost of forty-two
million dollars, twenty-two for paving and twenty million
for subsurface drainage. Furthermore, since new paving con
struction increased property values and added "materially"
to the convenience and the economy of residential and com
merical life, then residential and commerical property
owners ought to pay a large majority of the cost."3The Municipal Survey Commission, as expected, affirmed
the paving recommendations of the BMR. "Preparing, financing
and initiating a comprehensive programme of street improve
ment," the MSC wrote, "will be the greatest single contri
bution the present city administration can make to the econ
omy, comfort and efficiency of living and working in New
Orleans." And the MSC believed that a "consistent" and sys
tematic paving program, if "thoughtfully devised and compre
hensively applied," was the only alternative to "the far
more costly continuance of the loose and aimless procedure
of the past. The present city administration is being sum
moned to plan and execute now things which should have been
glIbid.. 211-14.
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planned and in execution long since. Delay and neglect in
the past add(ed) to the difficulties and the cost now neces
sary, but further delay can only further enhance those dif
ficulties and those cost." With the assistance of the civic
and commerical leadership of the city, the commission coun
cil could devise a consistent and comprehensive paving
policy and begin construction within two years. The "Compre
hensive Street Improvement Programme" should include the in
stallation of a "modern assessment" policy for real and per
sonal property and a thorough revision of the zoning laws
and ordinances. And, finally, the paving plan must compli
ment and support the development of a comprehensive city
plan, designed to direct and further the commercial and
civic growth of New Orleans. Without such a systematic and
comprehensive approach to city management. New Orleans would
continue its perceptable, though reversible, decline among
the nation's great cities.Ba
Regretably, from the perspective of the MSC and the
commerical elect it represented, the "loose and aimless"
practices of the past continued under the McShane adminis
tration. Pressured by the civic and business leadership, the
commission council responded first to the immediate need to
maintain city streets, preserving existing property values
and speeding commerical traffic in the "developed" portions
of the city. Meeting this demand required reallocating the
BaIbid.. 32-33.
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city's meager revenues (the McShane administration lowered
the assesment rate and decreased taxes), depriving citizens
of certain city services, and incurring additional debt.*3
The 1922 paving scheduled called for the city to pave
or resurface thirty streets at a cost to the city of
$560,000. But the city government appropriated only $125,000
for street paving and major resurfacing projects. Rather
than curtailing street projects, McShane administration con
sidered "emergency" budget revisions to meet the demands of
the Association of Commerce and the press for "good
streets". The Association of Commerce proposed that the city
administration retain the assessment rate at ninety percent
(though the association urged a further increase in the
homestead exemption, depriving the city of $320,000 in reve
nue) and issue new "paving certificates" bearing higher in
terest rates to attract investors. But the city council, an
xious to fulfill its campaign promises to reduce taxes and
"depoliticize" public affairs, wanted to dedicate budget
savings to maintaining streets while it considered perma
nent methods of funding the comprehensive paving plan. Com
missioner of Public Utilities Maloney suggested diverting
$400,000 from the franchise tax to fund paving, and Commis
sioner of Public Safety Stanley Ray urged the council to
ask the legislature for the authority to impose a special.

®3New Orleans Item, December 4, 14-18, 22, 1921, New Or
leans Daily States. December 15, 16, 20, 21, 27, 1921.
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permanent two mill tax dedicated to municipal paving. An in
crease in the millage rate would generate millions of
dollars in recurring revenue, permitting the council to
lower the assessment rate and reduce the tax burden on the
average taxpayer .**
But the business and civic leadership were unwilling to
wait for the legislature to convene and for the citizens of
the state to vote New Orleans a special millage increase.
Instead, they sought immediate relief and demanded that the
people of New Orleans sacrifice some city services for the
more essential and immediate need for paving. James Thomson,
the publisher of the Item, favored using permanent revenues
to fund the paving program, but he, like many civic and com
merical leaders, opposed any increase in the millage rate.
Rather, he recommended that the Orleans Parish School Board
surrender two of its six and a half mills to the municipal
government for paving. Thomson's proposal was, frankly, pre
posterous, but was indicative of the fanatical dedication
men like Thomson had for paving. Their persistence compelled
the commission council to rededicate funds to paving and re
surfacing projects. The McShane administration agreed to
transfer funds from the fire and police departments, the
free clinics operated by the New Orleans Board of Health,
and salary increases for municipal workers to the Municipal

a«Ibid.
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Repair Plant and to the paving program.09
Still, by the end of the summer, 1922, the commerical
and civic "elite" of New Orleans was clearly dissatisfied
with the approach of the McShane administration to street
maintenance and new street construction. The "pay-as-you-go"
policy of the McShane commission council continued the
same "loose and aimless" policy of the Behrman years. The
city administration needed to ask the present and the future
generations to share in the expense of removing New Orleans
from the mud. New Orleans, the Item editorialized, is a
"rich city, and an old center of accumulated wealth. It is
absurb to say that it cannot raise the money for paving if
its people make up their minds to come out of the mud". But
the problem was never that simple. For, despite the amateur
sociology and glib assurances of the Item. New Orleans was
not a wealthy city, though there were pockets of wealth in
the city, principally in the Garden District and the "Uni
versity Section". These areas, however, were the centers of
the anti-Regular reform movement that had demanded a reduc
tion in assessment rates and property taxes. In addition,
these sections of New Orleans were already paved (though
in need of repair or resurfacing) and did not want to be
assessed for new paving construction outside their own

" N e w Orleans Item. February 2, 14, August 13, 1921,
March 10-14, 26-31, July 17-28, August 1, 1922; New Or
leans Daily States. August 9, 16, 1921, March 26, 27, 1922,
February 7, 1923.
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areas or the downtown business district."®
Initiating a comprehensive paving and resurfacing plan,
then, required a thorough restructuring of municipal assess
ment and taxation policies and reorienting of city politics.
And, given the legal and political obstacles standing before
the McShane administration, it was understandable that the
commission council approach the recommendations of the MSC
and the Association of Commerce slowly and cautiously. In
early February Mayor McShane called an "informal" meeting of
the commission council to assess its "sentiment" on a paving
and assessment plan he had developed. The plan called for
dedicating either a new one mill tax to paving or dividing
an existing mill between the commission council and the Sew
erage and Water Board. In addition, the mayor proposed in
creasing the debt limitation under the 1916 refunding act,
permitting the commission council to fund the paving program
immediately and recouping its expenses through the permanent
paving assessment."7
The New Orleans Item and the Association of Commerce
reacted bitterly to the McShane plan. It was inconceivable,
the Item wrote, that after all the public discussion about
the need for a comprehensive revision in the assessment and
paving policies of the city, that Mayor McShane would offer
a plan that promised to wreck the paving program before it
""Ibid.
®7New Orleans Item. February 3, 4, 6, March 18, 23, 1923
New Orleans Daily States. March 18, 1923.
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began and threatened the Sewerage and Water Board with
financial ruin. The Association of Commerce, divided and un
able to agree on a single plan, made two recommendations.
The initial plan authorized the S&WB to build the subsurface
system and pave the streets. Property owners in the drainage
and paving area would be assessed for the cost of the entire
subsurface project and a prorated portion of the surface
paving. The Sewerage and Water Board would fund subsurface
construction by increasing water rates fifty percent for all
customers. The commission council would meet the cost of
street paving by issuing paving certificates underwritten by
a special two mill increase. The second recommendation
called for the creation of a "Special Independent Paving
Commission" authorized to built new streets. The paving com
mission, too, would fund new construction by "floating"
paving certificates backed by a two mill increase in the tax
rate.68
The Association of Commerce proposals were complex, ex
pensive, inequitable, and undemocratic. Both plans required
several constitutional and charter revisions, necessitating
hours of costly legal research and political lobbying and
distracting the council and the public from other, equally
important issues. The association's plans were too costly
from both a financial and a social aspect. It was unconscio
s"New Orleans Daily States. January 3, March 12, 20,
April 19, November 29, 1923; New Orleans Item. March 20, 23,
April 19, 24, May 30, June 3, November 29, 1923.
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nable to raise rates on a necessity of life to fund a com
prehensive paving plan. The plan discriminated against the
unimproved areas of New Orleans, requiring them to pay for
the entire cost of the subsurface construction and a higher
price for street paving. Revenues from the general property
tax, imposed on all property owners regardless of the loca
tion and condition of their property, helped build the
streets and subsurface drainage in those improved and ex
clusive neighborhoods. On the other hand, property owners in
the established residential areas and the central business
district were virtually exempt from assisting in the devel
opment of the unimproved areas of the city. Finally, even as
the Item recognized, the creation of another special board
ignored the recommendation of the BMR, undermining the demo
cratic process and eroding the authority of the commission
council.”
For the next several months the Association of Commerce
and the McShane administration exchanged proposals. The
businessmen opposed any increase in the millage rate,
arguing instead that property owners in the drainage and
paving areas should pay at least ninety-five percent of the
total cost. The entire city, they contended, should not be
compelled to pay for the improvements enjoyed by a small
segment of the population. They proposed, however, a size8*New Orleans Item, March 29, April 10, July 30, November
29, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. March 30, July 4, 30,
August 2, November 29, 1923.
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able increase in debt limitation for public improvements, a
fifty percent increase in the water rates charged by the
Sewerage and Water Board, and an increase in the city
gasoline tax— assessments imposed on other generations and
other classes of citizens. The council insisted on a more
modest increase in the debt limitation (twenty million as
opposed to thirty-five million) and one mill for paving for
the next ten years. The council believed that the associa
tion plan was too costly and patently unfair, possibly
jeopardizing the city's credit rating and penalizing the
majority of the people.-70
The dispute continued into the summer, and neither the
Association of Commerce nor the McShane administration would
compromise. The state legislature refused to raise the millage rate, or authorize the S5WB to pave streets. The legis
lature, however, raised the debt limitation for paving to a
meager fifteen million dollars and dedicated one cent of the
state gasoline tax to the municipal government for paving.
Though Andrew McShane objected to the Bond-Theole paving
law, other members of the municipal government and the
president of the Association of Commerce applauded the leg
islature, calling the new paving act "reasonable, construc-

7°New Orleans Item. November 23, December 12, 23, 1923,
January 10, February 19, April 2, 29, May 17, 20, 21, 1924;
New Orleans Daily States. November 23, December 19, 23,
1923; April 30, May 1, 9, 1924; Kittredge to McShane, Janu
ary 28, 1924, vol.10, CAO, CA, NOPL.
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tive, and practical".-71In many ways, the Bond-Theole act was a reasonable and
constructive solution to the paving problems of New Orleans.
It increased the debt limitation for public improvements to
$20,000,000, compelling all property owners to share in the
expense of paving and allowing the McShane administration to
expand its paving and resurfacing plans without relying ex
clusively

on "current" revenues. It placed greater finan

cial obligations on those citizens who benefitted most from
street improvements, the property owners in the paving areas
and those citizens who used the city streets for private use
or business. The Bond-Theole was a more judicious proposal
than those offered by the Association of Commerce (though it
could have benefitted from several of the recommendations of
the McShane administration), which sought to displace the
authority of the commission council and to shift much of the
cost of paving to those citizens least able to meet those
cost. And, it was, from the standpoint of Association of
Commerce, more equitable than the bill offered by the
McShane administration. That bill required all property
owners to share in the expense of paving, though only a rel
ative few citizens benefitted.
In other ways, however, the Bond-Theole act was more
indicative of the failure of "business reformism" and the
71-New Orleans Item, June 25, July 1, 8, 1924. Senators
Nat Bond (Martin Behrman's son-in-law-) and George Theole
sponsored the 1924 paving law. Both were "Old" Regulars.

McShane administration. In effect, the Association of Com
merce and the McShane administration represented the same
economic and social interests. Yet they were incapable of
consensus, principally because of the flaws and contradic
tions embedded in the business reform movement. The civic
and commerical leadership of New Orleans demanded a compre
hensive rehabilitation of public affairs that, in effect,
ensured their continued dominance, muffled popular politics,
and assured the continuation of the "loose and aimless"
policies of the past. The commercial elite demanded a new
tax and assessment policy that placed a greater burden on
public services. In addition, they demanded a massive
"public" works program that reallocated vital financial and
social resources and that, frankly, had few immediate social
or political benefits.
The McShane administration, on the other hand, though
anxious to undertake the reforms demanded by the civic and
business elite, could not convince the business leadership
to respect established democractic policies. Indeed, there
was no effective reason why the business community should
respect the efforts of the McShane commission council. Prom
the start of the McShane administration, the business and
civic elite presumed to govern in its name, imposing imprac
tical and aimless reforms on the city council. For its part,
the McShane commission seemed incapable of resisting the
political pressures placed on it, resulting in a government

by ad hoc business committees and the continuation of the
"loose and aimless" policies of the past— a past for which
the civic and commercial elite and the McShane administra
tion were now responsible.

Chapter Ten

The Barrone Street Blues

The McShane administration seemed poised and anxious to
resolve the city's bitter and persistent differences with
the New Orleans Railway and Light Company. And well it
should. The Behrman administration seemed incapable (its
critics said unwilling) of resolving the public utility pro
blem. Instead, as critics charged, the Behrman administra
tion, addicted to the old politics and overwhelmed by the
welter of wartime events, fabricated a series of temporary
accomdations that did little more than increase rates and
fares. Perhaps no other issue, these same critics asserted,
exposed the political and administrative bankruptcy of the
old regime more or contributed so much to its defeat in 1920
as the issue of the regulation and rehabilitation of the
public service industry. And, these critics boasted, no
other single issue would reveal more the fitness of the
municipal reform movement to govern New Orleans than the re
habilitation of New Orleans Railway and Light Company.x
The initial policies and actions of the McShane admin
istration, however, displayed little of the fitness and
readiness to govern that the leaders of the civic reform
xNew Orleans Daily States. December 26, 1920, February
16, 1921; New Orleans Item. December 8, 1920, Feburary 16,
March 25, 1925.
577

578
reform movement expected. In February, 1921, one month
before the expiration of the eight cent ordinance. Receiver
John O'Keefe, Judge Rufus Foster, and the representatives of
the major bond holders (the New York Trust Company and the
Chase National Bank) called on the commission council. It
was their hope, O'Keefe told the councilmen, to begin dis
cussion with them for the "complete re-organization and re
financing of the property [based] on the condition that a
just and constant return on a fair valuation would be
granted by the city authorities.2
The city administration, O'Keefe insisted, must "help"
in the reorganization and rehabilitation of NORLC and NOGLC.
Those two public service systems, he said, were overburdened
and deteriorating, and could not, under present conditions,
meet the public demands for more extensive service. If the
two principal utility companies in the city were to furnish
sufficient service now and in the future, then they must be
allowed to reorganize and refinance themselves in such a
manner that would preserve previous investments and encour
age new investment. The only feasible and expedient way to

2New Orleans Daily States. February 16, 1921; New
Orleans Item. February 16, 1921. The first action taken by
the new administration was to sue NORLC for the recovery of
delinquent taxes. The city claimed NORLC owed nearly
$600,000 in back taxes for 1919 and 1920, and that the eight
cent fare afforded the company the opportunity to meet its
civic obligations. Eventually, the city and the receiver
settled out of court. NORLC paid $332,000 in delinquent
taxes. See New Orleans Daily States, January 13, 16, 22,
22, 24, March 15, 1921.
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safeguard old investment and to attract new money, O ’Keefe
suggested, was to assure both a sufficient rate of return
and a generous valuation. With these guarantees, which only
the commission council could grant, the stockholders would
be able to reorganize, rehabilitate, and expand the services
of the companies.3
The council heard specific recommendations from O'Keefe
as well. He called on the council to establish the valuation
of the two companies at $55,000,000, guaranteeing them a
rate of return of eight percent on current investment and
eight percent on money contributing to the physical and
financial rehabilitation of the companies. In addition, the
receiver proposed that the commission council grant NORLC an
indeterminate service at cost franchise (NOGLC had an exclu
sive franchise with the city until 1925) that incorporated
all operating cost, taxes, replacements, extensions, and the
rate of return in the cost of service. The O'Keefe proposal
"granted** the city the right of purchase and gave the com
mission council authority over scheduling, routes, and
general corporate expenses, exclusive of stock and bond
issues.*
Despite the appeal and strengths of the service at cost
plan, O'Keefe confessed, it could not effect the reorganiza
tion and rehabilitation of the public service corporations
3New Orleans Item, November 24, 1920, January 21, Febru
ary 16-17, 1921.
■•Ibid.
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without the consent and assistance of the the municipal
government and the leading banks in New Orleans. The purpose
of his presentation, he said, was to convince the commission
council and the local bankers of the expediency of the
service-at-cost plan and of the justice of his proposal for
the rehabilitation of the public service industry.®
O'Keefe could do neither. Rudolph S. Hecht, the presi
dent of the Hibernia National Bank and the chairman of the
Bondholders Protection Committee, spoke for the bankers. He
told O'Keefe that the local banks could not fund the
rehabilitation of the companies under any circumstances or
with any guarantees. The city banks simply did not possess
the necessary capital to refinance NORLC, estimated at over
twlve million dollars, five million alone in the first year.
The commission council, too, was unwilling to endorse the
receiver's recommendations. Commissioner of Public Utilities
Paul H. Maloney, a tenacious Irish politician from the ex
clusive Twelfth Ward and the only Regular Democrat on the
commission council, questioned the wisdom and the justice of
the service-at-cost plan. Directing his remarks to the
representatives of the Chase National Bank (6. M. Dahl) and
the New York Trust Company (M. N. Buckner), Maloney repeated
the major criticisms of the service-at-cost plan. The plan
was, he said, to be frank, a windfall for a distressed and
suspect industry. The SAC plan, as suggested by company man3I b i d .
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agement, required the municipal government and the consumers
to underwrite and manage the entire cost of business, while
the management of NORLC, without the conventional incentives
for efficient and inexpensive service, received an assured
income and a guaranteed profit. And, more to the point,
Maloney objected to any suggestion that inflated the value
of NORLC and offered to pay a return on stocks and bonds
that never contributed to public service."
The two New York bankers told the Commissioner of Pub
lic Utilities that they appreciated the administration's
cautious, skeptical approach to the receiver's plan. Admit
tedly, the service-at-cost plan was untested and required
more precise definition and refinement. And, despite the
practical necessity and justice of O'Keefe's plan, the city
administration and the receiver seemed unequipped to resolve
their differences. The bankers suggested that the commission
council and the receiver submit their differences to a "dis
interested and competent board of arbitration," possessing

"New Orleans Item, January 21, February 17, 19, 1921;
New Orleans Daily States. February 16, 18, 1921. O'Keefe's
proposals had several other well-placed critics, including
Mayor McShane, Dr. V. K. Irion, Marshall Ballard, editor
of the Item, and State Senator E. M. Stafford and attorney
John J. McLoughlin, the two leaders of the anti-eight cent
fare movement. There were, as well, less notable critics.
For an example, see William Reese, secretary, Building
Trades Union to CPU Paul H. Maloney, March 15, 1921 and
Carpenters Union to CPU Maloney, April 18, 1921, Department
of Public Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence vol.2,
CA, NOPL. For a generous, though inaccurate, description
of Maloney's political abilities, see T. Harry Williams,
Huev Long. 223-24.
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the authority and prestige to bind the administration and
the company to its decisions. Judge Foster, perhaps sensing
an opportunity to end the receivership, snapped at the idea.
Since neither the receiver nor the council seemed capable of
resolving their differences, he told reporters, then perhaps
a conference of business and professional men could. With
that thought in mind, Foster "invited" several leading busi
nessmen and professionals to meet with him to select a board
of arbitration.7
Incredibly, Judge Foster informed the conference that
the commission council and the representatives of NORLC had
conceded to them the authority to settle the public utili
ties issue. The council had no intention, of course, of re
linquishing its authority to the court or to another group
of "special masters".® Nonetheless, Foster pursued the
selection of a "citizens advisory commission," appointing
forty business and professional men, with former NORLC

■'New Orleans Daily States, February 18, 22, 23, 25,
1921; New Orleans Item. February 18, 22, 23, 25, 1921.
"Commissioner Maloney, emulating former Mayor Behrman
and former City Attorney I. D. Moore, informed the confer
ence that the commission council would not be bound by any
recommendation made by the select committee. New Orleans
Item. March 21, 1921.
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president Hugh McCloskey serving as chairman.9 Chairman
McCloskey admonished the select committee to approach the
investigation with circumspection and objectivity, careful
to avoid any tincture of prejudice and partisanship. The
"ultimate" solution, he said, lay with the ability of the
committee to balance the interests of the public, of the
employees of NORLC, and of its "legitimate investors". The
public expected good service and strict financial account
ability from NORLC, its employees wanted "living wages" and
decent working conditions, and investors demanded security
for their investments and a fair rate of return.10
Near the end of March, after several weeks of "full and
mature deliberations," the McCloskey committee issued two
reports. Writing for the majority of the select committee,
chairman Hugh McCloskey prefaced its recommendations with
words critical of management and public authority.
The commerical future of New Orleans [he wrote] is
inseparably allied with the development of a modern
public utility corporation which can furnish trans
portation, power and light at reasonable cost to an
ever-growing population. To be able to furnish such
"New Orleans Item, March 1, April 9, 1921; New Orleans
Daily States. March 1, 1921. Committee member Sylvan Levy
asked McCloskey to expand the committee's membership to in
clude representatives from the city's "poorer people". But
McCloskey denied the request, explaining that Foster called
for a conference of businessmen and professional men. Leigh
Carroll called on McCloskey to invite V. K. Irion, John J.
McLoughlin, and B. M. Stafford to join the select committee.
McCloskey denied them access, too, remarking, disingenously,
that the conference should avoid any suspicion of partisan
ship.
10New Orleans Item, March 1, 1921; New Orleans Daily
States, March 1, 1921.
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service it is absolutely essential that the company
be put on a sound financial basis, and that the man
agement should enjoy the confidence, respect, and good
will of the people of New Orleans.
To accomplish those ends, the majority report recommended
removing "managerial" control from the receiver and the
board of directors, replacing them with a five-member board
of trustees, comprised of local businessmen and authorized
to determine company policy and to oversee its rehabilita
tion. The board of trustees would select a general manager
for the company whose duties would include its financial
reorganization and, with the assistance of the board of
trustees, the restoration of financial control and manage
ment to the people of New Orleans.11 The majority report,
however, was uncertain how the board of trustees and the
general manager were to restore managerial control to the
city, particularly since the local banks were incapable of
financing the rehabilitation of the company.13
Nonetheless, the majority report made several specific
recommendations for the financial reorganization and the
physical rehabilitation of NORLC and NOGLC. Unfavorable
financial conditions and a hostile political climate pre
vented the receiver from raising the new capital needed to
extend and improve services.

As

a result, property and ser

vice deteriorated badly, undermining public confidence in
“ New Orleans Daily States. March 23-24, 30, 1921; New
Orleans Item. March 23-24, 30, 1921; Reclassification of the
Electric Plant, 56-58.
“ Ibid.
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in the ability and willingness of the company to deliver and
maintain quality services. The company could not improve
services, the report continued, until it obtained additional
investment, and it could not obtain new investment until it
secured present investment against an unfair and illegal re
adjustment in its valuation. Nor could it regain the confi
dence and good will of the public by protecting property no
longer contributing to public service.13
The ownership and management of NORLC and NOGLC, the
report continued, claimed that valuation rested somewhere
between its historical or actual cost of $57 million and its
cost of reproduction at $74 million. Though a valuation of
$62 or $65 million would secure old money and attract new
investment, NORLC could not generate sufficient revenue to
support such an investment. By contrast, "extremists" on the
other side of the issue insisted that the council base the
valuation on current low market values. This approach, the
committee wrote, was patently unfair and clearly unworkable
and detrimental to the future of the company and the city.
A fairer adjustment, the committee concluded, lay between
the two extremes. But, the report cautioned, the committee
did not advocte "paying off securities on that basis, but
only for the purposes of adjusting the company's capitaliza
tion in such a way as to eliminate the necessity, or even
the temptation, of paying dividends on securities which are
X3Ibid.
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not represented by actual values".14
Specifically, the report recommended a "fair technical"
valuation of $44.7 million, eliminating more than thirty
million dollars in stocks and bonds that did not contribute
directly to public service. Eliminating nearly one-third of
the outstanding stocks and bonds of the company was, the re
port acknowledged, a difficult and deliberate process, best
resolved by a reorganization committee of bondholders and
only after the council adopted a workable rehabilitation
plan. The McCloskey committee recommended, as well, a uni
form rate of return of seven percent for old and new invest
ment. And money raised for the financial and physical reha
bilitation of the company would, with the consent and appro
val of the commission council, become part of the "rate base
valuation". The committee, however, rejected the service-atcost plan proposed by Receiver O'Keefe, describing it as an
unwise and improper grant of "unlimited power". Instead, the
report proposed a "modified" service-at-cost plan, fixing
the rate of return at seven percent and carfare at eight
cents, and requiring the company to reduce fares if it earn
ed more than seven percent. Finally, the report recommended
the consolidation of all street railway franchises into a
single indeterminate franchise, offered without competitive

x«Ibid.
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bidding to NORLC or its successor.xa
The "ultimate" solution to the utility question, of
course, did not rest with Judge Foster's ad hoc committee of
"nonpartisan" businessmen. Rather, it lay with the elected
commission council and the representatives of the principal
bondholders. Receiver O'Keefe reserved judgment until he
consulted with Judge Foster and the major bondholders, but
the commission council, speaking through Commissioner Paul
Maloney and assistant City Attorney Michael Provosty, re
fused to commit itself to the McCloskey recommendations.
Provosty advised the council that it alone possessed the
constitutional authority to establish rates and fares, the
rate of return, and the valuation of the public utility com
panies. Neither the court nor its hand-selected arbitration
board, Provosty insisted, had such authority. At best the
court could determine the "reasonableness" of fares, valua
tion, and return. Commissioner Maloney grasped the sense and
xaIbid. Initially, a subcommittee on valuation recommend
ed a valuation of $50 million, but the committee as a whole,
as a gesture of good will to the people of New Orleans, re
duced it to $44.7 million: $26 million for the streetcar
system, $10,048 for the electrical division, and $8,652 for
NOGLC. The majority report also suggested granting the coun
cil the option to purchase NOGLC at its initial valuation,
contending that there could be no permanent solution to the
public utilities question until the city resolved the
natural gas controversy and the "future status" of NOGLC.
The minority report, written by Leigh Carroll, Sylvan Levy,
Walker Spencer, and Robley S. Sterns, argued that the major
ity report placed the valuation and rate of return too high.
The minority report proposed a valuation of $40 million, a
six percent rate of return, an eight cent fare for 1921, and
seven cent fare for 1922. The minority report also suggested
that the council purchase NOGLC for $8,652.
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intent of Provosty's opinion. The McShane administration, he
said, would negotiate strictly with the authorized represen
tatives of the bondholders and would not permit, as had the
Behrman administration, incidental issues like wages and
fares to distract it from the principal issues of franchise
reform, valuation, and rate of return. But, as Maloney
revealed in calling for the repeal of the eight cent ordi
nance, the regulation of rates and fares was anything but
incidental to the reform and rehabilitation of the public
service industry.xs
Early in January, Commissioner Maloney, with the aid of
assistant City Attorney Rene Viosca, wrote a pointed letter
to John O'Keefe, reminding the receiver that the eight cent
fare expired at the end of March. The city administration,
the commissioner wrote, eager to begin discussions on more
substantive issues and to avoid an eleventh hour appeal from
NORLC for an extension of the eight cent fare, invited the
receiver and Judge Poster to begin meeting with the council.
O'Keefe and Foster "consented" to a meeting, but they were
unwilling to discuss, much less allow, a reduction in street
railway fare. The eight cent fare was indispensable to the
operation of the company, the said, and it would remain in
effect indefinitely, irrespective of the intent of the eight
cent ordinance or the will of the city council. With those

X8New Orleans Daily States, March 24, April 9, 13, 1921;
New Orleans Item. March 25, April 9, 13, 1921.
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remarks, the "conference" ended, and the council postponed
consideration of the eight cent fare until April.3-7

At the end of March, with the expiration of the eight
cent fare ordinance and the release of the McCloskey report,
Commissioner Maloney introduced a series of proposals for a
gradual reduction of the eight cent fare and the rehabilita
tion of NORLC. An extension of the eight cent fare, he told
his fellow councilmen, would be a serious mistake, allowing
the receiver and the court to determine the cost of service
and to set the terms for the rehabilitation of the company.
Rather, as an expression of the council's authority and de
termination and as an incentive to the receiver to begin
negotiations in earnest, Maloney recommended a gradual re
duction in carfare over the next two years. The proposal, as
enacted by the commission council, set carfare at seven and
a half cents, reducing it one-half cent every six months

17New Orleans Daily States, January 5, 13, 1921; New Or
leans Item. January 5, 7, 12-14, 19, 1921. Public sentiment
on the eight cent fare issue was divided. The press and the
McCloskey committee favored another "temporary" extension,
but other, less notable citizens favored repeal of the six
and eight cent ordinances and the restoration of the five
cent fare. For examples, see William A. Bell to Commissioner
of Public Utilities, January 4, 1921, John J. McLoughlin and
C. M. Stafford to Commissioner of Public Utilities, January
4, 1921, and William L. L. Shoemaker to Commissioner of Pub
lic Utilities, April 19, 1921, Department of Public Utili
ties, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL.
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unti it reached its "normal" level of five cents.1®
Receiver O'Keefe denounced the ordinance, ridiculing it
as dangerous and confiscatory and predicting that it would
provoke another strike and end in the collapse of the
public service industry in the city. But O'Keefe's remarks
were trite and disingenuous, designed to disturb the public
and to distract the council from the crucial issue of public
authority over private utility interests. The scheduled re
duction of fares was imperceptible, uncertain, and slow,
and, more to the point, never intended to fix fares below
the cost of operation (under the terms of the ordinance, the
receiver and the court had to give their approval to the or
dinance before it went into effect). The new ordinance was,
as Maloney insisted, o.ily temporary, intended to initiate
negotiations and to compel the receiver and the court to
acknowledge the authority of the municipal government over
the cost of service.19
The intention of the second set of proposals was to
begin discussions with the bondholders leading to an accept
able and permanent settlement and to establish the authority
iaNew Orleans Item. March 31, April 2-6, 1921; New Or
leans Daily States. April 2-6, 1921; Ordinance 6148 CCSr CA,
NOPL; O'Keefe v. The Citv of New Orleans 273 Federal Report
er 561. The ordinance also required the receiver to dedicate
any portion of the fare above six cents to wages and taxes.
19New Orleans Item. April 5, 6, 10, 1921; New Orleans
Daily States, April 5, 6, 10, 1921; John D. O'Keefe to Commissoner of Public Utilities, April 19, 1921; Leigh Carroll
to Commissioner of Public Utilities, April 21, 1921, Depart
ment of Public Utilities, Petitions and Correspondence
vol.2, CA, NOPL.
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of the municipal government over the rehabilitation of New
Orleans Railway and Light Company. Commissioner Maloney
offered a series of "Fourteen Points" (the ordinance reduc
ing carfare was one of those points), rejecting the princi
pal financial recommendations of the McCloskey committee
and, in effect, asserting the authority of the commission
council over the rehabilitation of the company. Specifical
ly, Maloney recommended setting valuation at $35 million,
allowing the company to earn a rate of return of five per
cent on its "actual" investment and seven to seven and a
half percent on money invested in the physical rehabilita
tion of the company. In addition. Commissioner Maloney pro
posed granting the commission council the authority to
approve all new stock and bond issues, regulate the distri
bution of "undivided" profits, inspect financial accounts,
and assess taxes on the basis of gross earnings rather than
net revenues.30
Understandably, the representatives of the bondholders
were displeased by Maloney*s recommendations, especially,
they remarked, in light of their recent concessions to the
council. The day before Maloney released his proposals, the
zoNew Orleans Item, March 29, 31, April 2-5, 1921; New
Orleans Daily States. April 2-5, 1921. Maloney's plan also
required the management of NORLC or its successor to estab
lish a "sinking fund" for repairs, replacements, and exten
sions and a uniform track system. Furthermore, like the
McCloskey committee, Maloney demanded that the manager of
NORLC be a New Orleans man and independent of corporate man
agement .

bankers met with the commission council, Rudolph S. Hecht,
and McCloskey committee members Hugh and Bernard McCloskey
and Arthur D. Parker. The bankers argued that the valuation
and rate of return recommended by the McCloskey committee
were patently unjust and unrealistic. The bankers complained
that those recommendations nullified all the common and much
of the preferred stock in NORLC, penalizing legitimate in
vestors at the expense of consumers and labor and making
it impossible to attract new investors. Similarly, any rate
of return below eight percent was, in essence, confiscatory,
denying a just profit to established investment and, ulti
mately, inviting a more expensive and incomplete rehabilita
tion. Nonetheless, despite their overwhelming dissatisfac
tion with the proposals, the bondholders were willing to
accept a valuation of $44.7 million and a constant rate of
return of eight percent, provided the council acknowledged
the continuing need and justice of the eight cent fare.
Otherwise, the company could no longer continue operating
and the bondholders could not undertake the rehabilitation
of the company.21
Despite the "concessions" offered by the bondholders
(they simply agreed to accept the recommendations of the
McCloskey committee, with minor variations, as the basis for
future discussions with the commission council), the council

2XNew Orleans Item, April 8, 9, 1921; New Orleans Daily
States. April 8, 9, 1921.
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passed the seven cent ordinance and began consideration o£
Commissioner Maloney's other recommendations.** But the or
dinance, rejected by the receiver and the court, never went
into effect. And the council, preoccupied with the implica
tions of a suit filed against it by Receiver O'Keefe and
uncertain about several features of the Maloney plan, enter
tained other proposals.23
The receiver's petition, filed in federal district
court and heard by Judge Henry D. Clayton (at the council's
insistance, Foster recused himself), asked the court to pre
vent the council from lowering streetcar fares and from in
terfering with the collection of the eight cent fare. The
receiver argued that any fare below eight cents was confis
catory, depriving the company of just compensation and deny
ing it equal protection under the law. And, more important
ly, the receiver contended that the commission council, as
the regulatory authority of the city, could not fix rates
and fares by ordinance or franchise. The council's authority
over rates and fares was strictly regulatory, subject to the

22New Orleans Item, April 8, 9, 11, 1921; New Orleans
Daily States. April 8, 9, 11, 1921; Ordinance 6148 CCS. CA,
NOPL.
230'Keefe to Commissioner of Public Utilities, April 19,
1921, Department of Public Utilities, Petitions and Corre
spondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL; O'Keefe v. Citv of New Orleans
273 Federal Reporter 560; New Orleans Item. April 12, 13,
1921; New Orleans Daily States. April 13, 1921; Fairclough,
"Public Utilities," 54-55.
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reqirements of service and the demands of the market.24
The city attorney argued that the suit was deceitful,
willfully misleading the court to the facts of the matter
and disguising the intentions of the receiver. The manage
ment of NORLC wanted the court to believe that the commis
sion council, acting as a regulatory agency and responding
to the demands of service, granted it fare increases in
1918 and 1920. In fact, NORLC never approached the council
seeking a "readjustment" in rates and fares. Rather, NORLC
asked for temporary relief from the extraordinary financial
conditions resulting from the war and readjustment. The com
mission council, acting under its contractual authority,
altered the franchise contract in 1918 and 1920, granting
temporary, emergency relief to NORLC. The passing of the
wartime and readjustment emergencies (repaying the War
Finance Corporation loan in late 19202S and averting a
second strike), however, ended the need for the emergency
rates and fares. And, rather than reducing utility rates too
fast, precipitating another crisis, the council provided for
a modest and deliberate reduction until it could determine

24Q ,Keefe v. Citv of New Orleans 273 FR 561-62; New
Orleans Daily States. April 16-19, 1921; New Orleans Item.
April 16-19, 1921.
23NORLC took more than two years and three compromises
to repay its WFC loan. See, for example, "Minutes of Meet
ings," January 6-19, February 2, 20, 27, July 28-29, August
5, 13, 19, October 31, December 18, 29, 1919, December 29,
1920, January 3, 1921, vols. 3, 4, 5, 8, Records of the War
Finance Corporation. Record Group 154; WFC to Monte Lemann,
October 21, 1919, vol.5, ibid.
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reasonable and acceptable rates and fares.38
But the management of NORLC, the City Attorney argued,
did not seek a reasonable adjustment of rates and fares from
the city council. Nor did management want the municipal
government to set the conditions for the rehabilitation of
the company. Rather, management wanted to determine the cost
of service, the rate of return, and the valuation, exclusive
of the commission council, and it appealed to the federal
court to free it from municipal control and regulation.37
Though the Maloney ordinance was a dead letter. Judge
Clayton believed that the issues raised in the receiver's
petition were important and required sober consideration and
response. The judge acknowledged that the municipal govern
ment had the authority to set rates and fares, but he ruled
that the commission council exceeded its authority in fixing
fares under the Maloney ordinance. It was apparent. Judge
Clayton wrote, that the eight cent fare was vital to the
operation of NORLC and that any fare less than eight cents
was, in essence, confiscatory, depriving NORLC of the equal
protection of the law. And, though the commission council
had the authority to grant franchises and contract for ser
vices, it could not, under the Louisiana constitution, per
manently fix rates and fares by contract, franchise, or

380'Keffe v. City of New Orleans 273 FR 561-62; New Or
leans Daily States. April 16-17, 19, 1921; New Orleans Item.
April 16-19, 1921.
37IMi.
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ordinance.28
The ruling was not, however, a defeat for the city. Nor
did it permit NORLC to determine exclusively the cost of
service, the conditions of rehabilitation, or escape public
regulation. Indeed, the ruling reaffirmed the position of
the city council and the Louisiana State Supreme Court that
the municipal government possessed exclusive authority over
the public utilities industry in New Orleans, including the
right to contract for services and to "regulate" rates and
fares.29 (The authority of the municipal government was
limited, however, restrained by the reasonable exercise of
its inherent powers.) In short, it did not limit the city's
authority to granting franchises and letting contracts, as
Commissioner Maloney and the City Attorney feared initially,
but recognized its right to determine rates, valuation, and
rate of return. And, perhaps most importantly, it accorded
the McShane administration the opportunity of abandoning an
inexpedient and suspect policy (that, characteristically, it
delayed in taking), forcing the council to resume discus2aO'Keefe v. City of New Orleans 273 FR 560, 562-67;
State v. City of New Orleans 91 Southern Reporter 533
(1922), 535-36; City of New Orleans v. O'Keefe 280 FR 92
(1922), 94; Ivy G. Kittredge to Maloney August 8, 1921,
Kittredge to Maloney, January 8, 1922, Kittredge to McShane,
April 1, 1922, vol.9, CAP. CA, NOPL; Provosty to Maloney,
May 8, 1924, vol. 10, ibid,; New Orleans Daily States, April
17, 22, 1921; New Orleans Item, April 22, 1921.
**Black v. City of New Orleans 82 Southern Reporter 81;
State v. City of New Orleans 91 SR. 533; Moore to Glenny,
August 8, 1918, Waldo to Moore, August 24, 1918, vol. 8,
CAP. CA, NOPL; Provosty to Maloney, May 8, 1924, vol.10,
ibid.

597
sions with NORLC.30
Late in May, 1921, the commission council began a
series of public discussions with C. C. Chappelle, an agent
of Chase National Bank and the Security Holders Committee of
NORLC, a junior securities association. Chappelle told the
council that the issue of rates and fares was incidental to
rehabilitation of the company. The principal issue, he said,
was reestablishing the financial integrity of the company,
sustaining current investment and attracting new money with
a reasonable valuation and an assured rate of return. Only
then could the new company assure sufficient service to the
city. Surely, he said, the council understood that a unrea
sonably low valuation and rate of return hampered the reor
ganization of the company and threatened the city with eco
nomic collapse. Earlier recommendations by Ballard and E. E.
Lafaye were, like Commissioner Maloney's recent attempt,
outmoded and unrealistic, based on theories and practices
rejected by most experts and the courts. Rather than risk a
protracted and futile court battle, Chappelle said, the
council should compromise with the bondholders, accepting
their offer for a valuation of $44.7 million and a rate of

3°New Orleans Daily States. June 22, 23, 26, August 30,
31, September 1, 1921; New Orleans Item. June 23-26, August
30, 31, September 1, 1921.
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return of eight percent for old and new investments.31
The council was unimpressed with Chappelle's presenta
tion and was unwilling to accept the recommendations of the
bondholders. Commissioner Maloney categorized Chappelle's
proposals as "propaganda," promoting the interests of bank
ers and speculators, exonerating NORLC of mismanagement and
justifying its exorbitant claims, and, in the process, dis
crediting the municipal government of New Orleans. Predic
tions of the financial collapse and economic ruin were "non
sense," Maloney told Receiver O'Keefe, and were designed to
intimidate the council and to dictate its decision. From the
start, Maloney continued, the management of NORLC challenged
the authority of the municipal government, questioning its
competence and motivation and seeking to abridge its power.
Taking sanctuary in the federal courts, management attempted
to fix rates and to set the conditions for the rehabilita
tion of the company. The company complained that it could
not improve services, though it received a sixty percent in
crease in rates and fares and paid dividends on certain
bonds. And, most importantly, management refused to negoti
ate in good faith, withholding essential financial informa
tion from the council and preventing it from making a fair

31C. C. Chappelle, The Assured Service Plan An Open
Letter to the People of New Orleans Concerning Their Public
Utility Problem (np 1921), 10-16, CA, NOPL; New Orleans
Item. May 19-27, June 3, 9-14, 27, 28, 1921; New Orleans
Daily States. May 19-27, June 4, 6, 11-14, 28, 1921.
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and accurate evaluation of the worth and earning capacity
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company.32
But Maloney did not confine his anger to the management
of NORLC. He confessed that the McShane administration was,
in part, responsible for the public service crisis in New
Orleans. The council seemed incapable of consensus or
action, and he pleaded with it to take "some concerted and
definitive action," recommending that it employ a staff of
utility experts to advise and direct the council on public
utility matters. Though the Maloney's proposal (and critique
of the McShane administration) received some support in the
newspapers, the council majority saw it as another waste of
time and money. Instead, the council instructed Commissioner
of Public Finance Richard M. Murphy to review all previous
proposals and to find a workable and acceptable plan for the
rehabilitation of NORLC.33
A week later, after consulting with Commissioners Wil
bert Black and Stanley Ray and attorneys John Patrick Sulli
van and Charles I. Rosen (but not Maloney or Mayor McShane),
Commissioner Murphy released his findings. The latest pro
posal of the Commissioner of Public Utilities, Murphy wrote,
would complicate the utilities issue, adding another layer
of bureaucracy and expense to city government, producing the

32New Orleans Daily States. May 19, 22, 27, June 11-12,
14, 1921; New Orleans Item. May 19, 22, 27, June 11-12, 14,
1921.
33Ibid.
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same conclusions as previous studies, and diminishing the
changes for "concerted and definitive action". The council
already possessed sufficient legislative authority and exe
cutive ability to develop and enforce a comprehensive plan
for the reorganization and operation of NORLC. And, he
wrote, after years of constant study and debate, the council
had ample information to offer an "intelligent and just"
plan for the rehabilitation of NORLC— one that offered com
promise and promised a reasonable solution to the crisis.34
Commissioner Murphy modeled his plan on the recommenda
tions of the McCloskey committee, Chappelle, and Commission
er Maloney. "I have come to the conclusion," Murphy wrote,
"that any appeal to the investors would be useless without
recognition of the valuation of $44,700,000 proposed by the
Citizens Advisory Committee of Forty (McCloskey committee)
and accepted as a compromise valuation by the representa
tives of the security holders of New Orleans Railway and
Light Company." In arriving at its assessment, the McCloskey
committee merely averaged the valuations determined by
Ballard, General Goethals, Frank Coleman, and the Special
Masters. The commission council, Murphy acknowledged, would
take the same approach. "It would be forced, by its sense of
fairness, to accept the average of all expert valuations

34Reclassification of the Electric Plant. 63, New Orleans
Daily States. June 21-24, 26; New Orleans Item. June 21-23,
26, 1921.
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honestly made."33
Fairness, so to speak, also required the commission
council to reconsider its position on the rate of return.
A single, unqualified rate of return, Murphy suggested, had
few financial and political advantages, and he urged the
commission council to grant NORLC separate rates of return
for old and new investment. His plan, phased in over the
next three years, allowed for a gradual increase in the
rate of return for old money, yielding eight percent in the
final year. Depending on market conditions, new money, allo
cated for the financial and physical rehabilitation of the
company, could earn between nine and ten percent, satisfying
the demands of investors and hastening the complete rehabil
itation of the company.33
Satisfying the demands of investors alone, as Commis
sioner Murphy understood, would not hasten the complete
rehabilitation of NORLC. Rehabilitation was, after all, a
political question, concerned as much with public authority
and accountability as private investment. Though financial
control remained in the hands of private investors. Commis
sioner Murphy proposed that the commission council and local
businessmen "manage" the rehabilitation and operation of the

33Ibid.
3"Ibid. The plan allowed NORLC to earn 5.7% in 1921,
6.14% in 1922, and 8% in 1921, and granted the company a
fare of seven cents and $1.30 mcf for artifical gas. Under
the terms of the plan, management had to reinvest twentyfive percent of its profit in the company.
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company. Under his plan, he said, the financial and physical
rehabilitation of the company would be temperate and wellordered, allowing the company, under the direction of a new
president and board of directors, to invest $5 million in
its first year of operation and $2 million in each of the
next five years. The commission council would select four
members of the board of directors, and the president and
three quarters of the board had to be Mew Orleanians. The
council also would have the authority to approve the sale of
new stocks and bonds, and had the option to purchase the
company at its original valuation of $44.7 million. 3‘r
Predictably, public sentiment and the commission coun
cil divided over the Murphy plan. James McLoughlin and C. M.
Stafford urged the commission council to discontinue its
discussions with the bondholders, advising it to exhaust its
legal remedies before submitting to a negotiated settlement.
William Railey, a businessman and anti-vice crusader, con
sidered the plan "unworkable," complaining that it ignored
the crucial issue of bringing efficient, economical natural
gas service to the city. George Terriberry, one of the three
Special Masters, wanted the right of purchase provision re
moved from the plan. "It will do much harm," he predicted,
"because it will always encourage some visionary to urge
municipal ownership in the future— which, if adopted, would

3,7Ibid.
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end in disaster."3"
Business and civic associations, like the Association
of Commerce, the Board of Trade, the Young Men's Business
Club, and the Housewives' League of New Orleans, were more
optimistic. They believed the plan reasonable and workable,
and they encouraged the council to continue negotiations.
The Item, too, believed the plan had "great value," offering
several intelligent and innovative recommendations. Yet, the
Item cautioned, there remained too many troubling and unre
solved issues to recommend the immediate and complete adop
tion of the plan. The valuation and rates of return set by
Commissioner Murphy were "too high" and the safeguards too
feeble to assure the efficient, economic rehabilitation of
the company.3*
The Daily States and Mayor McShane argued that the plan
was "politically motivated," fashioned without regard for
the concerns of ordinary citizens, designed to further the
interests of the principal stockholders, and to avoid the
regimen of public rehabilitation and regulation of NORLC.
The Daily States complained that the McShane administration
seemed in capable of consensus on the public service issue,

3aMcLoughlin and Stafford to Commissioner of Public Util
ities, June 21, 1921, Sixteen Petitoners to Commissioner of
Public Utilities, June 28, 1921, Department of Public Util
ities, Petitions and Correspondence, vol.2, CA, NOPL; New
Orleans Daily States. June 22-24, August 19, 1921; New
Orleans Item. June 22-24, 1921.
3"New Orleans Item, June 22-24, August 6, 26, 1921; New
Orleans Daily States. June 22-24, 1921.

and that it allowed its internal political differences to
influence public policy. The Murphy plan only accentuated
the rift within the commission council, and the States
urged the mayor and the council to reconvene the McCloskey
committee and direct it to devise a comprehensive plan for
the reorganization and operation of NORLC. In a lengthy and
petulent press release, Mayor McShane condemned the plan,
accusing commissioners Murphy, Black, and Ray of misplaced
loyalty and political expediency. The Murphy plan, the mayor
wrote, ignored the essential recommendations of prominent,
local citizens, including a respected member of the commmission council. Instead, the council majority offered a "modi
fied" version of a plan introduced by the bondholders, re
quiring the commission council to protect worthless invest
ment and to guarantee profit to a delapidated public service
corporation. •*°
Though the commission council rejected McShane's as
sessment and recommendations (he called for a valuation of
$35 million and a rate of return of 6.25%, with rehabilita
tion funded from "excess" profits) as "fundamentally wrong,"
it nonetheless postponed consideration of the Murphy plan
and, once again, sought expert advise on the rehabilitation
of NORLC. Toward the end of July, after several weeks of
pointless discussion, the council commissioned Frederick W.

*°New Orleans Daily States, June 24-27, August 24, Octo
ber 28, 1921.
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Ballard to "reappraise" NORLC and to advise the council on
the rehabilitation of the company. The following month
Ballard met with the council in executive session, defending
earlier valuations and justifying the necessity for a more
expensive rehabilitation of NORLC.‘•1
The valuations conducted before 1919, Ballard told the
commission council, were, at that time, accurate and com
plete assessments of the actual investment and earning power
of NORLC. Those investigations, however, operated under cer
tain assumptions and practices that based valuation on orig
inal investment and discounted the cost of reproducing the
service under present conditions. Since then the public
utilities industry had abandoned those assumptions, convinc
ing the state legislatures and the courts to adopt more
acceptable ways of gauging the valuation of public utility
properties. Adopting the principles determined by the indus
try and the courts, Ballard placed the valuation of NORLC
at $44.7 million, adding another $5.8 million for the
intrinsic value of the franchises and the cost of
"promotion".'•*

■•XF. W. Ballard, Valuation and Report on the Properties
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company to the Honorable
Mayor and Commission Council of the Citv of New Orleans.
Louisiana. August 10. 1921. hereafter cited as Valuation and
Report. 1-13, CA, NOPL; Reclassification of the Electric
Plant. 64-66; New Orleans Daily States. August 14-17, 1921;
New Orleans Item. August 15-18, 1921.
*aIbid.
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The council, Ballard advised, could assure the city of
a reasonable and complete rehabilitation of NORLC by doing
four things. First, the council had to abandon the idea of
establishing valuation, profit, and rates and fares by muni
cipal ordinance. If the council persisted in this attempt,
the federal court would take control of the rehabilitation
process, locking out the council and setting the cost of re
organization higher than the compromise figure of $44.7 mil
lion. Second, the council had to guarantee old and new in
vestment a sufficient and identical rate of return. The
court would never permit a rate of return below eight per
cent, and the bondholders would not undertake the financial
reorganization of the company without an adequate return on
previous investment. Third, the commission council must
agree to a thorough and, undoubtedly, expensive rehabilita
tion of the company. The entire system was "overloaded,"
Ballard claimed, and "cannot meet the demands [for service!
without increased investments for additional capacity". The
company needed $23 million over the next five years. If the
council allowed NORLC to attract this sort of investment,
then it could "assure reliable and satisfactory service" to
the city. Finally, despite its untested character, the coun
cil had to grant NORLC an indeterminate, cost-of-service
franchise. This sort of franchise, despite the reservations
of Mayor McShane, benefitted the city as much, if not more,
than the company. It maintained the legal and political
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integrity of the city, recognizing the authority of the
council to "contract" for public service and to "regulate,"
now and in the future, its cost and satisfying the principal
objections of the federal court.43
As expected, the council majority voted to accept the
Ballard valuation and report as the basis for negotiations
with the bondholders of NORLC. Hayor McShane and Commission
er Maloney, however, voted no, but for different reasons.
Mayor McShane, increasingly isolated from the council and
without influence in his own administration, considered the
valuation too expensive and the cost-of-service plan a
betrayal of city authority over the public service industry.
Though he voted no. Commissioner Maloney was more amenable
to compromise. He was convinced, he said, that the city
administration had to abandon the policy of seeking to fix
rates and fares and set the terms of rehabilitation through
binding contract or franchise. The courts and the industry
were adamant in their opposition to that policy, and, if
the council pursued that policy, ulitmately it would lose
authority over rehabilitation and regulation of NORLC.
Despite this realization, Maloney remained uncertain about
the character and extent of the city's authority over NORLC.
He urged the council, then, to delay consideration of the
Ballard report until the City Attorney clarified the city's
■*3Ballard, Valuation and Report. 11-12, 14, 16-20; New
Orleans Daily States. August 14-17, 1921; New Orleans Item.
August 15-18, 1921.
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legal status.*4
But Commissioner Murphy, speaking for the majority,
disagreed, arguing that the opinion of the City Attorney was
immaterial. The issues before the council, he said, were not
matters of law but of public policy. As a rate-making body,
Murphy contended, the authority of the council included the
authority to determine valuation and rate of return, set the
standards of service, and approve the sale of stocks and
bonds. These issues were integral parts of the council's
rate-making and contractual authority. In short, then, the
council could continue its negotiations with NORLC seeking a
permanent settlement without jeopardizing its position as a
rate-making body.43
Apparently, despite its initial approval, the commis
sion council shared Commissioner Maloney's misgivings about
the Ballard valuation and report. The Commissioner of Public
Utilities acknowledged the necessity of accepting the valua
tion recommended by Ballard and the bondholders. But he,
like so many others, questioned the legitimacy of the

44New Orleans Daily States. August 14-21, 1921; New Or
leans Item. August 15-21, 26, 1921.
43New Orleans Daily States. August 19, 1921; New Orleans
Item. August 19, 1921. In 1922, on the eve of the rehabili
tation settlement, City Attorney Ivy G. Kittredge affirmed
Commissioner Murphy's position. In his opinion, Kittredge
argued that the commission council was both a contractual
and rate-making body, and, though circumscribed by law, the
rehabilitation of NORLC was a matter of public policy. See
Provosty to Maloney, March 2, 1921, vol.8, Kittredge to
Maloney, august 18, 1921, vol.9, Kittredge to McShane, March
29, 1922, vol.10, CAP. CA, NOPL.

demands for single rate of return for present and future
investment and for a service-at-cost plan regulating the
cost and quality of service. The financial reorganization of
the company and its eventual rehabilitation, Maloney told
the council, hinged on meeting the "reasonable" expectations
of the bondholders for a secure investment and an assured
rate of return. Since no established method had yet confirm
ed the valuation favored by the commission, it had no choice
but to accept the figure recommended by Ballard and the
bondholders. The rate of return proposed by Ballard and the
bondholders, however, was unacceptable, and Maloney proposed
offering present investment a return of seven and a half
percent, one and a half percent returned to the company for
replacements and repairs and six percent to the investors.
The rate of return for new investment, used in the financial
and physical renovation of the company, would be set at
current market values.'*"
Despite the objections of Mayor McShane to certain sec
tions of the plan (he agreed to accept the valuation of
$44.7, but wanted the rate of return fixed at six and one
quarter percent), the commission council adopted the Maloney
••"New Orleans Daily States. August 30-31, September 1,
1921; New Orleans Item. August 30-31, 1921, September 1,
1921. The regulatory provisions of the second Maloney plan
paralleled those recommended earlier by the McCloskey com
mittee and Commissioner Murphy. In addition, plan called for
a seven cent fare and $1.30 mcf for artificial gas for the
first six months of the settlement; the council would then
reassess rates and fares after determining the rate of
return earned by the new company.

plan. Though at first hestitant and skeptical, the bondhold
ers agreed to the plan in principle (though they would not
consent to any particular feature), and began negotiations
for the financial reorganization of the company. The negoti
ations lasted until March, eventually reducing the valuation
of NORLC to $44.7 million and allowing the city council and
the City Attorney the time to draft the "settlement" ordin
ance. Late in March, 1922, Commissioner Maloney introduced
the settlement ordinance. The bondholders reacted angrily
to the ordinance, accusing the municipal administration of
"radically" altering the initial plan, compelling them to
reinvest one and a half percent of the rate of return on the
physical and financial rehabilitation. Eventually, after
the intercession of Rudolph Hecht and a compromise allowing
the company to sell stock to cover the cost of replacement
and repair, the bondholders accepted the plan. And near the
end of April, the council enacted the "settlement" ordinance
into law. In mid-June, the major bondholders formed a new
utilities corporation, New Orleans Public Service, Incorpo
rated (NOPSI), and in August NOPSI acquired the holdings of
New Orleans Railway and Light Company. Finally, in September
the council granted NOPSI indeterminate franchises, permit
ting the "new" company to operate the three major public
utilities in the city.*'7
47New Orleans Daily States, March 29-30, April 2-3, 4-10,
1921; New Orleans Item. March 22, 31, April 2-3, 4-10, 1921;
Fairclough, "Public Utilties," 55.
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Despite the intense, almost visceral, partisanship that
characterized the rehabiliatation of NORLC, there was,
surprisingly, little vocal opposition to the settlement
ordinance. Equally surprising, given the importance of the
public utilities issue in the history of the city, there has
been little notable scholarly interest in the settlement.
And that interest is, at best, only passing and incomplete,
content with seeing rehabilitation as politics as usual in
New Orleans. In his article on the public utilities issue
in New Orleans, Adam Fairclough, an able and accomplished
scholar, argued that the rehabilitation of NORLC did not
strengthen or improve public regulation. In fact, as he sug
gested, rehabilitation weakened public authority over the
public service industry. In practice, Fairclough wrote, the
conditions of rehabilitation "did not add up to effective
regulation". A politicized municipal government retained
complete authority over the regulation of public utilities,
and the vague and insufficient terms and provisions of the
settlement ordinances (there were four in all, a rehabilita
tion ordinance and three indeterminate franchise ordinances
for the separate utility departments) allowed NOPSI to "cir
cumvent too rigorous regulation". "Utility companies like
NOPSI gladly accepted a weak form of public regulation in
exchange for the advantages that went with perpetual fran
chises, and welcomed it as infinitely preferable to munici-
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pal ownership . " * B
But Fairclough's interpretation leaves much to be
desired, resting on a cursory review of the settlement or
dinances and neglecting the lengthy debate that determined
rehabilitation. The settlement ordinances were, in fact, a
considerable improvement over the welter of franchises and
ordinances that characterized public regulation prior to
1922. Apart from fixing the valuation ($44.7 million) and
rate of return (seven and a half percent for old money and
between eight and nine percent for new investment), the re
habilitation ordinance recognized the exclusive authority
of the city government over municipal public services. And
it also recognized the municipal government as both a ratemaking and contractual body, capable of adjusting rates and
fares to meet the demands of service and to fix the condi
tions for the rehabilitation of NORLC.•*
Those demands and conditions were essential to the
rehabilitation of NORLC and the regulation of NOPSI. The
indeterminate franchise ordinances codified existing public
utilities ordinances, binding NOPSI to "faithful and prompt
compliance" with every condition of the settlement and
allowing the municipal government to compel service and to
“•"Adam Fairclough, "The Public Utilities Industry in New
Orleans: A Study in Capital, Labor and Government, 18941929, " 55-56; New Orleans Daily States. April 4-10, 1922;
New Orleans Item. April 4-10, 1921.
•^Ordinances 6822, 7067-69, CCS. CA, NOPL; New Orleans
Daily States. April 4-10, 1922; New Orleans Item. April
4-10, 1922; Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 55-56.
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develop a comprehensive public service policy.30 The condi
tions of the rehabilitation or settlement ordinance were
even more significant. Two-thirds of the board of directors
of NOPSI had to be residents of New Orleans and, upon assum
ing office, the president of NOPSI had to reside in New
Orleans, restoring, at least in name, some managerial con
trol to the city. The ordinance also required NOPSI to
create a "sinking" fund of $300,000 each year from either
the earnings of bonds and preferred stock or the sale of
stock used for "improvements and betterments" in the company
and the retirement of debt.31 Dividends accrued by common
stock issued by NOPSI had to be reinvested in the company
until dividends amounted to forty percent of the value of
the stock. The sale of all stocks and bonds increasing the
valuation of NOPSI had to have the approval of the commis

3°Fairclough argued that the phrase "faithful and prompt
compliance" did not accord the city the "firm legal basis
for revoking the indeterminate franchises." But he missed
the point. As the public service authority for the city, the
city council— and not the franchises— would determine what
constituted "faithful and prompt compliance". Furthermore,
there was no need to specify the means of revoking the fran
chise. Under the terms of the agreement, the council had the
authority to purchase NOPSI or any one of the three utility
departments. Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 56.
31Initially, the settlement ordinance required the bond
holders to return a specific percentage of the seven and a
half percent rate of return to repairs and replacement and
to debt retirement. The council relented in its demands when
the bondholders, at the insistence of Rudolph Hecht, agreed
to seven and a half percent rate of return. Though not as
exacting as the original proposal, the compromise assured
that some portion of revenues would be returned to the city
in the form of improvements and services. New Orleans Item.
April 4, 1922; New Orleans Daily States. April 4, 1922.
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sion council. In essence, then, the council and the bond
holders set the terms and cost of rehabilitation, requiring
the bondholders and the city to pay representative portions
of the financial and physical rehabilitation of NORLC-NOPSI.
And finally, the municipal government had the "perpetual"
option to buy one or all of the public utilities at their
original valuation (plus or minus additions and deprecia
tions). Despite Fairclough's contention that the city did
not possess the will or the money to buy NOPSI, the munici
palization provisions strenghtened the regulatory authority
of the municipal government. For, like the other provisions
of the settlement ordinances, it gave the city an authority
over public services it never had before.

The rehabilitation of the public utilities industry
achieved much. It improved the quality of service, reducing
costs slightly and compelling NOPSI to renovate and modernszOrdinance 6822 CCS, CA, NOPL; W. Catesby Jones, assis
tant City Attorney, to Maloney, October 27, 1924, vol.10,
CAP. CA, NOPL; New Orleans Daily States. April 4-10, Sep
tember 24, 1922, March 20, 1923; New Orleans Item. April
4-10, 1922, March 19-20, April 17, 1923; Fairclough, "Pub
lic Utilities," 56. The terms of the settlement ordinances
were, as Fairclough suggested, vague and imprecise, and
were, from time to time, a source of confusion and disagree
ment. For the next several years, the council and NOPSI hag
gled over the rate of return, earnings, and the sale of
securities. In each instance, however, the council and the
company came to a mutual understanding without resorting to
the courts or delaying the rehabilitation of the company.
See, for example, Kittredge to Maloney, June 26, 1926 (rate
of return), W. Catesby Jones to Maloney, September 25, Octo
ber 27, 1924, Kittredge to Maloney, November 5, 1924 (sale
of new stock), vol.10, CAP. CA, NOPL.
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ize street railway and electric power services (the company
prevented the introduction of cheaper, more efficient natu
ral gas until 1928s3). The rehabilitation settlement elimi
nated excessive, unproductive investment, preventing it from
devouring revenues and emasculating services. It publized
and limited the rate of profit, tying it to efficient, eco
nomical management. It regulated rates and fares, allowing
the commission council to determine the cost of service. It
controlled investment, regulating the rate base and deter
mining the scope of rehabilitation. It reinvested profit in
services, restoring some of the wealth taken from the city
by the public service industry. And it provided for the
municipalization of public services, giving the city council
the legal and political power to enforce public regulation.
There were, to be sure, provisions of the settlement
ordinances that apparently permitted NOPSI to manipulate or
to avoid public regulation. And, then too, the rehabilita
tion agreements seemingly required the commission council to
protect (some students may argue promote) the interests of
the public service corporation, overlooking its speculative

S3For a brief and able account of the natural gas contro
versy, see Fairclough, "Public Utilities," 57-61. Though
Fairclough argued that the city council showed no interest
in the natural gas issue until Huey Long applied his unique
brand of political pressure, there is sufficient and con
vincing evidence that the municipal government under mayors
Behrman, McShane, and Arthur O'Keefe (no relation to John
O'Keefe) actively sought to bring natural gas to New
Orleans. I am working on an article that will, I hope, sub
stantiate my claim.
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and exploitive character. But the purpose of the rehabili
tation ordinances was regulation, specifically municipal
regulation, and regulation, as we have seen, served both
private and public interests. It should not be surprising,
then, that the settlement agreements contained specific pro
visions favoring either the corporation or the c i t y . "
Rehabilitation, then, transcended the financial reor
ganization and physical renovation of NORLC. Rehabilitation
and regulation were not, as the New Orleans Item at first
believed, matters of simple business. They were, rather,
as the Behrman administration asserted from the beginning,
fundamental political questions, demanding a political re
sponse and solution. As a political response, rehabilitation
ratified the public utilities policy initiated by the
Behrman administration in 1912, recognizing and strengthen
ing the exclusive authority of the municipal government over
the affairs of the public service industry."
Rehabilitation also revealed much of the character of
New Orleans politics in the progressive era. In one sense,
the politics of rehabilitation, like much of municipal poli
tics in general, did not concern political patronage or

" T h o m a s K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review
Article," Business History Review. 49 (Summer 1975), 159-83.
" A f t e r the Louisiana Supreme Court nullified the Nix act
in 1919, there were several other attempts to place NORLC
under state regulatory authority, but each attempt failed.
See New Orleans Item. May 7, June 3, 12, 30, July 6, 1920,
January 21, 1921.
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shallow personal advantage. Rather, many of the issues of
rehabilitation transcended partisan and social lines, per
mitting a variety of concerns and interests, private as well
as public, parochial as well as catholic, to fashion public
policy. Rehablitation was, nonetheless, a thoroughly polit
icized issue, allowing those same private, partisan, and
social interests to frustrate municipal reform and to
exhaust and defeat the McShane administration in 1925.

Chapter Eleven

A Last Hurrah

Late in the spring, 1922, after enduring nearly two
years of continuous and bitter disagreement with the McShane
administration and its supporters in the Orleans Democratic
Association, John Patrick Sullivan resigned as chairman.
Sullivan offered no explanation for his sudden departure,
but the Hew Orleans press did. In essence, they explained,
despite Sullivan's acknowledged "genius for practical lead
ership," he was unable to transform the ODA into a competent
and accomplished municipal administration. The reasons for
Sullivan's failure were apparent, though only through hind
sight. The ODA was a volatile mixture of traditional antiRegular reformers and businessmen committed to political
and economic independence and progressive reform and dis
satisfied professional politicians concerned only with fur
thering their own parochial interests. The anti-Regular
businessmen were, as a rule, the Item and the Daily States
agreed, political amateurs, dogmatic and uncompromising in
their beliefs and unaccustomed to building coalitions and
reaching census. The professional politicians of the ODA
were unconcerned with the "public interest," and they chaf
fed under the impolitic policies and practices of a munici
pal government run for the exclusive benefit of the social
618
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and commerical elite of the city. In brief, Sullivan and the
ODA reformers could win an occasional election, but they
could not govern.3In one sense, the failings of the McShane administra
tion were due to the personal limitations and political mis
apprehensions of the mayor and the social and commerical
element that "supported" him. By his own account, McShane
was no politician and he possessed few, if any, proven po
litical skills and attributes. He was, by all accounts, a
quarrelsome, peevish, and suspicious man, quick to anger,
quicker to condemn, and incapable of compromise and forgive
ness. The normal patterns of city politics and municipal ad
ministration, with their constant demands for temperance and
compromise, irritated and nearly incapacitated him. He seem
ed to take acception to every suggestion, balk at every de
tail, subscribe to the lone unpopular or impractical solu
tion, and question the motives of those who opposed him.
These irritations, both large and small, cost him countless
days at the office and, more importantly, the confidence and
trust of friends, the commission council, and the citizens
of Mew Orleans. His lack of effectiveness and his growing

xNew Orleans Item. May 11-13, 1922; New Orleans Daily
States. May 11, 1922. Later, the Item shifted more of the
responsibility to Sullivan, complaining that had Sullivan
been less concerned with "backroom dickering," he and the
ODA could have been "a tremendous power for good in New
Orleans". See New Orleans Item. September 3, 1922, January
5, 1925. See also, Reynolds, Machine Politics in New
Orleans. 214-15.

620
sense of isolation only aggravated his suspicions and pre
judices about politics and government, which, of course,
only lessened his effectiveness and increased his sense of
isolation even further.2
In another sense, as the Item and the Daily States
suggested, the failures of the McShane adminstration stemmed
from the incompatability of professional politicians and
municipal reformers. By definition, the municipal reform
movement (as conceived by John Parker and the other members
of the commerical and social elite of New Orleans), disdain
ed, at least in theory, organized politics, claiming that
political organization compromised independence and imperil
ed private rights. These men were, in part, contemptuous,
perhaps fearful, of public authority, demanding the concen
tration of public authority in their own hands and opposing
the expansion of public authority in areas hostle to their
interests. They reduced politics and municipal administra
tion to the narrowest and most inappropriate of definitions,
likening them to the modern business corporation and rele
gating citizens to the status of stockholders.3
The professional politicians of the ODA, too, shared
responsibility for the failures of the McShane administra
tion. Unlike many of the Behrman Regulars, the Sullivan or

2New Orleans Item. January 14, February 18, 24, March 6,
May 7, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. February 24, March 6,
1923.
3Ibid.
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"New" Regulars did not embrace the municipal reform move
ment. Rather, they seemed concerned only with political
patronage and its rewards, ignoring for the most part issues
like tax and assessment reform, paving, the rehabilitation
of New Orleans Railway and Light Company, and city planning.
The only exceptions were their opposition to civil service
reform and their desire to return to the councilmanic form
of government.* The McShane administration was unable to
ovecome the social and ideological differences between the
commerical and civic reformers and the Sullivan Regulars.
And, more to the point, it was not able to curb the exces
sive demands of either faction, spliting the reform coali
tion and paralyzing the municipal government.9
It did not take long for John Patrick Sullivan to re
gain his composure or reorganize his following. Near the end
of the summmer, Sullivan announced the formation of another
political organization, the New Regulars, composed of compe
tent "young, sturdy, and strong men and women who subscribed
to rule of no one m^n, but to the rule by Democrats for
Democrats". The New Regulars, Sullivan professed, was no
mere reform organization, "here today, gone tomorrow," but
a permanent and enlightened political organization, mindful

*Ibid.
9New Orleans Item, January 5-10, 15, July 28, 29, August
4, 10, October 17, 25, 1921, May 1, June 20, July 27-30,
August 8, 22, 25, 31, 1922, January 13, February 25, 1926;
New Orleans Daily States. January 5-10, 15-21, 23, February
6, 14, 18, 22, 1921, June 27, 1927.
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of the rewards of public service (patronage), but more con
cerned with the effective and economical management of the
municipal government,® In fact, however, as the Daily States
recognized, the New Regulars were anything but new, combin
ing the disconsolate remnant of professional politicians
from the ODA and the inexperienced and brash faction of
Sixth and Seventh Ward Democrats loyal to Francis and Gus
Williams.'7
Neither were the New Regulars particularly enlightened
nor altogether permanent. The New Orleans press claimed that
Sullivan and the New Regulars attracted and represented an
unsavory, "vicious" class of citizens. The press associated
the New Regulars with race horse gambling, bootlegging,
prostitution, and New Orleans Railway and Light Company and
later New Orleans Public Service. The claim was not totally
unwarranted. During his professional life as an attorney and
"New Orleans Daily States. August 10-14, 16, 20, 23, 25,
1922; New Orleans Item. August 10-14, 16, 20-25, 1922.
7The principal leaders of the New Regulars were Edward
Haggerty (First Ward), John J. O'Neil (Second Ward), George
Williams, no relation to Francis and Gus, (Third Ward), John
Bacon (Fourth Ward), Ural McMillan (Fifth Ward), Henrico
Desmare (Sixth Ward), John W. Bagert (Seventh Ward), Joseph
O'Hara (Tenth Ward), and Ivy G. Kittredge (Thirteenth Ward).
New Orleans Item, July 22, 23, August 10-14, 1922, September
13, 1923; New Orleans Daily States. August 10-14, 30, Sep
tember 11, 1922, September 13, 1923.
The term "Old Regulars" was not used until 1922, when
John Sullivan formed the "New" Regulars. Initially, the ex
pression Old Regulars referred only to the Behrman Regulars
and not to the entire organization, but over the course of
New Orleans politics the term became associated with the
Regular Democratic Organization. See New Orleans Item. May
14, 1920, July 15, 1922, January 18, 19, 27, February 20,
1924.

lobbyist, John Sullivan represented several "vicious"
economic interests, including the New Orleans Fair Grounds,
the New Orleans Brewers and Distillers Assocation, and, of
course, New Orleans Railway and Light Company. It was un
fair and inaccurate, though, to describe the entire organi
zation as corrupt and vicious, for there were men of integ
rity and intelligence, like Michael McKay and Ivy Kittredge
in the New Regular organization."
But the presence of men like McKay and Kittredge did
not necessarily ensure the political permanance and success
of the New Regulars. The success and permanance of the New
Regulars depended principally on their ability to win elec
tions and to convince the voters that they were capable of
enlightened and effective government. Under John Sullivan,
the New Regulars came close to winning control of the muni
cipal government in 1925 and being a force in state govern
ment. But close was never good enough.

In September, 1922, Martin Behrman, in poor health and
acting on advise from his doctor, family, and friends,
resigned as chairman of the Regular Democratic Organization
Though Behrman planned to remain active in the RDO and in
municipal and state affairs, he told the RDO caucus that he
would never again seek public office in New Orleans. Though

"New Orleans Item January 10, 13, 16, 28, 1925; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. January 10, 1925.
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Behrman's health may have been a deciding factor in his
decision to retire from active politics, it was not the sole
reason. After 1916, when Behrman won an uncontested and
nearly unprecedented third term, the RDO began to unravel,
factionalized along social, political, and ideological
lines. Though factionalism was certainly common in New Or
leans politics, even among the so-called machine politi
cians, it had never prevented the RDO from winning elec
tions or controlling the municipal government.
All that changed with 1916. The RDO and the Behrman
administration seemed incapable of answering the city's
needs or resolving its pressing problems. City finances were
in disarray, tax and assessment policies were inequitable
and, according to the reformers, "politicized," services
were deteriorating, and the city was held hostage by the
public utilities company and its employees. Discontent with
the municipal government undermined confidence in the RDO's
and Behrman's ability to govern, culminating in their defeat
in 1920. After 1920, Behrman was unable to heal the riffs
within the RDO, and rather than see it lose another munici
pal election under his leadership, he resigned, turning over
the RDO to Paul H. Maloney and a different generation of
Regulars. Behrman's retirement, however, like his confidence
in Paul Maloney and the "new” generation of Regulars, lasted
only a short time, cut short by the exigencies of politics
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and the desire for vindication.*
At the end of August, 1924, Martin H. Manion, a life
long Regular and the leader of the Fourteenth Ward, resign
ed his office and announced his unwillingness to remain in
an organization concerned more with the municipal elections
and less with municipal service.10 Chairman Maloney expres
sed surprise and consternation at Manion's decision and ex
planation, but he accepted the resignation without hesita
tion and called on the RDO precinct leaders in the Four
teenth Ward to select a new leader. Ordinarily, selecting a
replacement for Martin Manion would have had no special im
plication for municipal politics. But these were not ordi
nary times or circumstances. The Fourteenth Ward was one of
the two "silk stocking" wards (the Twelfth Ward, Maloney's
home, was the other), containing several stately and wealthy
neighborhods. As a rule, its voters were among the economic,
social, and civic leaders of the city. And these leaders
were, almost to a man, unremitting opponents of the Regular

®New Orleans Item, February 26, March 5, 16, 18, 19, 22,
23, July 15, 25, 27, August 25, September 17, 21, October 35, 20, 21, 1922; New Orleans Daily States,. March 25-27, June
4, July 12, 13, 16, 23-26, 31, September 9, October 4, 5,
1922. Behrman may have hastened his decision because of the
failure of his candidates to win the special and regular
elections for the Public Service Commission. Behrman backed
two nondescript candidates against Francis Williams, while
Paul Maloney endorsed Williams. Williams won both elections.
x°Manion, of course, was one of the more progressive
"Old" Regulars. During his political career in the Louisiana
House of Representatives, Manion sponsored or supported
several important "progressive" measures, including utility
regulation and woman suffrage.

626
Democratic Organization. In the municipal elections of 1908,
1912, and 1920, with a clear choice between a reform candi
date and Martin Behrman the residents of the Fourteenth Ward
voted in overwhelming numbers against Behrman and the RDO.
In a municipal election with no recognizable reform candi
date, the vote in the Fourteenth Ward could be decisive,
especially to the "Regular" candidate opposing Martin
Behrman. It was crucial, then, for any anti-Behrman candi
date be organized and well-represented in the Fourteenth
Ward.
The Regular Democrats of the Fourteenth Ward were, as
well, thoroughly divided, reflecting, in effect, the larger
schism within the RDO. There were three principal factions
competing for control of the ward and demanding representa
tion on the caucus. One faction, led by William Anthony
Bisso, the owner of a tugbqat and salvage company, repre
sented the "river" precincts along the Mississippi River.
These precincts, like their counterparts in the "lake" pre
cincts, were working-class neighborhoods and generally proRegular and pro-Behrman. But in 1920, these precincts dis
serted the incumbent mayor, casting a majority and decisive
vote for Andrew McShane. The "lake" precincts in the rear of
the ward were led by John P. O'Leary, a supporter of former
mayor Behrman and president of the Jefferson Construction
Company. Though less visible in municipal politics than
either the "river" or "uptown" areas, the rear precincts
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cast more votes in the mayoral election of 1920 than any
other section— votes that helped elect Andrew HcShane. The
third faction, centered in the "uptown" precincts adjacent
to Loyola, Newcomb, and Tulane universities, opposed Bisso
and O'Leary (and Behrman), endorsing Richard Webster Leche
(and Maloney), a "prominent" young attorney for ward
leader.xx
Eventually, after considerable political manuevering,
a majority of the precinct leaders settled on O'Leary (Bisso
withdrew from the contest earlier), giving former mayor
Behrman an additional vote in the caucus and ruining
Maloney's chances of winning the RDO nomination for mayor.
For obvious reasons, the Maloney Regulars in the Fourteenth
Ward contested the selection of O'Leary, in effect, compel
ling the RDO caucus to settle the dispute. Twelve members of
the caucus favored seating O'Leary, but Maloney and his
following on the caucus argued for a "democratic solution,"
calling for a "preference primary" to decide the true leader
of the Fourteenth Ward. Behrman and the majority of the
caucus rejected Maloney's petition as "impractical," but
voted to resolve the issue at a later time. That time was
the next day.12

lxNew Orleans Item, September 11-13, 23, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. September 14, 1924; New Orleans TimesPicayune, November 13, 1924.
X2New Orleans Item. September 20, 23, October 30, Novem
ber 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily States, No
vember 1, 2, 6, 13, 14, 20, 1924.
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The caucus reconvened the following day, anxious to
choose a new leader for the Fourteenth Ward and to move on
to more substantial matters. Martin Behrman moved that the
caucus accept John O'Leary as the leader of the Fourteenth
Ward Regulars. And eleven of the sixteen ward leaders voted
to seat O'Leary. But five caucus members, Edward Egan
(Second Ward), Albert J. Leggert (Seventh Ward), John Nunnemacher (Ninth Ward), R. J. Gregory (Twelfth Ward), and
C. S. Barnes (Thirteenth), refused to vote, but simply re
mained silent during the roll call vote on the O'Leary con
firmation. Once the caucus acknowledged O'Leary as the
leader of the Fourteenth Ward, the five ward leaders
announced their intention of supporting Paul Maloney, refus
ing to discuss any other candidate for mayor. When Behrman
ruled them out of order, Paul Maloney resigned as chairman
of the RDO caucus and announced his candidacy for mayor.13
"My friends," Maloney told reporters, referring to his five
supporters on the caucus, "have gone so far and have been so
persistent in their support of me as a candidate for mayor,
that I feel honor bound to continue my candidacy. There

X3New Orleans Item. November 13, 15, 1924; New Orleans
Daily States. November 15, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picavune.
November 13, 15, 1924. Maloney had been a candidate for
mayor since 1923, receiving enthusiastic support from the
women of the Twelefth Ward and, for a time, from Martin
Behrman. Behrman's enthusiasm ended when Maloney began
acquiring influence in the RDO caucus and when Maloney
began courting the support of John Sullivan, Robert Ewing,
and Huey Pierce Long. See New Orleans Item, passim, 1923.
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seems no turning back now. I entertain the kindest feelings
towards the [Regular] organization. Many of my warmest and
best friends are enrolled in its membership.1*1*
For the moment, Maloney remained a member of the RDO
and the leader of the Twelfth Ward, hoping, perhaps, that
the Regulars might still offer him their nomination. He
hoped in vain. The Regulars made no such concession. And
when the Regulars selected Thomas Killeen, the former presi
dent of the Choctaw Club, the Registrar of Voters for
Orleans Parish, and an intimate of Martin Behrman, to re
place him as chairman, Maloney conceded the Regular nomina
tion, announcing as an "independent" candidate for mayor.
Maloney's "independent" candidacy troubled the Regular Demo
crats. Though for the moment without significant organized
support, Maloney was an accomplished executive and public
servant, and, with the proper support and guidance, could be
a formidable candidate. He was the only Regular to survive
the election of 1920, and he served with distinction as Com
missioner of Public Utilities, arranging the rehabilitation
of NORLC and challenging the monopoly of the Cumberland
Telephone Company. And, as Maloney displayed in 1920, he
could attract support from both Regular and independent
voters. Clearly, Maloney's departure weakened the RDO and
his candidacy threatened the plans of the Regulars to regain

x *New Orleans Daily States, November 16, 1924; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. November 16, 1924.
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control of the municipal government.1®
Unwilling to nominate Maloney or to concede the elec
tion to John Sullivan and his New Regulars, the RDO caucus
approached Maloney with a "compromise". If Maloney agreed to
step aside, so too would Mayor Behrman (though not an
"active" candidate, Behrman was the overwhelming choice of
the "Old" Regulars who dominated the caucus), freeing the
way for a compromise candidate and assuring victory for the
Regulars in the municipal elections. Should Maloney withdraw
from the mayoral campaign, the Regulars assured him a place
on their commission council ticket, rewarding him with the
position of Commissioner of Public Finance and vice-Mayor.3-®
Maloney rejected the compromise. The Regulars, he con
tended, conceded nothing, but gained every advantage. Every
one of the compromise candidates mentioned by the Regulars
was either a friend or a protege of Martin Behrman,3-7 in
effect conceding the election to the former mayor and allow
ing him to govern indirectly through a mayor and a commis
sion council chosen not for their ability but for their
loyalty and subservience to Martin Behrman and his "Old"
“ New Orleans Item, January 25, 1921, November 16, 17,
1924; New Orleans Daily States. November 16, 17, December
15, 1925, January 8, 12, 1925.
“ New Orleans Item. November 22, 26, December 2, 1924;
New Orleans Daily States, November 16-20, 22-24, 1924; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. November 23, 24, 1924.
“ Ibid. The candidates mentioned most often were former
Commissioner of Public Property Edward E. Lafaye, Civil
District Court Judge William H. Byrnes, banker Charles
Theard, State Senator John C. Davey, and Robert Riordan,
the chairman of the Louisiana Tax Commission.
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Regulars. Maloney, on the other hand, supporters argued,
conceded everything and gained nothing. The Regulars asked
him to delay his ambitions, and those of the voters, to
serve in an administration dominated by his political ad
versaries and in a position that promised few personal and
political rewards and that asked him to further the ambi
tions of other men, in particular Martin Behrman and the
"Old" Regulars.18
t

If Maloney remained independent of Martin Behrman and
the Regulars, these same "friends" asserted, he would become
a more legitimate and attractive candidate, particularly to
the "independent" voters in the Uptown sections of the city
and to the New Regulars of John Patrick Sullivan. For these
voters and politicians, the principal issue of the campaign
was the final defeat of "Behrmanism" and the continuation
and fufillment of the reforms begun in 1920. In their view,
Martin Behrman and his Regulars represented a failed public
policy, dependent on high taxes, unprincipled assessment
practices, profligate, reckless finances, needless city
services, and undue interference with private business and
personal interests. An independent candidate that stood
against the return of Behrmanism and had the unqualified
support of the civic and commerical leadership of the city
and the New Regulars would force the "Old" Regulars to
nominate Martin Behrman, whose health and political past
iaIbid.
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made him an unattractive and vulnerable candidate. And, as
the election of 1920 demonstrated, Martin Behrman and the
Regulars could not defeat an independent candidate blessed
with the support of civic reformers and practical politi
cians .xs
But this was not 1920. Though an attractive and legiti
mate candidate, to be sure, Maloney hardly qualified as an
independent anti-Regular candidate. He was, after all, until
his recent conversion, an unrepentant Regular Democrat. As a
member of the Regular Democratic Organization, Maloney
served first as a state legislator, then as the leader of
the Twelfth Ward, Commissioner of Public Utilities, and,
since 1922, when Martin Behrman "retired" from active muni
cipal politics, chairman of the RDO caucus. Beginning in
1922, Maloney cultivated more power within the organization,
and openly sought its nomination for mayor. During his ten
ure on the commission council, Maloney pressed for more ex
acting regulation of public utilities, fashioning a rehabil
itation settlement and ordinance favorable to both sides and
more reminiscent of the sort of solution favored by the RDO
than the Orleans Democratic Association. And, with his col
leagues on the commission council, Maloney opposed many of
the recommendations of the Municipal Survey Commission and
the City Planning and Zoning Commission, irritating the
civic and commerical leaders of the city. Paul Maloney,
“

Ibid.
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then, would never have the unqualified support of the civic
and social elite of New Orleans.
Though many "Old" Regulars believed that John Sullivan
arranged and directed Maloney's independent candidacy, the
Commissioner of Public Utilties did not have the undivided
confidence of the New Regular organization. Maloney's apos
tasy from the RDO was more a matter of convenience than con
viction, and his following in
part, limited

the RDO

was, forthe most

to a handful of supporters and confined to the

Uptown wards. Despite his elevated position within the RDO
caucus, Maloney did not have the confidence of former mayor
Behrman or the majority of other the ward leaders. In early
1923, six months after announcing his retirement, Martin
Behrman began

reasserting his command over the RDO and its

ward leaders,

forcing Maloney farther into the background

and eventually replacing him altogether as the acknowledged
leader of the Regular Democratic Organization. Mayor Behrman
and his "Old" Regulars endorsed state, parochial, and muni
cipal candidates, conducted their campaigns, and dispensed
all patronage. By the end of 1924, Behrman had regained com
plete dominance of the RDO caucus, denying Maloney the priv
ilege of naming Richard Leche the leader of the Fourteenth
Ward and, in effect, forcing Maloney to resign as chairman
of the RDO caucus. In addition, the bulk of Commissioner
Maloney's support came from the same sort of voters already
committed to anti-Behrman municipal reform. In brief, then.
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Paul Maloney could not command the respect of his own orga
nization and, apparently, could contribute little to the
new.20
Finally, the political circumstances were different in
1924 and 1925.2X Martin Behrman and the Regular Democrats
were no longer in power and responsible for the economic,
social, and political problems of the city. The people and
the press blamed the ODA, John Sullivan, and the McShane
administration for the collapse of municipal services, for
high utility bills, for unpaved streets, and for the parti
san and personal incompetence of the municipal government.
Despite the demands for personal competence and political
experienced in municipal affairs, many Regulars and reform
ers, were not yet convinced that the return of these
2°New Orleans Item, October 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, November 12,
13, December 20, 23, 24, 1924; New Orleans Daily States.
October 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 19, December 23, 1924. Several mem
bers of the "Old" Regulars joined the Maloney campaign. Many
of them, however, had opposed Behrman in 1920, returning to
the RDO only after the collapse of the ODA and then "desert
ing" the Regulars for Maloney and Sullivan. For example,
"Old" Regulars Henry Desmare, a leader of the Sixth Ward
and a former member of the ODA, left the RDO for Maloney.
So too did Richard Leche, Ural McMillian, and Maurice
DePass. The majority of Maloney supporters, however, came
from the civic and commerical establishment and from the
McShane administration.
21The state constitution of 1921 lengthened McShaneTs
term by five months, scheduling the municipal elections for
February, 1925. Thereafter, the municipal elections would
take place during even numbered years. The stated purpose of
the provision was to prevent the municipal elections from
influencing the state campaign. In reality, it was a com
promise between Governor Parker, who wanted to limit the
mayor of New Orleans to one term, and John Sullivan, who
wanted to the New Orleans vote to influence state elec
tions .

!
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personal and civic virtues meant the return of Martin
Behrman.22
Martin Behrman never doubted that the RDO would return
to power and that with the right leadership and support the
Regulars could restore integrity to the municipal government
and city politics. Like many "public men," Martin Behrman
recognized that the McShane administration and those it
represented were responsible for the paralysis of municipal
affairs. From his standpoint, the principal failure of the
McShane administration was its inability to provide sustain
ed, disciplined leadership. No one person or political or
ganization spoke for the administration or could discipline
its disparate factions. After four years of so-called reform
government, it was apparent to Martin Behrman and to many
others, that only the Regular Democratic Organization could
discipline the municipal government of New Orleans, restor
ing order and purpose to public affairs.23

22New Orleans Item. April 16, June 17, 18, 1924; New
Orleans Times-Picavune. June 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily
States. November 30, December 1, 1924.
23New Orleans Item. November 22, 26, 27, 1924, January 6,
1925; New Orleans Daily States. January 26, November 16,
December 26, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picavuner November 20,
26, 27, 1924. For Martin Behrman, the McShane administration
failed principally because "amateur" politicians and "silk
stocking" reformers formed its leadership. Unlike the re
formers, professional politicians adhered to a code of
strict professional standards, and operated under constant
public review. By contrast, the amateur politician and "silk
stocking" reformer operated by private standards, creating
an "invisible" government of private privilege.
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There was legitimate concern, however, that Behrman's
health and his political reputation might prevent him from
taking a direct and active part in the restoration. Behrman
shared these concerns, stating on several occasions, partic
ularly after he resumed leadership over the RDO caucus, that
he was physically unable and spirtually unwilling to cam
paign for office. There was, as well, speculation that the
"Behrman era" had past, that the former mayor represented an
older generation and an outdated politics. Some members of
the RDO caucus, those who eventually left with Maloney,
argued that Behrman should step aside for younger, more
capable and appealing candidates. Mayor Behrman was not un
aware of these concerns, and, to an extent, he agreed with
them. As late as November, 1924, Behrman reiterated his un
willingness to run for office, instead urging the RDO caucus
to nominate a younger, more vigorous candidate, some one
like Edward E. Lafaye or Robert Riordan.24
But Lafaye and Riordan declined the nomination, com
pelling the "Old" Regulars and Martin Behrman to reconsider
his nomination. The supporters of Martin Behrman were con
vinced that, despite questions about his health and politi
cal record, Behrman could defeat Paul Maloney and govern the
city. By the beginning of December, Martin Behrman, too, was
convinced that he could win the mayoral election and recon-

24New Orleans Item, November 12, December 1, 2, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. November 26-29, December 3, 5, 1924.
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struct municipal government and politics. Early in December,
the RDO caucus, complete with the five ward leaders support
ing Maloney, met to select the Regular nominee for mayor.
The caucus adopted a resolution binding all ward and pre
cinct leaders to support the Regular nominees for mayor and
the commission council, prompting the supporters of Paul
Maloney to leave the meeting and the RDO. With the Maloney
supporters deserting the RDO, the caucus nominated Martin
Behrman for a fifth and last term as mayor.29
Though Martin Behrman and Paul Maloney were confident
of election, some men were disturbed by the prospect of the
return of the RDO to power or the continuation of municipal
misrule under John Patrick Sullivan. Other men were con
vinced that they could influence, if not determine, the
outcome of the election, themselves governing the city
through political alliances and building coalitions for
future municipal and state campaigns. Those men, Andrew
McShane, Francis and Gus Williams, and Huey Pierce Long,
would be disappointed by the results of the municipal
elections. Their convictions and political maneuverings
would influence, though not determine, the course of the
municipal campaign.

29New Orleans Item, December 3, 4, 6-10, 1924; New
Orleans Daily Statesr December 5-10, 1924; New Orleans
Times-Picavune. November 15, 16, 19, 26, 29, December 2,
6-10, 1924.
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At the beginning of 1924, an exhausted and disillusion
ed Andrew McShane declared that he would not seek another
term as mayor. McShane's tenure as mayor had soured him on
municipal politics and government. McShane was, as he said,
no politician, and was unwilling, perhaps incapable, of bow
ing to either professional politicians or self-interested
businessmen. McShane saw himself as a disinterested, publicminded citizen, drafted by the people and alone charged with
representing their wishes. He found himself mired in patron
age disputes, legislative compromise, and economic and
political conflict with the people who elected him. Disillu
sioned by politics, he lost favor and influence in his own
administration, standing idlely and helplessly while his adadministration collapsed from internal division and con
flict. "I have had more hell since I was elected mayor," he
said, "then in all the rest of my life before." Under no
circumstance, would he seek reelection or participate in the
municipal campaigns. By the end of the year, McShane had
changed his mind, disturbed more by the prospect of Martin
Behrman or Paul Maloney serving as mayor than with being
condemned to four more years of personal and political
hell.2"
Initially, Andrew McShane hoped to endorse the nominee
of the Regular Democratic Organization. Apparently, McShane

28New Orleans Item, February 8, November 20, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. February 8, 10, 11, November 20, 1924.
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recognized that Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars would
never nominate Paul Maloney for mayor. Instead, like many
other "independent" citizens, McShane believed, perhaps
hoped, that the RDO would nominate some one like Edward E.
Lafaye or City Engineer John Klorer. For McShane and other
civic reformers, these men offered a legitimate and thought
ful alternative to a true civic reform candidate. But polit
ical circumstances changed during the year. Maloney did not
honor the wishes of the RDO caucus, but instead left the
organization, declaring himself an "independent" candidate
for mayor and allying with John Patrick Sullivan and, later,
Huey Pierce Long. "I will not stand by idle," McShane told
reporters, referring to Maloney's alliance with Sullivan,
"while the ideals and objectives for which I have fought and
striven during my administration are disregarded and thrown
side."2"7
Though not yet a declared candidate, McShane declared
his campaign against the corrupt alliance of Paul Maloney
and John Sullivan. For Andrew McShane, the candidacy of Paul
Maloney and his subsequent alliance with John Sullivan was
both politically troubling and personally distasteful, a
bitter reminder of his failed administration and the failure
of municipal reform politics to effectively govern the city.
From McShane's vantage, the alliance between Maloney and

2-7New Orleans Daily States. November 20, 1924; New
Orleans Item, November 20, 1924.
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Sullivan strengthened the special interests and partisan
concerns that had since 1921 combined to dilute and then
paralyze the municipal reform movement. Sullivan was the
consumate spoils politician, unconcerned with political
ethics and social responsibility. He sabotaged the civil
service reforms promised by the ODA and viewed public policy
as an oppotunity to expand his reservoir of political
patronage. Maloney represented the corrupt alliance between
politics and corporate interest, using the authority of the
municipal government to protect and further the financial
interest of companies like NORLC-NOPSI. For McShane, Maloney
and Sullivan were responsible for the failure of his admin
istration and the degredation of municipal affairs in New
Orleans.2a
But so too were Martin Behrman and the Regular Democra
tic Organization. They were more concerned with political
advantage than economic and social progress, content to ally
with any political or economic interest that promised their
continued political success. When the RDO nominated Behrman,
McShane decided to seek reelection, contending that his own
candidacy gave the people of New Orleans a valid alternative
between two generations of machine politicians.2®
McShane*s candidacy (it became official at the end of
the year) clearly threatened Paul Maloney. Maloney had hoped
2°New Orleans Times-Picavune. November 21, December 12,
1924; New Orleans Daily States. December 5, 1924.
2®Ibid.
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to attract the independent anti-Behrman voter, who, along
with the New Regular voter, would give him a majority in the
municipal elections. McShane's candidacy forced Maloney into
ern open alliance with Sullivan's New Regulars, jeopardizing
the independent vote and exposing his relationship with Huey
Long.30 Reaction to McShane's candidacy among the friends of
Paul Maloney and the opponents of Martin Behrman was immedi
ate and critical. The Daily Satesr the principal newspaper
supporter of Maloney, Sullivan, and Long, called the McShane
candidacy "pathetic," denouncing the incumbent reform mayor
as a "tool" of Martin Behrman. Other critics, like the
Times-Picayune, did not doubt McShane's integrity, but they
did question his judgment. The Times-Picavune acknowledged
the sincerity of McShane's candidacy, reminding voters that
the McShane administration gave the city a period of "repair
and recuperation" from the excessess of "Behrmanism". But
the Picayune also pointed out the failures of the McShane
administration, contending that those failures made "Behr
manism" an attractive, though false, alternative to munici
pal reform under*the "independent" candidacy of Paul
Maloney. Any vote for McShane, the Times-Picavune and the
Daily States predicted (though incorrectly), spoiled the
chances of Maloney and promised the return of Martin Behrman
and the Regular Democratic Organization. To the contrary, as

3°New Orleans Item, November 21, 22, December 26-30,
1924; New Orleans Daily States. December 14, 1924.

642
we shall see, a vote for Andrew McShane was an anti-Regular
vote, cast in protest against both Behrman and Maloney.3X
The principal threat to the Maloney-Sullivan coalition
came from Francis and Gus Williams and their "Independent"
Regular Organization. Initially, the Williamses joined John
Sullivan, hoping that their affiliation with the New Regular
organization would serve their political asperations. It
soon became apparent to the Williamses that the New Regulars
served only the ambitions of John Sullivan and those he
chose to favor. In the summer of 1923, Francis and Gus left
the New Regulars, forming their own political organization,
the "Independent" Regulars. The Williams brothers promised
to rid municipal affairs of "boss rule" and to end the
corrupt alliance between the municipal government and alien
corporations like New Orleans Public Service and the Cumber
land Telephone Company.32
The Williamses were not only independent, but also
ambitious and impatient. Not content with their present
3XNew Orleans Times-Picavuner December 29, 31, 1924, Jan
uary 16, 17, February 16, 1925; New Orleans Item. January
16, 17, 1925. McShane had little organized support, and what
little he had was virtualy nonexistent. A group of support
ers calling itself the "Mohawk Democratic Club" endorsed
McShane and his "municipal ticket". Needless to say, the
Mohawk Democratic Club commanded few votes, and the McShane
ticket consisted of four candidates for the commission coun
cil.
32New Orleans Item, June 6-10, 29, July 4, 1923; New
Orleans Daily States, June 6-10, July 4, 1923; Williams,
Huey Long. 167-68. The "Independent" Regulars attracted few
supporters, though several acknowledged professional politi
cians joined. Among them were Richard A. Dowling, Thomas I.
O'Connor, and John St.Paul.
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positions and standing in municipal affairs, they decided to
challenge both the "Old" and the New Regulars in the munici
pal election of 1925. Early in November, 1924, before either
faction had settled on its candidate, Francis Williams
announced for mayor. The Times-Picavune commented the next
day on Williams's candidacy. The Picayune saw great promise
in Francis Williams. He was, it remarked, a forceful and
energetic politician, but at times ill-tempered and impul
sive. Though one day he may become an excellent mayor, at
this time he did not have the temperment or maturity to
govern the city.33
But the public and Maloney and Sullivan thought other
wise. Late in October, before Williams announced, the Item
conducted a "strawvote" election, sending sample ballots to
its subscribers and asking them to express their preference
from among the major candidates for mayor. The names of four
candidates, Maloney, Behrman, Arthur J. O'Keefe (the Regular
leader of the Tenth Ward and the former City Treasurer), and
Francis Williams, appeared on the "ballot". The "voting" was
very close; fewer than sixty votes separated Behrman from
Maloney. Francis Williams was a close third. Though

33New Orleans Times-Picavune. November 12, 1924;
Williams, Huey Long. 167-68. Francis Williams was a loud and
tempetious man, prone to coarse actions and language. He
was, however, also deeply committed to the interest of or
ganized labor (he was the attorney for the Carmen's union in
the 1920s) and to the lower classes of New Orleans. From
every indication, he was a sincere, though personally ambi
tious, "urban progressive".
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obviously unscientific and biased, the poll revealed that
neither Behrman nor Maloney was the clear choice of the
city's "voters". And the strawvote showed as well that a
third candidate like Francis Williams could influence the
outcome of the election .* +
Francis Williams was more of a threat to Paul Maloney
than to Martin Behrman. Despite their personal and political
differences, Williams and Maloney shared the same constitu
encies. Williams, like Maloney, appealed to the anti-Regular
reformers and anti-Behrman Regulars that elected McShane in
1920. Williams's strength was concentrated in the Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Fourteenth wards, areas of the city
crucial to Maloney's candidacy. Williams was, as well, as
Public Service Commissioner, in an authoritative position to
criticize the NORLC rehabilitation settlement fashioned by
Commissioner of Public Utilities Paul Maloney. And Williams
had a personal dislike for John Sullivan and Huey Long,
the two principal supporters of the Maloney canpaign.3*
But Williams's political and personal appeal did not
detract from his considerable political liabilities. His
affiliation with the carmen's union and his early associa
tion with Huey Long soured many businessmen, and his politi
cal "independence" irked Martin Behrman and John Sullivan.
As a result, his organized political support was limited and
3,*New Orleans Item. November 18-21, 24, 30, December 11,
1924.
39Ibid.; Williams, Huey Long. 167-68.
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few people considered him a "serious" candidate (there were
rumors that Williams was a Behrman "dummy candidate"). These
liabilities surfaced almost immediately. Within weeks of an
nouncing his candidacy, Francis Williams sought an "accomo
dation" with both the "Old" and New Regulars. Williams ap
proached the "Old" Regulars first, hoping either for its en
dorsement for mayor or for a spot on the commission council
ticket. Aware of Williams's shortcomings, the "Old" Regulars
dismissed his candidacy, offering him neither position nor
encouragement.3B
Maloney and the New Regulars offered the Williamses
some encouragement, but little else. Eoprly in December,
Maloney's followers met with Francis Williams, trying to
convince him that his candidacy jeopardized Maloney's
opportunity of defeating Behrman and the "Old" Regulars.
These followers "promised" Francis a place on Maloney's com
mission council ticket and agreed to endorse Gus for Recor
der of Mortgages, a position he held currently.3‘/ The
Williams brothers waited several weeks before making their
decisions. Late in December, Francis withdrew from the
mayoral campaign, "accepting" the endorsement of the Inde
pendent Regulars for the commission council. But by that

3BGus Williams complained that the demands of the Behrman
Regulars were so demeaning that they compromised his "selfrespect". New Orleans Item. December 9, 17-19, 1924, January
5, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picayune. December 4, 1924; New
Orleans Daily States. December 3, 4, 14, 1924.
37Ibid.
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time, Sullivan, Maloney, and Huey Long had concluded that
Williams was more valuable (and less threatening) to their
coalition as Public Service Commissioner, and they insisted
that Francis withdraw completely from the municipal cam
paign .3“
The Williamses hesitated, unwilling to bow to Maloney
and Sullivan. But they did bend, or at least appeared to, to
Huey Long. According to newspaper reports, Long "convinced"
Williams to withdraw, arguing that the common enemy was
Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars. Long also persuaded
Williams, after several "heated" sessions, to endorse Paul
Maloney for mayor. Though Huey Long later became a very per
suasive politician, it seems farfetched that he convinced
Francis Williams to withdraw from the municipal elections.
Long had virtually no following in New Orleans, receiving
only 12,000 votes in the city in the 1924 gubernatorial
election. It seems more likely that Francis Williams, with
more experience in municipal affairs than Long, sensed that
there was no support for his candidacy and that he had no
other choice but to withdraw and endorse Paul Maloney. With
Williams out of the race, however, Maloney could concentrate
on selecting his commission council ticket and defeating

3°New Orleans Daily States, December 15-17, 20, 21,
1924; New Orleans Item. December 16-18, 20, 1924-
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Martin Behrman.3®
Maloney's selections for the commission council, two
anti-Behrman Regulars, a member of the commerical establish
ment, and a New Regular office holder from the McShane ad
ministration, spoke of his political accomodation and his
electoral needs. Charles H. Hendricks and Paul B. Habans,
the two anti-Behrman Regulars would, Maloney assumed, appeal
to those Regulars weary of Behrman*s domination of the RDO.
Hendricks, a former state Representative and Senator from
Behrman*s home ward, had lost favor with the former mayor
and had been gerrymandered from his job in 1921 to make room
for John C. Davey, a protege of Behrman. Paul Habans was a
former school teacher and administrator, and, at one time, a
protege of Martin Behrman. When the "Old" Regulars gained
control of the Orleans Parish Democratic Central Committee
in 1924, Behrman chose Habans as its chairman. Not only did
Habans hold an important position in the RDO, he also came
from the Seventh Ward, a section of the city below Canal
Street essential to Maloney's hopes for election. Ben C.
Brown was among the commerical elite of New Orleans. Born
and educated in Canada, Brown came to the United States in
3SThe New Orleans press overreacted to Huey Long's intru
sion in the municipal election, claiming that a vote for
Maloney was a vote for Huey Long. The patterns of municipal
politics were set long before Huey Long became an active
player in the municipal election, and, as the election
returns indicate. Long's presence in the municipal campaign
had no impact on the outcome. For an account of the 19241925 election that gives Long more credit than he is due,
see Williams, Huey Long. 73, 81, 84, 162, 212, 213, 382.
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the 1890s, settling at first in St.Louis before moving to
New Orleans. In 1905 Brown established a dairy and ice cream
company, and, with business success, came social and civic
acceptance.1-0
As impressive and significant as those selections were
to Paul Maloney, none was more important than the endorse
ment of John D. Klorer. Klorer was a noted civil engineer
and served five years as City Engineer during the McShane
administration. Klorer had a reputation as an efficient
and apolitical public servant, acquiring that reputation as
one of the administration's principal negotiators during the
NORLC rehabilitation controversy. Klorer had been mentioned
frequently as a possible mayoral candidate, but he was never
a serious candidate. He was, though, a serious candidate for
the commission council, running as an independent. Maloney
tried to convince Klorer to accept a place on his ticket,
hoping to appeal to the civic and social refomers who ad
mired the City Engineer, but Klorer declined. Instead,
Maloney, like Behrman, endorsed Klorer, virtually assuring
his election to the commission council. The Maloney press
pronounced the municipal ticket (Maloney endorsed the New
Regulars candidates for parochial offices), the best in
years, proclaiming it the "people's" ticket, and predicting

-°New Orleans Item, April 18, November 21, 1913, April 7,
1914, December 17, 1924; New Orleans Daily States. December
17, 1924, January 4, 16, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune.
November 19, December 26, 1924, January 6, 1925.

a complete victory in the municipal primary in February.'•x
Defeating Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars, as
Maloney and Sullivan surely understood, encompassed more
than selecting an appealing, though conventional, municipal
ticket. For Paul Maloney to win the municipal election, he
had to disassociate himself from the numerous and painful
failures of the McShane administration. In addition, he had
to assure his disparate fallowing that his administration
would not be either a restoration of "Behrmanism" or the
continuation of municipal misrule under John Sullivan. The
Maloney platform, then, reflected those concerns. Maloney
promised a true, "business-like" administration, a more
equitable assessment and tax policy, stricter regulation of
NOPSI, cheap natural gas for the city, better schools and
teacher pay, a reasonable, though comprehensive, zoning and
planning ordinance, including provisions for residential
segregation.
Though the platform contained an impressive list of
capital improvements and municipal reforms, supporters of
Martin Behrman lacerated it, calling it a litany of empty
generalities, platitudes, and false promises. The Item
acknowledged that it contained several planks pledging Com
missioner Maloney to municipal reform and to vital social
4XBew Orleans Item, December 23, 1924; New Orleans Daily
States. December 23, 24, 1924; New Orleans Times-Picayune.
December 24, 1924.
42New Orleans Item, January 4, 9, 21, 22, 25, 1925; New
Orleans Daily States. January 16, 17, 22, 1925.
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and civic improvements. But these promises, the Item remind
ed its readers, were the same ones offered by the ODA in
1920. But those promises, the Item asserted, went unfulfill
ed principally because the same men who supported Paul
Maloney either "reneged" on them or were never truly commit
ted to them.'*3
Mayor Behrman agreed. In the opening speech of his cam
paign, Behrman stressed the administrative and political
failures of the past four years. Behrman did not attribute
these failures to the citizens of New Orleans (a reference
to the sort of campaign rhetoric used by civic reformers
like John Parker and Andrew McShane) or even to Mayor
McShane, but to the men now supporting Paul Maloney. These
men, the former mayor said, for their own selfish political
purposes, blocked the reforms promised by the ODA in 1920,
retarding the economic and social development of the city
and fracturing its political cohesion. The essential purpose
of his campaign and administration, he said, was to restore
political and social harmony to municipal affairs, assuring

'•3New Orleans Item, January 9, 1925. The New Regular
politicians were not the only men to support Maloney. He
received endorsements from Commissioners Stanley Ray and
Wilbert Black, Esmond Phelps, Charles I. Rosen, and Hugh
and Bernard McCloskey.
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the return of economic and civic development .**
Like Paul Maloney, Martin Behrman sought first to bring
harmony to his political faction. Behrman began reconciling
the disparate Regular factions in the early 1920s, welcoming
back into the ranks of the RDO those men who had deserted
the Regulars in 1920. He intensified his efforts after 1922,
hoping that his retirement would speed reconcilation, but a
complete reunification was, frankly, not possible, forcing
Behrman out of retirement and compelling him to seek another
term as mayor.48 Behrman, much like Maloney, chose his muni
cipal ticket to reflect the politicial and electoral needs
of the "Old" Regulars. Behrman selected one stalwart "Old"
Regular, a businessman, and an attorney for the commission
council ticket. Behrman, like Maloney, also endorsed John
Klorer, the independent candidate for the commission coun■•■•New Orleans Item, December 5, 1924, January 5, 6, 9,
February 1, 1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. December 12,
1924, January 9-12, 18, 29, 30, 1925. Critics of the Behrman
candidacy charged that the McShane administration accom
plished more than any previous Behrman administration, and
that any failure on the part of the McShane municipal gov
ernment to resolve the economic problems of the city stemmed
from sixteen years of stagnation under Martin Behrman.
“•"Martin Behrman was, without question, an ambitious
politician and wanted to vindicate his loss to McShane in
1920. But he was, as well, a devoted "party man," seeking
above all else the restoration of the RDO to power. The list
of returning Regular Democrats is too long to cite here, but
it was considerable and was a determining factor in the
municipal elections. Returning Regulars included Harold W.
Newman, Edward Comiskey, Fred Earhart, Joachim O. "Bathtub
Joe" Fernandez, and Maurice Picheloup. Reconciliation was,
of course, never complete. Several "Old" Regulars left
Behrman to ioin Maloney and Sullivan. The most noteable
desertions were Ural McMillian, Martin Manion, and Michael
James McKay.
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cil. The "Old" Regular candidate was Arthur J. O'Keefe, a
tea and coffee merchant and leader of the Irish and German
Tenth Ward, the home ward of Robert Ewing, the publisher of
the Daily States and the most noteable supporter of Paul
Maloney, John Sullivan, and Huey Long. The businessman was
William T. Hall, president of Hall Coffee and Sugar Company
and the Panama Rice Milling Company and a resident of the
spacious and politically important Ninth Ward. The final
candidate was Joseph Sinai, a successful civil attorney and
the law partner of Judge James Henrigues.
The anti-Behrman Daily States ridiculed the ticket as
"pitifully weak and handicapped," a calculated, though
transparent, attempt by the Behrman Regulars to hide behind
a mask of social and professional respectability. None of
the men selected by th 2 "Old" Regular caucus, with the
exception of John Klorer, the newspaper reported, possessed
the sort of independent character or necessary experience to
resist the political demands of Martin Behrman and the "Old"
Regulars and to govern the city effectively and well. Admit
tedly, the Behrman commission council ticket, not unlike the
Maloney ticket, lacked practical political and governmental
experience, but the same sort of criticism applied to every

46New Orleans Item, November 7, 1911, June 23, 1912,
December 11, 15, 16, 28, 1924, January 12, February 21,
1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. December 24, 27, 28, 1924;
Melvin G. Holli and Peter d'A. Jones, eds., Biographical
Directory of American Mayors, 1820-1980. (Greenwood Press,
1981), 273-74.
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commission council since 1912. The Regular Democractic Or
ganization, like the Good Government League and the Orleans
Democractic Association, chose prominent business and pro
fessional men for the commission council, relying on organi
zation and the appeal of the municipal reform movement,
rather than on personality and professional occupation, to
attract voters. The Behrman administration never viewed
political independence as an impediment to public service
(the careers of Martin Manion, Harold Newman, Edward Lafaye,
and John Klorer were examples of that view). It demanded,
however, and to some degree achieved, a coordinated expres
sion of public policy— something the McShane administration
rarely, if ever, accomplished.*7
As in past elections, however, voters concentrated
their attention on the principal candidates for mayor and
their platforms. Two of the three major newspapers of New
Orleans, the Times-Picayune and the Daily States endorsed
Paul Maloney, but the Item, for years a relentless and, at
times, merciless, critic of Martin Behrman and the RDO,
supported the former mayor and his ticket. The Picayune and
the States argued that the election of Martin Behrman meant
‘•"’'New Orleans Daily States. December 29, 1924; New
Orleans Item. December 3, 1924, January 16, 1925. The "Old"
Regulars "fielded" a complete municipal ticket, as well.
The principal candidates were Henry Mooney for District
Attorney, Richard Meredeth for Criminal Sheriff, Maurice
Hartson for Civil Sheriff, and C. P. Taylor, Victor
Mauberret, Fred Schmidt, James Malloy, Henry Umbach, A. R.
Norbusch, and James Humphreys for the Board of Assessors.

654
the return of "politicized" public administration and the
continuation of the economic and social paralysis first felt
during the last years of the war under the Behrman adminis
tration and lasting throughout the entire McShane adminis
tration. *" The New Orleans Item believed differently. The
Item contended that neither Paul Maloney nor Andrew McShane
had the qualifications or disposition to reconcile the dis
crete political and social interests of the city. McShane
was a man of determination and principle, but he was also
willful and unbending, unwilling to compromise ideals to
save his principles. By contrast, the Item editorialized,
Paul Maloney was so ambitious for office that he would sac
rifice his principles for political gain.*3
Martin Behrman, however, the Item continued, possessed
all the personal attributes and practical experience to rec
tify the social and economic problems of the city and to re
store integrity to municipal and political affairs. Behrman
was personally and politically honest, the Item said, never
profiting from his position as mayor and never willing to
compromise his principles for political advancement. Behrman
was, as well, no mediocre ward politician, but an accom
plished public servant, ever "receptive to progressive
suggestion [and] sympathetic [to] constructive thought".
*BNew Orleans Times-Picayune and New Orleans Daily
States, any edition beginning in January 1925 and continuing
into early February, 1925.
*3New Orleans Item. January 1, 5, 9, 26, 1925, February
2, 1925.
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And, most importantly, Martin Behrman reformed the Regular
Democractic Organization, expelling the corrupt and vicious
element of "ringsters" and realigning the RDO with the
forces of economic and social progress in New Orleans.90
The endorsement of the Item was sincere,91 but its
reasons require clarification. There was no question that
Martin Behrman was honest and capable and that his conduct
as the leader of the Regular Democratic Organization and as
mayor was exemplary, setting the standards for the organiza
tion and the municipal government. But though Behrman was a
devoted public administrator, he was not without personal
and political ambition, intent on advancing the legitimate
political interests of the RDO and the public policy inter
ests of the municipal government. Those concerns and inten9°New Orleans Item, September 3, 1922, January 5, 22,
February 26, 1925. In many ways, the Behrman coalition did
not differ from Maloney's. The "Old" Regulars contained pro
fessional politicians, businessmen, current and former
office holders, and "new men," like Thomas Semmes Walmsley,
who sought a career in politics. Principally, however, the
majority of Behrman supporters came from the "common class”
of citizens who participated in politics as part of their
civic responsibility and personal advancement.
91The opponents of Martin Behrman accused him of "buying"
the endorsement of the New Orleans Item. In 1924, Genevieve
Clark Thomson, the wife of James Thomson, publisher of the
Item, ran for the unexpired term of Congressman H. Garland
Dupre. Behrman endorsed Mrs. Thomson. Though she lost the
election, Behrman "earned" the thanks and support of the
Thomsons and the New Orleans Item. When the newspaper en
dorsed Behrman in 1924-1925, critics claimed that Thomson
was repaying an old campaign debt, a claim Thomson denied.
Thomson claimed that the Item endorsed Behrman because of
his sincere, though sudden, "conversion" to the principles
of modern, prgressive reform and because a Maloney-Sullivan
administration was a menace to prgress and reform in the
city. New Orleans Item, February 1, 1925.
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tions expressed by Mayor Behrman and his administration
often clashed with the interests of some Regular Democrats,
as in the case of Storyville,32 and the civic-commerical
elite, as in the case of the Public Belt Railroad Commis
sion, the regulation of public utilities under the Manion
and Nix bills, and the rehabilitation of New Orleans Railway
and Light Company. In brief, though Behrman was open to pro
gressive thought and suggestion and sought to "realign" the
RDO with the interests of municipal reform, the Item and the
civic and commerical elite of New Orleans opposed the sort
of municipal reform advocated by the Behrman administration.
Only later, after four years of municipal rule under Andrew
McShane and the ODA, did the Item admit its mistake and ac
knowledge its support of municipal rule under Martin Behrman
and the RDO.
Convincing the Item alone, of course, would not win the
municipal election. Behrman had to assure the commerical and
civic leaders of New Orleans that he could overcome the
political divisions within the city and restore its economic
fortunes. Behrman also had to convince the public that his
32In October 1917, Mayor Behrman, only after the United
States Navy threatened to remove the Algiers (Behrman's home
ward) Naval Station, ordered the repeal of the Storyville
ordinance and the dismantling of the "red-light district".
The action of the Behrman administration went against the
interests of Regular Democrats like Thomas Anderson, Victor
Mauberret, and Robert Maestri and the brewers and distillers
who had vast financial investments in the district. For a
fuller account on the history of Storyville, see Terrence W.
Fitzmorris, "'The Basin Street Blues': Storyville, 18971917," paper in the possesion of the author.
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administration would restore essential city services to the
benefit of all citizens. Behrman's platform and campaign re
flected those concerns. Soon after the New Year, Behrman
released his platform.93
On one level, the platform clearly addressed the inter
ests and needs of the commerical and civic establishment. It
promised an extensive (and, frankly, necessary) public works
program aimed at ending the geographic and commerical isola
tion of New Orleans, rebuilding its decaying transportation
system, and providing for greater commerical and residential
development. The Behrman platform called for the municipal
government, in partnership with several independent state
and parochial commissions, to build bridges across the
Mississippi River (a project that predated the war) and Lake
Pontchartrain, connecting the city by rail and highway with
the "outside" world. The former mayor pledged his adminis
tration to a comprehensive paving plan and a comprehensive
zoning and planning ordinance, though Behrman stopped far
short of endorsing the Favrot City Planning Commission. And
the platform promised to end the chronic housing shortage in
New Orleans by reclaiming a large section of Lake Pontchar
train for commerical, residential, and recreational develop
ment. Behrman endorsed the NORLC-NOPSI rehabilitation
ordinance, however, promising to improve services, reduce

S3New Orleans Item. January 3-6, 1925; New Orleans Daily
States. January 4, 1925.

658
rates ("whenever possible"), and enforce strictly all provi
sions. Finally, Behrman pledged to work closely and on
friendly terms with the various business and professional
organizations of the city, promising to include more of them
in municipal affairs.*■*
But Martin Behrman and the "Old" Regulars had no inten
tion of relinquishing control of the municipal government to
the so-called commerical and civic leadership that had for
years blocked municipal reform and demoralized the municipal
government. In a statement that accompanied the platform,
Behrman spoke directly to that issue. "I believe," he said,
"that our people want an administration with party obliga
tions and party responsibilities; for it is only through
party government with party responsibilities that true pro
gress has been made in government." For Martin Behrman and
the Regular Democratic Organization, then, good government
was popular and representative and "true progress" was the
effective expression of the popular will. The McShane admin
istration and the commerical and political factions it rep
resented could never establish good government or initiate
"true progress" because they were never truly popular and
their policies were never really expressions of the popular
will.03

s,,New Orleans Itemr January 4, 6, 1925.
BBNew Orleans Item, January 3-6, 1925; New Orleans TimesPicayune, January 15, 1925.
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Those failures— and, of course, those of the Behrman
administrations— were expressed best in the issues raised
during the municipal campaign. The Behrman campaign empha
sized the failure, indeed the unwillingness and inability,
of the Maloney-Sullivan "administration" to initiate the
reforms promised during the 1920 municipal campaign or to
adopt the recommendations of its own municipal survey
commission. The Maloney-Sullivan coalition, in short, mis
represented itself. It was, in fact, unconcerned with muni
cipal reform and good government. It first crippled, then
destroyed, efforts to enact a comprehensive civil service
system for city government, and it used the immense re
sources of the state, parochial, and municipal governments
to construct a second, less enlightened political organiza
tion, dedicated exclusively to political spoils and patron
age. Without regard for the safety, health, and general wel
fare of the citizens of New Orleans, Maloney and Sullivan
reduced taxes, misappropriating money to special interests
projects like a "comprehensive" paving plan and curtailing
essential services like police and fire protection. At every
instance, it bent to the pressures of special commercial in
terests, allowing them to determine the assessment and tax
policy of the municipal government and giving them excessive
influence over the physical and commerical development of
the city (the "Old" Regulars ignored the efforts of the
McShane administration to curb demands of the Favrot City
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Planning Commission).1**1
Mayor Behrman and the "Old" Regulars did not challenge
Maloney and Sullivan on the NORLC-NOPSI rehabilitation or
dinance. Rehabilitation was, after all, a problem the
McShane administration inherited from Martin Behrman and the
settlement plan owed much to the policies of the Behrman ad
ministration. t>'7 But Andrew McShane had no qualms about
attacking Maloney, the commission council (Ray and Black en
dorsed Maloney and the New Regular municipal ticket), and
Sullivan on the rehabilitation settlement ordinance. Mayor
McShane argued that the financial and corporate management
of NORLC-NOPSI were solely responsible for the intolerable
physical and financial condition of the public service in
dustry in New Orleans and they, along with the present com
mission council, were responsible for the costly rehabili
tation settlement. McShane complained that the commission
9®New Orleans Item, November 21, December 1, 14, 21,
1924, January 4 through February 5, 1925; New Orleans Daily
StatesP December 14, 1924, January 3 through February 5,
1925.
9'7The Behrman campaign depicted Maloney and his prin
cipal supporters as the "determined enemies of labor,"
contending that the NORLC-NOPSI settlement ignored the
just demands of organized labor. The charge had some justi
fication. Several Maloney supporters, Sullivan, Parker,
District Attorney candidate Hugh Wilkinson, had anti-labor
reputations. But the Behrman administration, though clearly
on the side of labor during the war and the 1920 strike, did
not make the interest of labor an integral part of its ef
forts to rehabilitate NORLC. Seeking a fair settlement for
stockholders and consumers was, however, hardly an act
inherently unfriendly to labor. During the 1925 campaign,
Martin Behrman received endorsements from the major labor
unions in the city. New Orleans Item, December 14, 21, 1924,
January 9, 11, 20, 24, 1925.
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council, particularly Commissioner of Public Utilities Paul
Maloney, bent to the financial and political influence of
New Orleans Railway and Light Company, arriving at a settle
ment that favored a mismanaged, bankrupt company and burden
ing the taxpayers and citizens of New Orleans with exorbi
tant rates and inadequate service.sa
The response of Paul Maloney and the New Regulars to
the accusations of the "Old" Regulars and Andrew McShane was
simple and direct. The ODA commission council inherited six
teen years of incompetent and "politicized" municipal rule
from the Behrman administration. No municipal government,
even one dedicated to progressive municipal reform, could in
one term cure the administrative and political paralysis of
Behrman misrule. The ODA commission council was dedicated to
municipal reform, but it did not govern under ideal condi
tions. And, though the commission council acted effectively
and prudently on most issues, Mayor McShane and a remnant of
unreconstructed politicians blocked or distorted some
aspects of the municipal reform movement in New Orleans."
The two "conspicuous failures" of the ODA commission
council, the New Regulars admitted, were civil service re
form and the revision of tax and assessment policy. Though

" N e w Orleans Item, November 21, December 1, 1924,
January 18, 25, 28, 30, 1925; New Orleans Daily States.
January 22, February 16, 1925.
" N e w Orleans Item. January 6, 16, 17, 19, February 1,
16, 1925; New Orleans Daily Statesr January 8, 13, 23, 24,
1925.
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the RDO and Behrman administration did not introduce the
"spoils system" to New Orleans, the Maloney campaign argued,
they perfected it, contributing directly to the administra
tive and political collapse of the municipal government in
1920. In the years since the defeat of Martin Behrman in
1920, the ODA attempted without success to initiate an ef
fective and permanent civil service system in New Orleans.
The failure of the ODA, the New Regulars argued, resulted
from sincere differences within the association about the
merit and form of civil service legislation and from the
concerted opposition of the "Old" Regulars to civil service
reform proposed by the ODA. And the revision of the assess
ment and tax policies of New Orleans had only been delayed,
blocked by a Board of Assessors controlled by the "Old"
Regulars .•**
In other areas, the Maloney campaign argued, the ODA
administration provided the services and enacted the reforms
it promised. It reduced taxes and cut needless expenses,
freeing revenues for more appropriate services. It initiated
coAt the summer session of the Louisiana General Assem
bly, John Sullivan introduced a civil service bill creating
a permanent civil service board for the Board of Commissioers for the Port of New Orleans. The special civil service
board, comprised exclusively of businessmen, would govern
the public employees of the Dock Board. The "Old" Regulars
in the legislature opposed the bill, claiming that Sullivan
sought to create a permanent class of New Regular supporters
and, at the same time, realign his faction with the business
community. The bill failed, allowing Sullivan to claim that
the "Old" Regulars blocked civil service reform for New
Orleans. New Orleans Item. June 15, 18 19, 1924; New Orleans
Daily States, June 19, 1924.

budget and administrative reforms allowing the municipal
government to operate more efficiently. The ODA commission
council revised the state and municipal laws concerning
paving, permitting the municipal government to inaugurate a
comprehensive paving plan (the New Regulars conveniently
forgot that the "Old" Regulars enacted the Bond-Theole pav
ing law). And, despite years of acrid disagreement between
the Behrman administration and New Orleans Railway and Light
Company and the unreasonable behavior of Mayor McShane, Com
missioner Maloney and the ODA commission council brought
about the prudent and expedient rehabilitation of NORLC. The
recommendations proposed by Mayor McShane were unacceptable
to the financial managers of NORLC and would not further the
public rehabilitation of the company. Nor was there any in
dication from Mayor Behrman that he opposed the Maloney re
habilitation settlement or that he would enforce its provi
sions. A McShane administration, then, threatened to disrupt
the financial arrangements of the rehabilitation agreement
and a Behrman administration promised once again the inef
fective, politicized regulation of the public service indus
try in New Orleans. McShane was incapable of governing and
Behrman incapable of reform, only the New Regulars were
capable of both.*3-
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In the last days of the municipal campaign (offically
it lasted five weeks), Maloney and Behrman supporters in
tensified their campaigning, conducting countless rallies
and, as custom demanded, predicting the outcome of the muni
cipal elections. Each campaign, of course, predicted a com
plete victory for its candidate and a thorough, though jus
tified, defeat for the opposition. Those endorsing Paul
Maloney claimed that he would win fifteen of the seventeen
wards, electing his entire commission council ticket and
most of the parochial ticket. In a similar fashion, the
"Old" Regulars saw Martin Behrman winning eleven or twelve
wards, defeating Maloney by "a handsome total majority" and
carrying the entire RDO ticket to power. Both sides dis
counted the possibility of a second primary, arguing that
the McShane candidacy came too late to have any significant
effect on the election."*
The New Orleans press, with the exception of the Daily
States, thought differently. The Item and the Times-Picayune
predicted a close election, with only a few thousand votes
separating Behrman and Maloney. They predicted McShane to
finish a distant third, but expected his vote to have a sig
nificant effect on the outcome of the mayoral election,
forcing the two leading candidates into a second primary.

®*New Orleans Item. January 21, 25, 31, February 1, 2,
1925; New Orleans Daily States. January 10, 23, 25, 29,
February 1, 1925; Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans,
217-23.
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The two newspapers were convinced that the majority of
citizens voting for McShane would come from the same class
of independent voters who elected him in 1920. For Paul
Maloney to win the mayoral campaign, then, the McShane vote
would have to be small, somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000
votes, an indication that the Commissioner of Public Utili
ties had succeeded in attracting the "unbossed" Democratic
voter. On the other hand, if the McShane total exceeded
6,000 votes then Maloney had failed to win the independent
voters of New Orleans, and Martin Behrman would be the next
mayor of New Orleans.03
As the election officials began tabulating the results,
it became apparent that a second primary would be necessary
to determine the next mayor. What was not so apparent, how
ever, was what effect the McShane candidacy had had on the
first primary and, more to the point, what effect his vote
would have on the second primary. Appearances, of course,
can be deceiving.
Martin Behrman received 35,837 votes, forty-eight
percent of the vote, winning majorities in nine wards and
pluralities in two.04 Paul Maloney garnered 33,771 votes, or
forty-six percent of the vote. Maloney received majorities
"3New Orleans Item, January 25, 31, February 2, 3, 12,
1925; New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 3, 5, 1925;
Reynolds, Machine Politics, 217-23.
S4Behrman won majorities in the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifteenth wards
and pluralities in the Third (Sullivan's ward) and Seven
teenth wards. New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 5, 1925.
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in only five wards and a plurality in one.*9 McShane won no
wards or precincts, receiving only 4,654 votes.** Despite
the ambiguous character of the election returns, the New
Regulars argued that the majority of McShane voters would
support Maloney in the second primary, making him the next
mayor of New Orleans. Behrman and the "Old" Regulars dis
agreed with that assessment, claiming that the McShane vote
was an anti-Maloney and anti-Sullivan vote. Mayor McShane
agreed with the "Old" Regulars. "As a matter of fact," he
told reporters, "I got many more votes that Mr. Behrman
would have got [sic] than I got from Mr. Maloney." The "Old"
Regulars, too, predicted victory in the second primary.*7
There is some question, though, whether the McShane
vote hurt, or favored either candidate. It seems, rather,
that the McShane candidacy represented the unreconstructed
anti-Regular voter opposed to both Maloney and Behrman. His
candidacy did not siphon votes from either Behrman or
Maloney. By his own admission, McShane's candidacy was not
an endorsement of Martin Behrman or the "Old" Regulars. At
first, McShane entered the campaign because of his opposi
tion to a Maloney-Sullivan administration. He was willing to

*9Maloney received majorities in the Sixth, Twelfth,
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth wards and a plurality
in the Seventh ward. New Orleans Times-Picavune. February 5,
1925.
""Ibid.
*7New Orleans Times-Picayune. February 5, 6, 1925; New
Orleans Daily States. February 5, 6, 1925; Reynolds, Machine
Politics in New Orleans. 217-23; Williams, Huev Long. 224-25.

667
endorse the "Old" Regular candidate only if the Regulars
nominated an independent civic leader like Edward Lafaye
or John Klorer. When the RDO nominated Martin Behrman,
however, McShane announced his own candidacy, in effect
running as the independent reform candidate against two
established machine politicians representing factions of
the same sordid political organization.
An assessment of the McShane vote does not support the
contention of contemporaries or historians that it divided
the anti-Behrman vote, preventing Paul Maloney from winning
a first primary victory. Admittedly, McShane*s vote came
principally from those wards and precincts he won in the
1920 mayoral election. In those ten wards (the Third, Sixth,
h

i

Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
Sixteenth, and Seventeenth wards), McShane received 3,249
votes, nearly seventy percent of his total vote. But in the
traditional anti-Regular wards (the Eleventh, Twelfth,
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth), Mayor
McShane received 1,965 votes, only forty-two percent of his
vote. McShane received 2,169 votes, fifty-seven percent of
his vote, in the wards carried by Martin Behrman, but only
1,572 votes, or thirty-four percent, in the Maloney wards.
And, in the wards where Behrman and Maloney received plural
ities, McShane garnered nearly one thousand votes. Clearly,
then, the McShane vote did not represent so much an antiBehrman vote as an anti-Regular vote that did not bother to
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discriminate between Maloney and Behrman.■■
In the days following the primary, several prominent
businessmen announced their opposition to a second primary,
calling on Paul Maloney to withdraw his candidacy. In their
view, a second primary would be divisive and unnecessary,
resulting ultimately in the election of Martin Behrman. The
sense of the voters, they argued, was with the Behrman Regu
lars, and no amount of campaigning could change the voters'
minds. Despite the size and distribution of the McShane
vote, they believed that Paul Maloney could not defeat
Martin Behrman. The former mayor received more than 25,000
votes in the eleven wards he and the "Old" Regulars command
ed, and more than 10,000 votes in the so-called Maloney
wards. In contrast, the Maloney vote was concentrated in the
wards above Canal Street or controlled by professional poli
ticians like Sullivan and Francis and Gus Williams. Behrman
and the "Old" Regulars could only add to their totals in a
second primary, while Maloney would be fortunate to retain
the vote he received in the first primary.
The businessmen also pointed out that the Behrman Regu
lars controlled the municipal and parochial governments of
New Orleans. The RDO elected three of its candidates to the
commission council (Behrman would be the fourth), controlled
the District Attorney's Office, the Board of Assessors, six

""Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans. 217-23;
Williams, Huev Long. 224-25.
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parochial offices (the New Regulars elected six parish
officers, all of them incumbents), fifteen of the seventeen
state Representatives, five of the seven state Senators, and
fifteen of the seventeen members of the Democratic Central
Committee for Orleans Parish. The businessmen conceded that
the election had been close, but the decision of the voters
was clear and they saw no legitimate reason to question the
will of the people.89
At the end of the week, the New Regular leadership and
the executive committee of the Maloney campaign met to con
sider their plans for a second primary. But during the con
ference, it became apparent that Maloney could not defeat
Behrman in a second primary. Overwhelmed with debt and de
sertions, the New Regulars advised Maloney to withdraw from
the second primary. Unable to raise more money or to prevent
further erosion of his support, Paul Maloney withdrew from
the campaign, conceding the election to Behrman.70
With the campaign and election over, Martin Behrman
urged the citizens of New Orleans to place their partisan
considerations behind them, concentrating their efforts
instead on building a political system dedicated to public
service. Too often in the past, he said, public service was
"sacrificed to political expediency". New Orleans could no
longer live in the past. It had to deal with its present
" N e w Orleans Item, February 5-10, 1925. The state and
party officials were elected in January, 1924.
7°New Orleans Item. February 5-7, 1925.
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problems and plan for the future. "Political conditions have
changed," he said in an interview after the municipal
campaign. "Organizations such as ours no longer hold their
grip on the public by the old influences. Old agencies that
held men in line have disappeared, and today public offici
als are elected to office upon the record of their accom
plishments. If we are to remain in power, we can only do so
by giving the people what they pay for and that I propose to
do during this administration." "My greatest aim," he con
tinued elsewhere, "will be to give New Orleans an adminis
tration which will work for the advancement of the city's
coromerical and industrial interests as well as its social
welfare, and to put an end to the public discord which has
retarded our development." And, though politics must always
determine public policy, he concluded, it must never again
impede "civic progress".73Early in May, Martin Behrman again took the oath of
office as mayor of New Orleans. In his brief remarks before
a modest crowd of supporters and civic officials, the "new"
mayor reminded his audience how little the needs of the city
had changed in the past twenty years. In 1925, as in 1904,
the city demanded an extensive array of public and social
services, all essential to the public and private welfare of
its citizens. Today, as yesterday, he continued, the citi

7iNew Orleans Item, March 1, 4, 19, April 23, 1925, Janu
ary 12, 1926; New Orleans Daily States. April 23, 1925.
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zens of New Orleans demanded a healthy physical and commerical environment, modern transportation systems, an expanded
water, sewerage, and drainage system, better police and fire
protection, more and better health facilities, ample, cheap
gas and electric service, affordable, decent housing, super
ior public education, and, most important of all, an effi
cient and honest municipal government.72
Though the demands for essential city services had not
changed, Behrman said, the ability of the municipal govern
ment to address and resolve those issues had changed for the
better and for the worse. The commission council system and
the other divisions of the municipal government were, for
the most part, reliable and effective instruments of the
public will, and did not require any fundamental revision.
Over the past eight years, however, the municipal government
of New Orleans allowed private and partisan interests to
erode its authority and distort its fundamental purpose. The
Regular Democratic Organization, the mayor said, would re
store discipline to the municipal administration, giving it
structure and purpose and allowing it to more clearly define
public needs and to achieve the public good.73
When the commission council met for the first time,
it adopted a series of resolutions imposing a rigorous par
tisan and administrative discipline on all municipal depart

72New Orleans Item. May 4, 5, 1925.
73Ibid.
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ments serving under it. From the outset, the Behrman admin
istration sought to exert greater authority over the munici
pal and parochial governments, reclaiming the initiative
over public policy from the independent boards and commis
sions controlled by an commerical-civic elite that had crip
pled earlier administrations and demoralized the municipal
reform movement.7*
The Behrman adminstration sought, as well, to eliminate
the influence of John Sullivan over public administration
and public policy, removing "unqualified" appointees and
severing ties with those interests favored by Sullivan. The
resolutions also sought to bring order and purpose to the
municipal administration and public policy by revising the
budgetary commitments of the McShane administration. The new
budget reflected the commitments of the Behrman administra
tion to essential city services, rather than to those benefitting a special class of citizens and interests. The
Behrman budget called for more money for police and fire
protection, schools and teachers, expansion of the sewerage
and water system, and better health care.7*
The budget also provided for a planned and manageable
city plan, coordinating the priorities of businesses and
neighborhoods. As such, the new administration pledged
greater support for the City Planning and Zoning Commission,

7*New Orleans Item. March through September, 1925.
7BIbid.

the Sewerage and Water Board, and the Department of Public
Property. In addition, Behrman promised to complete the Lake
Pontchartrain seawall, opening up a vast tract of land for
residential and commercial development. He also called for
a bridge across the Mississippi River, permitting the Public
Belt Railroad Commission and the port authority to facili
tate and expand the flow of commerce. Finally, the 1926 bud
get called on the mayor and the council to find the proper
balance between services and revenues, preventing partisan
ship from impeding civic progress.7®
Martin Behrman would never fulfill those commitments to
municipal reform. Early in January, 1926, after weeks of
confinement at home, he died.77

76Ibid.
77New Orleans Item, October 3, 1925, January 2, 3, 12,
1926; New Orleans Daily States, January 3, 12, 1926.
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